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The subject matter of this book are the formal and semantic properties of 
INDEFINITE PRONOUNS, expressions such as those highlighted in (1)-(4), in the 
languages of the world. 
 
(1) English 
  Someone once said that anything goes. 
(2) Italian 
  Nessuno ha mai detto questo. 
  nobody has ever said that 
  'Nobody has ever said that.' 
(3) Russian 
  Kto ugodno mozˇ et prijti. 
  who INDEF can come 
  'Anyone can come.' 
(4) Japanese 
  Dare-ka ni ki-ite mi-masyoo. 
  who-INDEF DAT ask-CONV try-POL:HORT 
  'Let's ask somebody.' 
 
Indefinite pronouns have traditionally played only a minor role in descriptive 
linguistics, but the theoretical work in semantics, pragmatics and syntax of the 
last few decades has shown that the distribution of indefinite pronouns is 
highly complex and interesting in many ways. These theoretical discussions 
have often used the narrower terms QUANTIFIERS or NEGATIVE POLARITY ITEMS 
for certain sub-classes of indefinite pronouns.  
 This book gives a comprehensive overview of the main theoretical debates 
around the semantic and syntactic properties of indefinite pronouns. Its major 
original contributions are a large-scale cross-linguistic study of indefinite 
pronouns (see especially chapter 4 and Appendix A) and a detailed 
investigation of the diachronic sources of the markers of indefinite pronouns 
(chapters 6-8). This rich factual material is brought to bear on the issues that 
have been present in the literature. The new generalizations that emerge from 
the typological and diachronic study are discussed and explanations are 
provided. Throughout the book, particular emphasis is put on links between 
the formal properties of indefinite pronouns and their functional (semantic and 
syntactic) properties. 
 In chapter 2 after this overview, I give a brief introduction to the goals and 
methods of the typological approach that is applied in this book. Typological 
work presupposes cross-linguistically applicable concepts, so a definition of 
'indefinite pronoun' that is independent of language-particular properties is 
provided. Another important precondition for typology is the availability of 
data from a wide range of languages, so the issue of sampling is also discussed 
in chapter 2. This study is based on quite detailed data from 40 languages, and 
on very limited data from another sample of 100 languages which comes close 
to being representative of the world's languages. The 40-language sample is 
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biased toward European languages, as is inevitable due to limitations on the 
availability of data. 
 Chapter 3 maps out the space of formal and functional variation that is 
found in indefinite pronouns. Formally, indefinite pronouns typically occur in 
several series, with each series comprising a set of indefinites referring to the 
major ontological categories (person, thing, place, time, manner,...). For 
instance, English has the some-series (somebody, something, somewhere,...), the any-
series (anybody, anything,...), and the no-series (nobody, nothing,...); Russian has 
the -to-series (kto-to 'somebody', cˇ to-to 'something', gde-to 'somewhere',...), the -
nibud'-series (kto-nibud' 'anybody', cˇ to-nibud' 'anything',...), and others. In terms 
of synchronic formal structure, languages are remarkably similar typologically, 
but extremely interesting cross-linguistic variation is observed in the different 
meanings or functions that these different series can express. In chapter 3, I 
identify nine core functions (i.e. meanings and/or contexts) that must be 
distinguished for the purposes of cross-linguistic comparion. Not all of these 
functions are distinguished formally in every particular language, but each 
function is justified by attested differences between the functional ranges of 
different indefinite pronoun series. These nine functions are as follows: 
 
specific, known to the speaker 
(5) Somebody called while you were away: guess who! 
 
specific, unknown to the speaker 
(6) I heard something, but I couldn't tell what kind of sound it was. 
 
non-specific, irrealis 
(7) Please try somewhere else. 
 
polar question 
(8) Did anybody tell you anything about it? 
 
conditional protasis 
(9) If you see anything, tell me immediately. 
 
standard of comparison 
(10) In Freiburg the weather is nicer than anywhere in Germany. 
 
direct negation 
(11) Nobody knows the answer. 
 
indirect negation 
(12) I don't think that anybody knows the answer. 
 
free choice 
(13) Anybody can solve this simple problem. 
 
Some of these functions are well known and well established (e.g. 'free choice', 
'negation'), while others are less known (e.g. 'known vs. unknown to the 
speaker', 'irrealis'). There is one distinction that is very often made in the 
literature but that does not appear in the above list: NEGATIVE POLARITY. 
'Negative polarity items' are often said to be restricted to the functions in (8)-
(12), but the cross-linguistic data show that the notion of negative polarity is too 
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crude. In addition to indefinite pronoun series that are restricted to precisely 
these five functions, there are other indefinites that are restricted to a subset of 
these five functions, or to a set of functions that comprises some non-negative 
polarity functions in addition to some negative-polarity functions. The final 
section of chapter 3 then discusses alternative ways of expressing what many 
languages express by indefinite pronouns, including the rare but apparently 
attested case of a language that completely lacks indefinite pronouns. 
 Chapter 4 presents the principal typological generalizations that emerge 
from the data of the 40-language sample. These take the form of implicational 
universals concerning the distribution of indefinite pronoun series over the 
nine functions distinguished in chapter 3. While there are many differences in 
the distribution of indefinite pronoun series of different languages, the 
variation is not without limits. As elsewhere in typology, we find many 
regularities in the bewildering diversity that strikes us at first sight. This can be 
illustrated with examples from Russian, which differs in an interesting way 
from English. The sentences in (14)-(17) are the Russian equivalents of (6), (7), 
(9), and (10). 
 
Russian 
(14) Ja uslysˇ ala cˇ to-to, no ja ne ponjala, kakoj zvuk èto bylo. (=6) 
  I heard what-INDEF but I not understood what sound it was 
 
(15) Popytajtes', pozˇ alujsta, gde-nibud' v drugom meste. (=7) 
  try:IMPV:PL please where-INDEF in other place 
 
(16) Esli ty uvidisˇ  cˇ to-nibud', skazˇ i mne srazu. (=9) 
  if you see what-INDEF tell:IMPV me immediately 
  
(17) Vo Frejburge pogoda lucˇsˇ e, cˇ em gde-libo v Germanii. (=10) 
  in Freiburg weather better than where-INDEF in Germany 
 
Although above I glossed Russian kto-to, cˇ to-to as 'somebody, something', and 
kto-nibud', cˇ to-nibud' as 'anybody, anything', these examples are sufficient to 
demonstrate that the English some-series and the Russian to-series  are  by  no 
means  equivalent,  and neither are the any-series and the -nibud'-series. The -to-
series cannot be used in (15), and the any-series cannot be used in the English 
equivalent (7). Furthermore, the -nibud'-series cannot be used in (17), where 
English has the any-series, and Russian employs a third series, the -libo-series. 
But cross-linguistic variation of this kind is strongly constrained by a number of 
implicational universals which are summarized by the IMPLICATIONAL MAP in 
Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. The implicational map for indefinite pronoun functions   
            (7) 
            direct 
        (4)  (6)  negation 
        question indirect 
          negation 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
specific specific irrealis 
known unknown non-specific  
        (5)  (8) 
        conditional comparative 
            (9) 
            free choice 
 
The map is to be read as follows: An indefinite pronoun series will always 
express a set of functions that are adjacent on the map. For instance, the English 
any-series covers functions (4)-(9), and the Russian -nibud'-series covers 
functions (3)-(5). Since adjacency on such an implicational map can only be 
explained by similarity of function or meaning, the implicational map may be 
considered as a geometric representation of its semantic or cognitive domain. 
 In chapter 5, I discuss a variety of theoretical approaches to the functions of 
indefinite pronouns, beginning with the tradition of structural semantics. 
Probably the best-known approach is that of logical semantics, where 
indefinites are seen as the counterparts of the existential or the universal 
quantifiers. While many important insights have been gained within this 
approach, there is one crucial problem that has remained unresolved: the 
existence of indefinite pronouns which appear to correspond to the existential 
quantifier in some contexts, and to the universal quantifier in others (for 
instance, English any- and Italian nessuno 'anybody; nobody'). Another 
interesting approach (Progovac 1994) tries to subsume the distribution of 
certain indefinites under the syntactic binding theory that was originally 
developed for reflexive and reciprocal pronouns. Next I present the mental-
space-approach (Fauconnier 1985), which offers important insights into the 
nature of non-specificity and related phenomena. Finally Fauconnier's (1975a, 
1975b) work on pragmatic scales and scalar implicatures is discussed, which 
provides a perspective for solving the puzzle of the double nature of any- and 
similar indefinites in other languages. On the basis of the various theoretical 
proposals I then attempt an explanation of the implicational map. 
 Chapter 6 begins the diachronic investigation of indefinite pronouns. Since 
very few in-depth studies of diachronic changes in indefinite pronouns are 
available, most of the typological generalizations in the diachronic parts of this 
book are based on etymological information. In chapter 6 I look at those 
indefinites that are best analyzed as having arisen by grammaticalization from 
a complex syntactic construction involving an interrogative pronoun (these 
constructions thus explain in part why indefinites are so often based on 
interrogatives). I identify four such constructions: 'I don't know wh-', 'wh- you 
want', 'wh- ever it may be', 'no matter wh-'. The main effects of 
grammaticalization, such as phonological erosion, desemanticization, reduced 
syntactic scope etc. can all be shown to be present in the attested 
grammaticalized indefinites. The semantic aspect of grammaticalization can be 
seen in the extension of an indefinite's range of functions from its original 
function to other functions along the implicational map. 
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 Chapter 7 deals with a number of further sources of indefinite pronouns that 
cannot be easily subsumed under grammaticalization. These are indefinites 
marked by scalar additive focus particles ('also', 'even', 'at least'), reduplicated 
indefinite pronouns, indefinite pronouns derived from generic nouns ('person', 
'thing', etc.), and others. A very important type of indefinite pronoun across 
languages is represented by the use of interrogative pronouns as indefinites 
without any additional markers. I argue that the indefinite use is always 
secondary in such instances. As in chapter 6, for each of the diachronic sources 
of indefinite pronouns I identify the original motivation and thereby contribute 
to explaining their formal properties. 
 In chapter 8, I single out one of the nine functions, the function of direct 
negation (as in (11) above), for further detailed discussion. I show that the 
cross-linguistic patterning of negative indefinite pronouns cannot be 
understood without placing them in the context of other indefinites and that 
the implicational map captures important aspects of their behavior. Negative 
indefinite pronouns are particularly interesting because they may or may not 
cooccur with the normal sentential negation marker on the verb. The situation 
in which negative indefinites and verbal negation cooccur has sometimes been 
called 'double negation', but in fact this situation is much more common cross-
linguistically than negative indefinites of the standard European type which 
simultaneously act as sentential negators. I formulate a number of typological 
generalizations concerning the cooccurrence of negative indefinites and verbal 
negation and propose explanations for them. The chapter ends with an 
examination of the diachronic sources of negative evidence, which are quite 
parallel to those of other indefinites. 
 The concluding chapter 9 summarizes the typological generalizations of this 
book and briefly looks at wider typological and areal connections.  
 The book is concluded with two appendices: Appendix A gives detailed data 
on indefinite pronoun series and their distribution in the languages of the 40-
language-sample, providing many examples of indefinite pronouns. Appendix 
B gives the data from the world-wide 100-language-sample. 
 With this book I hope to contribute to Wilhelm von Humboldt's program of 
investigating universal grammar through broad cross-linguistic comparison, 
which he formulated in his 1827 study of the dual: 
 
'Unter den mannigfaltigen Wegen, welche das vergleichende Sprachstudium 
einzuschlagen hat, um die Aufgabe zu lösen, wie sich die allgemeine menschliche 
Sprache in den besonderen Sprachen der verschiedenen Nationen offenbart? ist 
einer der am richtigsten zum Ziele führenden unstreitig der, die Betrachtung eines 
einzelnen Sprachtheils durch alle bekannten Sprachen des Erdbodens hindurch zu 
verfolgen.'i 
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i 'Among the manifold ways that comparative linguistics must pursue towards a solution 
of the question of how the general human language is manifested in the particular 
languages of the different nations, indisputably one of the most successful ones is 
examining a single part of language throughout all the known languages of the earth.' 
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2 
  
A Typological Perspective on Indefinite Pronouns 
 
 
2.1. Language Typology 
 
This book approaches the topic of indefinite pronouns with the goals and 
methods of language typology as founded by Wilhelm von Humboldt (e.g. 
1827), revived by Joseph Greenberg (1963) and summarized most recently in 
Croft (1990). A few general remarks on the typological approach are thus in 
order before we turn to a definition of indefinite pronouns in the next section. 
Language typology, as understood here, is the scientific study of variation and 
the limits to variation in the structure of languages. There are several reasons 
why typological research is of central importance to our understanding of 
human language. 
 Despite the bewildering diversity of their structure, different languages have 
always been regarded as roughly equivalent instantiations of the more abstract 
notion of 'human language', a unique and universal endowment of human 
beings. However, the question arises how language could be universal and at 
the same time be manifested in forms that show seemingly unlimited variation. 
Systematic cross-linguistic investigations of language structure, as conducted 
by typologists at least since Humboldt (1827), have made possible significant 
advances toward a resolution of the apparent contradiction between 
universality and diversity. Above all, typological studies have demonstrated 
that cross-linguistic variation is by no means random. On the contrary, the 
grammatical systems of languages around the world show such striking 
similarities that it seems not inconceivable to extract a common core, a 
'universal grammar', out of the individual grammars.  
 On another level, linguistic typology is indispensable for our goal of 
explaining particular grammatical phenomena and of detecting significant 
generalizations. The fundamental problem that we are faced with is to state 
generalizations at the right level of generality. Linguists often fall into the trap 
of explaining a language-particular phenomenon by a high-level generalization 
(making reference e.g. to innate language structure or to general cognitive 
capacities), thus wrongly predicting that the phenomenon in question should 
be universal. And conversely, linguists also often explain a very general 
phenomenon by a low-level explanation (making reference e.g. to historical or 
other accidents in a particular language), thus wrongly predicting that the 
phenomenon in question should be restricted to the particular language they 
are dealing with. Cross-linguistic studies can help steer us through the Scylla of 
overgeneralization and the Charybdis of undergeneralization. If in a cross-
linguistic study a phenomenon turns out to be universal, we know that it must 
be explained with reference to universal factors; if on the other hand a 
phenomenon turns out to be restricted to a single language or a small set of 
isolated cases, then a particular explanation is called for. 
 Now it turns out that many, if not most, interesting grammatical phenomena 
fall between these two extremes: They are not completely universal, but they 
are not restricted to a small random set of languages either. However, more 
sophisticated techniques have been developed by typologists that allow us to 
find universal generalizations even for non-universal phenomena. The central 
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notion is that of an IMPLICATIONAL UNIVERSAL, i.e. a property that holds in all 
languages that have some other property. In a way implicational universals are 
even more important than absolute universals because they give us some 
additional insight into the nature of grammar: If a property A is implied by a 
property B, then it is quite likely that the two are causally related. The major 
cross-linguistic generalizations of this work will take the form of implicational 
universals. 
 An important practical problem with typology is that typological studies can 
never reach the same depth of analysis as studies on individual languages. The 
more languages a typologist investigates, the less attention he or she can give to 
each individual language, so typological studies are of necessity more 
superficial than single-language studies, and this book is no exception. It is true 
that there is a certain danger that data from individual languages are isolated 
from their larger context in broad cross-linguistic studies. But on the other 
hand, single-language studies that do not consider the typological variation 
also isolate their data from the cross-linguistic context and thereby are in 
danger of misinterpreting the facts, however deep and fine-grained their 
analyses are. The obvious solution to the limitations of typological and single-
language work is to combine the two to the extent that this is possible. Both ap-
proaches to language are complementary, because necessarily one loses depth 
as one gains in breadth, and conversely, one loses breadth as one gains in 
depth. But neither depth nor breadth are inherently more important – what 
counts is the volume of the new knowledge which results from multiplying 
breadth and depth.  
 On the empirical side, the present work focuses more on breadth, because 
there are already a substantial number of in-depth studies of indefinite 
pronouns in individual languages which I have been able to make use of, 
whereas the typological perspective has not been elaborated sufficiently in 
previous research. This empirical breadth is used as a measure for theoretical 
approaches and thus hopefully leads to greater depth of explanation. 
 A typological study logically consists of four steps. First, the domain of 
phenomena to be compared across languages is delimited by formulating a 
definition that is cross-linguistically applicable. Second, the space of typological 
variation is mapped out by providing a complete taxonomy of the various 
means by which the phenomenon under discussion is expressed in different 
languages. Third, correlations between individual structural options and other 
parts of the grammar are identified and formulated as implicational universals. 
Fourth, explanations for these universals are sought. In this book, the first step 
(definition) is taken in the following section (§ 2.2), the second step (taxonomy) 
follows in chapter 3, the third step (correlations) is the topic of chapter 4, and 
the fourth step is the explanation of the implications in semantic terms that is 
proposed in § 5.6. 
 
 
2.2. Indefinite Pronouns:  
Definition and Delimitation of the Domain of Inquiry 
 
2.2.1. Mixed functional-formal definitions 
 
This work applies the cross-linguistic perspective to INDEFINITE PRONOUNS like 
English somebody, something, somewhere, anything, anytime, or Japanese dareka 
‘somebody, anybody’, dokoka ‘somewhere, anywhere’, daremo ‘anybody, 
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nobody’, nanimo ‘anything, nothing’. Such indefinite pronouns generally occur 
in SERIES, e.g. the English some-series and the any-series, or the Japanese -ka-
series and the -mo-series. The functional distinctions exhibited by such 
contrasting series will be the main object of my interest. 
 There is both a functional and a formal component to the definition of the 
subject matter of this study: From a functional point of view, the expressions 
investigated here can be characterized as INDEFINITE (in the sense discussed 
below), and from a formal point of view they can be characterized as 
PRONOUNS, i.e. grammatical elements. 
 This double or hybrid definition is as it should be: The subject matter of a 
typological investigation cannot be defined either on an exclusively formal 
basis or on an exclusively functional basis. Purely formal definitions are 
impractical because there are extremely few if any structural (or formal) 
properties that can be identified and compared across languages. It is possible, 
for example, to study the Instrumental case in various Slavic languages on the 
basis of a purely formal definition (case forms which are the reflexes of Proto-
Slavic *-mi˘ , *-jo4, *-mi, etc.), but a definition of this kind cannot serve as the 
basis for a typological study, simply because most languages do not have 
suffixes of these shapes. On the other hand, purely functional definitions have 
the disadvantage that they tend to pick out quite heterogeneous expressions. 
For example, a typological study of temporal expressions that is not formally 
delimited would have to consider such diverse phenomena as verbal tense 
inflections, tense iconicity in coordinate structures (like I came, I saw, I 
conquered), and temporal adverbs and nouns like tomorrow and hour. Although it 
is rarely made explicit, typological investigations are usually based on a 
combined functional-formal definition of their domain of inquiry, e.g. Dahl’s 
(1985) study of tense-aspect systems, Svorou’s (1994) study of spatial 
adpositions, Koptjevskaja-Tamm’s (1993) study of action nominal constructions, 
Nedjalkov’s (ed.) (1988) study of resultative constructions, Stassen’s (1985) 
study of comparative constructions, and many others. 
 
2.2.2. The formal criterion: 'pronoun' 
 
The formal criterion used here is the pronominal, i.e. grammatical na-ture of the 
expressions. In particular, I will not deal with lexical indefinite expressions like 
a woman, a tree, a meadow, or with general nouns which are not pronouns by any 
criterion, like a person, a thing, a place, etc. Since semantically there is almost no 
difference between an indefinite pronoun like someone and a lexical noun 
phrase like a person, this is a formal criterion. 
 It is true that it is not always immediately obvious whether an expression is a 
pronoun or not. Often pronouns are easily recognizable as such because of 
highly specific phonological and morphological properties, e.g. the Genitive 
singular suffix -go in Polish pronouns (je-go ‘his’, ko-go-s´  ‘someone’s’) vs. -y, -u, 
-a in nouns (osoby ‘a person’s’). But in many other cases, formal pronominal 
features are harder to detect. The English indefinite pronoun something differs 
from the lexical phrase some thing only in its prosodic ('– – vs. ª– '–), 
morphological (*somethings vs. some things) and syntactic properties (something 
important vs. some important thing). The French pronoun quelque chose 
‘something’ differs from the phrase quelque chose ‘some thing’ in its agreement 
properties: the pronoun takes masculine agreement (quelque chose s’est passé 
‘something happened’), whereas the noun chose ‘thing’ is feminine. In Turkish, 
bir s3ey ‘something’ formally resembles a phrase (bir ‘one’, s3ey ‘thing’), but the 
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process of m-reduplication shows that we are dealing with a single word. This 
process applies to words, so kitap-mitap ‘books and so on’ is possible, while *bir 
kitap mir kitap is impossible. However, we do have bir s3ey mir s3ey ‘something 
and so on’, so bir s3ey must be a single word, and hence a pronoun. 
 But even if it were possible to obtain all the relevant data also for little-
known languages, it would still be futile to try to draw a clear-cut boundary 
between lexical expressions and grammatical, pronominal expressions that 
applies to all cases. When new pronouns are created in a language, they are 
often grammaticalized from nouns that have a very general meaning (cf. 
Lehmann 1982a: 38-56, Sugamoto 1989), and since grammaticalization is a 
gradual process, there must be plenty of cases in many languages that are 
somewhere in the middle on their way from the lexicon to the grammar. 
 It should furthermore be emphasized that the term pronoun is used here in its 
broad sense where it comprises not only PRO-NOUNS (i.e grammatical items that 
can replace nouns or noun phrases), but also PRO-ADVERBS like somewhere, 
sometime (which can replace adverbs or adverbial phrases), PRO-ADJECTIVES like 
Polish  jaki-s´  ‘some kind of’, and even PRO-VERBS. Thus the term pronoun 
(without a hyphen) should not be understood in its etymological sense 
(‘replacing a noun’), but in its traditional sense.i Since I am mainly interested in 
the differences between different series of indefinite pronouns, such as the 
English some-series (somebody, something, somewhere, etc.) and the any-series 
(anybody, anything, anywhere, etc.), it would not make any sense to exclude the 
non-nominal members of these series from my considerations. 
 Also included are indefinite determiners that clearly belong to a series of 
indefinite pronouns, such as English some and any, or German irgend-ein (which 
belongs to the irgend-series, cf. irgend jemand ‘somebody’, irgend etwas 
‘something’, irgend-wo ‘somewhere’, etc.). Determiners are not pronouns be-
cause they do not replace anything, but in traditional grammar determiners are 
often treated as pronouns or at least together with pronouns, so including them 
here does not do too much violence to the term pronoun. 
 
2.2.3. The functional criterion: 'indefinite' 
 
We now turn to the functional part of the definition of INDEFINITE PRONOUN. 
Again, the definition is quite straightforward: I will regard as indefinite 
pronouns such pronouns whose main function is to express indefinite ref-
erence. While this terminological usage is highly transparent, it represents a 
certain departure from traditional terminology. In traditional Western 
grammar, the following types of pronouns are usually distinguished (e.g. 
Grevisse 1986: § 625-736, Braune 1961: § 282-300):  
 
(18) (i) personal pronouns  
  (ii) demonstrative pronouns  
  (iii) relative pronouns  
  (iv) interrogative pronouns  
  (v) indefinite pronouns   
 
Whereas the first four of these form relatively coherent sets, the category of 
indefinite pronouns seems to function as a sort of waste-basket category in 
many traditional descriptive grammars. In addition to indefinite pronouns in 
the narrow sense (in which the term is used throughout this work), the 
following four types of expressions are commonly put in this category: 
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 (a) MID-SCALAR QUANTIFIERS like few, several, many.ii These express quantity 
and have nothing to do with indefiniteness—many of them combine freely with 
the definite article (the few, the many). However, some mid-scalar quantifiers are 
incompatible with the definite article in various languages, e.g. English some 
(*the some), German einige ‘several, some’ (*die einigen), French maints ‘many’ 
(*les maints). And more importantly, some mid-scalar quantifiers are formally 
very similar to indefinite pronouns (and diachronically derived from them), e.g. 
English some [sm] (mid-scalar quantifier) vs. some [sUm] (indefinite pronoun), 
Russian ne-kotorye ‘some’ (mid-scalar quantifier, plural) vs. ne-kto ‘someone’ 
(indefinite pronoun). These facts may explain why mid-scalar quantifiers have 
often been lumped together with indefinite pronouns. 
 (b) GENERIC PRONOUNS like French on ‘one’, German man ‘one’, English one 
are also often called 'indefinite pronouns'. It is true that they are both 
pronominal and indefinite, so they would fall under the definition as stated 
above, but since generic pronouns have very different properties from words 
like someone, they are not further considered here. Moreover, formally distinct 
generic pronouns do not seem to be very widespread: most languages make do 
without them, whereas the large majority of languages seem to have indefinite 
pronouns like someone. 
 (c) UNIVERSAL QUANTIFIERS like all and every. The collective universal 
quantifier ‘all’ is quite compatible with the definite article in many languages 
(e.g. all the children, French tous les enfants, Hebrew kol ha-yeladim), and even the 
distributive universal quantifier ‘every’ can be combined with the definite 
article in some languages, e.g. Modern Greek i káthe ghlósa ‘every language’. As 
a rule, universally quantified noun phrases are semantically definite, even 
when not marked as such in languages that have a definite article. 
 That said, it must be acknowledged that there are close connections between 
distributive universal quantifiers (‘every’) and indefinite pronouns that express 
irrelevance of choice (‘any’). Although universal quantifiers are not considered 
indefinite pronouns and are not the focus of my attention in the present study, 
they will be mentioned and discussed in connection with free-choice indefinites 
later (§ 6.5). (Cf. Gil 1991 for an excellent typological study of universal 
quantifiers.) 
 (d) IDENTITY PRONOUNS/DETERMINERS like other and same. These express 
identity and non-identity and do not show an affinity to indefiniteness at all. 
 After these negative statements, what kinds of pronouns are left for our 
investigation? Essentially, indefinite pronouns like those in (19a-c). 
 
(19) a. someone, something, somewhere, somehow,... 
  b. anyone, anything, anywhere, anyhow,... 
  c. no one, nothing, nowhere, never,... 
 
It could be objected that the pronouns of the any-series mainly express free 
choice rather than indefiniteness (as in You may take anything), and that the 
pronouns of the no-series express non-existence rather than indefiniteness. This 
may be true, and perhaps the definition 'pronouns whose main function is to 
express indefinite reference' should be made more specific to include all of 
them. 
 However, the crucial point to note is that there are very close connections 
between different series of indefinite pronouns as in (19a-c), not just in English, 
but in many other languages as well, as I will show in the course of this work. 
In English, there are contexts where either the some- or the any-series can be 
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used, without a great meaning difference (If you see someone/anyone, tell me), and 
there are contexts where either the no-series or the any-series can be used 
without any meaning difference (I saw nobody/I didn’t see anybody). Such close 
connections, which will be the focus of our attention in the main part of this 
work, justify the inclusion of all of these pronoun types in the typological 
investigation. The points of contact and overlap with other grammatical 
phenomena are minor compared to the internal coherence of indefinite 
pronouns like those in (19a-c). 
 
 
2.3. Earlier Work 
 
The in-depth study of indefinite pronouns does not have a long history in 
linguistics. To be sure, indefinite pronouns have generally been described in 
reference grammars. In the European tradition of grammaticography that goes 
back several centuries, there is always a separate section on pronouns, divided 
into sub-sections on different kinds of pronouns, usually in the following 
sequence: personal pronouns, demonstrative pronouns, relative pronouns, 
interrogative pronouns, indefinite pronouns. But the description of indefinites 
is very often restricted to the formal side in such works, i.e. to their derivational 
structure and their inflectional properties. Only reference grammars with a very 
complete syntactic component, such as Kühner and Stegmann (1914) (Latin), 
Paul (1916-20) (German), Schwyzer (1953) (Classical Greek) have had anything 
to say on the functions of indefinite pronouns. In these older grammars, much 
of the syntax component consists of the description of syntactic and semantic 
properties of grammatical categories and grammatical words, and the functions 
of indefinite pronouns are then described in the section on pronoun syntax. In 
more modern grammars, where the syntax is generally given more autonomy, 
the situation sometimes becomes worse: The functional properties of indefinite 
pronouns do not fit into any of the major parts of the syntax, and as a result of 
this, even voluminous grammars may be completely silent on the functions of 
indefinite pronouns, e.g. Sˇ vedova (ed.) (1980) (Russian), Engel (1988) (German). 
In smaller reference grammars, especially grammars of little-known languages, 
indefinite pronouns are often completely ignored. 
 The first comparative studies of indefinite pronouns were conducted within 
the framework of historical-comparative linguistics of the older Indo-European 
languages (Brugmann 1911, Delbrück 1893), the Romance languages (Lombard 
1938-39), and the Finno-Ugrian languages (Beke 1913-14). Since indefinite 
pronouns even in closely related languages often show quite different forms, 
these comparative studies are not very successful in meeting their own goals, 
but instead they tend to take on a typological character. Some later comparative 
studies by Indo-Europeanists such as Frei (1940), Gonda (1954-55) explicitly 
take into account typologically similar phenomena from non-Indo-European 
languages. 
 The first theoretically-oriented in-depth studies of the functions of indefinite 
pronouns of individual languages appear in the 1960s,iii motivated by the 
structuralist movement in semantics (Greimas 1963, Veyrenc 1964, Manoliu-
Manea 1966, Krˇ ízˇ ková 1971, Topolinska 1972), by logical semantics 
(Seliverstova 1964, Dahl 1970, Horn 1972, Grzegorczykowa 1972b, Levin 1973, 
Paducˇ eva 1974), or by transformational grammar (Lees 1960: 123-125, Klima 
1964, Labov 1972, Ali 1970, 1972). Since the 1970s, there is also a steady flow of 
papers that deal contrastively with indefinite pronouns in two languages 
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(Rybák 1965, Doncˇ eva 1970, Pálfy 1982, Stephanides 1983, 1985, Kirova 1986, 
Mostovska 1988). 
 While the present study is unique in the breadth of its scope, it is not the first 
typological study of indefinite pronouns. Valuable typological generalizations 
concerning the formal properties of indefinite pronouns have been made in 
Majtinskaja (1969), Coyaud and Aït Hamou (1972, 1976), and von Bremen 
(1983). Schmid (1980) is the only previous study that attempts to combine a 
world-wide typological comparison (involving a dozen languages) with a closer 
look at the environments (mainly negative, interrogative and conditional 
clauses) where different indefinite pronouns appear. Gil (1991), in his 
typological study of 'universal quantifiers', also looks at free-choice indefinites 
in some detail. Kahrel (1989) and Bernini and Ramat (1992) are large-scale 
typological studies of negative pronouns. 
 In the 1980s and the early 1990s, negative-polarity indefinites have again 
become the topic of studies within the Chomskyan syntactic framework (e.g. 
Aoun 1985, 1986, Mahajan 1990, Progovac 1992, Zanuttini 1991, Li 1992, Laka 
1994), among them also an ambitious typologically-oriented proposal (Progovac 
1994). Other theoretical approaches that have dealt with indefinite pronouns are 
Antoine Culioli’s 'enunciative' approach (Culioli (ed.) 1980, 1984, Fisher and 
Franckel (eds.) 1983, Dhelverúdhi 1989, Le Goffic 1994, Mellet 1994), the 
Guillaumean approach (Hirtle 1982, 1988), Gilles Fauconnier’s theories of 
pragmatic scales (Fauconnier 1975a, 1975b, 1977, 1979, 1980, Ladusaw 1980) and 
mental spaces (Fauconnier 1985, 1987), and Ronald Langacker’s Cognitive 
Grammar (Langacker 1992: 103-41). 
 It is obviously far beyond the scope of this work to discuss all the previous 
work on indefinite pronouns. However, the major theoretical approaches will 
be discussed in chapter 5, and many other smaller contributions to the 
theoretical debate will be mentioned throughout this study. Many of the more 
descriptively oriented works on individual languages have served as useful 
sources of data (cf. Appendix A, where many of these studies are cited), 
without which the typological generalizations of this study would have been 
impossible. 
 Thus, I see the present work as firmly rooted in the unbroken tradition of 
previous generations of linguists. I hope that by collecting and comparing the 
insights and data accumulated in these earlier works, and by highlighting the 
cross-linguistic generalizations that emerge, this work will constitute a step 




2.4. The Language Samples 
 
2.4.1. General problems of typological sampling 
 
Even though its ultimate goal is generalizing over all the languages of the 
world, typological work can in practice only be based on a relatively small 
subset of languages. In selecting the languages to be compared, the three most 
important considerations are the size and the representativeness of the sample 
and the availability of data. 
 The choice of the best SIZE of the sample is easiest: One simply has to select 
the relation between breadth and depth (cf. § 2.1.1) that best suits one’s goals. If 
the questions asked in a typological study are fairly superficial, a relatively 
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large sample of languages can be covered. The deeper the questions are, the 
fewer languages can be handled.  
 A more difficult problem is to find a compromise between 
representativeness and availability of data. A sample is REPRESENTATIVE of the 
world’s languages to the extent that its internal diversity corresponds to the 
diversity of the whole set of languages. The most important factor limiting 
linguistic diversity is, of course, genetic relationship. Thus, the languages 
included in a representative sample should be as genetically distant from each 
other as possible. This in turn presupposes that we can determine genetic 
closeness and distance, and to the extent that our knowledge of the genetic 
relationships between languages is incomplete, a sample based on it is also 
problematic. Various ways of dealing with the problem of sampling genetic 
groupings have been proposed, each with their own advantages and 
disadvantages (Dryer 1989, Perkins 1980, Nichols 1992, Rijkhoff et al. 1993). 
Another potential problem is areal relatedness (Sprachbund phenomena), which 
can be mitigated by selecting languages that are areally as distant from each 
other as possible. 
 However, a factor that restricts typological research much more seriously 
than sampling problems is the AVAILABILITY OF DATA. Data from well-studied 
and widely spoken languages are usually much more easily accessible than 
data from little-studied languages spoken by small groups in 'remote' areas, 
and the widely spoken languages come from just a few genetic groups (10 of 
the world’s 20 largest languages are Indo-European, 4 are Sinitic). This problem 
of potential genetic bias becomes worse the deeper the questions are that one 
wishes to investigate, because in-depth data are available for much fewer 
languages than superficial descriptions. But even if one limits oneself to 
questions that can be answered by an average reference grammar, it is not easy 
to obtain data of equal quality and depth from a balanced, unbiased sample 
that is truly representative of the genetic diversity of the world’s languages. 
Thus, any typological study has to make a conscious compromise between the 
limiting factors of potential genetic bias and availability of data. 
 It is important to recognize that this choice is not entirely independent of the 
kind of question under investigation. The general goal of maximal genetic 
diversity of a typological sample is based on the assumption that genetic 
relatedness is by far the most important factor of bias. In general, this is 
probably true: For example, the fact that most Dravidian languages have 
retroflex consonants and postpositions (rather than prepositions) is certainly 
not an accident or evidence for a typological connection between the two, but is 
simply due to common inheritance from Proto-Dravidian, which also had these 
features. But not all structural features of a language have the same degree of 
DIACHRONIC STABILITY (cf. the discussion in Nichols 1992: ch. 5). Some features 
are very stable and change only very slowly, whereas others tend to change 
quite rapidly. This phenomenon has long been known in the domain of lexical 
change: There is no doubt that words belonging to the basic vocabulary (e.g. 
body part terms, kinship terms, numerals) are diachronically more stable than 
peripheral words. But in the domain of grammatical features, differential rates 
of change have only just begun to be investigated systematically (Nichols 1992). 
Nevertheless, the rate of change of the feature under study has important 
consequences for the selection of the sample (as noted in Croft 1990: 23). Highly 
unstable phenomena are much less likely to be common retentions from the 
parent language, and hence the problem of genetic bias is less severe when one 
studies grammatical features with low diachronic stability. 
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 It turns out that the feature studied in this work, indefinite pronouns and 
their functions, shows a remarkably low degree of diachronic stability. 
Indefinite pronoun systems may differ substantially even in languages that are 
closely related, such as Polish and Russian, Dutch and German, Catalan and 
Portuguese, Latvian and Lithuanian (cf. the relevant data in Appendix A, 
especially the distribution of indefiniteness series). This impressionistic 
statement could easily be made more precise by introducing some measure of 
diversity and comparing indefinite pronouns to other, more stable features such 
as marking type (head marking vs. dependent marking), alignment type 
(ergative, accusative, etc.), or pronominal-argument type (independent 
pronouns vs. pronouns as verbal inflection). However, I trust that the 
impression is sufficiently robust to convince readers. This means that the 
problem of genetic bias is probably much less severe for this study than one 
might first have thought. 
 
2.4.2. Selection of the samples for this study 
 
After the general remarks of the preceding section, let me now explain the 
choices made in this work. To deal with the problem of sample size and the 
relation between breadth and depth, I have chosen a two-level-approach, i.e. I 
use two different samples showing different combinations of breadth and 
depth: First, a large sample of 100 languages is investigated with respect to very 
few superficial parameters that can even be found in a sketchy description (cf. 
Appendix B). Second, a smaller sample of forty languages is studied in some 
depth with respect to questions that can only be answered by excellent 
reference grammars or dictionaries, by specialized studies of indefinite 
pronouns in these languages, or by information obtained from native speakers 
(cf. the data in Appendix A).  
 The problem of representativeness has been solved satisfactorily only for the 
100-language-sample, which is evenly distributed among the genetic groups of 
the world (for minor reservations, cf. the discussion in § 2.4.3.2). The 40-
language-sample is very biased genetically toward Indo-European languages 
(22 of the 40 languages), and even more areally toward European languages (30 
if the Caucasus is included in Europe, 27 if it is excluded). The reason for this 
bias is of course the limited availability of data for other languages. However, 
since a diachronically unstable phenomenon like indefinite pronouns is less 
affected by genetic bias (as discussed in the previous subsection), I hope that 
the 40-language-sample still gives a fairly good picture of the variation found in 
human languages in general.  
 It should perhaps also be noted here explicitly that this study is limited to 
spoken languages, i.e. that no sign languages have been taken into account. The 
cross-linguistic study of sign languages is still in its infancy, and my own 
competence does not allow me to say anything even about an individual sign 
language. But clearly, eventually linguistic theory will have to account for 
spoken languages and for signed languages in a unified way. 
 
2.4.3. The two samples 
 
2.4.3.1. The 40-language sample. The 40 languages are listed in Table 1. See 
Appendix A for the data on these languages, as well as the sources for these 
data. 
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Table 1. The languages of the 40-language sample 
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Indo-European 
 Germanic  
  West 1. German 
    2. Dutch 
    3. English 
  North 4. Swedish 
    5. Icelandic 
 Italic   
  Latin-Romance 6. Latin 
   Western 7. Portuguese 
    8. Catalan 
    9. French 
    10. Italian 
   Eastern 11. Romanian 
 Greek 12. Modern Greek 
 Slavic 
  South 13. Bulgarian 
    14. Serbian/Croatian 
  West 15. Polish 
  East 16. Russian 
 Baltic 17. Lithuanian 
    18. Latvian 
 Celtic 19. Irish 
 Indo-Iranian 
  Iranian 
   Eastern 20. Ossetic 
   Western 21. Persian 
  Indic 22. Hindi-Urdu 
Turkic 
 Southern 23. Turkish 
 Central 24. Kazakh 
 Northern 25. Yakut 
Finno-Ugrian 
 Ugrian 26. Hungarian 
 Finnic 27. Finnish 
Manchu-Tungusic 28. Nanay 
Nakh-Daghestanian 29. Lezgian 
Afro-Asiatic  
 Semitic 30. Maltese 
    31. Hebrew 
 Chadic 32. Hausa 
Niger-Congo 33. Swahili 
Kartvelian 34. Georgian 
Dravidian 35. Kannada 
Sino-Tibetan 36. Chinese 
Andean  37. Ancash Quechua 
affiliation unclear 38. Japanese 
    39. Korean 
    40. Basque 
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 
2.4.3.2. The 100-language sample. This sample was selected according to the 
sampling method proposed in Rijkhoff et al. (1993), which measures the internal 
diversity of genetic groupings by means of a simple calculation based on the 
algebraic structure of a genetic language tree. This method is adopted here 
because it has the advantage that no information in addition to a complete 
classification of the world’s languages (as offered in Voegelin and Voegelin 
(1977), Ruhlen (1987), Bright (ed.) (1992)) is required, in contrast to the methods 
employed in Dryer (1989) and Nichols (1992), which presuppose a lot of 
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additional knowledge about the time depth of genetic groupings. As in the 
example samples in Rijkhoff et al. (1993), my sample is based on the 
classification in Ruhlen (1987) because it is the most readily available 
classification. 
 The actual procedure of selecting the languages is described in detail in 
Rijkhoff et al. (1993) and will not be repeated here. Note, however, that I deviate 
from their model in one respect: Whenever no data were available for any 
language of a grouping that should have been represented in the sample, rather 
than reducing the sample size I added another language elsewhere in the next 
higher grouping. In this way, my 100-language sample really contains 100 
languages, not 76 as would have been the case if Rijkhoff et al.’s proposal had 
been followed. Thus, my 100-language sample may show some distortions, but 
since imprecision is present elsewhere in the procedure (Ruhlen’s (1987) 
classification is far from perfect, and Rijkhoff et al.’s sampling method is only an 
approximation), I do not think that this is a serious problem. In any event, not 
too much hinges on the quality of the 100-language sample because the data 
that I have for these languages is quite restricted anyway. The main point of 
this sample is to provide an impression of the world-wide situation, making it 
plausible that the conclusions based on the heavily biased 40-language sample 
can be extrapolated to the world’s languages.iv 
 For genetic groupings which contain a greater number of languages for 
which information is available (Indo-European, Altaic, Semitic, etc.), I selected 
the languages randomly. In many other cases, I had to be content if I found any 
data at all. 
 The languages of the 100-language sample are listed in Table 2. A more 
detailed description of the sample, including the genetic classification of the 
languages is given in Appendix B, together with the data that I gathered for 
these languages. 
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Khalkha Mongolian  
Nahali  














Seychelles Creole  
Slave  
Songhai  
















Xinh Mul  
 Xhosa  
———————————————————————————————————
———————————— 
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i If one wants to use pronoun only in its etymological sense (‘noun-substitute’), as 
suggested e.g. by Jespersen (1924: 83), one has to come up with a new cover term 
comprising pro-nouns, pro-adverbs, pro-adjectives, etc. The term pro-form is sometimes 
used in this sense, e.g. by Vater (1975). I go along with the tradition in ignoring the 
etymology of pronoun and regarding it as a term with no internal structure, so that com-
bined terms like pronominal adverb, pronominal verb, etc., are not contradictory.  
ii I call such words mid-scalar quantifiers because they can be arranged on a scale from 
maximal to minimal quantity (all – most – many – several – few – none, cf. Horn (1972: 
61)), where they occupy the middle.  
iii Descriptively and/or diachronically oriented studies had appeared sporadically earlier, 
e.g. Gessner (1895) (Spanish), Einenkel (1903) (English), Etzrodt (1909), Ohlhoff 
(1912), Foulet (1919) (French).  
iv Note also that a typological approach that seeks to discover universal properties (like 
this book) is really interested in the notion of a POSSIBLE HUMAN LANGUAGE (in 
contrast to what Nichols (1992) calls 'population typology', which deals with existing 
languages), and we have no way of being sure that the existing diversity at the end of 
the second millennium CE is represenatative of the possible diversity. Inevitably, thus, 
our 'representative samples' are only gross approximations. 
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3.1. The Main Formal Types of Indefinite Pronouns 
 
In the first section of this chapter, I give a survey of the formal types of 
indefinite pronouns. We first look at the types of markers that characterize 
morphologically complex indefinite pronouns, and then examine the kinds of 
bases to which these markers are attached. 
 
3.1.1. Types of indefiniteness markers 
 
Indefinite pronouns normally occur in SERIESi which have one member for each 
of the major ONTOLOGICAL CATEGORIESii such as person, thing, property, place, 
time, manner, amount, plus a few others. Some examples of different indefinite 
pronoun series in different languages are given in (20). 
 
(20) a. English some-series any-series no-series 
   person: somebody anybody nobody 
   thing: something anything nothing 
   place: somewhere anywhere nowhere 
   time: sometime anytime never 
   manner: somehow anyhow no way 
   determiner: some any no 
 
 b. Polish nie-series s´ -series -kolwiek-series ni-series 
   (‘somebody’, etc.) (‘somebody’, etc.) (‘anybody’, etc.) (‘nobody’) 
  person: niekto ktos´  ktokolwiek nikt 
  thing: nieco cos´  cokolwiek nic 
  property: niejaki jakis´  jakikolwiek nijaki 
  place: — gdzies´  gdziekolwiek nigdzie 
  time: niekiedy kiedys´  kiedykolwiek nigdy 
  manner: niejako jakos´  jakkolwiek nijak 
  amount: — iles´  ilekolwiek — 
  determiner: niektóry którys´  którykolwiek z%aden 
 
 c. Lezgian sa ... jata’ni-series xˆ ajit’ani-series sa ...-ni-series 
   (‘somebody’, etc.) (‘anybody’, etc.) (‘nobody’, etc.) 
  person: sa wuzˇ  jat’ani wuzˇ xˆ ajit’ani sa kas-ni 
  thing: sa wucˇ  jat’ani wucˇ xˆ ajit’ani sa zat’ni 
  property: sa hixˆ tin jat’ani hixˆ tin xˆ ajit’ani — 
  place: sa hina jat’ani hina xˆ ajit’ani sana-ni 
  time: sa mus jat’ani mus xˆ ajit’ani sadra-ni 
  manner: sa hik’ jat’ani hik’ xˆ ajit’ni sak’-ni 
  amount: sa hiq’wan jat’ani hiq’wan xˆ ajit’ani — 
   
  28 
In the most common case, indefinite pronouns consist of (i) a stem indicating 
the ontological category, plus (ii) a formal element shared by all members of an 
indefinite pronoun series,  such as some- and any- in English, nie-, -s´ , -kolwiek 
and ni- in Polish, and sa ... jat’ani, xˆ ajit’ani and sa ...-ni in Lezgian. This element 
will be called INDEFINITENESS MARKERiii in the present work. 
 The indefiniteness marker is an affix or a particle which stands next to the 
pronoun stem. It may be a prefix, like English some-, any- no-, Polish nie-, ni-, or 
it may be a suffix, like Polish -s´ , -kolwiek. The indefiniteness marker may consist 
of two or more parts, e.g. Lezgian sa ... jat’ani, where the first part is placed 
before and the second part is placed after the stem. Even indefiniteness markers 
consisting of three or four parts are not unheard of, e.g. French que ce soit (in qui 
que ce soit ‘anybody’, quoi que ce soit ‘anything’, etc.) or Russian by to ni bylo (in 
gde by to ni bylo ‘anywhere’, kak by to ni bylo ‘anyhow’). 
 When the indefiniteness marker is an affix, it is usually the outermost affix of 
an indefinite pronoun, i.e. it is an EXTRAFIX.iv Case inflections are normally 
inside the indefiniteness marker. This is best illustrated with a postfixal 
indefiniteness marker like Latin -dam in qui-dam, or Georgian -me in ra-me. 
 
(21) Latin (‘somebody’) (22) Georgian (‘anything’) 
  Nom. qui-dam  Nom. ra-me 
  Gen. cujus-dam  Dat. ras-me 
  Dat. cuj-dam  Gen. ris(a)-me 
  Acc. quem-dam  Instr. rit(i)-me 
  Abl. quo-dam  Adv. rad-me 
 
Case prefixes are rarer, but if one considers Russian 'prepositions' like s ‘with’, 
u ‘at’, as case prefixes, then the extrafixal (more specifically, antefixal) nature of 
the Russian prefixal indefiniteness markers ni- and koe- can be illustrated: 
 
(23) Russian 
  Nom. koe-kto ‘somebody’ ni-kto ‘nobody’ 
  u-case koe u kogo  ni u kogo 
  s-case koe s kem  ni s kem 
  ot-case koe ot kogo  ni ot kogo 
 
However, like all extrafixes, extrafixal indefiniteness markers show a tendency 
to be rearranged. Thus, alongside forms like Georgian ra-d-me and Russian koe u 
kogo, there also exist forms like ra-me-d and u koe-kogo. See further § 6.3.3 and 
Haspelmath (1993b). 
 When the indefiniteness marker is not an affix but a particle (or a sequence 
of particles), it may stand next to its derivational basis or at the margin of a 
phrase. These two positions are different only with indefinite determiners, 
which do not form a phrase of their own but combine with a noun phrase. 
Examples (24a-c) show such discontinuous indefinites, where the basis (which 
is always an interrogative determiner, ‘which?’) precedes the noun and the 
indefiniteness marker follows it. 
 
(24) a. Japanese 
   Yosikoo-ga dono tegami mo yom-ana-katta. 
   Yoshiko-NOM which letter INDEF read-NEG-PAST 
   ‘Yoshiko didn’t read any letter.’ 
  b. Dutch (Paardekooper 1978: 577) 
   Ik lees dat liever als wat voor boeken ook. 
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   I read that preferably than what kind books INDEF 
   ‘I read that with more pleasure than any books.’ 
  c. Lezgian (Nakh-Daghestanian; Haspelmath 1993a: 196) 
   Hi kac xˆ ajit’ani hajwan ja. 
   which cat INDEF animal is 
   ‘Any cat is an animal.’ 
  d. French 
   Tu n’es pas capable d’agir par quelque impulsion personnelle que ce soit. 
   ‘You are not able to act by any personal impulse.’ 
 
 While indefiniteness markers are sequences of segments in most cases, this is 
not the only possibility. Like other grammatical morphemes, they can also be 
expressed by reduplication and by stem modification. 
 The signaling of indefinite pronouns by means of REDUPLICATION (mainly 
full reduplication) is rather common. Some examples are shown in (25) (see 
further § 7.4): 
 
(25) a. Latin 
   quis-quis ‘anyone’ 
   ubi-ubi ‘anywhere’ 
  b. Malay 
   apa-apa ‘something’ 
  c. Chinese Pidgin Russian (Nichols 1986) 
   cˇ ego-cˇ ego ‘something, anything’ 
   kakoj-kakoj ‘some, any’ 
 
 Finally, the indefiniteness marker may consist in a STEM MODIFICATION. This 
type is extremely rare, but I have found an example in Chechen. In this 
language indefinite pronouns are formed from interrogative pronouns by 
lengthening the final consonant of the stem and adding the particle a.v 
 
(26) Chechen (Nakh-Daghestanian; Maciev 1961) 
     interrogative indefinite 
person: Abs. mila milla a ‘someone’ 
    Gen. Ìe¯ nan Ìennan a ‘someone’s’ 
    Loc. Ìänga Ìängga a ‘at someone’ 
thing:  Abs. hun hu?a a ‘something’ 
    Gen. ste¯ nan stennan a ‘of something’ 
    Loc. stenga stengga a  ‘at something’ 
place:   micˇ Ìa micˇcˇ aÌa a ‘somewhere’ 
time:   maca macca a ‘sometime’ 
manner muxa muxxa a ‘somehow’ 
determiner  mülxa mülxxa a ‘some’ 
 
 Thus the first important generalization that we can make is that indefinite 
pronouns are as a rule DERIVED forms. That this is not a trivial observation can 
be seen from the artificial language Esperanto, designed by Ludwik Zamenhof 
in 1887. As a rule, Esperanto grammar follows the typological design of 
Standard Average European, eliminating irregularities and 'useless' features 
like gender and agreement. There are two indefinite series in Esperanto, which 
are clearly related to interrogative pronouns, much as in many natural 
languages: 
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(27) Esperanto interrogative indefinite negative 
    (‘wh-’) (‘some-’) (‘no-’) 
person: kiu iu neniu 
thing:  kio io nenio 
property: kia ia nenia 
place:  kie ie nenie 
time:  kiam iam neniam 
manner: kiel iel neniel 
 
 A priori, it seems logical that the indefinite meaning should be expressed by 
a maximally unmarked form, as in the Esperanto series iu ‘someone’, io 
‘something’, etc. After all, indefiniteness is not a concrete, positive meaning that 
can be easily described. Instead, indefiniteness seems to be very similar to the 
absence of any meaning at all, and from this point of view, it makes sense to 
give indefinite pronouns a maximally unmarked form. 
 However, natural languages that are structured like Esperanto in this respect 
are virtually unattested. I am not aware of a clear case in which an indefinite 
pronoun is formally unmarked with respect to a marked interrogative pronoun. 
With respect to its indefinite pronoun system, Esperanto is thus probably not a 
possible human language. The derived nature of indefinite pronouns is one of 
the cross-linguistic observations that call for an explanation. 
 Let us briefly examine possible exceptions to the rule that if there is a basic-
derived relation between interrogatives and indefinites, it is always the 
indefinites which are derived. In a large number of languages, indefinites and 
interrogatives are formally identical (see §3.1.2.1 and §7.3). Now some 
languages require a sentential interrogative marker in question sentences, and 
when this interrogative marker attaches to the interrogative pronoun, it might 
look as if it were derived from the unmarked indefinite pronoun.5a  In the 
Australian language Ngiyambaa (Donaldson 1980: 148-50), 
interrogative/indefinite roots must be combined with special sentential 
markers both when used as interrogatives and when used as indefinites. Thus, 
minja- ‘what/something’ appears as minja-wa: ‘what?’ or as minjaN-ga: 
‘something’. Thus Ngiyambaa has a system where indefinites are based not 
directly on interrogatives, but on the same base as interrogatives. 
 Exceptions to the general rule that indefinite pronouns are derived are rare, 
but occasionally we find indefinite pronouns or even whole series that are not 
synchronically related to anything else, as exemplified by the cases in (28). 
 
(28) a. German 
   nichts ‘nothing’ 
   nirgends ‘nowhere’ 
  b. Catalan  
   ningú ‘anybody’ 
   res  ‘anything’ 
   enlloc ‘anywhere’  
   mai ‘ever’ 
   cap  ‘no’ 
  c. Hindi/Urdu 
   koii  ‘someone’ 
   kuch ‘something’ 
   kahi$ ‘somewhere’ 
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   kabhii ‘sometime’ 
 
Such cases are not uncommon in the Indo-European languages of Europe, but 
outside of Europe they are rare. In my 100-language sample, I have found such 
indefinites only in five languages. Diachronically all the above indefinites are 
known to go back to interrogatives or generic nouns plus an indefiniteness 
marker (or negation).  
 
3.1.2. The derivational bases of indefinite pronouns 
 
In the previous subsection we saw that indefinite pronouns are generally 
marked as such by different kinds of indefiniteness markers. Thus, indefinite 
pronouns are generally derived forms. But what are they derived from? 
 There are two main types of derivational bases from which indefinite 
pronouns are derived in the world’s languages: (i) INTERROGATIVE PRONOUNS, 
and (ii) GENERIC ONTOLOGICAL-CATEGORY NOUNS such as ‘person’, ‘thing’, 
‘place’, ‘time’, ‘manner’, etc. In addition, indefinite pronouns may be based on 
the numeral 'one'. 
  
3.1.2.1. Interrogative-based indefinites. Most of the examples of indefinite 
pronouns given in the preceding subsection illustrate interrogative-based 
indefinites: all four Polish series in (20b), two of the Lezgian series in (20c), as 
well as the Latin, Georgian, Russian, Japanese, Dutch, French, Malay and 
Chechen cases in (21-26) above. In descriptions of indefinites in individual 
languages or language families, we often find statements pointing to the 
seemingly remarkable fact that indefinite pronouns are based on interrogative 
pronouns (e.g. Frei (1940) on Indo-European, Beke (1913-14: 130) on Finno-
Ugrian). This fact may be surprising from the point of view of speakers of 
English or French (in which languages the words for ‘somebody’ and 
‘something’ are not based on interrogative pronouns), but it is in fact an ex-
tremely common phenomenon in languages across the world, as has been 
shown by two studies of the Stanford universals project. According to Ultan 
(1978: 230), 'indefinite words are at least in part either formally identical with or 
related to question words... The only possible exceptions to this statement in 
the present sample appear to be Samoan and Rotuman...' (Ultan’s sample 
consists of 79 languages, distributed world-wide.) And Moravcsik (1969) states: 
'The indefinite pronoun has been found to be identical or similar, in most cases, 
to some question pronoun.' Moravcsik lists 26 languages (representing all 
continents) which exhibit this similarity. In my sample of 100 languages, 63 
languages show this similarity. It is thus not as ubiquitous as Ultan’s results 
suggested, but clearly the majority of the world’s languages have interrogative-
based indefinite pronouns. 
 As Ultan and Moravcsik observe, indefinite pronouns are sometimes not 
overtly derived from interrogative pronouns, but are identical to them. For 
example, in Khmer, the shapes of indefinite pronouns (ne´q-naa ‘somebody’, 
qw´y ‘something’, etc.) are identical to those of interrogative pronouns (ne´q-naa? 
‘who?’, qw´y? ‘what?’, etc.), as shown by the following examples: 
 
(29) Khmer (Huffman 1967: 153, 155) 
  a. Look cON tIñ qw´y? 
   you want buy what 
   ‘What do you want to buy?’ 
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  b. Kñom tIñ qw´y ha´y, trOlOp tow pte´h. 
   I buy what:INDEF PRF return go house 
   ‘After I buy something, I’m going back home.’ 
 
In such cases we can say that indefinite pronouns are zero-derived (derived by 
conversion) from interrogative pronouns. Here one might object that the 
direction of derivation could just as well be the opposite: Interrogative pro-
nouns could be zero-derived from indefinite pronouns. However, this is 
unlikely because indefinite pronouns are usually expressed by more 
morphemes than, and usually derived from, interrogative pronouns. Hence, 
typologically indefinites are a marked category relative to interrogatives. 
Moravcsik (1969: 77) states this in even stronger terms: 'If [the indefinite 
pronoun and the question pronoun] are partially similar it is the indefinite 
pronoun whose shape includes morphologically that of the question pronoun.' 
Thus, there is a universal asymmetric markedness relation such that indefinite 
pronouns are usually more marked than and derived from interrogative 
pronouns. This asymmetry is sometimes neutralized (in languages like Khmer), 
but it is virtually never reversed. The semantic and diachronic relationship 
between indefinites and interrogatives will be further discussed below (§ 7.3). 
  
3.1.2.2. Generic-noun-based indefinites. The other main type of derivational 
basis, general ontological-category nouns, can be exemplified by the Persian 
indefinite series in (30). 
 
(30) Persian 
  kas-i ‘someone’            lit. ‘a person’ 
  cˇ iz-i ‘something’ ‘a thing’ 
  (dær) yek jˇ â-yi ‘somewhere’ ‘(at) one place’ 
  yek vaVt-i ‘sometime’ ‘one time’ 
  yek towr-i ‘somehow’ ‘one manner’ 
 
These indefinite pronouns are based on the general nouns kas ‘person’, cˇ iz 
‘thing’, jˇ â ‘place’, etc. The indefiniteness marker -(y)i also occurs in ordinary 
indefinite noun phrases (e.g. ketâb-i ‘a book’), so it seems that there is nothing 
special about the expressions in (30): They are perhaps not indefinite pronouns 
at all, but ordinary indefinite noun phrases that Persian uses to express what 
many other languages express by means of indefinite pronouns. 
 It may well be that this is the correct analysis for some languages (cf. the 
discussion in § 3.3). However, there are many cases where combinations of a 
generic ontological-category noun plus an indefiniteness marker have been 
grammaticalized sufficiently to  qualify as real pronouns. A good example is 
provided by English somebody, something, sometime, someplace, anybody, etc. 
These forms are clearly distinct from the indefinite NPs some body, some thing, 
some time, etc., both semantically and formally, and thus show that indefinite 
pronouns can be derived from general ontological-category nouns.vi 
 Another example is provided by Hebrew isˇ , discussed in Glinert (1982: 460-
61). This is both a noun (‘man’) and an indefinite pronoun (‘anyone’), so one 
might ask whether these are really two different items (with isˇ  ‘anyone, no one’ 
derived from isˇ  ‘man’) The answer is yes: That isˇ  ‘anyone, no one’ is a separate 
lexical item is shown by three syntactic facts: (i) isˇ  ‘anyone, no one’ is restricted 
to negative-polarity contexts (cf. § 3.2.2), as shown in (31a-b); (ii) isˇ  ‘anyone, no 
one’ allows a partitive phrase, like other pronouns, cf. (32); and (iii) isˇ  ‘anyone, 
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no one’ cannot be modified by an adjective, cf. (33). In all these respects, isˇ  
‘man’ behaves differently. 
 
Hebrew (Glinert 1982: 461) 
(31) a. Im yesapru zot le-isˇ ,... 
   if they:tell that to-man 
   ‘If they tell it to anyone/to a man,...’ 
  b. Sipru zot le-isˇ . 
   they:tell that to-man 
   ‘They will tell it to a man <*to anyone>.’ 
(32) Isˇ  mehem lo hesˇ iv. 
  anyone of:them NEG replied 
  ‘None of them replied.’ <*A man of them didn't reply.> 
(33) Lo haya sˇ am isˇ  meyuÌad. 
  NEG was there man special 
  ‘A special man was not there.’ <*No one special was there.> 
 
These syntactic differences show that the pronoun isˇ  is a different lexical item 
and can be regarded as derived (at least diachronically) from the general noun 
isˇ  ‘man’. 
 In my 100-language sample, I registered 42 languages with generic-noun-
based indefinites. It may be that many of these cases are not really indefinite 
pronouns, but represent languages that lack indefinite pronouns (cf. § 3.3). But 
my suspicion is that subtle differences like those cited above can be found in 
many of these languages. See § 7.5.1 below for further discussion of the use of 
generic nouns as indefinite pronouns. 
 
3.1.2.3. ‘One’-based indefinites.  The two types of derivational bases discussed 
above are by far the most important ones for the overwhelming majority of 
indefinite pronouns in the languages that I have surveyed. However, a minor 
third type should also be mentioned: the numeral ‘one’. 
 Most often this numeral is used in the sense ‘somebody’, and it is not un-
common in languages where indefinite pronouns are not based on inter-
rogatives. For example, in Egyptian Arabic, ‘someone’ is waaÌid, and English 
someone is of course also a case in point. Since the numeral ‘one’ is usually the 
source for the grammaticalization of indefinite articles (cf. e.g. Givón 1981), it is 
hardly surprising that it should be used as the basis of an indefinite pronoun as 
well. Why it should consistently have the meaning ‘someone’ rather than 
‘something’ is less obvious, but this must have to do with the unique 
importance of individuality for people. Very rare are cases like Lezgian (cf. 
(20c) above) where the numeral ‘one’ (sa) is also the basis of adverbial indefinite 
pronouns such as sana ‘somewhere’, sak’(a) ‘somehow’. See below § 7.5.2 for 
further discussion of the role of ‘one’ in indefinite pronouns. 
 
3.1.3. The ontological categories 
 
It is an interesting question why indefinite pronoun series should consist 
precisely of words for ontological categories such as ‘person’, ‘thing’, 
‘property’, ‘place’, ‘time’, ‘manner’, ‘amount’, ‘reason’. For example, why are 
more concrete features like color and size or more abstract notions like con-
cession systematically absent from lists of indefinite pronouns? Jackendoff 
1983:48-56 argues that such ontological categories reflect the major constituents 
of conceptual structure. Still, one might want to know why conceptual structure 
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is made up precisely of these constituents (see Heine et al. (1991: 55-58) for some 
recent discussion). 
 Fascinating though this question is, I will not pursue it further here because 
it is not specific to indefinite pronouns. Independently of genetic and areal 
affiliation, languages express roughly the same ontological categories as 
interrogative and demonstrative pronouns, as well as several more specific 
pronoun types (e.g. relative pronouns) that are not universal. Since the different 
types of pronouns generally show parallels in the way they express the various 
ontological categories, traditional grammars of Indo-European languages often 
contain a table of 'correlative pronouns' (including pronominal adverbs), e.g. 
Table 3 for Classical Greek. 
 
Table 3. 'Correlative pronouns' in Classical Greek (somewhat simplified) 
———————————————————————————————— 
ontological interrogative demonstrative relative indefinite 
category pronouns pronouns pronouns pronouns 
 
person tís hou$tos hós tis 
     ‘who?’  ‘this’  ‘which’  ‘someone’ 
thing  tí  –  –  ti 
     ‘what?’      ‘something’ 
property poi$os toiósde hoi$os poiós 
     ‘what kind?’  ‘this kind’  ‘which kind’  ‘some kind’ 
place pou$ ekei$ hou$ pou 
     ‘where?’  ‘there’  ‘where’  ‘somewhere’ 
time  póte tóte hóte poté 
     ‘when?’  ‘then’  ‘when’  ‘sometime’ 
manner põs hoúto¯ s ho¯ s po¯ s 
     ‘how?’  ‘like this’  ‘as’  ‘somehow’ 
amount pósos tosósde hósos posós 
     ‘how much?’  ‘this much’  ‘how much’  ‘some amount’ 
———————————————————————————————— 
Such an organization of the various types of pronouns is not only typical of 
Indo-European languages but can be observed in languages of different types 
(cf. the analogous table for Lezgian in Haspelmath (1993a: 188)). The pronoun 
types are characterized by their stems (Greek ti-/po-: interrogative/indefinite, 
(hou-)to-: demonstrative, ho-: relative) and show similar affixes for the various 
ontological categories (in Greek, -ou for place, -ote for time, -o¯ s for manner, 
etc.). There are various idiosyncrasies, as we expect for derivational 
morphology. 
 The seven ontological categories represented in Table 3 are the categories 
that are most often expressed by simple means in the languages of the world. 
Of course, it is always possible to create more specific complex expressions, e.g 
for color (interrogative what color?, indefinite of some color, etc.) or concession 
(interrogative: despite what?, indefinite despite something, etc.). This is what 
languages do which have fewer than these seven most common categories, e.g. 
English, where amount and property have to be expressed by a circumlocution 
(how much, what kind). 
 The distinction between human and non-human referents is made prac-
tically everywhere (‘who’ vs. ‘what’, ‘somebody’ vs. ‘something’), even in 
languages where humanness is not very prominent elsewhere in the grammar. 
Languages that assign a prominent role to other gender distinctions in their 
grammar (e.g. sex-based gender) nevertheless usually make the human/non-
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human distinction here, e.g. Classical Greek. Languages like Gothic which have 
a gender distinction here (hwas ‘who (masc.)’, hwo ‘who (fem.)’, hwat ‘what’) are 
rare, as are languages like Lithuanian which lack a human/non-human 
distinction (kas ‘who, what’). 
 The standard series of seven categories is most often enriched by the addi-
tion of further distinctions in the place category. Many languages have simple 
expressions for the directional notions ‘whither’ and ‘whence’, and sometimes 
also for the path notion ‘along where’ (e.g Polish te4dy ‘this way’). Furthermore, 
many languages have a determiner (‘which’) that is different from both the 
substantival ‘who’/‘what’ and the adjectival ‘what kind’. Another notion that is 
sometimes expressed by simple means is cause or reason (‘why’). 
 In general, there do not seem to be great differences between different types 
of pronouns with respect to which ontological categories they have. True, there 
are sometimes specific gaps for indefinite pronouns: For example, while 
English and German have simple cause interrogatives, why and warum, both 
languages lack the corresponding indefinites (*somewhy, *irgendwarum). 
However, Russian does have a regularly formed pronoun that expresses 
precisely this idea: pocˇ emu-to ‘for some reason’, from pocˇ emu ‘why’. Thus, the 
English and German gaps may well be accidental. 
 These few remarks on ontological categories should suffice. We now turn to 
a first overview of the functional distinctions expressed by indefinite pronouns, 
a topic of central concern to this work. 
 
 
3.2. The Main Functional Types of Indefinite Pronouns 
 
This section gives an informal description and exemplification of the most 
important functional distinctions that are expressed by different series of in-
definite pronouns. Most of these distinctions are discussed again in later parts 
of this work. 
 
3.2.1. Negation: negative indefinite pronouns 
 
Many languages have special indefinite pronouns that are only used in 
negative sentences where the scope of negation extends over the indefinite. For 
example, Latin nemo, English nothing, Bulgarian nikoj, and Lezgian sada-ni al-
ways express negation. Some of these indefinites contain a formally negative 
formative synchronically (Bulgarian ni-) or at least diachronically (English no-, 
Latin ne-), but many do not. 
 
(34) a. Latin 
   Nemo venit. 
   nobody came 
   ‘Nobody came.’ 
  b. English  
   I noticed nothing. 
  c. Bulgarian 
   Ni-koj ne  se obadi. 
   NEG-who NEG REFL phoned 
   ‘Nobody phoned.’ 
  d. Lezgian 
   Sada-ni za-z am zˇgˇ a-na-cˇ . 
   one.place-even I-DAT it:ABS find-AOR-NEG 
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   ‘I did not find it anywhere.’ 
 
Notice that in some languages, an indefinite pronoun by itself is sufficient to 
express sentential negation, e.g. in Latin and English, while in others the 
negative pronouns cooccur with verbal negation, e.g. in Bulgarian and Lezgian. 
 Other languages do not have any special negative indefinites, but employ in-
definites that are also used for other, non-negative functions. For instance, 
Swedish någon (ex. 35) and Bambara fEn (ex. 36) are not interpreted negatively 
when used in questions. In some cases, a sentence may even be ambiguous, 
interpretable as negative or non-negative, as exemplified by Hindi/Urdu (37). 
 
(35) Swedish 
  a. Fick du någon?  
   got you some 
   ‘Did you get any?’ 
  b. Jag har inte sett någon av dem. 
   I have not seen any of them 
   ‘I have not seen any of them.’ 
(36) Bambara (V.F. Vydrin, p.c.) 
  a. í yé fEn yé wà? 
   you PERF thing see Q 
   ‘Did you see anything?’ 
  b. n tE fEn fO 
   I NEG:FUT thing say 
   ‘I will not say anything.’ 
(37) Hindi/Urdu 
  a. Aaj koii aayaa. 
   to.day someone came 
   ‘Today somebody came.’ 
  b. Aaj koii  nahi$ aayaa. 
   today someone NEG came 
   ‘Today somebody didn’t come.’ Or: ‘Today nobody came.’ 
 
 An important subclassification of negation concerns the syntactic position of 
the negative element. In the cases that we have seen so far in this section, the 
negated indefinite pronoun is an argument of the negated clause. But the 
negated indefinite pronoun may also be in a subordinate clause, in particular in 
situations of negative raising (i.e. when the negation in the superordinate clause 
logically belongs to the subordinate clause). In such situations of 
SUPERORDINATE NEGATION, some languages use the same indefinite series  as in 
direct negation (cf. 38-39), but others require a different series (40-41).  
 
(38) Italian 
  a. Non è venuto nessuno. 
   not has come anybody 
   ‘Nobody has come.’ 
  b. Non è necessario che venga nessuno. 
   not is necessary that come anybody 
   ‘It is not necessary that anybody come.’ 
(39) Basque 
  a. Ez naiz i-noiz etorri-ko. 
   NEG I:AUX INDEF-when come-FUT 
   ‘I will never come.’ 
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  b. Ez dut uste gizon hori i-noiz ikusi dud-anik. 
   NEG I:it:AUX believe man that INDEF-when seen I:him:AUX-COMP 
   ‘I don’t believe that I’ve ever seen that man.’ 
(40) German 
  a. Niemand ist gekommen. 
   nobody is come 
   ‘Nobody came.’ 
  b. Es ist nicht nötig,  dass jemand kommt. 
   it is not necessary that someone comes 
   ‘It is not necessary that anybody come.’ 
(41) Hungarian 
  a. Nem lát-t-am sem-mi-t. 
   NEG see-PAST-1SG NEG-what-ACC 
   ‘I did not see anything.’  
  b. Nem hisz-em, hogy vala-ki lát-t-a volna. 
   NEG think-1SG that INDEF-who see-PAST-3SG SBJV 
   ‘I don’t think that anybody has seen it.’ 
 
Many languages also require special indefinites with implicitly negative ex-
pressions like the preposition ‘without’ or the verbs 'deny' and 'refuse', e.g. 
Russian nikakaja pomosˇcˇ  ‘no help’, but bez kakoj-libo pomosˇcˇ i ‘without any 
help’ (*bez nikakoj pomosˇcˇ i). Indefinites in such contexts of implicitly negative 
expressions and indefinites in the context of superordinate negation are usually 
the same, so they are treated together as INDIRECT NEGATION here. Van der 
Wouden (1994: ch. 1) shows that superordinate negation and implicit negation 
share the semantic property of anti-additivity (a Boolean property). Thus, the 
function of indirect negation as defined here is ultimately based on meaning. 
 Topics related to indefinite pronouns and negation will be treated in detail in 
chapter 8. 
 
3.2.2. Negative polarity (or scale reversal) 
 
Some series of indefinite pronouns in some languages are also associated with 
negative environments (like the negative pronouns in the previous section), but 
are not restricted to the expression of non-existence. In addition to negative 
clauses, they can also be used in conditional and interrogative clauses, in the 
standard of comparison, and in some further environments. Expressions that 
show this distribution are generally called NEGATIVE POLARITY ITEMS.vii  
 One type of negative polarity items are lexical minimal-unit expressions of 
the type (lift) a finger, (see) a living soul, which probably exist in all languages. 
But some languages also have indefinite series that show the same properties. 
The best-known negative-polarity indefinite is of course the English any-series, 
but similar indefinites can be found in many other languages (cf. Schmid 1980: 
ch. 3). 
 In the following, I will exemplify the various conditions under which 
negative polarity items are licensed mainly on the basis of examples from 
English (see Linebarger (1981, 1987), von Bergen and von Bergen (1993) for 
detailed studies of negative polarity in English). The (a) examples show 
minimal-unit negative-polarity items, and the (b) examples show indefinite 
pronouns. 
 In declarative affirmative sentences, negative-polarity items are ill-formed: 
 
(42) a. *He lifted a finger to help her. 
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  b. *He did anything to help her. 
 
 The central context where negative polarity items are licensed is direct (or 
clausemate) negation.  
 
(43) a. He didn’t lift a finger to help her. 
  b. He didn’t do anything to help her. 
 
Next, negative-polarity items are licensed in (especially polar) questions (i.e. 
interrogative sentences), 
 
(44) a. Would she lift a finger for you? 
  b. Have you heard anything new about the ozone hole? 
 
and in the protasis of a conditional sentence: 
 
(45) a. If you budge an inch, I’ll hit you. 
  b. If you tell anybody, we’ll punish you. 
 
Both questions and conditional protases are compatible with the truth of the 
corresponding negative clause, so might conceivably be interpreted as natural 
extensions of the prototypical licensing context (cf. Progovac 1994).  
 Negative-polarity items may also occur in quite a few non-negative contexts 
that only carry a negative implication od some kind. These include negative 
quantifiers like ‘few’, 
 
(46) a. Few people give a damn about the rain forest. 
  b. Few people show any interest in global issues. 
 
the restrictive focus particle ‘only’, 
 
(47) a. Only Mira has a hope in hell of passing. 
  b. Only Luozhu has anything substantial to report. 
 
the purposive complement of an excessive comparative (‘too’), 
 
(48) a. Khadija is too tired to give a damn. 
  b. Ayse is too occupied to invite anyone else. 
 
complements of implicitly negative verbs like ‘doubt’, 
 
(49) a. I doubt that Ronald gave a red cent to charity. 
  b. We doubt that Juan applied anywhere. 
 
and arguments of implicitly negative adpositions like ‘without’: 
 
(50) a. Noriko is getting by without lifting a finger. 
  b. Hannu is getting by without doing anything. 
 
 A context where the connection to negation is less obvious is the standard of 
comparison of inequality or equality: 
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(51) a. Cows fly more often than John lifts a finger to help Louise. 
  b. The boy can run faster than anyone in his class. 
 
(52) The boy runs as fast as anyone in his class. 
 
 Finally, negative-polarity items are licensed in relative clauses headed by a 
universal quantifier: 
 
(53) a. Everyone who knows a damn thing about Dyirbal knows that it’s  
   syntactically ergative. 
  b. Everyone who likes any kind of seafood will like our new seafood sticks. 
 
 To give some examples of negative-polarity indefinites from a less well-
known language, consider the Catalan indefinite series ningú ‘anybody’, res 
‘anything’, cap ‘any’, mai ‘ever’ etc.: 
 
(54) Catalan (Lleó 1983) 
  a. (direct negation) No  et demano res. 
       not you I:ask anything 
       ‘I do not ask you anything.’ 
  b. (interrogative) Hi ha res de nou? 
       there has anything of new 
       ‘Is there anything new?’ 
  c. (conditional)  Si el veus mai,... 
       if him you:see ever 
       ‘If you ever see him,...’ 
  d. (implicit negation) Sense dir res, va menjar la sopa.  
       without say anything did eat the soup 
       ‘Without saying anything, she ate the soup.’
  
 
 However, in-depth research on negative polarity has shown that the various 
contexts that are usually regarded as negative-polarity contexts behave by no 
means uniformly (see especially van der Wouden 1994). The most important 
subtypes of negative-polarity contexts are questions, conditionals, the standard 
of comparison, indirect negation, and direct negation. 
 We already saw in the preceding section that direct negation and indirect 
negation are two functions that must be distinguished. In addition to 
indefinites that can only be used in the scope of (direct or indirect) negation, 
there are also indefinites that are used in the other negative-polarity contexts 
but cannot be used in the contexts of direct negation. Such a case is the Russian 
-libo-series: 
 
(55) Ja ne videla *kogo-libo/ ni-kogo. 
  I not saw whom-INDEF/ INDEF-whom 
  ‘I didn’t see anyone.’ 
(56) a. Znajut li oni cˇ to-libo ob ozonnoj dyre? 
   know Q they what-INDEF about ozone hole 
   ‘Do they know anything about the ozone hole?’ 
  b. Esli ty skazˇ esˇ ’ komu-libo, my tebja nakazˇ em. 
   if you tell whom-INDEF we you punish 
   ‘If you tell anyone, we’ll punish you.’ 
  d. Malo kto pokazyvaet kakoj-libo interes v ètom. 
   few who shows which-INDEF interest in this 
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   ‘Few people show any interest in it.’ 
 
 Indefinite pronouns very often behave in the same way in questions and 
conditionals, but there are also indefinites that are restricted to questions and 
cannot be used in conditionals, e.g. the Persian hicˇ -series (cf. 57), and 
indefinites that are restricted to conditionals and cannot be used in questions, 
e.g. the Modern Greek -dhípote-series (cf. 58). 
 
(57) Persian 
  a. Âyâ hicˇ  cˇ iz-i mi-sˇ anav-i? 
   Q INDEF thing-INDEF IMPF-hear-2SG 
   ‘Can you hear anything?’ 
  b. *Agar hicˇ  cˇ iz-i sˇ anid-i, be man begu. 
   if INDEF thing-INDEF hear-2SG to me tell:IMPV 
   ‘If you hear anything, tell me.’ 
 
(58) Modern Greek 
  a. An dhis oti-dhípote, pés mu. 
   if you:see what-INDEF tell:IMPV me 
   ‘If you see anything (at all), tell me.’ 
  b. *Ídhes oti-dhípote? 
   you:saw what-INDEF 
   ‘Did you see anything (at all)?’ 
 
The standard of comparison stands apart from questions and conditionals in 
that very often an indefinite series that can be used in questions and 
conditionals is inadmissible in the standard of comparison, e.g. etwas in 
German (cf. 59). Conversely, indefinites that occur in the comparative context 




 a. Hast du etwas gesehen? 
  Did you see anything? 
 b. *Das steht dir besser als etwas anderes.viii 
  'This suits you better than anything else.' 
 
(60) Romanian (Beatrice Primus, p.c.) 
 a. Niculina fuge mai repede decît ori-ce fata* din clasa*. 
  Niculina runs more fast than INDEF-what girl in class 
  'Niculina runs faster than any girl in her class.' 
 b. *Daca* auzi ori-ce, trezes3te-ma*. 
  if hear:2SG INDEF-what wake-me 
  'If you hear anything, wake me up.' 
  
3.2.3. Specificity and non-specificity 
 
In some languages, different indefinite series are used depending on whether 
the indefinite NP is SPECIFIC or NON-SPECIFIC. The concept of specificity is a key 
concept in the semantics of reference and has been discussed extensively in the 
literature (cf., among many others, Seliverstova 1964, Fodor 1970, Jackendoff 
1972a: ch. 7, Ioup 1977, Croft 1983, Galmiche 1983, Fauconnier 1985, Paducˇ eva 
1985, Lavric 1990, Enç 1991). There is no universal agreement on what 
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phenomena fall under this concept, but there seems to be a broad consensus 
that it is best illustrated by a sentence such as (61). In this sentence, the NP a 
native speaker of Ainu is ambiguous between a specific reading and a non-
specific reading. On the specific reading, (61) could be continued by (62a), and 
on the non-specific reading it could be continued by (62b). 
 
(61) Nobuko wants to marry a native speaker of Ainu. 
(62) a. (specific) ...She fell in love with him during fieldwork sessions. 
 b. (non-specific) ...because she is Ainu herself, and she wants her  
  children to acquire her ancestors’ language. 
 
In the specific reading, the existence of a uniquely identified Ainu speaker is 
presupposed, whereas in the non-specific reading, the identity of the Ainu 
speaker has not been established. I will say (preliminarily) that an expression is 
specific if the speaker presupposes the existence and unique identifiability of its 
referent. 
 Several overt correlates of the specific/non-specific distinction have been 
cited in the literature, especially (i) 'discourse referents', (ii) paraphrasability by 
an existential sentence, and (iii) disambiguation by specific determiners. 
 (i) Only a specific NP can have a 'discourse referent', i.e. can be referred to by 
an anaphoric pronoun in a present indicative clause (Karttunen 1976: 366). 
 
(63) a. Cheolbai bought a bicycle [specific]. It is black. 
  b. Cheolbai wants to buy a bicycle [non-specific]. *It is black.ix 
 
 (ii) A paraphrase with an existential sentence is only possible with a specific 
NP (Heringer 1969: 90). 
 
(64) a. (specific) There is a native speaker of Ainu who Nobuko wants to  
   marry. She fell in love with him during fieldwork sessions. 
  b. (non-specific) *There is a native speaker of Ainu who Nobuko  
   wants to marry because she is Ainu herself... 
 
 (iii) There are determiner-like expressions in some languages which seem to 
force a specific reading, especially English a certain and its equivalents in other 
languages (e.g. German ein bestimmter, Dutch zeker, Russian opredelennyj, etc.) 
 
(65) English 
  (only specific)  Nobuko wants to marry a certain native speaker of Ainu. 
(66) German 
  (only specific) Murat möchte ein bestimmtes Gemälde kaufen. 
    Murat wants a certain painting buy 
    ‘Murat wants to buy a certain picture.’ 
      
 These three tests positively identify only specific NPs. However, once we 
bring indefinite pronouns into the picture, we also get a positive criterion for 
non-specific NPs. It is not uncommon for languages to have two different 
indefinite series for specific and non-specific NPs. I will give some examples 
from Russian, Lithuanian, Modern Greek, Georgian, and Kannada. The specific 
and non-specific indefiniteness markers are shown in (67). (The interrogative 
pronoun on which the indefinites are based is symbolyzed by 'WH'.) 
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(67)   specific non-specific 
 Russian WH-to WH-nibud’ 
 Lithuanian kazˇ -WH WH nors 
 Modern Greek kápjos etc. kanénas etc. 
 Georgian WH-Vac WH-me 
 Kannada WH-oo WH-aadaruu 
 
The following sentences illustrate the prototypical context with ‘want’: 
 
(68) Russian (Paducˇ eva 1985: 211) 
  a. Ivan xocˇ et  spet’ kakoj-to romans. 
   Ivan wants sing which-INDEF romance 
   ‘Ivan wants to sing some [specific] romance.’ 
  b. Ivan xocˇ et  spet’ kakoj-nibud’ romans. 
   Ivan wants sing which-INDEF romance 
   ‘Ivan wants to sing some [non-specific] romance.’ 
(69) Lithuanian (Pilka 1984: 57) 
  a. Ji nore%jo i4sigyti kazˇ -kokia4  preke4 (bet jos negavo). 
   she wanted acquire INDEF-which thing but it not:got 
   ‘She wanted to acquire some [specific] object (but she didn’t get it).’ 
  b. Ji nore%jo i4sigyti kokia4  nors preke4 (*bet jos negavo). 
   she wanted acquire which INDEF thing but it not:got 
   ‘She wanted to acquire some [non-specific] object  
   (*but she didn’t get it).’ 
(70) Modern Greek 
  a. Théli na pandreftí me kápja Elinídha. 
   wants SBJV he:marry with some Greek 
   ‘He wants to marry some [specific] Greek woman.’ 
  b. Théli na pandreftí me kamjá Elinídha. 
   wants SBJV he:marry with any Greek 
   ‘He wants to marry some [non-specific] Greek woman.’ 
 
 The specific/non-specific contrast is relevant in many other contexts. In 
some contexts, only specific NPs are possible. Such is the case, in particular, in 
affirmative declarative sentences in the perfective past or in the ongoing 
present. In such prototypical realis sentences, the speaker is committed to the 
existence and identifiability of the entity, and indefinites of the non-specific 
series are simply unacceptable. 
 
(71) Lithuanian (Pilka 1984: 29, 56) 
  a. *Kas nors ate%jo.     (OK: Kazˇ -kas  ate%jo.) 
   who INDEF came        INDEF-who came 
   ‘Somebody came.’ 
  b. *Zˇ iu¯ re%-k, kas nors be%ga.  (OK: Kazˇ -kas  be%ga.) 
   look-IMPV who INDEF runs     INDEF-who runs 
   ‘Look, somebody is running.’ 
(72) Modern Greek 
  *Kanénas írthe.      (OK: Ká-pjos  írthe.) 
  anyone came         INDEF-who came 
  ‘Somebody came.’ 
(73) Kannada (Bhat 1981: 7) 
  *Yaar-aadaruu bandaru.    (OK: Yaar-oo bandaru.) 
  who-INDEF came        who-INDEF came 
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  ‘Someone came.’ 
 
 The same ambiguity as in ‘want’ contexts is observed in various types of 
other IRREALIS contexts (cf. Croft (1983) for this use of the term irrealis). One 
such irrealis context is in future sentences. Since the event is in the future and is 
not realized yet, the speaker is not committed to the existence of the referent. 
 
(74) Russian 
  a. V subbotu oni uedut kuda-to. 
   in Saturday they go whither-INDEF 
   ‘On Saturday they will go somewhere [specific].’ 
  b. V subbotu oni uedut kuda-nibud’. 
   in Saturday they go whither-INDEF 
   ‘On Saturday they will go somewhere [non-specific].’ 
 
 Other irrealis contexts are created by various kinds of non-indicative 
modality, e.g. the verb ‘can’. 
 
(75) Lithuanian (Pilka 1984: 29) 
  a. Gali kazˇ -kas ateiti. 
   can INDEF-who come 
   ‘Someone [specific] can come.’ 
  b. Gali kas nors ateiti. 
   can who INDEF come 
   ‘Someone [non-specific] can come.’ 
(76) Kannada (Bhat 1981: 4) 
  Raamu ellig-aadaruu hoodaanu. 
  Ramu whither-INDEF go:may 
  ‘Ramu may go somewhere [non-specific].’ 
 
 Non-specific NPs are also admitted in a perfective past and ongoing present 
sentence when the sentence is qualified by some indication of epistemic 
modality. 
 
(77) Lithuanian (Pilka 1984: 50) 
  Matyt, kas nors juo bus pasiskunde4s. 
  apparently who INDEF her was complaining 
  ‘Apparently someone [non-specific] complained about her.’ 
(78) Russian (Kobozeva 1981) 
  Kazˇ etsja, kto-nibud’ priblizˇ aetsja. 
  seems who-INDEF approaches 
  ‘Apparently someone [non-specific] is approaching.’ 
 
Although these sentences are set in the past and present, respectively, the 
speaker’s uncertainty makes them qualify as irrealis, and indefinites may be 
non-specific. 
 In addition to irrealis contexts, ambiguity can also be found in distributive 
contexts, for example in the indefinite object NP when the subject is marked as 
distributive-key: 
 
(79) Lithuanian (Pilka 1984: 127) 
  a. Visi kazˇ -ka4  skaite%. 
   all INDEF-what read 
   ‘Everybody is reading something [specific].’ 
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  b. Visi ka4  nors skaite%. 
   all what INDEF read 
   ‘Everybody is reading something [non-specific].’ 
 
The difference here is that in (79a), everybody reads the same thing, whereas in 
(79b), different people may be reading different things. The event in (79b) is 
taking place at the moment of speech, so the speaker must presuppose the 
existence of the reading material, but since it is distributed over the referents of 
the subject NP (‘everybody’), it is not a UNIQUE object and therefore also 
qualifies as non-specific. 
 In another type of distributive context, the indefinite NP is distributed over a 




  a. Po subbotam sjuda priezzˇ aet kto-to iz Derbenta. 
   on Saturdays hither comes who-INDEF from Derbent 
   ‘On Saturdays someone [specific] from Derbent comes here.’ 
  b. Po  subbotam  sjuda  priezzˇ aet  kto-nibud’  iz  Derbenta. 
   on Saturdays hither comes  who-INDEF from Derbent 
   ‘On Saturdays someone [non-specific] from Derbent comes here.’ 
(81) Modern Greek (Veloudis 1982: 181) 
  Érxete póte-póte kanís ipopsífios. 
  comes when-when any candidate 
  ‘Now and then a candidate comes.’ 
 
 So far we have seen contexts where only specific indefinites are allowed 
(realis contexts) and contexts where either specific or non-specific indefinites 
may occur (irrealis contexts). In addition, there are also contexts where only 
non-specific indefinites may occur. These are irrealis contexts where the specific 
meaning is excluded for pragmatic reasons. 
 First of all, let us consider imperatives. Imperatives describe an unrealized 
event, hence non-specific indefinites are admissible, as in (82-85) (a). In this 
context, specific indefinites do not have another meaning (as in the other 
irrealis contexts), but are excluded, as shown by (82-85) (b). 
 
(82) Lithuanian (Pilka 1984: 56) 
  a. Aplanky-kite mana kada nors. 
   visit-IMPV.2PL me when INDEF 
   ‘Visit me sometime [non-specific].’ 
  b. *Aplanky-kite mana kazˇ -kada. 
   visit-IMPV.2PL me INDEF-when 
   ‘Visit me sometime [specific].’ 
(83) Russian 
  a. Kupi mne kakuju-nibud’ gazetu. 
   buy me which-INDEF paper 
   ‘Buy me some [non-specific] newspaper.’ 
  b. *Kupi mne kakuju-to gazetu. 
   buy me which-INDEF paper 
   ‘Buy me some [specific] newspaper.’ 
(84) Modern Greek (Dhelverúdhi 1989: 413) 
  a. Píjene ke vres kanéna náfti. 
   go and find any sailor 
   ‘Go and find some [non-specific] sailor.’ 
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  b. *Píjene  ke vres kápjo náfti. 
   go and find some sailor 
   ‘Go and find some [specific] sailor.’ 
(85) Kannada (Bhat 1981: 6) 
  a. Ellig-aadaruu hoogu. 
   whither-INDEF go:IMPV 
   ‘Go somewhere [non-specific].’ 
  b. *Ellig-oo hoogu. 
   whither-INDEF go:IMPV 
   ‘Go somewhere [specific].’ 
 
Specific indefinites in imperatives are inadmissible because they would violate 
Grice’s cooperative principle (this was observed in Kobozeva (1981) and Croft 
(1983)). On the one hand, the speaker asks the hearer to do something, but on 
the other hand he or she withholds some crucial information from the hearer. 
For instance, by uttering a sentence like (83b), the speaker would make it clear 
that he presupposes a unique newspaper that the hearer should buy, but does 
not say which one. Thus, the hearer cannot be expected to be able to fulfill the 
request. By contrast, if the speaker uses a non-specific NP (kakuju-nibud’ gazetu 
in (83a)), he thereby signals to the hearer that the identity of the newspaper is 
immaterial. It is left to the hearer to select a newspaper, and he is therefore in a 
position to fulfill the request. 
 A very similar account can be given for questions. In questions, too, in-
definite phrases can only be non-specific. Some examples are given in (86-89). 
 
(86) Russian (Paducˇ eva 1985: 212) 
  a. Uvidel  li vy kogo-nibud’? 
   saw Q you whom-INDEF 
   ‘Did you see anyone?’ 
  b. *Uvideli li vy kogo-to? 
   saw Q you whom-INDEF 
(87) Kannada (Bhat 1981: 6) 
  a. Raamu ellig-aadaruu hoodan-oo? 
   Ramu whither-INDEF go:he:did-Q 
   ‘Did Ramu go anywhere [non-specific]?’ 
  b. *Raamu ellig-oo hoodan-oo? 
   Ramu whither-INDEF go:he:did-Q 
   ‘Did Ramu go somewhere [specific]?’ 
(88) Lithuanian (Pilka 1984: 58) 
  Tu skaitei ka4  nors apie maju4 kultura4? 
  you read what INDEF on Mayas’ culture 
  ‘Did you read anything [non-specific] about the culture of the Mayas?’ 
(89) Modern Greek (Dhelverúdhi 1989: 411) 
  Sinándises kanénan ekí pu píjes? 
  you.met anyone there where you.went 
  ‘Did you meet anyone [non-specific] at the place where you went?’ 
 
Pragmatically, questions are closely related to imperatives: They are requests 
by the speaker to the hearer to supply missing information. By using a specific 
indefinite phrase in a question, the hearer would again withhold some crucial 
information from the hearer, thereby violating Grice’s cooperative principle. 
 Questions in many ways behave similarly to conditional protases. Like 
questions, conditional protases admit only non-specific indefinite phrases, no 
specific indefinite phrases (cf. Croft 1983). Examples: 
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(90) Kannada (Bhat 1981: 7) 
  a. Yaar-aadaruu bandare heel5utteene. 
   who-INDEF come:COND tell:FUT:1SG 
   ‘I will tell you if anyone [non-specific] comes.’ 
  b. *Yaar-oo bandare heel5utteene. 
   who-INDEF come:COND tell:FUT:1SG 
   ‘I will tell you if anyone [specific] comes.’ 
(91) Modern Greek (Dhelverúdhi 1989: 413) 
  An me dhí kanís pu dhe me kséri,... 
  if me sees anyone that not me knows 
  ‘If anyone [non-specific] sees me who doesn’t know me...’ 
 
The explanation for this fact is less straightforward, but it seems possible to 
extend the account given for imperatives and questions if we recall that a 
conditional can be thought of as an instruction to the hearer: 'Suppose someone 
sees me who doesn’t know me...'. Again, we have the basic imperative structure 
that leads to pragmatic unacceptability when it contains a specific indefinite 
phrase. 
 Now that we have seen questions and conditional protases among the 
contexts for non-specific indefinites, I should point out that there is an overlap 
with negative-polarity contexts here: Questions and conditionals are also 
negative-polarity contexts (see the previous section). This fact has received little 
or no attention in the literature, but it is important in the present context. As we 
will see in chapter 4, there are quite a few languages in which the same 
indefinite pronoun is used both in irrealis non-specific environments (i.e. 
imperatives, future, modality, ‘want’, etc.) and in negative-polarity 
environments. 
 The overlap between non-specificity and negative-polarity contexts extends 
further to the core cases of negative polarity: Any indefinite phrase that is in the 
scope of negation is non-specific. However, unlike questions and conditionals, 
negative sentences also allow specific indefinite phrases. Consider the examples 
in (92-93). 
 
(92) (non-specific)  Niklas couldn’t see anything. (*Everyone else saw it.) 
(93) (specific)   Niklas didn’t see something. (Everyone else saw it,  
       only Niklas missed it) 
 
A specific indefinite pronoun in a negative sentence (as in 93) is a rare 
phenomenon (cf. Givón 1978), but it is by no means impossible. The context 
provided in (93) shows that such sentences are plausible in appropriate cir-
cumstances. In (93), the indefinite phrase is not in the scope of negation, as can 
be shown by the paraphrase in (94). 
 
(94) There was something that Niklas didn’t see. 
 
 When an indefinite phrase is in the scope of negation, it is necessarily non-
specific. Some languages use their usual non-specific indefinites in negative 
contexts as well, e.g. Greek. 
 
(95) Modern Greek 
  a. Direct negation 
   Dhen ídha kanéna. 
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   not I:saw anyone 
   ‘I didn’t see anybody.’ 
  b. Implicit negation 
   Xorís na dhó kanéna... 
   without SBJV I:see anyone 
   ‘Without seeing anybody...’ 
  c. Superordinate negation 
   Dhen pistévo pos kanénas írthe. 
   not I:believe that anyone came 
   ‘I don’t think that anyone came.’ 
 
However, many other languages use special indefinites in negative contexts, 
either special negative pronouns (§ 3.2.1), or other specialized indefinites. Thus, 
Russian -nibud’-indefinites cannot be used in sentences like (95a-c), and 
Lithuanian nors-indefinites cannot be used for direct negation as in (95a). 
 We can now summarize the contexts where specific and non-specific in-
definite phrases are allowed as in Figure 2. In one type of contexts, only specific 
indefinites are possible, in another type both are possible but there is a meaning 
difference, and in a third type, only non-specific indefinite phrases are allowed. 
Negative polarity overlaps only partially with this third type, because 
imperatives are not negative-polarity contexts. 
 




















no negative polarity negative polarity 
 
 
Based on these semantic distinctions, we can already identify one important 
parameter of cross-linguistic variation: In some languages, different indefinite 
series distinguish between negative polarity and no negative polarity (e.g. 
English, Catalan, § 3.2.2.), in other languages different indefinite series 
distinguish between specificity and non-specificity (e.g. Russian, Modern 
Greek, Kannada).   
 
3.2.4. Knowledge of the speaker 
 
Another semantic factor that is sometimes relevant in choosing between 
different indefinite series is the knowledge of the speaker: The speaker may or 
may not be able to identify the referent of the indefinite pronoun. This 
classification applies only to specific phrases, in which the identifiability of 
their referents is presupposed. With non-specific phrases, whose referents are 
not identifiable in principle, the question of identifiability by the speaker does 
not even arise – such expressions are necessarily unknown to the speaker. The 
possibilities can be summarized as in Figure 3. 
 
  48 









to the speaker 
 
known  





 In Russian, for example, the -to-series can only be used if the referent cannot 
be identified by the speaker. Thus, in (96a) the speaker does not know who it 
was that Masˇ a met, and in (96b) the speaker has forgotten what she wanted to 
tell the hearer. 
 
(96) a. Masˇ a vstretilas’ s kem-to okolo universiteta. 
   Masˇ a met with who-INDEF near university 
   ‘Masˇ a met with somebody near the university.’ 
  b. Cˇ to-to ja tebe xotela skazat’. (Paducˇ eva 1985: 211) 
   what-INDEF I you wanted tell 
   ‘I wanted to tell you something.’ 
 
Example (97a) implies that the speaker has already forgotten who she met with, 
which makes the sentence somewhat odd, and (97b) is completely deviant, 
because it is incoherent to utter a desire about something specific that one 
cannot identify. 
 
(97) a. ?Ja vstretilas'  s kem-to segodnja v 19  cˇ asov. 
   I met with who-INDEF today at 19 hours 
   ‘I met with someone [unknown to me] today at 19 hours.’ 
  b. *Ja xocˇ u  spet’ kakoj-to romans. (Paducˇ eva 1985: 211) 
   I want sing which-INDEF romance 
   ‘I want to sing some [specific, unknown] romance.’ 
 
If the referent can be identified by the speaker but the speaker chooses to 
withhold the information about its identity from the hearer, the koe-series or the 
determiner odin ‘one’ is used in Russian: 
 
(98) a. Ja  vstretilas’  s  odnim  cˇ elovekom  segodnja  v  19  cˇ asov. 
   I met with one person today at 19 hours 
   ‘I met with someone [known to me] at 19 hours.’ 
  b. Masˇ a vstretilas’ koe  s  kem  okolo universiteta. 
   Masˇ a met INDEF with who  near university 
   ‘Masa met with someone [known to me] near the university.’ 
 
 The semantic distinction of (lack of) knowledge of the speaker is not nearly 
as important as the two factors discussed in the previous sections, negative 
polarity and (non-)specificity. It has received very little attention in the 
theoretical literature. However, it can be found in quite a few languages. In my 
40-language sample, I found evidence for such a distinction in ten languages. 
 In Kannada, indefinites of the WH-oo-series are always specific and imply 
that the speaker cannot identify the referent (see Bhat (1981), who calls this 
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'physical identification'). Thus (99) is unambiguously specific, and the speaker 
does not know which book Ramu wants. 
 
(99) Kannada (Bhat 1981: 3) 
  Raamu-vige yaavud-oo ondu pustaka beekaagide. 
  Ramu-DAT which-INDEF one book want:having:is 
  ‘Ramu wants a [specific, unknown] book.’ 
    
 In Lithuanian, the kai-series is restricted to indefinites whose reference is 
known to the speaker, while the kazˇ -series is used when the reference is 
unknown to the speaker (this is not surprising since the original meaning of kazˇ 
- is ‘the speaker does not know’, see § 6.2.1): 
 
(100) Lithuanian (Pilka 1984: 97,29) 
  a. Turiu kai ka4  <?*kazˇ -ka4> tiktai tau vienai pasakyti. 
   I:have INDEF what INDEF-what only to:you alone to:say 
   ‘I’ve got something to say that’s for your ears alone.’ 
  b. Kazˇ -kas ate%jo. 
   INDEF-who came 
   ‘Somebody came (I don’t know who).’ 
 
 In German, the indefinites jemand ‘someone’ and etwas ‘something’ may be 
expanded by the prefixed indefiniteness marker irgend only if the referent 
cannot be identified by the speaker. Thus, in (101a) the speaker may or may not 
know who called, and the hearer could ask who it was. By using irgend in 
(101b), the speaker makes it clear that he is ignorant about the caller’s identity, 
so the hearer cannot ask who it was. 
 
(101) German 
  a. Jemand hat angerufen. (—Wer war es?) 
   ‘Someone called. (—Who was it?)’ 
  b. Irgend jemand hat angerufen. (*—Wer war es?) 
   ‘Someone (I don’t know who) called. (*Who was it?)’ 
 
In English, too, the (lack of) knowledge of the speaker is relevant, as was 
pointed out in Warfel (1972) (cf. also Wierzbicka 1980b: 325, Croft 1983). The 
determiner some (pronounced [sUm], stressable), when used with a singular 
count noun, implies that the speaker cannot identify the referent. In (102a-c), 
the continuations in parentheses presuppose identifiability by the speaker and 
are therefore excluded. 
 
(102) English (Warfel 1972: 43-4) 
  a. John is looking for some book on reserve (*and I know which one). 
  b. Hortense is watching for some sailor who’s due in port today. 
   (*He is a friend of mine.) 
  c. Ralph is worried because he lost some letter he was supposed to mail  
   (*but I have it right here). 
 
Note that some behaves differently in this respect from the most frequent 
members of the some-series: someone and something can be used irrespectively of 
whether the speaker can identify the referent or not. 
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3.2.5. Free-choice indefinite pronouns 
 
Many languages have a special series of indefinite pronouns to express the 
meaning of free choice, as illustrated in (103). Such indefinites are often 
prosodically prominent in the sentence. 
 
(103) a. English 
   After the fall of the Wall, East Germans were free to travel anywhere. 
  b. Russian 
   Ty mozˇ esˇ ’ sdelat’ cˇ to ugodno. 
   you can do what INDEF 
   'You can do anything.' 
  c. Lezgian (Haspelmath 1993a: 195) 
   Mac’a-laj wucˇ  xˆ ajit’ani alaq’-zawa-j-di  ja. 
   Mac’-SUPERDIR what INDEF  be.able-IMPF-PTCP-SBST is 
   ‘Mac’ can do anything.’ 
  d. Hungarian (Stephanides 1985: 80) 
   A cikk-ek-et meg-ir-hat-om bár-hol, bár-milyen  
   the article-PL-ACC PREV-write-POT-1SG INDEF-where INDEF-which 
   körülmény-ek között. 
   circumstance-PL under 
   ‘I can write the articles anywhere, under any circumstances.’ 
  e. Tagalog (Schachter and Otanes 1972: 532) 
   Ang kahit na sinu-mang piyanista ay 
   TOP INDEF LK who-INDEF:LK pianist PT  
   makakatugtog ng ganyang piyesa. 
   can:play   GEN such:LK piece 
   ‘Any pianist can play a piece like that.’ 
 
Free-choice indefinites are semantically similar to universal quantifiers like 
‘every’ (‘everyone’, ‘everything’, etc.). In many environments, free-choice 
indefinites can be replaced by universal quantifiers without a noticeable change 
in the truth conditions. 
 However, there is always a difference in meaning between free-choice in-
definites and universal quantifiers, and in many contexts there is also a sig-
nificant difference in the truth conditions, as pointed out by Vendler (1967) 
(who also coined the now widespread term free choice). For example, (104a) is 
quite different from (104b). 
 
(104) a. (free choice) You can take any apple. 
  b. (universal) You can take every apple. 
 
The precise characterization of the meaning of free-choice indefinites has 
proved to be a difficult task. I discuss various theoretical approaches to free-
choice indefinites below in § 5.2.1, § 5.5. 
 In this section, I will concentrate on presenting and characterizing the 
contexts where free-choice indefinites may occur. There seems to be very little 
cross-linguistic variation in the conditions under which free-choice indefinites 
are possible, and the examples from different languages in the following should 
be taken as illustrating the uniformity of free-choice indefinites, not as pointing 
to typological differences. 
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 The first thing to note is that free-choice indefinites are semantically non-
specific, so they cannot occur in contexts which do not allow non-specific 
indefinites, i.e. in perfective past and ongoing present contexts: 
 
(105) a. English 
   *Anyone lived in a pretty town. 
  b. Russian 
   *Ona kupila cˇ to ugodno. 
   she bought what INDEF 
   ‘She bought anything.’ 
 
 However, free-choice indefinites are much more restricted than non-specific 
indefinites. The most typical environment for them are sentences that express 
possibility, be it objective possibility or permission (as illustrated in (103a-e) 
above). In most other typical non-specific contexts, free-choice indefinites are 
awkward, although they are somewhat better in these contexts than in specific 
contexts. 
 
(106) a. ‘want’ 
   ?*Nobuko wants to marry any man who speaks Ainu. 
  b. imperative 
   ?*When you go to town tomorrow, please buy me anything. 
  c. future 
   ?*Next week Mahmut will go anywhere. 
 
In particular, free-choice indefinites are bad in contexts of necessity, which is in 
striking contrast to their acceptability in contexts of possibility (cf. Horn 1972: 
143). 
 
(107) a. You can <*must> marry anybody. 
  b. I allow <*require> you to marry anybody. 
 
 However, free-choice indefinites are allowed in imperatives if the imperative 
is interpreted as a permission rather than as a command. As was pointed out by 
Strickland (1982: 19-20), out of context an utterance like (108) sounds odd, but 
in a context such as (109) or (110), imperatives with any are quite acceptable. 
 
(108) ??Bring me any chair. 
(109) A — What chair do you want? 
  B — Oh, bring me any chair. It doesn’t matter. 
(110) A — Bring me a chair. 
  B — Which one? 
  A — Oh, any one. 
 
 The reason for the acceptability of the free-choice indefinite in (109) is that 
although the sentence is structurally an imperative sentence, its communicative 
force is not that of a command. In the context it is already clear to A that B 
wants A to bring a chair, and B’s utterance in (109) is functionally equivalent to 
‘You can bring me any chair’. Similarly, in (110) A’s elliptical utterance any one 
can be completed not only by the corresponding parts of A’s previous utterance 
(bring me), but one could also say that the non-elliptical version of any one 
would be any one is possible (or similar). Compare also the analogous example 
from Lithuanian (ka4 nors ‘something’, bet ka4 ‘anything (free choice)’). 
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(111) Lithuanian (Pilka 1984: 140) 
  Nupir-k man ka4  nors <*bet ka4> paskaityti. — O ka4? — 
  buy-IMPV for:me what INDEF INDEF what to:read and what  
  Bet ka4 . 
  INDEF what 
  ‘Buy me something to read. — And what? — Anything.’ 
 
 A related case are imperatives that function in a way similar to conditional 
antecedents. In the sentences in (112), where in each case a free-choice 
indefinite is used, the imperative clauses are not commands, but challenges by 
the speaker that serve to emphasize the speaker’s argument. Again, a 
paraphrase with ‘can’ is always possible. 
 
(112) a. English (Strickland 1982: 33) 
   Go ask anyone. You’ll see that I’m right. 
  b. French (Strickland 1982: 33) 
   Demande à n’importe qui. 
   ‘Ask anyone.’ 
  c.  Yakut (Ubrjatova (ed.) 1982: 207) 
   Kim-ten baVarar yjyt-yN, itinnik etiextere. 
   who-ABL INDEF ask-iMPV.2PL everybody will:say 
   ‘Ask anyone, everybody will say so.’ 
  d.  Italian 
   Domanda-lo a chi-unque. 
   ask(IMPV)-it to who-INDEF 
   ‘Ask anybody.’ 
 
Thus, imperatives are no exception to the generalization that free-choice 
indefinites are allowed in contexts of possibility, but not in other non-specific 
contexts. 
 There is, however, one further important type of contexts in which free-
choice indefinites may occur, which is not easily subsumed under the notion of 
possibility: contexts in which a sentence may be interpreted generically. 
Consider the examples in (113-114). 
 
(113) English 
  Any doctor will tell you that Stopsneeze has dangerous side effects. 
   
(114) a. Russian (Paducˇ eva 1974: 80) 
   Petja resˇ it ljubuju zadacˇ u. 
   Petja solves any problem 
   ‘Petja will solve any problem.’ 
  b. Italian 
   Qualunque costituente di categoria Xn che viene spostato lascia 
   any constituent of category Xn that is moved leaves  
   dietro di  sé una categoria vuota dello stesso tipo. 
   behind of itself a category empty of.the same type 
   ‘Any constituent of category Xn that is moved leaves behind an  
   empty category of the same type.’ 
  c. Lithuanian (Pilka 1984: 141) 
   Bet kuri kate — zˇ irduolis. 
   INDEF which cat mammal 
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   ‘Any cat is a mammal.’ 
  d. Lezgian (Haspelmath 1993a: 196) 
   Hi kac xˆ ajit’ani hajwan ja. 
   which cat INDEF animal is 
   ‘Any cat is an animal.’ 
 
Generic sentences are often in an imperfective present tense, but they may also 
be in a perfective future tense, as (113a) and (114a) show.  
 A further context where free-choice indefinites are licensed are hypothetical 
(cf. 115) and counterfactual (cf. 116) sentences: 
 
(115) a. English, French (Strickland 1982: 37) 
   I would give anything to see that. 
   Je donnerai n’importe quoi pour voir ça. 
  b. Italian 
   Lei parlerebbe dei suoi problemi amorosi con chi-unque. 
   she would:talk of her problems love.related with who-INDEF 
   ‘She would talk to anyone about her love problems.’ 
 
(116) English, French (Strickland 1982: 36) 
  a. At that point, I think I would have accepted anything. 
  b. Je crois qu'à ce moment là, j'aurais accepté n'importe quoi. 
 
 And finally, as König (1991: 104) observes, contexts expressing sufficient 
conditions license free-choice indefinites, independently of the tense or 
modality of the clause: 
 
(117) Any amount is adequate/sufficient. 
  (*Any amount is required/necessary.) 
 
3.2.6. Summary: the main functional distinctions 
 
We can summarize the main semantic and pragmatic distinctions that recur 
cross-linguistically as in Figure 4 (cf. Croft (1983) for a similar list).  
 
Figure 4. The main functional distinctions 
 
specific known to speaker 
 unknown to speaker 
non-specific irrealis contexts 
 negative polarity conditionals  
  questions  
  standard of comparison 
  indirect negation 
  direct negation 
 free choice 
 
These are the functional distinctions that I have investigated systematically in 
the 40 languages of the smaller sample. Several further semantic, syntactic and 
pragmatic distinctions to which indefinite pronouns may be sensitive are 
treated in § 4.7 and § 8.1-2. 
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3.3. Alternatives to Indefinite Pronouns 
 
Before going on to study systematically the differences between the systems of 
indefinite pronouns in the world’s languages, let us ask whether indefinite 
pronouns are necessary, or whether a language could do without them, either 
for all their functions or for only some of them. It appears that the majority of 
languages do have indefinite pronouns, and that all the different functions 
discussed in § 3.2 are most often expressed by indefinite pronouns. However, 
for all these functions, alternative strategies of expressing them are attested, 
and probably quite a few languages lack indefinite pronouns altogether. The 
alternative strategies will not be discussed later in this study, but they are noted 
in this section. 
 There are four main ways of expressing what other languages express by 
means of indefinite pronouns: (i) generic nouns, (ii) existential sentences, (iii) 
non-specific free relative clauses, and (iv) universal quantifiers. 
 
3.3.1. Generic nouns 
 
We saw in § 3.1.2 that indefinite pronouns are sometimes derived from generic 
ontological-category nouns such as ‘person’, ‘thing’, ‘place’, ‘time’, ‘manner’. 
These generic nouns are very similar in meaning to indefinite pronouns like 
‘somebody’, ‘something’, ‘somewhere’, ‘sometime’, ‘somehow’, and languages 
may make use of indefinite noun phrases consisting only of such generic nouns 
to express what other languages express by means of indefinite pronouns. 
 It appears that this is the most common way of replacing indefinite pro-
nouns, and it is quite widespread. The following is a small sample of languages 
that show this feature, with two examples for each language. 
 
(118) a. Khalkha Mongolian 
   (neg) xün ‘someone’ = ‘(one) person’ 
   (neg) jum ‘something’ = ‘(one) thing’ 
  b. Irish 
   duine (éigin) ‘someone’ = ‘a (certain) person’ 
   rud (éigin) ‘something’ = ‘a (certain) thing’ 
  c. Somali (Berchem 1991: 79-84) 
   nin ‘someone’ = ‘man’ 
   wax ‘something’ = ‘thing’ 
 
 As I observed in § 3.1.2, it is not always easy to distinguish generic nouns 
from indefinite pronouns based on generic nouns. But it does seem that there 
are a substantial number of languages that replace indefinite pronouns in this 
way. Whenever a grammar that is otherwise quite complete is silent about 
indefinite pronouns, it may be assumed that the language does not use gram-
matical means, but the lexical means of general nouns.x 
 It is also not uncommon for some members of an indefinite series to consist 
of a non-grammaticalized expression involving a general noun. Consider the 
German and Italian negative series in (129). 
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(119)   German Italian 
  ‘nobody’ niemand nessuno 
  ‘nothing’ nichts niente 
  ‘nowhere’ nirgends in nessun luogo 
  ‘noway’ auf keine Weise in nessun modo 
  ‘no’ kein nessun(o) 
 
The German expression auf keine Weise and the Italian expressions in nessun 
modo (lit. ‘in no manner’), in nessun luogo (lit. ‘in no place’) are very weakly 
grammaticalized if at all and should probably not be regarded as indefinite 
pronouns. Rather, the corresponding indefinite pronoun series are defective in 
their places. However, as I made clear earlier (§ 3.1.3), I am not interested here 
in which ontological categories are represented in each series, so I will not 
always take pains to distinguish grammaticalized generic-noun-derived 
indefinites from non-grammaticalized expressions like auf keine Weise. What 
counts is that both German and Italian undeniably have an n-series.  
 A series may even be said to exist when only a determiner exists. For ex-
ample, Russian ljuboj ‘any’ is an indefinite determiner of the type studied in this 
work, but all its combinations with generaic nouns are non-grammaticalized 
(ljuboj cˇ elovek ‘any person’ = ‘anyone’, v ljubom meste ‘anywhere’ = ‘at any 
place’, etc.). Nevertheless these expressions fall under the scope of the present 
study. 
 
3.3.2. Existential sentences 
 
In Tagalog (and other Philippine languages, e.g. Cebuano), existential sentences 
are used where other languages use specific indefinite pronouns. A sentence 
like (120) can perhaps literally be translated as ‘There is (one) having come 
yesterday’. 
 
(120) Tagalog (Schachter and Otanes 1972: 276-8) 
  May dumating kahapon. 
  exist come:AG yesterday 
  ‘Someone came yesterday.’ 
 
Tagalog expresses indefinites in this way not only in agent position. For 
indefinites that are patients or places, the patient- and place-oriented verb 
forms are used: 
 
(121) May ginawa ang Americano. 
  exist do:PAT TOP American 
  ‘The American did something.’  
  (Lit. ‘As for the American, there exists something that was done.’) 
(122) Mayroon siya-ng pupuntahan. 
  exist she:TOP-LK go:LOC 
  ‘She is going somewhere.’ 
  (Lit. ‘As for her, there exists a place where (she) went.’) 
 
The same strategy is also used when other languages use negative indefinite 
pronouns, as in (123) (Schachter and Otanes 1972: 521). 
 
(123) Wala-ng dumating kahapon. 
  not.exist-LK come:AG yesterday 
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  ‘No one came yesterday.’ 
 
 However, the existential strategy does not work when there are two in-
definites in the same clause – unlike the predicate calculus, natural languages 
do not allow a sequence of two ‘there is’ expressions in one clause. In such 
cases, Tagalog must make use of an indefinite pronoun of its -man-series 
(interrogative pronoun plus -man) for one of the two indefinites. 
 
(134) a. At kung ako ’y may nadayang sinu-man,... (NT, Lk 19.8) 
   any if I PT exist swindle what-INDEF 
   ‘And if I have swindled anyone out of anything,...’ 
  b. Wala sila-ng sinabi kaninu-man. (NT, Mk 16.8) 
   not.exist they:TOP-LK say who-INDEF 
   ‘They did not say anything to anybody.’ 
 
 Tagalog also uses its -man-series for the free-choice function (Schachter and 
Otanes 1972: 532): 
 
(125) Matatapos namin ito kailan-man. 
  finish  we this when-INDEF 
  ‘We can finish this at any time.’ 
 
So not even Tagalog, which uses its existential strategy quite extensively, lacks 
indefinite pronouns completely – they are merely restricted in the range of 
functions they fulfill. 
 
3.3.3. Non-specific free relative clauses 
 
The free-choice meaning is often expressed most naturally by means of a non-
specific free relative clause whose subject is identical to the subject of the main 
clause and whose predicate is an expression of free choice (e.g. ‘want’). In some 
languages, this is the only way of expressing the free-choice function. For 
example, in Maltese one would normally use a relative clause with ried ‘want’, 
as in (126a-b). 
 
(126) Maltese (Haspelmath and Caruana, forthcoming) 
  a. Tista’ tieÌu liema tuffieÌa trid. 
   you:can:IMPF you:take:IMPF which apple you:want:IMPF 
   ‘You may take any apple.’ 
   (Lit. ‘You may take which(ever) apple you want.’) 
  b. SetgÌet tmur fejn riedet. 
   she:can:PERF she:go:IMPF where she:want:PERF 
   ‘She was allowed to go anywhere.’ 
   (Lit. ‘She could go where she wanted.’) 
 
Theoretically one could also use the free-choice determiner kwalunkwe, but this 
sounds very artificial because kwalunkwe (from Italian qualunque ‘any’) has not 
been assimilated sufficiently yet. 
 
3.3.4. Universal quantifiers 
 
Some languages use universal quantifiers with meanings ‘every’ and ‘all’ 
instead of indefinite pronouns to translate free-choice indefinites in other 
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languages. Since the meanings of ‘every’ and ‘any’ are very similar and forms 
meaning ‘every’ and ‘any’ are almost interchangeable in some contexts, this is 
not unexpected. An example comes again from Maltese, a language lacking 
special free-choice indefinites. When the free-choice expression is in subject po-
sition, Maltese uses kull ‘every’ or a related complex expression, e.g. 
 
(127) Maltese (Haspelmath and Caruana, forthcoming) 
  KulÌadd jista’ jsolvija din il-problema. 
  everyone he:can:IPF he:solve:IPF this the-problem 
  ‘Anyone/everyone can solve this problem.’ 
 
 In several languages, speakers are also uncomfortable with indefinites in the 
standard of comparison and prefer to use a universal quantifier instead, for 
example in Swedish. 
 
(128) Swedish (Kersti Börjars, Martin Tamm, p.c.) 
  Pojken kan springa fortare än alla i sin klass. 
  the:boy can run faster than all in  his class 
  ‘The boy can run faster than anyone/everyone in his class.’ 
 
3.3.5. Languages without indefinite pronouns 
 
While it is easy to find cases in which indefinite pronouns are noz used and 
alternative strategies are preferred, it is not easy to find a language that 
completely lacks indefinite pronouns. All the languages cited above in this sec-
tion replace indefinites in some functions, but do use them for others. Thus, 
Tagalog uses an alternative strategy when specific reference is intended but 
employs indefinite pronouns for the free-choice function, and in Maltese the 
reverse situation obtains. 
 When a description of a language does not mention indefinite pronouns, we 
cannot of course be sure that they do not exist – the author may simply have 
failed to include them for some reason. Grammar books do not often say 
explicitly that indefinite pronouns do not exist in the language, and even when 
they do, this may only be true for a subset of the functions that indefinite 
pronouns may have.xi Unless a grammar is both explicit about the lack of 
indefinite pronouns and says what alternative means are used for the functions 
that indefinite pronouns typically fulfill, we cannot be sure that they are really 
absent. 
 A good candidate for an example of a language lacking indefinite pronouns 
is Lango, a Nilo-Saharan (Western Nilotic) language for which we have the 
excellent description of Noonan (1992). For the specific functions, Lango uses 
generic nouns (Nàt ‘person’, gìn ‘thing’) combined with the indefinite suffix -
mOrO (Noonan 1992: 161-62), e.g. 
 
(129) Lango (Noonan 1992: 153) 
  Na~t-tO!rO! ojwato opêo 
  person-INDEF 3SG:hit:PRF Opio 
  ‘Someone hit Opio.’ 
 
The suffix -mOrO is not restricted to a few generic nouns but can be used with 
any noun (twòl-lOrO ‘a snake’). Noonan is also quite explicit that negative 
pronouns are non-existent in Lango (1992: 242). Instead, an existential 
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construction (not unlike the Tagalog construction above in § 3.3.2, but involving 
generic nouns) is employed: 
 
(130) Lango (Noonan 1992: 242) 
  a. gên-nOrO amE acamo  pe 
   thing-INDEF REL 1SG:eat:PERF NEG 
   ‘I ate nothing.’ (Lit. ‘A thing I ate doesn’t exist.’) 
  b. Nat-tOrO amE ocamo dEkko pe 
   person-INDEF REL 3SG:eat:PERF stew:that NEG 
   ‘No one ate that stew.’  
   (Lit. ‘A person who ate that stew doesn’t exist.’) 
 
 Although Noonan’s grammar is quite comprehensive, he does not say how 
the meaning of free-choice indefinites is expressed in Lango, so even in this 
well-documented case we cannot be completely sure. But what a case like 
Lango does show is that it is quite likely that we will find true cases of 
languages lacking indefinite pronouns as we learn more about little-known 
languages. 
 Thus, the subject matter of this study is probably not universal, although it is 
very widespread in the world’s languages. Of course, this lack of universality 
does not mean that this work is irrelevant to language universals. If universals 
research were concerned only with universal features, not much would be left 
to investigate: Very few linguistic features that had once been assumed to be 
absolute universals have stood the test of time –  linguists have discovered 
languages lacking subjects, numerals, nasals, and even vowels. All this only 
means that the generalizations formulated in this work apply only to languages 
that have indefinite pronouns. Technically, they are all implicational universals 
whose initial antecedent is ‘If a language has indefinite pronouns, then...’. In 
the next chapter, the main implicational generalizations will be presented. 
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i The term series was taken from Veyrenc (1964). 
ii Another equivalent term is epistemological category (Durie 1985: ch. 6). Ontological 
category is from Jackendoff (1983: 51). Jackendoff’s list of major ontological 
categories is: thing, place, direction, action, event, manner, amount. The main 
difference between Jackendoff’s list and the lists in (20) is that Jackendoff does not 
distinguish between person and thing. It may well be that this distinction is located at a 
lower conceptual level, but practically all languages make the person/thing distinction 
in their indefinite pronouns at the same level as the other distinctions, so it is best to 
regard person and thing as two separate ontological categories.  
iii The term was taken from Veyrenc (1964) (indicateur d’indétermination). 
iv The term extrafix is a cover term for postfixes (suffixes that follow inflectional 
suffixes) and antefixes (prefixes that precede inflectional prefixes). The term postfix is 
well-established in the literature (e.g. to refer to the Russian reflexive suffix -sja which 
follows verbal aspect, tense, and person-number inflections); the neologisms antefix and 
extrafix were first used in Haspelmath (1990: 29, 63). 
v A similar phenomenon has been observed for Japanese: The negative indefinite nani-
mo ‘nothing’ (from nani ‘what?’) has the variant nanni-mo. However, this seems to be 
an isolated case in Japanese. 
5a This seems to be the situation in Luiseño (Uto-Aztecan), as pointed out to me by 
Mark Durie. 
vi English is somewhat peculiar in that it has both interrogative-based and generic-noun-
based indefinite pronouns, even within the same series: somebody, something, 
someplace (based on generic nouns) exists alongside somewhere, somehow and 
somewhat in the some-series (similarly in the any-series). It is much more common for 
all members of an indefinite series to be derived from the same kind of basis. 
vii Since negative polarity items are not restricted to negative contexts, as described in 
more detail below, this term (which was coined by Baker 1970) is not particularly 
felicitous. As the discussion in § 5.5 will show, a term like scale reversal would be 
much more appropriate than negative polarity (and negative polarity items should be 
called scale reversal items) However, I continue to use the terms negative polarity, 
negative polarity item because they are so entrenched in the linguistic literature. 
viii This sentence is grammatical on the irrelevant reading 'This suits you better than 
something else.' 
ix In (63b), a bicycle can also be interpreted specifically, and on this reading the mini-
discourse is fine. A discourse referent is also possible in a sentence with non-indicative 
modality or future tense, e.g. Pedro wants to buy a new bicycle [non-specific]. It 
must/will be black. 
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x Examples of such grammars are Dixon (1988) (Boumaa Fijian) and Foley (1991) 
(Yimas).  Some grammars also explicitly deny the existence of indefinite pronouns, e.g. 
Berchem (1991: 79-84) (Somali), Noonan (1992: 242) (Lango). 
xi For example, Berchem (1991: 79-84) explicitly and emphatically denies the existence 
of indefinite pronouns in Somali (cf. the generic nouns in (118c)). However, he also 
says that only a limited number of generic nouns may take the negative suffix -na and 
function as negative pronouns, as in Nin-na ma iman (person-NEG NEG came) ‘Nobody 
came.’ This limitation to a few nouns is evidence that a closed class of negative 
pronouns has developed. 
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4  
 
An Implicational Map  





In the preceding chapter we have seen various syntactic and semantic 
conditions under which languages may use different series of indefinite 
pronouns. These are the distinctions that were found relevant for languages in 
general, but this does not of course mean that all languages reflect all these 
functional distinctions in the phonological form of the indefinite pronouns. On 
the contrary, there is probably no language that makes all the possible 
distinctions, and many languages make only very few distinctions (two series 
of indefinite pronouns seems to be the minimum for languages that do not 
make extensive use of avoidance strategies as discussed in § 3.3). What we 
have, therefore, is MASSIVE MULTIFUNCTIONALITY. The majority of the series of 
indefinite pronouns are used to express more than one of the functions 
distinguished in § 3.2, as illustrated by the examples in (131-33). 
 
(131) English any-series 
 a. negative polarity: conditional 
  If anybody left us, we are lost. 
 b. free choice 
  Anybody could have left us. 
 
(132) Hebrew sˇ ehu-series 
 a. specific (ongoing state)  
  Balsˇ an ze eÌad sˇ e-mesabex ma-sˇ ehu kal. 
  linguist that one that-complicates what-INDEF easy  
  ‘A linguist is someone who complicates something easy.’ 
 b. negative polarity: question 
  Ha?im tafs-u ma-sˇ ehu? 
  Q catch:PERF-3PL what-INDEF 
  ‘Did they catch anything?’ 
 
(133) Yakut da-series 
 a. negative polarity: standard of comparison (Ubrjatova (ed.) 1982: 209) 
  Kün annyVar tuox-tan da min bu oloVu taptyy-byn. 
  this world what-ABL INDEF I this life love-1SG 
  ‘In this world I love life more than anything.’ 
 b. direct negation (Afanas’ev and Xaritonov 1968:335) 
  Kini kim-i da kör-bö-tö. 
  he who-ACC INDEF see-NEG-PAST 
  ‘He did not see anyone.’ 
 
 A more traditional term for such a situation is polysemy, but in many cases 
there is no obvious meaning difference between the different functions – these 
often seem to be just different CONTEXTS rather than different MEANINGS. In 
order not to prejudice the analysis, I will use the neutral term 
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MULTIFUNCTIONALITY, which unlike the term polysemy does not imply the 
presence of multiple meanings, but subsumes polysemy as a special case. 
Moreover, even where an indefinite series clearly expresses more than one 
semantically distinguishable function, one could maintain that from the point 
of view of the individual language, there only is one general meaning 
(Gesamtbedeutung) that happens to correpond to several more specific meanings 
in other languages. My strategy of investigating multifunctionality allows me 
to remain neutral on this issue – I need take no stand on whether 
multifunctionality should be analyzed in terms of polysemy or in terms of a 
general meaning. All that is necessary is the possibility of identifying the 
functions in any language. 
 
 
4.2. The Semantic Map Methodology 
 
One of the central proposals of this book is to account for cross-linguistic 
variation in indefinite pronouns in terms of a semantic map, a strategy that has 
been applied successfully to other grammatical categories. In this section I 
argue that indefinite pronouns are best understood if they are approached 
similarly. 
 
4.2.1. Indefiniteness markers as grammatical categories 
 
The multifunctionality of indefinite pronoun series is hardly a surprising 
phenomenon, as we are used to multifunctionality elsewhere in the semantics, 
pragmatics and syntax of grammatical items, or GRAMMATICAL CATEGORIES. 
For instance, nominal cases are notoriously multifunctional. Thus, the Classical 
Greek Dative case may express indirect object, beneficiary, instrument, agent, 
cause, and time, and the Russian Instrumental case may express instrument, 
agent of passive, time, and predicate nominal.i Or take the example of the 
English Future tense, which may express pure future time reference (but not in 
conditional and temporal clauses), intention, and generic situations, or the 
German Present tense, which may express progressive, habitual, and generic 
situations and future time reference. Similarly for voice categories: the Latin 
Passive may express passive, anticausative, and reflexive, and the Modern 
Greek Middle may express reflexive, reciprocal, anticausative, passive, and 
potential passive. With such typical grammatical categories as case, tense and 
voice categories, exactly the same problems of description, analysis and cross-
linguistic generalization arise as we noted above for indefinite pronouns. This 
means that we can make use of the experience, the methodology and the 
theoretical approaches that have been developed for the study of the 
prototypical grammatical categories. 
 One might even go as far as to claim that the different indefiniteness series 
ARE grammatical categories. The main difference between prototypical 
grammatical categories like case categories or tense categories is that these 
apply to an open set of words (nouns, verbs), whereas indefinite markers 
combine with a rather small set of words denoting ontological categories 
(interrogative pronouns, or generic ontological-category nouns, cf. § 3.1.2). 
Even 'normal' grammatical categories like number do not necessarily apply to 
an open class of words, e.g. in languages where number is only marked on 
pronouns. Anyway, this is ultimately a terminological issue, and my main 
reason for mentioning this possibility here is to highlight the similarities 
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between indefiniteness markers and more prototypical grammatical markers 
like case and tense markers. 
 Several kinds of grammatical categories have been the object of systematic 
large-scale cross-linguistic investigations in the last two decades: tense, aspect 
and mood markers (e.g. Dahl 1985, Bybee 1985, Bybee et al. 1994), spatial 
relation markers (e.g. Svorou 1994), voice categories (e.g. Geniusˇ iene% 1987, 
Haspelmath 1990, Kemmer 1993), case markers (Croft 1991). All these studies 
have shown clearly that universal patterns can be found in grammatical 
categories. In language after language, independently of genetic affiliation and 
areal location, we find similar grammatical meanings (or functions, or uses), 
similar patterns of multifunctionality, and similar expression types. Of course, 
there are also significant differences between languages of different types, but 
this does not detract from the overall universal pattern. These cross-linguistic 
studies of grammatical categories have made a considerable contribution to our 
knowledge about human languages, and it is in their spirit that the present 
work is written. 
 
4.2.2. The use/function-based approach 
 
The typological studies of grammatical categories just cited employ the same 
basic research strategy followed in the present work. The strategy was outlined 
already in Ferguson’s (1970) programmatic paper. Using the example of 
multifunctional case markers, Ferguson showed that the structuralist approach, 
which tries to formulate highly abstract general meanings (Gesamtbedeutungen) 
for grammatical categories in individual languages (following Jakobson 1936), 
is incapable of describing and explaining cross-linguistic similarities and 
differences. Consider the dative case in German, Lezgian, and Classical Greek. 
In German, the Dative case is mainly used for indirect objects and beneficiaries, 
so one might propose a general meaning like ‘recipient’. In Lezgian, the Dative 
expresses direction and experiencer in addition to these functions, so one might 
try some vague abstract notion of ‘goal’ to encompass all three functions. In 
Classical Greek, the functions include indirect object, beneficiary, instrument, 
agent, and cause (but not direction), and it seems difficult to come up with 
anything more concrete than ‘oblique’. But however ingenious and perhaps 
insightful the general meanings may be, they cannot be compared to each 
other. What could the relation be between ‘recipient’, ‘goal’ and ‘oblique’? 
There is no answer – not surprisingly, there is very little cross-linguistic work 
that has come out of the research on general meanings.ii 
 As an alternative to this extreme semasiological or bottom-up approach, one 
might propose an extreme onomasiological or top-down strategy. This would 
involve setting up an exhaustive list of all imaginable functional distinctions in 
a domain – probably an impossible task in most cases. It appears that human 
cognitive resources are in priniple sufficiently rich to allow for the creation of 
an indefinite number of (complex) subtle conceptual distinctions. 
 Thus, the only possible route left is the middle road between the two ex-
tremes, and this is what Ferguson (1970) proposed and the typologists have 
practiced. The functional distinctions to be recognized must be at an inter-
mediate level, the level of USES (or FUNCTIONS). Every grammatical category 
can have several uses. Whenever two roughly comparable categories in two 
languages turn out to differ in one type of environment or meaning, this is 
sufficient for setting up a separate use. Consider the case of the German Dative 
and the Lezgian Dative again. These are roughly comparable in that the core 
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uses of the German Dative, indirect object and beneficiary, are also central uses 
of the Lezgian Dative. But the Lezgian Dative can also be used in direction 
expressions like Derbent-di-z ‘to (the city of) Derbent’, which is not possible in 
German (where a preposition has to be used: nach Derbent). In order to describe 
the difference between the German and the Lezgian Datives, we need at least 
the function or use 'direction'. By applying this strategy to more and more 
languages in the domain of inquiry, the list of different, cross-linguistically 
relevant uses is gradually enlarged. 
 Now it could turn out that this strategy leads to the same unconstrained 
proliferation of functional distinctions as the top-down (or onomasiological) 
approach, and then it would be of no more use. But experience tells us that 
languages do not differ from each other in unlimited ways. Cross-linguistic 
variation is tightly constrained also in the area of grammatical meanings. While 
the human mind can conceive of an indefinitely large number of ideas, only a 
small recurring subset of possible concepts are conventionalized in 
grammatical categories. The practice of typology has shown consistently that as 
more languages are drawn into the investigation, fewer and fewer new uses 
turn up, and the uses that have already been established turn out to be relevant 
even for new languages that have never been studied before. 
 Indefinite pronouns are no exception to this general pattern, as we have seen 
in § 3.2. The distinctions described there were found to be of central importance 
in a wide variety of languages, independently of genetic and areal connections. 
 
4.2.3. A geometric representation of implicational universals 
 
In order to capture the relationships between different uses within a use-
/function-based framework, the methodology of SEMANTIC MAPS has been 
proposed and will be adopted here (cf. Anderson 1982, Bybee 1985: 195-6, Croft 
et al. 1987). The highly specific uses or functions that I have identified above in 
§ 3.2 are thought of as existing in a semantic or functional space. The relations 
among these uses can be studied by determining cross-linguistically which uses 
can be covered by the same grammatical marker. These relations are 
represented geometrically on a semantic map in such a way that two uses or 
functions that are expressed by the same grammatical marker in at least one 
language are adjacent on the map. The underlying hypothesis is that it will be 
possible to draw up such a map in a way that is consistent with any existing 
grammatical system. 
 Consider first an abstract example: 
 
Figure 5.  
     c 
   a b  e 
     d 
 
Figure 5 represents a semantic map of the five uses or functions a, b, c, d, and e. 
There are various ways in which these functions can be covered by different 
markers in different languages. Three possibilities are given in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6. 
         c 
 Language I: marker X: a, b  a b   e 
   marker Y: c, d, e    d 
 
         c 
 Language II: marker W: a, b, d, e a b  e 
   marker Z: c    d 
 
 
 Language III: marker U: b, c    c 
   marker V: d, e  a b  e 
   marker T: a    d 
 
However, the semantic map in Figure 5 disallows languages like Language IV 
and V in Figure 7, because in these hypothetical languages there are markers 
that have several uses that are not adjacent on the semantic map. 
           
Figure 7.  
         c 
 *Language IV: marker S: a, e  a b  e 
    marker R: b, c, d   d 
 
 
 *Language V: marker Q: a, c    c 
   marker O: b, e  a b  e 
   marker P: d    d 
 
So the semantic-map approach not only helps us to express the relations of 
semantic similarity between various uses, but it also makes testable predictions 
about what a possible linguistic system is. 
 Indeed, semantic maps can also be thought of as making statements about 
IMPLICATIONAL UNIVERSALS. For any two uses/functions a and b that are ex-
pressed by the same marker, the semantic map predicts that all uses/functions 
that are located in the space between a and b are expressed by the same marker 
as a and b. Thus, we can also speak of IMPLICATIONAL MAPS.iii The main cross-
linguistic implicational generalizations about the distribution of indefiniteness 
markers that I propose in this study will be expressed in the form of an 
implicational map. 
 Another area where semantic maps make predictions is the diachronic 
extension of the functions of a marker (cf. especially Croft et al. 1987, Kemmer 
1993). The prediction is that when markers gradually acquire new functions, 
they will first be extended to those functions that are adjacent to the original 
functions on the map, and only later to functions that are further away. The 
diachronic extension of indefiniteness markers of indefinite pronouns will be 
discussed in chapter 6 (especially § 6.4). 
 We now turn to the implicational map that I propose. 
 
 
4.3. The Implicational Map  
 
      80 
After examining the evidence from a wide variety of languages, I have arrived 
at a two-dimensional implicational map for the uses/functions of indefiniteness 
markers. This map is shown in Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8. An implicational map for functions of indefiniteness pronoun series 
 
            (7) 
            direct 
        (4)  (6)  negation 
        question indirect 
          negation 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
specific specific irrealis 
known unknown non-specific  
        (5)  (8) 
        conditional comparative 
            (9) 
            free choice 
 
This map consists of nine functions/uses (taken from Figure 4 in § 3.2.6) 
arranged in two dimensions. Three of the nine functions are arranged in a one-
dimensional sequence, and a second dimension is introduced for the other six 
functions. The functions are numbered to allow us to refer to the various 
positions on the map in a simple way. 
 The evidence for the cross-linguistic generalizations embodied in this 
semantic map is found throughout this work. Some evidence has already been 
presented in § 3.2. Most of the evidence from the 40-language sample is found 
in Appendix A. More evidence, also from other languages that are not in the 
sample, is scattered throughout other parts of this work. 
 In this chapter, I will confine myself to showing how this map works with 




The distribution of indefinite pronoun series over the functions on the map in 
English is shown in Figure 9. (In this and in subsequent representations of the 
map, function numbers and connecting lines between functions are omitted for 
the sake of clarity.) 
 
Figure 9. English 
          
     direct 
   question indirect negation 
specific specific irrealis  negation  
known unknown non-specific  
    conditional comparative  
      free-choice 
 
English has three main series of indefinite pronouns: the some-series, the any-
series, and the no-series. Each of these corresponds to a continuous area 
(graphically delineated by a closed line) on the map. 
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 The some-series covers the five uses ‘specific-known’, ‘specific-unknown’, 
‘irrealis’, ‘question', and 'conditional’ – for examples see (98), (102), (74), (151a), 
and (154a) respectively. The any-series covers the six uses ‘question', 
'conditional’, ‘comparative’, ‘indirect negation’, ‘direct negation’, and ‘free 
choice’ – for examples, see (44b), (45b), (51b-52), (49-50), (43), and (103) above. 
The no-series covers only the function ‘direct negation’ (e.g. 34b). 
 Note that two indefinite series may of course overlap in their distribution: 
the some-series and the any-series overlap in the uses ‘question' and 
'conditional’, and the no-series overlaps with the any-series. 
 The kind of map exemplified in Figure 6 is simplified in several ways, in 
addition to the simplification inherent in the selection of just the nine uses of 
Figure 5. First, finer differences between two series that overlap in one function 
are not shown, for example the difference between the no- and the any-series 
(cf. Bolinger 1977: 37-65), or the difference between the some- and the any-series 
in functions where either is possible (cf. § 4.3.7 below). Second, marginal series 
are not included. In English, one could perhaps recognize a marginal -ever-
series (whoever, whatever, wherever, etc.), or a no matter-series (no matter who, no 
matter what, etc.). The indefinite adverb ever has special properties and could be 
thought of as a series of its own. And third, differential behavior of different 
members of the same series is ignored. An example of this is the singular 
determiner some, which in most ways behaves just like the other members of 
the some-series. However, unlike the other members, it does not have the 
‘specific-known’ use, as we saw in § 3.2.4. One could easily add this 
information to Figure 6 by distinguishing a some1-series and a some2-series, the 
latter consisting only of one member, the determiner some. Some2 still conforms 
to the implicational generalization, because it occupies the continuous area 




The distribution of indefinite pronoun series in Russian is shown in Figure 10. 
(For a full justification of this distribution, see Appendix A, Section 16.) 
 
Figure 10. Russian 
     direct 
   question indirect negation 
specific specific irrealis  negation  
known unknown non-specific  
    conditional comparative  
      free-choice 
 
Russian is richer than English in its indefinite pronoun system: It has at least 
seven core series, as well as several marginal series (see Appendix A). Russian 
shows even more overlap between the different indefinite series. For two 
functions, three different series of indefinites are possible, again with the 
differences that are neglected in Figure 10. In addition to the pragmatic dif-
ferences in terms of speaker expectations (§ 4.7.4), stylistic differences are also 
relevant: Where the -nibud’-series and the -libo-series overlap, the -nibud’-series 
is more colloquial, while the -libo-series is more formal. But Russian differs 
from English not only quantitatively, but also qualitatively. The space of 
indefinite pronoun functions is divided up quite differently. There is a special 
series for a ‘specific-known’ function (koe-), the two free-choice indefinites 
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(ugodno/ljuboj) do not have any other functions, and there is a series that spans 
the five functions ‘irrealis non-specific’, ‘question', 'conditional’, ‘comparative’, 
and ‘indirect negation’ (-libo). On the other hand, there are also some obvious 
similarities between Russian and English: a special series for ‘direct negation’ 
(ni-/no-) as opposed to ‘indirect negation’, and overlap in the question and 
conditional functions between a ‘left-hand’ series (-to/some-) and a ‘right-hand’ 
series (-nibud’/any-). Russian also has two series that overlap completely: the 
ugodno-series (kto ugodno ‘anyone’, cˇ to ugodno ‘anything’, etc.), and the ljuboj-




The distribution of indefinite pronoun series in Nanay (Manchu-Tungusic) is 
shown in Figure 11. 
 
Figure 11. Nanay 
     direct 
   question indirect negation 
  specific irrealis  negation  
   non-specific  
    conditional comparative  
      free-choice 
 
My information on Nanay (from Onenko 1980, 1986) is less complete than my 
information on English and Russian. I lack information on the the difference 
between the 'known' and 'unknown' sub-cases of the 'specific' function, and it 
may be that Figure 11 requires some changes in details (for instance, it could be 
that -nuu and -daa overlap, just like English some-/any-, and Russian -to/-nibud’). 
But it is beyond doubt that Nanay again differs significantly from both English 
and Russian, while at the same time conforming to the implicational general-
izations embodied in the map. In particular, Nanay has an indefinite series (-
daa) which covers all the functions between ‘direct negation’ and ‘irrealis non-
specific’, as shown in (134-138). Within the irrealis function, -daa may even be 
used with past perfective events if an evidential modality is present (138b). 
 
Nanay (Onenko 1980: 441-2, 449) 
(134) direct negation  
  Tuj manga puksin-du xamacˇ aa-daa aliasi-ni goani. 
  thus strong storm-DAT who-INDEF bear-3SG PT 
  ‘Of course, nobody can bear such a strong storm.’ 
(135) indirect negation  
  Duente doowani xaj-daa xazˇ on anaa pulsiu-mi acˇ aasi. 
  taiga inside who-INDEF weapon without walk-CONV suit:NEG 
  ‘One should not walk in the taiga without any weapon.’ 
(136) comparative 
  Naj xaj-doj-daa murumku, masi, imdar.  
  human who-than-INDEF smart strong skillful 
  ‘A human being is smarter, stronger, and more skillful than anyone.’ 
(137) conditional  
  Xajdu-daa maNga-wa, kamaa-wa baa-xan osini, mimbi-we  
  where-INDEF difficulty-ACC problem-ACC find-PAST if I-ACC  
  doolaa xeersigu-xeeri. 
  quietly call-IMPV 
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  ‘If you meet with difficulties anywhere, call me quietly.’ 
(138) irrealis non-specific: possiblility, evidential  
  a. Xaj-daa osii-daa osi-zˇ ara. 
   what-INDEF [?]  happen-FUT.3SG 
   ‘Something may happen.’ 
  b. Sajna, xaj-daa zˇ aka o-cˇ i-ni bizˇ ere. 
   probably what-INDEF thing happen-PAST-3SG apparently 
   ‘Probably something has happened.’ 
 
The free-choice indefiniteness marker -daa xem aja includes the marker -daa, but 
is distinct from it. An example of its use is (139). 
 
(139) free choice (Onenko 1986: 116) 
  Xaami-daa xem aja, ii-xeri. 
  when-INDEF   come-IMPV 
  ‘Come at any time.’ 
 
The indefiniteness marker -nuu is only used with specific expressions: 
 
(140) specific 
  a. Uj-nuu zˇ ook-cˇ i laN zˇ i-cˇ i-ni. (Onenko 1986: 98) 
   who-INDEF house-DIR near go-PAST-3SG 
   ‘Someone went up to the house.’ 
  b. Ñoambani xajla-nuu bajtalto-j-cˇ i. (Onenko 1980: 443) 
   they what-INDEF accuse-PRES-3PL 
   ‘They are accusing him of something.’ 
 
 These three examples should be sufficient to illustrate how the semantic map 
captures cross-linguistic generalizations about indefinite pronoun systems and 
makes universal predictions. It embodies the hypothesis that no language will 
be found where, for instance, an indefinite series expresses both the free-choice 
function and the irrealis-non-specific function, but not the question/conditional 
and comparative functions, or an indefinite series that expresses both the 
specific-known and the irrealis-non-specific functions, but not the specific-
unknown function, etc. In the 40 languages that I looked at, I have not found a 
single counterexample to the implicational map. The reader may examine the 
data from the 40-language sample in Appendix A. For convenience, the 




4.4. The Distributional Schemas of  40 Languages  
 
Figures 12.1-40 show the distributional schemas of the 40 languages of the 
smaller sample. More details, examples, and sources of the data can be found in 
Appendix A for each language. (For some languages, the specific-known 
function is missing: This means that I lack the relevant data.) 
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4.5. Further Restrictions on Combinations of Functions 
 
The patterns of the 40 languages shown in § 4.4 exhibit a bewildering diversity 
– in fact, every language has its unique pattern, so that there are no two 
languages in my sample that have the same system. My data provide evidence 
for 37 different combinations of functions in indefinite pronoun series (see 
Table 4 below), a much larger number than previous studies suggested. Thus, 
with respect to indefinite pronouns, as elsewhere in the grammar, languages 
vary widely. However, the variation is not unconstrained: All languages 
conform to the adjacency requirement imposed by the implicational map, 
which embodies the deeper unity behind the superficial diversity. 
 It should also be noted that in most languages several indefinites overlap in 
their distribution, i.e. some functions may be expressed by several different 
indefinite pronouns. Sometimes there are additional subtle meaning 
distinctions, but in many cases two (or more) indefinites are equivalent for 
most purposes. This massive overlap of indefinites shows that an approach to 
grammatical meaning that relies on contrast cannot be correct. If grammatical 
meaning consisted in contrasts in a tight system, we would expect to find only 
patterns where the space of functions is neatly divided up among the different 
indefinite series. But as in the case of tense, aspect, and modality markers (cf. 
Bybee 1988), the grammatical meaning of indefiniteness markers must be due 
to their semantic substance, not to contrasts in the system. 
 We have seen that the implicational map puts interesting constraints on the 
distribution of indefinite pronoun series. But there are probably further 
restrictions on possible combinations of functions in addition to the adjacency 
requirement of the map. Given this requirement, there are 95 geometrically 
possible combinations of functions that any one indefinite series could express, 
but only 37 different combinations are attested in my data. Since several types 
are systematically missing, it is unlikely that the other 58 combinations are all 
accidental gaps. Table 4 lists the 37 attested combinations and gives an example 
of each type (the digits represent the nine functions of Figure 5). 
 
Table 4. Attested combinations of functions  
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
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1  Russian koe- 
12  Kazakh älde- 
123  Serbian/Croatian ne- 
12345 English some- 
123456 German etwas 
1234567 Swedish någon 
2  Kannada -oo 
23  Basque bait? 
2345 Latin ali-, Greek ka- 
23456789 Portuguese qualquer 
2345689 German irgend 
345  Russian -nibud’ 
3456 Ossetic is- 
34567 Greek típota 
345678 Nanay -daa 
3456789 Hindi/Urdu bhii 
34568 Lithuanian nors 
345689 Dutch dan ook 
4567 Hebrew isˇ  
45678 Catalan cap 
456789 English any 
4568 German je 
45689 Serbian/Croatian bilo 
4589 Hungarian akár 
467  Italian nessuno 
4678 Finnish -kaan 
468  Icelandic nokkur 
568  Russian by to ni bylo 
5689 Bulgarian -to i da e 
589  Modern Greek -dhípote 
67  Icelandic n- 
678  Maltese ebda 
6789 Kannada -uu 
689  German jeder 
7  German n- 
89  Swedish som helst 
9  Icelandic sem er 
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Some of the missing combinations are probably true accidental gaps, but many 
others are apparently excluded for principled reasons, i.e. they cannot occur in 
any language. Two such principles might be formulated along the following 
lines: 
 (i) Principle 1: Combinations of less than three functions are not possible in 
the middle of the map, i.e. in the area of functions 4, 5, 6, 8. This excludes the 
combinations '4', '5', '6', '8', '45', '46', '58', '68'. (Perhaps the fact that no indefinite 
expresses just function 3 is also related to this principle.) 
 (ii) Principle 2: Functions 9 (free choice) and 8 (comparative) are never 
combined with function 1 (specific-known). This excludes combinations such as 
'1234568', '1234678', '1234689', '12346789', '12358', '1234589'. 
 These two principles thus have to be added to the adjacency requirement of 
the implicational map. Of course, they are also on need of further explanation. 
A speculative explanation for Principle 1 will be suggested in § 5.4.4. Principle 2 
can probably be explained by the need to distinguish between meanings that 
are too different – the emphatic functions ‘comparative’ and ‘free choice’ are 
just too different semantically from ‘specific known’ to be expressible in the 
same way (cf. § 5.6.1, § 5.7.2 for more on the nature of these differences). 
 
 
4.6. Earlier Formulations of Typological Implications 
 
There are two earlier attempts at accounting for the cross-linguistic variation in 
terms of implicational constraints: the implicational hierarchy of Edmondson 
(1981, 1983) and the map-like schemas of Bernini and Ramat (1992). I became 
aware of them only after I had arrived at my implicational map, and I see the 
similarities between these two proposals and my own results as confirming the 
soundness of the general approach. However, both these attempts are much 
smaller in scope and have a number of shortcomings in comparison to my map. 
 Edmondson (1981, 1983) formulates an implicational hierarchy for various 
kinds of negative-polarity items (auxiliaries, intensifying adverbs, indefinite 
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pronouns). This hierarchy is shown in Figure 13, together with examples of the 
four types of negative-polarity items predicted by this hierarchy. 
 
Figure 13. Edmondson's  implicational hierarchy for negative-polarity items 
 
 comparative ⊃ conditional ⊃ interrogative ⊃ negation 
       |–––––––––| 
      Malagasy velively 
    |––––––––––––––––––––––––––| 
     Italian mica '(not) at all' 
  |–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––| 
   Latin quis-quam 'anyone' 
 |–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––| 
  English any 
 
Edmondson's implicational hierarchy bears obvious resemblances to my 
implicational map, especially with respect to the functions 'negative', 
'interrogative' and 'conditional'. Only the position of the comparative function 
is incompatible with my map, and the data show that Edmondson's hierarchy 
cannot be correct: Many languages have indefinites that express just the 
comparative and the free-choice function, but not the conditional, question and 
negation functions, e.g. Lithuanian bet-indefinites, Swedish som helst-
indefinites, Basque edo-indefinites and Romanian ori-indefinites. In addition, 
the implicational relations cannot be expressed by a hierarchy, because some 
indefinites that are used in the conditional and interrogative functions are not 
used in the negative functions (e.g. the Russian -nibud'-indefinites). 
 Bernini and Ramat (1992: ch. 6) distinguish just three main functions of 
indefinite pronouns: N (cf. English no-), A (any-), and S (some-). Technically, N 
is defined as the indefinite used in elliptical answers, as in (141); A is defined as 
the indefinite used in positive or negative questions (141-42); and S is defined 
as the indefinite used in positive (and presumably realis) answers, as in (142). 
 
(141) Did you see anyone? — No, nobody. 
(142) Didn’t you see anyone? — Yes, (I did see) someone. 
 
Bernini's and Ramat’s map-like schema looks as follows (1992: 126): 
 
(143)   negative positive 
  answer N S 
  question A A 
 
They do not claim explicitly that this schema expresses an adjacency re-
quirement (and they do not call their schema an implicational map), but in the 
seven types that they distinguish, all indefinites (indicated by the letters x, y, z) 
occupy contiguous areas, as shown in Figure 14 (Bernini and Ramat 1992: 127-
36). 
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Figure 14. Types of indefinite pronoun distributions in European languages according 
to Bernini and Ramat 
 
 neg. pos.  neg. pos.  neg. pos.  neg. pos. 
answer   x   y    x   y    x   y    x   y 
question neg z   z  neg x   z  (neg) x   y  (neg) y   y 
 e.g. English    e.g. Russian  e.g. Romanian  e.g. Norwegian 
 (no/some/any)  (ni-/koe-/nibud’)  (ni-/-va)  (ingen/noen) 





     











answer   x   y  neg x   y  neg x   x    
question (neg) x   x  neg x   x  neg x   x    
 e.g. M. Greek  e.g. Basque  e.g. Danish    
 (típota/káti)  (i-/-bait)  (noget)    
 NA vs. S  A vs. S  AS    
 
The similarities between Bernini's and Ramat’s and my approach are evident. 
The fact that they distinguish fewer functions results from the scope of their 
study, which includes all negation patterns, but includes non-negative 
indefinites only peripherally. 
 However, there are several problems with their approach. First, the use of 
the terms N, A and S is confusing. On the one hand, these are said to refer to 
functions, but then they are also used to refer to specific distributional patterns. 
For example, Romanian is said to have an N vs. S pattern, although the -va-
indefinites are used for the functions S and A. This is mainly a terminological 
problem, but the result is that it is not always clear what the authors mean. 
 Second, I see no reason why negative questions should be given special 
prominence. Apparently English is the only language where negative questions 
are said to have different indefinites than negative declarative sentences, but 
this is not the case (Did you see nobody? is quite acceptable, as is I didn’t see 
anybody.) A third problem is that negative elliptical answers are used to define 
the function 'N'. As I argue in § 8.1.2, elliptical answers are not a good criterion 
for defining negative pronouns. 
 In conclusion, although the proposals advanced by Edmondson and by 
Bernini and Ramat are problematic in several respects, they are interesting 
precursors to the implicational map proposed in this work. 
 
 
4.7. Some Finer Distinctions 
 
The nine functions of indefinite pronoun series that are represented on the 
implicational map constitute the core functions with respect to which 
indefinites can differ within or across languages. However, they do not exhaust 
the possibilities. In this section I mention a couple of further distinctions that 
are relevant but for which I could not get systematic cross-linguistic data. Some 
of these distinctions can probably be eventually be integrated into the map, 
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Hoeksema (1983) shows that there are two types of comparative standard 
expressions in which indefinites may behave differently, nominal comparatives 
and clausal comparatives. Only clausal comparatives allow ook maar-indefinites 
in Dutch (cf. 144a), whereas nominal comparatives do not (cf. 144b). 
 
(144) a. Jansen was sneller dan ook maar iemand ooit geweest was. 
   Jansen was faster than INDEF anyone ever been had 
   'Jansen was faster than anyone had ever been.' 
  b. *Jansen was sneller dan ook maar iemand. 
   Jansen was faster than INDEF anyone  
   'Jansen was faster than anyone.' 
 
Similarly, in Serbian/Croatian only clausal comparatives (marked by nego 
'than') allow i-indefinites (cf. 145), whereas nominal comparatives (marked by 
od 'from, than') do not (cf. 146) (Progovac 1994: 71). 
 
(145) Marija je visˇ a nego i-ko u razredu. 
  Marija is taller than INDEF-who in class 
  'Marija is taller than anyone in the class.' 
(146) Marija je visˇ a od *i-koga/bilo koga u razredu. 
  Marija is taller from INDEF-whom in class 
  'Marija is taller than anyone in the class.' 
 
The data from Dutch and Serbian/Croatian suggest that the comparative 
function should eventually be split up into two functions, the clausal 
comparative function being closer to the indirect negation function (Dutch ook 
maar-indefinites are used in the indirect-negation and (marginally) in the direct-
negation functions), and the nominal comparative function being closer to the 
free-choice function (Serbian/Croatian i-indefinites are not used in the free-
choice function).iv 
 
4.7.2. Indirect negation 
 
The indirect-negation function can be subdivided at least into the two functions 
'implicit negation' (i.e. expressions like 'without', 'lack') and 'superordinate 
negation' (i.e. sentential negation in a superordinate clause). German jeder and 
Latvian jeb WH are examples of indefinites that behave differently in these two 
contexts: 
 
(147) German jeder 
  a. (implicit) ohne jede Vorwarnung 
    'without any warning' 
  b. (superordinate) #Es ist nicht nötig, dass jeder kommt. 
    'It is not necessary that anybody comes.' 
 
(148) Latvian jeb WH 
  a. (implicit) Tru@ka jeb-ka@da e@dama@. 
    lacks INDEF-which food 
    'Any food is lacking.' 
  b. (superordinate) *Es nedoma@ju, ka jeb kas atna@ks. 
    I not:think that INDEF who came 
    'I don't think that anybody came.' 
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I have too few examples of such a contrast, but these two cases suggest that the 
sub-case 'implicit negation' is closer to the comparative and free-choice 





Strictly speaking, the 'question' function on the map refers only to polar 
questions. In many cases, different indefinites are used in parametric (or 'WH-') 
questions, as for instance in Italian, where niente from the negative-polarity 
series is not used in parametric questions, cf. (149a-b). 
 
(149) Italian (Zanuttini 1991: 141) 
  a. Ha  detto niente di nuovo? 
   has said anything of new 
   'Has he said anything new?' 
  b. Quando ha detto qualcosa/*niente di nuovo? 
   when has said something/anything of new 
   'When did he say something new?' 
  c. Quando mai ha detto niente di nuovo? 
   when ever has said anything of new 
   'When has he ever said anything new?' 
 
However, two kinds of parametric questions must be distinguished: Ordinary 
questions asking for information, and rhetorical questions that presuppose a 
negative answer. When a negative-polarity indefinite is used in parametric 
questions, usually a rhetorical reading results, as in (149c). Similarly, Progovac 
(1994: 98) reports that (150) from Serbian/Croatian, with the negative-polarity 
indefinite ikoga, must have rhetorical force. The situation is similar with English 
any-indefinites (cf. Lakoff 1969: 609, Borkin 1971, Lawler 1971) and Modern 
Greek típota-indefinites (cf. Tsimpli and Roussou 1993: 150-57). 
 
(150) Serbian/Croatian 
  Kada je Marija i-koga uvredila? 
  when is Marija INDEF-whom insulted 
  'When did Marija insult anyone?' 
 
It appears that ordinary parametric questions must be situated to the left of the 
'question' function on the map, perhaps just coinciding with the 'irrealis non-
specific' function, whereas rhetorical parametric questions must be close to the 
indirect negation function, perhaps just coinciding with the 'question' function. 
Positive and negative expectations are also sometimes relevant in polar 
questions, as is discussed in the next section. 
   
4.7.4. Expectations of the speaker 
 
In a number of unrelated languages, the pragmatic contrast between positive 
and negative or neutral expectations of the speaker is relevant for the choice of 
the indefinite pronoun series within the conditional and (polar) question 
functions. Invariably the indefinite series that is chosen for positive 
expectations is the one that has more functions to the left of the 
question/conditional functions on the map, and the series that is chosen for 
neutral or negative expectations is the one that has more functions to the right 
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on the map. It is therefore tempting to propose a further subdivision of the 
question and conditional functions and thus to capture this generalization by 
making the map more fine-grained. Although such a step would not be against 
the spirit of the whole enterprise, it meets with a technical problem: It is not 
possible to draw a two-dimensional map in such a way that the adjeacency 
requirement is always satisfied – indefinites like the Russian -nibud'-series 
cannot be accommodated (see the discussion below). Thus, the parameter of 
speaker expectations must be treated as belonging to a different, though 
related, dimension. The relevance of speaker expectations has been reported in 
the literature for English, Catalan, Russian, and Japanese. 
 The importance of pragmatic conditions for the English some/any distinction 
was originally pointed out by Bolinger (1960) and became widely known 
through Lakoff (1969). In questions and conditional protases, the unmarked 
case is the occurrence of negative-polarity indefinites of the any-series. 
However, if the speaker’s expectations are positive, indefinites of the some-
series are used. Consider Lakoff’s examples: 
 
(151) English (Lakoff 1969: 609-11) 
  a. Do you think those men want to do some work?  
   (Because my road needs to be repaired.) 
  b. Do you think those men want to do any work?  
   (Because they’ve been standing around all morning telling dirty jokes.) 
 
In (151a), the speaker expects (or hopes) that the answer to his question will be 
positive, so some is used. By contrast, in (151b) the speaker expects the answer 
to be negative, so only any can be used here. 
 Two special types of questions that consistently behave according to this 
generalization are invitations and requests in the form of a question and 
rhetorical questions. In invitations and requests, the speaker expects (or hopes 
for) a positive answer, so the some-series must be used (Bolinger 1977: 31): 
 
(152) a. (invitation) Good morning, will you have some <*any> breakfast? 
  b. (request) May I have something for somebody who is coming by at  
   four o’ clock to pick it up? 
 
 The situation is quite similar with conditional protases. When the speaker 
expects that the condition will be fulfilled (or assumes that it has been fulfilled), 
some-indefinites are used, but when the expectation is that it will not be 
fulfilled, any-indefinites are used. Again, (153a-b) are from Lakoff (1969: 610). 
 
(153) a. Unicorns are mythical beasts: if Joan seens any <??some> unicorns out  
   there, I’ll eat my hat. 
  b. If John sees some <??any> goldfish in that tank, it’s not surprising: there  
   are lots of them in there. 
 
Lakoff also points out special uses of conditionals: conditional promises and 
warnings. In conditional promises, the speaker hopes that the hearer will fulfill 
the condition, so that (154a) has some, whereas in conditional warnings, the 
speaker hopes that the hearer will not fulfill the condition, so that (154b) has 
any (Lakoff 1969: 611). 
 
(154) a. I promise you that, if you eat some <*any> spinach, I’ll give you ten  
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   dollars. 
  b. I warn you that, if you eat any <*some> candy, I’ll whip you. 
 
 The relevance of speaker expectations is found in other languages as well. In 
Catalan, as in English, negative-polarity indefinites are used when speaker 
expectations are negative, whereas positive-polarity indefinites are used when 
they are positive. According to Lleó (1983: 326), in (155a) the speaker considers 
it more likely that someone came to see her, whereas in (155b) she considers it 
more likely that the answer to her question is negative. 
 
(155) Catalan (Lleó 1983: 326) 
  a. Ha vingut algú a veure’m? 
   has come someone to see-me 
   ‘Has someone come to see me?’ 
  b. Ha vingut ningú a veure’m? 
   has come anyone to see-me 
   ‘Has anyone come to see me?’ 
 
In questions that are used as requests and therefore expect a positive answer, 
the negative-polarity indefinite is impossible (Lleó 1983: 313). 
 
(156) Podríeu tancar alguna <*cap> finestra,  si us plau? 
  could close some any window if you please 
  ‘Could you close some window, please?’ 
 
Analogously, in conditional protases a negative-polarity indefinite (157a) 
indicates lower likelihood than an affirmative-polarity indefinite (157b) (Lleó 
1983: 326): 
 
(157) a. Si en Joan vol res, ja ens ho dirà. 
   if ART Joan wants anything already us it will:say 
   ‘If Joan wants anything, he will tell us about it.’ 
  b. Si en Joan vol alguna cosa, ja ens ho dirà. 
   if ART Joan wants some thing already us it say:FUT.3Sg 
   ‘If Joan wants something, he will tell us about it.’ 
 
 Finally, conditional warnings and promises behave as expected from the 
above discussion on English: 
 
(158) a. Si dius res  <?alguna cosa>, et castigaran. 
   if say:2SG anything something you they’ll:punish 
   ‘If you say anything, you’ll be punished.’ 
  b. Si dius alguna cosa <?res>, et donaran  un premi. 
   if say:2SG something anything you give:FUT.3PL a prize 
   ‘If you say something, you’ll get a prize.’ 
 
 Speaker expectations have been shown to be relevant also in Russian 
(Paillard 1984). In (159a), there is no particular expectation on the part of the 
speaker, whereas in (159b) the context makes it clear that the speaker expects a 
positive answer (cf. also Dahl 1970: 38). 
 
(159) Russian (Paillard 1984: 272-3) 
  a. Vy kogo-nibud’ zˇ dete? 
   you who-INDEF wait 
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   ‘Are you waiting for anybody?’ 
  b. Ja celuju Valjusˇ ku i vsë prislusˇ ivajus’: ne razdastsja li v  
   I kiss Valjusˇ ka and still listen not sounds Q in 
   koridore zvonok. No zvonka vsë net.     – Ty zˇ desˇ ’ kogo-to? –
  
   corridor ring but ring still not.exist you wait who-INDEF  
   sprasˇ ivaet Valjusˇ ka. 
   asks  Valjusˇ ka 
   ‘I kiss Valjusˇ ka and continue to listen if the bell rings in the  
   corridor. But there is still no ring. – Are you waiting for someone?  
   – asks Valjusˇ ka.’ 
 
In confirmation questions introduced by pravda, cˇ to...? ‘is it true that...?’, only -
to-indefinites are admissible (Paillard 1984: 272): 
 
(160) Pravda, cˇ to ty kupil kakuju-to <*?kakuju-nibud’>  
  true that you bought which-INDEF which-INDEF  
  francuzskuju knigu? 
  French  book 
  ‘Is it true that you bought a French book?’ 
 
By contrast, in questions marked with the question particle razve, which 
indicates  that the  speaker  would  be  surprised  at  a positive answer,  only -
nibud’-indefinites are possible (Paillard 1984: 272): 
 
(161) Razve slucˇ ilos’ cˇ to-nibud’ <*?cˇ to-to>, o cˇ em ja ne znaju? 
  PRT happened what-INDEF what-INDEF about that I NEG know 
  ‘Did anything happen that I don’t know about?’ 
 
Since Russian -nibud'-indefinites are also used in a function to the left of the 
question and conditional functions, the irrealis-non-specific function, it is not 
possible to express the similarity between English, Catalan and Russian by 
making the implicational map more fine-grained. Still, Russian conforms to the 
above generalization that the indefinite chosen for positive speaker 
expectations is the one that is located further to the left on the map. 
 A type of question which usually implies positive speaker expectations is the 
negated polar question (this seems to be true cross-linguistically). In Japanese, 
there is a fairly rigid division between the ka-series of indefinite pronouns, 
which occurs in non-negative sentences, and the mo-series, which occurs in 
negative sentences. 
 
Japanese (cf. Hasegawa 1991: 271) 
(162) a. Dare-ka ki-ta. 
   who-INDEF come-PAST 
   ‘Someone came.’ 
  b. Dare-mo /*dare-ka ko-nakat-ta. 
   who-INDEF who-INDEF come-NEG-PAST 
   ‘Nobody came. /Somebody didn’t come.’ 
 
In contrast to English, where the some-series is possible in negative sentences 
but is then interpreted as not being in the scope of the negation, the Japanese 
ka-series is completely impossible with negation, where the mo-series is 
obligatory. However, in negated polar questions this ban is lifted. As McGloin 
(1976: 409) points out, ka-indefinites are used in polar questions when the 
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speaker has a firm basis for believing that the presupposition is true, i.e. when 
the speaker expects a positive answer. Thus, (163a) is an information-seeking 
question, whereas (163b) is interpreted as an explicit invitation (McGloin 1976: 
409). 
 
(163) a. Nani-mo tabe-mas-en ka? 
   what-INDEF eat-POL-NEG Q 
   ‘Are you not going to eat anything?’ 
  b. Nani-ka tabe-mas-en ka? 
   what-INDEF eat-POL-NEG Q 
   ‘Aren’t you going to eat something?’ 
 
Notice that the same is true for the English some/any contrast (cf. e.g. Bolinger 
1977: 24). 
 And again the situation is quite parallel in conditional antecedents. When the 
speaker makes a promise and therefore has positive expectations, the ka-series 
is possible with negation, as shown in (164b) (McGloin 1976: 415). 
 
(164) a. Nani-mo tabe-nakat-tara, eiga e ture-te it-te  
   what-INDEF eat-NEG-COND movie to bring-CONV go-CONV  
   age-na-i yo. 
   give-NEG-PRES AFF 
   ‘If you don’t eat anything, I won’t take you to the movie.’ 
  b. Nani-ka tabe-nakat-tara,... 
   what-INDEF eat-NEG-COND 
   ‘Unless you eat something, I won’t take you to the movie.’ 
 
 Thus, we have seen four languages (English, Catalan, Russian, Japanese) 
where speaker expectations play an important role in selecting an indefinite 
pronoun series. This is all the more remarkable as the uses of the two different 
series are different in other ways in the four languages: English some/any and 
Catalan algú/ningú are non-polarity/negative-polarity items, Japanese ka/mo are 
positive/negative, and Russian -to/-nibud’ are specific/non-specific. That 
negative expectations are expressed by indefinites that are located further to the 
right on the implicational map is of course just what we expect, because the 
negation functions are also located on the right. However, the details of an 
explanation of these facts remain to be worked out. 
 
4.8. Toward an Explanation of the Implicational Map 
 
At this stage we have completed the third step of typological analysis, 
implicational generalizations. The next and final step is the explanation of the 
observed patterns. Why are indefinite pronoun series distributed over the 
various functions in such a way that the semantic map of § 4.3 results? 
 I have already alluded to an obvious interpretation of the implicational map: 
Closeness on the map means close semantic relatedness. This is of course 
intuitively very plausible, but we have to ask further: In what way are the 
various functions semantically related? Only once we have an explicit account 
of the semantic relationships between the functions of indefinite pronoun series 
can we say that we understand the typological pattern. 
 The next chapter will discuss a number of theoretical approaches to the 
interrelations of the various functions of indefinite pronouns, which is a 
necessary prerequisite for explanatory success. 
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i Note that I follow the convention (used in Comrie (1976), Bybee et al. (1994), and 
others) of capitalizing language-particular grammatical categories. 
ii See the works by modern Gesamtbedeutung semanticists like William Diver, Erica 
García, Robert Kirsner, Yishai Tobin, and others. None of them has anything to say on 
cross-linguistic variation. (An interesting exception to this generalization is David Gil's 
work (e.g. 1993), general meanings are investigated cross-linguitically.) 
iii Implicational maps are different from implicational hierarchies in that hierarchies 
make predictions for all cases that are higher than an element on the hierarchy, whereas 
maps make predictions only about adjacency. Thus, implicational maps represent 
weaker generalizations than implicational hierarchies. 
iv Hoeksema (1983) shows that clausal comparatives, but not nominal comparatives, are 
semantically 'anti-additive' (in Boolean terms), like indirect-negation contexts, so this 
distribution is expected. 
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5  
 




This chapter will review and discuss various theoretical approaches to the 
semantic and syntactic functions that are found in different indefinite pronoun 
series. These approaches generally concern only a small subset of the functions 
distinguished in chapter 3. Thus, the approaches dealt with in this chapter are 
not necessarily to be seen as alternatives, and some of them could and should 
be regarded as complementary (though others are indeed incompatible). Most 
of these theoretical approaches are based on a much narrower range of data 
than this study, often only data from a single language. My discussion will 
highlight the points that are illuminated by the broad cross-linguistic data 
assembled in this study. In § 5.6, I make an attempt to show how the various 
functions of indefinite pronouns fit together and how the implicational map of 
chapter 4 is motivated. Finally, § 5.7 deals with focusing and sentence accent. 
 
 
5.1. Structuralist Semantics 
 
My discussion begins with structuralist semantics, the study of meaning in the 
spirit of Ferdinand de Saussure’s foundational work. (While linguists in the 
19th century developed theoretical perspectives in many areas of semantics, 
pragmatics, and syntax, the functions of indefinite pronouns were not among 
them. The descriptions of indefinite pronouns in pre-structuralist reference 
grammars are too sketchy to warrant discussion here.) 
 The fundamental assumption of structuralist linguistics is that language is a 
system whose parts must be defined and described on the basis of their place in 
the system and their relation to each other, not on the basis of their own 
intrinsic properties (as the opposing view, which might be called 'substantivist', 
would maintain). A typical structuralist analysis of a class of linguistic units 
classifies them on the basis of several binary distinctions (or 'oppositions').  
These  binary  distinctions are often written  in the form '[+α] vs. [–α]' and are 
called features ('semantic features' in the case of a semantic analysis). 
 Structuralist semantics, especially in application to grammatical meaning, 
was pioneered by Roman Jakobson (especially 1936, 1957) and was widely 
adopted by linguists in the following decades, particularly in Europe. There are 
a substantial number of studies on indefinite pronouns that came from this 
tradition (Greimas 1963, Veyrenc 1964, Manoliu-Manea 1966, Krˇ ízˇ ková 1971, 
Levin 1973, Dausendschön-Gay 1977, Ponomareff 1978, Pilka 1984, 
Gluszkowska 1985). Studies from the generative tradition often preserve much 
of the spirit of classical structuralism in their emphasis on abstract formal 
systematization (e.g. Labov 1972). 
 In contrast to the other approaches to be dealt with below, no particular 
analysis in this approach has become famous and widely discussed, so an il-
lustrative example should be sufficient here. A typical case of a structuralist 
study is provided by Veyrenc (1964). Veyrenc classifies four Russian indefinite 
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series (-to, -nibud’, koe-, -libo) in the way shown in (165), where kto ‘who’ is taken 
as representative of the whole series. 
 
(165) unique  non-unique 
  real kto-to  koe-kto 
  virtual kto-nibud’ kto-libo 
 
The feature 'real/virtual' corresponds closely to my specific/non-specific 
distinction (§ 3.2.3), and Veyrenc’s classification makes sense this far: the to- 
and koe-series are indeed specific most of the time, while the -nibud’- and the -
libo-series are non-specific. Veyrenc does not mention the possibility of the -to-
series being used non-specifically (cf. Appendix A, Section 16), but this does not 
pose a threat to his analysis. He could simply take this as evidence for the un-
marked status of the feature value 'virtual' ('[–real]': When an opposition is 
neutralized, neutralization is invariably in favor of the unmarked member of 
the opposition. 
 However, the other feature ('unique/non-unique') is very weakly motivated. 
Veyrenc justifies it with reference to the plural-like meaning of the koe-series 
(koe-gde ‘somewhere, here and there’, koe-cˇ to ‘something, this and that’).  Now  
the  schema  in (165) predicts that the relation between the -nibud’-series and 
the -libo-series can be described in the same way, but this is not in fact the case: 
The -libo-series does not have a plural-like meaning, but rather it has its most 
important function in indirect-negation and comparative functions (cf. 
Appendix A, Section 16). Evidently, the binary classification of (165) is a 
Procrustean bed into which Veyrenc squeezes a distinction that is of a very 
different nature.i While Veyrenc’s analysis is certainly not one of the best 
structuralist analyses, it serves well as an illustration of the approach and the 
problems associated with it. 
 First, it is often left unclear what the status of the semantic features is. In 
many analyses, it seems that they are created ad hoc and are not interpreted 
further, so that they do not have any additional explanatory power and might 
as well be replaced by arbitrary numbers. Uninterpreted semantic features 
become interesting only if it is hypothesized that there is a universal restricted 
(possibly innate) set of them  (see Wierzbicka (1980a: ch. 1) for discussion). 
 Second, the binary privative oppositions that are usually employed, 
contrasting an unmarked feature value [–α] with a marked feature value [+α], 
often simply do not do justice to the facts. Even if the classification of (165) for 
Russian indefinites could be accepted, there are still other indefinite series in 
Russian that remain to be accounted for. For instance, the by to ni bylo-series is 
in many ways similar to the -libo-series (cf. Appendix A), with which it overlaps 
to a certain extent, but it also differs from it. One would have to postulate a 
third opposition (say 'emphatic/non-emphatic'), but this would lead to new 
possible combinations of features that are not instantiated (e.g. 'real + unique + 
emphatic') and would have to be arbitrarily excluded.  
 Third, the view that grammatical meaning consists in oppositions rather 
than in inherent semantic substance leads us to expect no overlap between 
contrasting units. But we do find massive overlap of the functions of 
grammatical items in many areas, including indefinite pronouns (cf. § 4.5). 
Thus, there are certain contexts where either the -nibud’-series or the -libo-series  
may be used with only a stylistic difference, and the -to-series and the -nibud’-
series also overlap. 
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 Fourth, structuralist semantics makes wrong predictions about semantic 
change. An analysis in terms of binary oppositions would lead us to expect 
changes consisting in a feature switching from a plus value to a minus value (or 
vice versa), or in adding or replacing a feature. But semantic change seems to 
proceed in a gradual fashion, with an expression acquiring only one slightly 
different new use at a time. There is good evidence that the -libo-indefinites 
originally were free-choice indefinites (§ 6.2.2). The -libo-indefinites lack the 
free-choice function now, but they still have the comparative function (very 
often expressed by free-choice indefinites in other languages). In addition, they 
now have the indirect-negation function and the question/conditional function, 
overlapping here with the -nibud’-series. The analysis of (165) does not even 
begin to account for these (hypothesized) changes. Quite generally, 
grammatical meanings often retain subtle traces of earlier (especially lexical) 
meanings which are better accounted for by a substantivist approach that 
attributes semantic substance to them (cf. Bybee 1988 for discussion). 
 Fifth, structuralist semantic analyses of different languages are rarely 
comparable and thus are not a suitable basis for typological studies (cf. § 4.2.2). 
Of course, if structuralist semanticists operated with a sufficiently restricted 
universal set of semantic features, comparability would be ensured (much as 
phonemic systems are comparable when based on a restricted universal set of 
phonological features). But in the absence of such a restricted set of features, 
analysts typically attempt to build a system that best captures the peculiarities 
of a given language, with the result that existing analyses of distinct languages 
are often radically different. 
 For all these reasons, I am skeptical about the approach of structuralist 
semantics. This does not, of course, mean that there is no value in it – the 
studies of indefinite pronouns cited above all contain valuable data and discus-
sion, much of which has been directly useful for this study. But I will base my 
conclusions on a substantivist rather than a structuralist view of language. 
 
 
5.2. Logical Semantics 
 
Since Gottlob Frege’s and Bertrand Russell’s writings, modern linguistics has 
been influenced by the thinking and notational devices of mathemati-
cal/philosophical logic. Indefinite pronouns are one of the areas where logical 
semanticists have had especially many things to say, based on the predicate 
calculus of modern logic. There are two main aspects of indefinites which have 
been discussed from a logical-semantic point of view: free-choice indefinites (§ 
5.2.1) and non-specific indefinites (§ 5.2.2). 
 As in the preceding section, my evaluation of the logical-semantic approach 
will be rather critical, and I will discuss alternative ways of dealing with the 
issues raised by logical semantics in § 5.4-5. 
 
5.2.1. Free-choice indefinites and universal or existential quantifiers 
 
There is a huge literature on quantification and corresponding phenomena in 
grammar, beginning with the late 1960s.ii Most of this literature is not 
immediately relevant to my more narrow concern of exploring the relation 
between meaning and form in indefinite pronouns. In the following, I will 
concentrate on the logical-semantic literature that deals with indefinite 
pronouns in the narrow sense. 
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 In general, logical formulas containing an existential quantifier correspond 
to sentences with specific indefinites, and logical formulas containing a 
universal quantifier correspond to sentences with universal pronouns,iii as 
illustrated in (166-167). 
 
(166) a. (∃x) (Pavlina saw x) 
  b. Pavlina saw something. 
(167) a. (∀x) (Waldemar ate x) 
  b. Waldemar ate everything. 
 
 But what is the logical structure corresponding to free-choice indefinites? 
Rather than introduce a new quantifier, logicians and linguists working within 
logical semantics have tried to express the meaning of free-choice quantifiers in 
terms of the two classical quantifiers, the universal and the existential 
quantifiers. Since most of the relevant discussion has taken place in English and 
no typological evidence has generally been taken into account, the English any-
series (most often the determiner any) has been at the center of the attention. 
This has led to additional problems and challenges, because the English any-
series is also widely used in non-free-choice uses, in particular in negation and 
negative-polarity contexts. The prevailing view among linguists seems to be 
that two anys have to be distinguished: a 'free-choice any', corresponding to the 
universal quantifier, and a 'polarity-sensitive any', corresponding to the 
existential quantifier (cf. Carlson 1980, 1981). But a sizable minority has 
defended the view that any has a unitary meaning corresponding to the 
universal quantifier (e.g. Savin 1974, Gil 1991). The third logical possibility, 
unitary meaning corresponding to the existential quantifier, has also found 
adherents (Davison 1980, Kadmon and Landman 1993). 
 
5.2.1.1. Univocal universal any. The view that any invariably corresponds to 
the universal quantifier was put forward in two famous works of philosophical 
logic (Reichenbach 1947: §21, Quine 1960: §29). According to Reichenbach and 
Quine, any differs from every in that the universal quantifier to which it 
corresponds always has wide scope with respect to other logical operators such 
as negation and material implication. In (168), an example of the free-choice use 
of any, there is no additional operator, so that any and every are logically 
equivalent. 
 
(168) a. (∀x) (x knows this secret) 
  b. Anybody knows this secret. 
  c. Everybody knows this secret. 
 
In (169-170), examples of any in negative-polarity contexts, we see how the 
difference between any and every is reflected in the different scope relations 
between the universal quantifier and the additional operator. 
 
(169) a. (∀: member x) (x contributes ⊃ x gets a poppy)iv 
  b. If any member contributes, he or she gets a poppy. 
  c. ((∀: member x) (x contributes)) ⊃ (I’ll be surprised) 
  d. If every member contributes, I’ll be surprised. 
(170) a. (∀: poem x) ¬ (I know x) 
  b. I do not know any poem. 
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  c. ¬ (∀: poem x) (I know x) 
  d. I do not know every poem. 
 
If we only consider these examples, the analysis seems satisfactory. Not only 
does it allow us to maintain a unitary, non-ambiguous meaning of any, it also 
accounts for the fact that an existential meaning seems to be associated with 
negative-polarity any. Indeed, (169b) and (170b) can be paraphrased by (171b) 
and (172b), which contain the existential expression ‘there is’. 
 
(171) a. ((∃: member x)(x contributes)) ⊃ (x gets a poppy) 
  b. If there is a member who contributes, he or she gets a poppy. 
(172) a. ¬ (∃: poem x) (I know x) 
  b. There is no poem that I know. 
 
Given the general logical equivalences in (173-174), it follows that (171a) and 
(172a) are equivalent to (169a) and (170a), and the (near) synonymy between 
(171b) and (169b), and between (172b) and (170b) is explained. 
 
(173) (∀x) (Fx ⊃ p) ≡ ((∃x)(Fx)) ⊃ p 
(174) (∀x) ¬ (Fx)  ≡ ¬ (∃x)(Fx)  
 
 Reichenbach even offers an explanation for the fact that any always has the 
widest possible scope: He says that any corresponds to a free variable. As a rule, 
logical formulas must be closed in the argument variables, and expressions 
containing free variables do not have a determinate truth value. But, 
Reichenbach claims (1947: 105), 'when an expression containing a free variable 
is true for all values of the variable, it can be asserted.' This idea is not made 
precise, but it has a certain intuitive plausibility, and it explains why the scope 
of any is always the whole formula (Fx ≡ (∀x)(Fx), ¬ Fx ≡ (∀x) ¬ Fx, Fx ⊃ p ≡ 
(∀x)(Fx) ⊃ p, etc.). 
 
5.2.1.2. Negative-polarity any as existential. Whereas the univocal analysis of 
any has been adopted by some linguists (Bolinger 1960, Bach 1968: 112, Savin 
1974, Schmid 1980, Hintikka 1980, LeGrand 1974, Gil 1991), other linguists have 
objected that any should correspond to an existential quantifier in negative-
polarity contexts like (45b), (46b). The following five arguments (among others) 
have been cited in the literature for the existential nature of negative-polarity 
any (Dahl 1970: 38-39, Horn 1972: §2.35, Davison 1980, Carlson 1980, 1981, 
Ladusaw 1980: 94-104, Linebarger 1980, 1981: ch. 5, and many others). 
 First, any-indefinites are ambiguous in negative-polarity environments, as 
shown in (175-177). In one of the readings, they are roughly equivalent to every-
pronouns (the 'universal reading'), and in the other reading they are roughly 
equivalent to some- or no-pronouns (the 'existential reading'). Note that the two 
readings are in fact different suprasegmentally (see Ladd (1980: 160) for some 
discussion of the intonational differences). 
 
(175) You can’t do anything here. 
  a. ‘You can do nothing here.’ (existential reading) 
  b. ‘You can’t do everything here.’ (universal reading) 
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(176) If anybody can swim the channel, I can do it. 
  a. ‘If somebody can swim the channel, I can do it.’ (existential reading) 
  b. ‘If everybody can swim the channel, I can do it.’ (universal reading) 
(177) Can anybody swim the channel? 
  a. ‘Can somebody swim the channel?’ (existential reading) 
  b. ‘Can everybody swim the channel?’ (universal reading) 
 
Such cases seem to show that there are two different anys, one corresponding to 
a universal quantifier, and one corresponding to an existential quantifier. 
 Second, in many other languages free-choice indefinites and indefinites in 
negative-polarity environments are formally different. Horn (1972: 131) 
observes 'the isolation of the situation in English from the usual trend en-
countered in the languages of the world to separate the two cases morpho-
logically'. It is unclear, however, what the basis for Horn’s claim is. My data 
show that the situation in English is certainly not 'isolated': 18 of my 40 sample 
languages have indefinites which are used both in the free-choice function and 
in conditionals. But on the other hand, 19 languages indeed have special free-
choice indefinites which cannot be used in conditionals and questions. And 
only 12 languages have indefinites which are used both in the free-choice 
function and in the direct-negation function.  
 Third, only negative-polarity any may occur in existential sentences with 
there (cf. 171-172), whereas free-choice any is impossible in such sentences 
(*There is any apple that you can take). 
 Fourth, only free-choice any may be modified by the particles almost/nearly 
and absolutely: 
 
(178) a. (free choice) Absolutely/almost anyone can ride a bike. 
  b. (negative polarity) Has (*absolutely/*almost) anyone seen my bike? 
 
 Fifth, the wide-scope universal analysis does not account for all occurrences 
of any, e.g. in questions. Sentence (179a) is not correctly paraphrased by (179b). 
 
(179) a. Has wealth made anyone happier? 
  b. (∀: person x) (has wealth made x happier?) 
 
 I might add a sixth argument from the cross-linguistic distribution of in-
definites on the implicational map that we saw in chapter 4: In many 
languages, the indefinites that occur in negative-polarity contexts are also used 
in irrealis non-specific contexts like imperatives or modal contexts (e.g. Russian 
-libo, Lithuanian -nors, Modern Greek típota, Hindi/Urdu bhii, Yakut eme, 
Georgian -me, Kannada -aadaruu). In such contexts, the wide-scope universal 
analysis is completely ruled out. 
 For further arguments see Carlson (1980, 1981) (especially concerning more 
complicated scope interactions) and Ladusaw (1980) (especially concerning the 
formulation of compositional meaning). 
 It should also be mentioned, however, that there is an additional argument 
against separating a free-choice any and a negative-polarity any, in addition to 
the general preference for univocal analyses: There are occurrences of any-
indefinites that are, so to speak, neutral between free-choice any and negative-
polarity any. As Carlson (1981: 13) observes, sentences (180a-c) have only one 
reading. 
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(180) a. Bob can run faster than anyone. 
  b. Bob is unlikely to kick anyone. 
  c. For Bob to eat anything now would be impossible. 
 
Note that these are precisely the uses (comparative, indirect negation) which 
are between the free-choice function and the question and conditional functions 
on the implicational map of chapter 4. 
 
5.2.1.3. Problems with the logical-semantic approach to free-choice indefi-
nites. Thus, the logical-semantic approach is in a dilemma: On the one hand, 
there is an analysis that accounts for a core set of data and permits the desired 
unitary treatment of any, and on the other hand, a closer look seems to show 
that any is not only ambiguous, but ambiguous between two meanings 
(existential and universal quantification) that are in a sense opposites.v 
 Another limitation of logical semantics is that it cannot express the 
difference between any and every in cases where they are roughly equivalent. In 
(181a) (showing free-choice any), we have some kind of universal meaning, but 
as Vendler (1967) has pointed out, (181a) and (181b) do not have the same 
meaning, and not even the same truth conditions. 
 
(181) a. Any doctor will tell you that Stopsneeze has dangerous side effects. 
  b. Every doctor will tell you that Stopsneeze has dangerous side effects. 
 
Assuming a meaning element of universal quantification in free-choice in-
definites is particularly suspect in cases like (182a), which is evidently very dif-
ferent from (182b). 
 
(182) a. Take any apple. 
  b. Take every apple. 
 
 Thus, we are justified to be skeptical that universal quantification in the 
standard logical sense is involved in free-choice indefinites at all. 
 It happens that Davison (1980) has claimed that free-choice indefinites are to 
be understood as existential quantifiers, too, differing from negative-polarity 
indefinites mainly in that they carry a pragmatic implicature of universality (cf. 
also Carlson (1981: 16-20) for arguments for this view, and Kadmon and 
Landman (1993) for a similar approach). It is not surprising that this option has 
also been advocated, because it would again permit a univocal semantic 
characterization of any. However, as has been shown in the preceding 
subsection, there are many behavioral  differences between free-choice any and 
negative-polarity any which also argue against a univocal existential analysis. 
 Thus, although the logical-semantic approach has allowed us to ask many 
interesting new questions, it has ultimately remained unsuccessful with respect 
to the relation between free-choice indefinites and negative-polarity indefinites. 
We will see in § 5.5 that a wider perspective was necessary to make new 
progress. 
 
5.2.2. (Non-)specific indefinites and referential opacity 
 
The logical-semantic approach has also been applied to describe the difference 
between specific and non-specific noun phrases. However, since English 
indefinite pronouns do not make this distinction, (non-)specificity has not often 
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been discussed with reference to indefinite pronouns in the logical-semantic 
literature. The main motivation of these analyses has been to explicate 
specific/non-specific ambiguities, not to explicate the meaning of a particular 
indefinite expression. 
 The basic idea is that the two readings of a sentence like (183) can be dis-
tinguished by assigning different scope relations to the existential quantifier 
that binds the variable corresponding to the ambiguous NP. In the specific 
reading, the existential quantifier has scope over ‘want’ (184a), and in the non-
specific reading, it has narrow scope and is within the scope of ‘want’ (184b). 
 
(183) Bob wants to marry a linguist. 
(184) a. (specific) (∃: linguist x) (Bob wants to marry x) 
  b. (non-specific) Bob wants (∃: linguist x)(Bob to marry x) 
 
The original idea seems to be due to Quine (1956), and it was later taken up by 
several linguists, among others C. L. Baker (in an unpublished 1966 paper), 
Bach (1968), Dahl (1970), Fodor (1970). 
 Unfortunately, some confusion has arisen as a result of the different goals of 
logicians and linguists. While linguists are mostly interested in explaining 
ambiguities, Quine as a logician was primarily occupied with the problem of 
REFERENTIAL OPACITY. If the two inference rules of substitutivity of identicals 
and existential generalization are not valid in a context, logicians say that the 
context is REFERENTIALLY OPAQUE. The ‘want’ context of (183) is such an 
opaque context:  
 (i) Existential generalization is not possible: It could be that there is no 
linguist—at least in the non-specific reading; logicians also speak of an OPAQUE 
or DE DICTO READING, as opposed to a TRANSPARENT or DE RE READING, 
corresponding to the linguists’ specific reading. 
 (ii) NPs cannot be replaced by other NPs with the same extension without 
affecting the truth value. This is best illustrated with a sentence like (185). 
 
(185) Bob wants to marry the linguist he met at the last conference. 
 
Suppose that the linguist he met at the last conference has the same extension as the 
mother of Irene, Jonathan and Charlotte. Then one cannot infer from this and (185) 
that Bob wants to marry the mother of Irene, Jonathan and Charlotte, because 
Bob might not know that the two are identical. 
 Referential opacity is by no means restricted to contexts like ‘want’ that al-
low NPs to be non-specific. Sentences with non-volitional propositional-at-
titude verbs such as ‘believe’, ‘think’, ‘imagine’ are perhaps even more typical 
examples of referential opacity (cf. Jackendoff (1983: ch. 11), Fauconnier (1985: 
ch. 1) for convincing treatments of opacity). But a sentence like (186) does not 
show the specific/non-specific ambiguity I am interested in here.vi 
 
(186) Mary believes that a friend of mine is a busdriver. 
 
Thus, the specific/non-specific distinction must not be collapsed with the 
transparent/opaque distinction, as is sometimes done in the linguistic liter-
ature, even if only terminologically (Fodor 1970, Givón 1973, Lavric 1990: § 3.6). 
 There are a number of works in the literature in which the analysis of (non-
specificity) in terms of different scopes of an existential quantifier is applied to 
indefinite pronouns, most notably Dahl (1970) for Russian -to/-nibud’ (and, 
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following him, Rufizˇ icˇ ka (1973); Pilka (1984: 65) for Lithuanian kazˇ -/nors). As 
we saw in § 3.2.3, (183) has two different translations in Russian and many 
other languages, corresponding to the two readings in (184a-b). (In Russian, 
these different translations appear only when an indefinite determiner, kakoj-to 
or kakoj-nibud’ ‘some’ is used. Thus, (187a-b) correspond more closely to English 
Bob wants to marry some linguist. When the determiner is omitted, the Russian 
sentence is just as ambiguous as the English one.) 
 
(187) Russian 
  a. Bob xocˇ et zˇ enit’sja na kakoj-to lingvistke. 
   Bob wants marry on which-INDEF linguist 
  b. Bob xocˇ et zˇ enit’sja na kakoj-nibud’ lingvistke. 
   Bob wants marry on which-INDEF linguist 
 
Dahl proposes the generalization that 'a variable, bound by an existential 
quantifier that stands first in a declarative sentence, will be realized as a to-
pronoun' (1970: 35). This not only accounts for ‘want’ contexts, conditionals, 
and questions, but also for the fact that the non-specific -nibud’-series appears 
when a distributive meaning is intended. In such cases, the existential 
quantifier follows not a non-reality verb like ‘want’, but another quantifier: 
 
(188) a. Vse ljudi cˇ itajut cˇ to-to. 
   all people read what-INDEF 
   ‘Everybody is reading something.’ 
   (non-distributive: everyone is reading the same thing) 
  b. (∃: thing x) (∀: people y) (y read x) 
 
(189) a. Vse ljudi cˇ itajut cˇ to-nibud’. 
   all people read what-INDEF 
   ‘Everybody is reading something.’ 
   (distributive: each person may read something different) 
  b. (∀: people x) (∃: thing y) (x read y) 
 
Dahl’s rule also accounts for the fact that a specific -to-indefinite may cooccur 
with negation only if it is not in the scope of negation. (190-91) are parallel to 
(188-89), except that a non-specific indefinite which is in the scope of negation 
is obligatorily a ni-indefinite, not a -nibud’-indefinite. 
 
(190) a. Ja ne videl kogo-to. 
   I not saw whom-INDEF 
   ‘I didn’t see someone.’ 
  b. (∃: person x) ¬ (I saw x) 
(191) a. Ja ne videl nikogo <*kogo-nibud’>. 
   I not saw whom-INDEF whom-INDEF 
   ‘I didn’t see anybody.’ 
  b. ¬ (∃: person x) (I saw x) 
 
 But Dahl runs into problems with futures. A non-specific -nibud’-indefinite is 
licensed in future sentences as well. Here Dahl is forced to introduce an abstract 
performative verb PREDICT. Thus, the two sentences in (192-93) (a) are analyzed 
as (192-93) (b). 
 
(192) a. Doroga koncˇ itsja gde-to. 
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   road ends where-INDEF 
   ‘The road will end somewhere [specific].’ 
  b. (∃: place x) I PREDICT (road end at x) 
(193) a. Doroga koncˇ itsja gde-nibud’. 
   road ends where-INDEF 
   ‘The road will end somewhere [non-specific].’ 
  b. I PREDICT (∃: place x) road end at x) 
 
A similar difficulty arises with non-reality verbs that are not followed by a 
subordinate clause, as shown in (194a) and its English translation (194b). 
 
(194) a. Ja poprosila ee o kakoj-to/ kakoj-nibud’ knige. 
   I asked her for which-INDEF which-INDEF book 
  b. I asked her for some [specific/non-specific] book. 
 
Here we have a difference between Russian -to and -nibud’, and ambiguity in 
English, but there are no two different syntactic positions for the existential 
quantifier. Again, the only solution for the logical-semantic approach seems to 
be to posit an additional abstract predicate that does not appear at the surface 
(Bach 1968, Fodor 1970: 17, 1977: 127-9). Thus, the two meanings of (194b) are 
analyzed as in (195a-b). 
 
(195) a. (∃: book x) (I asked her (SHE GIVE ME x)) 
  b. I asked her ((∃: book x)(SHE GIVE ME x)) 
 




The logical-semantic approach has undoubtedly meant progress in our 
understanding of the relevant semantic distinctions. But its limitations are 
equally apparent: In both areas considered here, free-choice/negative-polarity 
indefinites and specific/non-specific indefinites, some fundamental questions 
were left unresolved. 
 I will try to show in § 5.4-5 that approaches that do not make crucial use of a 
logical-semantic representation fare better in coming to grips with the se-
mantics of indefinite pronouns. But first we must consider syntactic approaches 
to indefinite pronoun functions. 
 
 
5.3. Syntactic Approaches 
 
5.3.1. Transformational approaches 
 
The tools developed by the transformational syntacticians in the early 1960s 
were soon applied to indefinite pronouns (Lees 1960, Klima 1964). Klima 
proposed to account for the alternation between some-, any- and no-indefinites 
in English by various transformations, so that the sentences in (196a-b) share 
the same deep structure, and (196c) has the same deep structure minus an 
abstract negation element. 
 
(196) English 
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  a. There wasn’t any snow falling. 
  b. There was no snow falling. 
  c. There was some snow falling. 
 
Some is the spellout of an abstract element QUANT, any is the spellout of the 
abstract elements INDEF + QUANT, and no is the spellout of NEG + INDEF + 
QUANT. The incorporation of INDEF into QUANT, i.e. in fact the conversion of 
some into any, is effected by a transformational rule that inserts INDEF if QUANT 
is in the scope of a suitable trigger. Klima noted that in addition to negation, 
'INDEF incorporation' is triggered by other expressions such as only, parametric 
questions, if, before, lest, and 'adversative predicates' like difficult, afraid, ashamed, 
refuse, reluctant, surprised, and he introduced a syntactic feature ‘affective’ 
shared by all these triggering expressions. This uninterpreted, arbitrary feature 
‘affective’ was of course not very illuminating. 
 Later writers attempted to reduce the triggering environment for negative-
polarity any and other negative-polarity items to negation by proposing that the 
core case of ‘affective’ expressions is negation, and that the other ‘affective’ 
expressions share a negative implicature (Baker 1970, Linebarger 1981, 1987). 
But none of these proposals were felt to be totally convincing. The most 
problematic case for the negative implicature view are relative clauses 
modifying universally quantified NPs, as in (197). It is hard to see where the 
negative implicature is here. 
 
(197) Everyone who knew anything shared their knowledge with me. 
 
 An additional blow was dealt to syntactic analyses by the demonstration in 
Bolinger (1960) and Lakoff (1969) that pragmatic conditions also play a role in 
the distribution of some and any (see § 4.7.4). In the 1970s, interests of generative 
syntacticians shifted in other directions, and it was not until the late 1980s that 
a new attempt at accounting for indefinite pronouns in syntactic terms was 
made (but see McCawley (1988: 546-561), where a Klima-style transformation is 
still advocated). 
 
5.3.2. A binding approach 
 
A very interesting theory of negative-polarity indefinites in terms of Chomsky’s 
(1981) Binding Theory was developed by Progovac (1994) (cf. also Progovac 
1988, 1990, 1991, 1992a, 1992b, 1993), elaborating an idea of Milner (1979) and 
Aoun (1986). Progovac points out some intriguing similarities between the 
syntactic locality restrictions on reflexive pronouns and on negative-polarity 
items and formulates a typology of kinds of negative-polarity indefinites in 
different languages that is not unlike my own typology formulated in the 
implicational map (chapter 4). Although due to her narrow syntactic 
perspective Progovac's approach is less successful than it could be, her theory is 
original and important and needs to be discussed in greater detail. 
 
5.3.2.1. Principles A and B and raising at LF. Chomsky’s Binding Theory 
consists of three principles: 
 
(198) Chomsky’s Binding Theory (1981: 183-222) 
  Principle A: An anaphor must be bound in its governing category. 
  Principle B: A pronominal must be free in its governing category. 
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  Principle C: A name must be free. 
 
Binding is defined as co-indexing with a c-commanding antecedent, and the 
'governing category' is a local domain of a certain kind, most often a clause. 
(The details do not concern us here.) Typical examples of 'anaphors' are re-
flexive pronouns. Principle A explains why (199a) is possible, whereas (199b) is 
ungrammatical because the antecedent is outside the clause of the reflexive 
pronoun, and thus outside its governing category. 
 
(199) a. Luozhui praised herselfi. 
  b. *Luozhui was glad [that the teacher praised herselfi]S. 
 
Principle B explains why (200a) is ungrammatical (the 'pronominal' her has its 
antecedent within its clause), whereas (200b) is possible (the antecedent is 
outside the governing category). 
 
(200) a. *Luozhui praised heri. 
  b. Luozhui was glad [that the teacher praised heri]S. 
 
Principle C explains why both (201a) and (201b) are ungrammatical. 
 
(201) a. *Luozhui praised Luozhui. 
  b. *Luozhui was glad [that the teacher praised Luozhui]. 
 
 Progovac now observes that some indefinites in some languages show a very 
similar distribution (her account also extends to other negative-polarity items, 
but I will confine the discussion to indefinites, which figure most prominently 
in Progovac’s work). In Serbian/Croatian, the language discussed most 
extensively by Progovac, the ni-series of indefinite pronouns is reminiscent of 
anaphors: It may cooccur with clausemate negation, but not with superordinate 
negation. 
 
(202) Serbo-Croatian (Progovac 1994: 40-1) 
  a. Milan ne vidi ni-sˇ ta. 
   Milan not sees NEG-what 
   ‘Milan cannot see anything.’ 
  b. *Milan ne tvrdi [da Marija poznaje ni-koga]. 
   Milan not claims that Marija knows NEG-whom 
   ‘Milan does not claim that Marija knows no one/anyone.’ 
 
The i-series, on the other hand, is reminiscent of pronominals: It may not occur 
with clausemate negation, but it does occur with superordinate negation 
(Progovac 1994: 41-3). 
 
(203) a. *Marija ne poznaje i-koga 
   Marija not knows INDEF-whom 
   ‘Marija does not know anyone.’ 
  b. Milan ne tvrdi [da Marija poznaje i-koga]. 
   Milan not claims that Marija knows INDEF-whom 
   ‘Milan does not claim that Marija knows anyone.’ 
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Progovac proposes to account for these similarities by saying that negative-
polarity items are subject to the same binding principles as reflexive pronouns 
and ordinary pronouns. They are bound (and hence licensed) by negation, and 
Serbian/Croatian ni-indefinites are subject to Principle A (i.e. they are 
'anaphors"), and i-indefinites are subject to Principle B (i.e. they are 
'pronominals').viii 
 But this is not yet sufficient to account for the distribution of i-indefinites. 
Ordinary pronouns need not be bound, so (204) is acceptable. By contrast, i-
indefinites must be bound, but not in their governing category. (205) is 
ungrammatical because i-koga is not bound by anything at all. 
 
(204) The teacher praised her. 
(205) *Marija poznaje i-koga. 
  Marija knows INDEF-who 
  ‘Marija knows anyone.’ 
 
Progovac explains this situation by assuming that i-indefinites raise to a higher 
position at the syntactic level of Logical Form (LF), and that they are subject to 
Principle A there. In (206), sentence (203b) is shown both at S-structure (= 
'surface structure') and at LF. 
 
(206) a. (S-structure) Milan ne tvrdi [da Marija poznaje i-koga]. 
  b. (LF)    Milan ne tvrdi i-koga [da Marija poznaje e]. 
 
These facts follow from the assumption that i-indefinites are 'anaphoric 
pronominals', i.e. that they are subject both to Principle A and to Principle B of 
the Binding Theory. Their pronominal requirement (‘must be free in its 
governing category’) is satisfied at S-structure, and their anaphoric requirement 
(‘must be bound in its governing category’) is satisfied at LF. 
 A third type of indefinite arises from the possibility of an indefinite series 
that is subject only to Principle A, but that raises at LF (like Serbian/Croatian i-
indefinites). Progovac claims that English any-indefinites should be analyzed in 
this way. This explains why any-indefinites occur both with clausemate 
negation (cf. 4.45), like Serbian/Croatian ni-indefinites, and with superordinate 
negation (cf. 4.46), like Serbian/Croatian i-indefinites. 
 
(207) a. (S-structure) Milena did not know anything. 
  b. (LF)    anything [Milena did not know e]. 
(208) a. (S-structure) Franz did not think [that Milena saw anything]. 
  b. (LF)    Franz did not think [anything [that Milena saw e]]. 
 
In (207), anything is bound by its clausemate negation and satisfies its anaphoric 
requirement at S-structure. In (208), anything is bound by superordinate 
negation and satisfies its anaphoric requirement at LF. 
 Thus, the main three types of negative-polarity indefinites discussed by 
Progovac can be represented as in Table 5. The two binary parameters 'non-
raising vs. raising' and 'Principle A only vs. Principle A and B' yield four slots, 
of which three are filled by Serbian/Croatian and English indefinites (the 
fourth slot cannot be filled because no indefinite can be simultaneously subject 
to Principles A and B without raising – these principles contradict each other, 
and the only way an item can satisfy both is to raise and satisfy them at dif-
ferent syntactic levels). 
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Table 5. Three types of negative-polarity indefinites (Progovac 1994) 
 
 subject to  
Principle A only 
subject to 













5.3.2.2. Non-negative contexts. Of course, this cannot be the whole story 
because any-indefinites and i-indefinites also occur in various non-negative 
negative-polarity contexts, e.g. in questions, conditionals, and with 'adversative 
predicates', as in (209-11). 
 
(209) a. Da li Milan voli i-koga? 
   Q Q Milan loves INDEF-whom 
  b. Does Milan love anyone? 
(210) a. Ako Milan voli i-koga, bi-c´ e srec´ an u zˇ ivotu. 
   if Milan loves INDEF-whom be-FUT.3SG happy in life 
  b. If Milan loves anyone, he will be happy. 
(211) a. Sumnja-m da Milan voli i-koga. 
   doubt-1SG that Milan loves INDEF-whom 
  b. I doubt that Milan loves anyone. 
 
Progovac (1994: ch. 4) assumes that negative-polarity indefinites in these 
contexts are licensed (i.e. bound) by a null 'polarity operator' situated in a high 
position in the sentence (specifically, in the COMP position). She further 
assumes that the notion of 'governing category' can be defined in such a way 
that COMP falls outside of the governing category of the indefinite, so that the 
non-raising ni-indefinites cannot be licensed by the polarity operator. Only 
raising indefinites can be licensed by it. 
 Progovac then identifies a further parameter: Some indefinites (e.g. English 
any- and Serbian/Croatian i-) are licensed both by superordinate negation and 
in non-negative licensing contexts. Other indefinites are licensed only by 
superordinate negation, e.g. Turkish hiç-indefinitesix: 
 
(212) Turkish (Progovac 1994: 89; data from Mürvet Enç)  
  a. (clausemate negation) 
   Ali hiç kimse-yi  gör-me-di. 
   Ali INDEF anyone-ACC see-NEG-PAST(3SG) 
   ‘Ali did not see anyone.’ 
  b. (superordinate negation) 
   Ali hiç-bir sey-in bozul-dugˇ -u-nu söyle-me-di. 
   Ali INDEF-one thing-GEN break-REL-3SG-ACC say-NEG-PAST(3SG) 
   ‘Ali didn’t say that anything broke down.’ 
  c. (conditional) 
   *(Egˇ er) Ali hiç kimse-yi  getir-ir-se, televizyon seyred-ecegˇ -iz. 
   if Ali INDEF anyone-ACC bring-AOR-COND television watch-FUT-1PL 
   ‘If Ali brings anyone over, we will watch TV.’ 
 
Yet another type, according to Progovac, is represented by Chinese rènhé, which 
is licensed only by clausemate negation and non-negative environments, not by 
superordinate negation. 
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(213) Chinese (Progovac 1994: 87; data from Yen-Hui Audrey Li) 
  a. (clausemate negation) 
   Ta¯  bù xiˇ huan rènhé do¯ ngxi. 
   she not like  any thing 
   ‘She does not like anything.’ 
  b. (superordinate negation) 
   *Woˇ  méiyoˇ u gàosu guo ta¯  niˇ  zuò rènhé shìqing. 
   I NEG:PRF tell ASP he you do any thing 
   ‘I did not tell him that you did anything.’ 
  c. (conditional) 
   Rúguoˇ  ta¯  xiˇ huan rènhé do¯ ngxi qing gàosu woˇ . 
   if  he like any thing then tell me 
   ‘If she likes anything, tell me.’ 
 
Progovac proposes to account for these types in terms of different raising 
possibilities of different negative-polarity indefinites. In the framework of her 
assumptions, raising must be to the specifier of COMP in the case of licensing by 
superordinate negation, but to a lower position (specifically, IP adjunction) in 
the case of non-negative licensing contexts, because the specifier of COMP is 
already occupied by the polarity operator. Thus, she can account for the 
Turkish data in (212) by hypothesizing that Turkish hiç-indefinites can raise 
only to the specifier of COMP, and for the Chinese data in (213) by saying that 
Chinese rènhé can only adjoin to IP, whereas English any and Serbian/Croatian 
i-indefinites have both options. Thus, by proposing two binary parameters and 
subdividing one value into three sub-options, Progovac predicts seven types of 
indefinites, five of which are attested. Progovac’s typology can be summarized 
as in Table 4.5. 
 
Table 6. Seven possible types of negative-polarity indefinites (Progovac 1994) 
 
  subject to 
Principle A only 
subject to  
Principles A & B 
no raising  1. Serbian/Croatian       
    ni- 
— 
raising specifier of COMP 
& IP adjunction 
2. English 
    any- 
5. Serbian/Croatian   
    i- 
 specifier of COMP 
only 
3. Turkish 
    hiç- 
6. [?] 
 IP adjunction 
only 
4. Chinese 
    rènhé 
7. [?] 
 
As far as I can see, nothing excludes types 6 and 7 in Progovac’s theory, but she 
does not comment on these types. 
 
5.3.2.3. Comparison with the implicational map. Progovac’s theory distin-
guishes three main types of contexts with respect to which we observe variation 
between different indefinites: clausemate negation, superordinate negation, 
and non-negative contexts. The distribution of the seven types over these three 
contexts can be represented as in Figure 15. 
 
Figure 15. Distribution of Progovac’s indefinite types over contexts 
  non-negative  superordinate clausemate 
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  contexts  negation    negation 
            |——1————-| 
  |———————————2——————————-| 
      |———————3————––––––| 
  |———————5———————–| 
  |———4———|     |———4———–| 
      |———6————-| 
  |———7———| 
 
Looking at Progovac’s theory in this way, it can be easily compared to my 
approach in terms of the implicational map. The similarities to the upper right 
subarea of my map are immediately evident: Progovac’s three contexts are 
more or less equivalent to my three functions ‘direct negation’, ‘indirect 
negation’, and ‘question/conditional’. Thus, Progovac’s typology and my 
typology show some significant resemblances. 
 There is only one respect in which Progovac’s theory and mine make dif-
ferent predictions: The implicational map excludes the possibility of type 4, 
which Progovac allows. Progovac’s data would seem to show that she is right, 
because if Chinese rènhé is possible in conditionals and in the direct-negation 
function, but not in the indirect-negation function (cf. 213), it would be a 
counterexample to my implicational map. However, while (213b) with the 
superordinate verb gàosu ‘tell’ sounds odd, rènhé is possible with other 
superordinate verbs such as xiangxin ‘think’: 
 
(214) Chinese (Fengxiang Li, p.c.) 
  Woˇ  bù xiangxin rènhé rén lái le. 
  I not think any person come PFV 
  ‘I don’t think that anybody came.’ 
 
The fact that xiangxin ‘think’ allows rènhé, while gàosu ‘tell’ does not, must have 
to do with the fact that verbs of thinking in general allow negative raising much 
more readily than some other verbs. But whatever the explanation is, a closer 
look at the Chinese data shows that it does not contradict my implicational 
map. 
 
5.3.2.4. Discussion of Progovac’s theory. Progovac's theory is particularly 
successful in bringing out the parallels in the locality restrictions on certain 
types of anaphoric pronouns and on certain types of indefinites. Reflexive 
pronouns often must be coreferential with a clausemate antecedent, and 
similarly indefinite pronouns often must cooccur with clausemate negation. 
Other types of pronouns cannot be coreferential with a clausemate antecedent, 
and likewise some indefinites cannot occur with clausemate negation. These 
parallels would seem to call for a unified account, and Progovac has provided a 
concrete proposal of how to achieve it. I will not discuss the details of her 
theory here because it presupposes a large number of controversial 
assumptions that I do not necessarily share. I will restrict myself to pointng out 
a number of general weaknesses of her approach which will have to be 
addressed in future work. 
 First, Progovac assumes that the Binding Theory is a primitive of universal 
grammar, although it has been argued (convincingly, to my mind) that the 
locality restrictions on reflexive pronouns can be explained with reference to 
more general extragrammatical principles (Van Valin 1990, Levinson 1991). 
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Ultimately we need an extragrammatical account that extends both to reflexive 
pronouns and to indefinite pronouns with locality restrictions. 
 Second, and most importantly, Progovac has made no attempt to incorporate 
the undeniable semantic-pragmatic motivation (§ 5.5) into her theory. In her 
theory it is not clear what unifies the the two licensers of negative-polarity 
items, negation and the empty 'polarity operator' (and of course, the very 
existence of this operator, which never surfaces, is doubtful). Furthermore, a 
theory like Progovac's, where negative-polarity items must be lexically marked 
as subject to certain binding principles and as having certain raising 
possibilities, runs into problems with open-class negative-polarity items of the 
sort discussed by Schmerling (1971) (I didn’t say a word/do a thing/hear a sound/eat 
a bite/move a muscle/...). 
 Third, Progovac's account in terms of the Binding Theory fails to extend to 
related types of indefinites such as irrealis-non-specific indefinites and free-
choice indefinites.x These are clearly semantically related to negative-polarity 
indefinites, but they are not susbject to syntactic locality restrictions. 
 Fourth, as Progovac (1994: 90) notes herself, there is no independent 
evidence for the various parametric differences that she assumes. Her system 
seems to work, but she has no way of predicting  when an indefinite will be 
subject to which binding principle, and when it will select which raising option. 
It is true that there is probably a lot of arbitrariness, but some things can be ex-
plained. In particular, diachronic explanations are possible – e.g. the fact that 
Serbian/Croatian i-indefinites are marked by i, which means ‘and, also, even’. 
It is not clear how such connections could be accounted for in Progovac’s 
framework.xi 
 Progovac's work has shown clearly that much of the work on binding in 
syntax is relevant to an understanding of certain properties of indefinite 
pronouns. However, by choosing a narrow syntactic approach, she has missed 
the possibility of integrating her insights into a more realistic mixed approach 
that recognizes the basic semantic-pragmatic motivation of negative prolarity, 
without denying the important role of syntax for an interesting range of facts. 
 
 
5.4. Mental Spaces 
 
5.4.1. Introduction to the mental space approach 
 
The approach that seems most suitable for describing non-specificity and re-
lated phenomena is Fauconnier’s (1985, 1987) theory of MENTAL SPACES. (A 
somewhat similar approach had already been proposed in Jackendoff 1972a: ch. 
7). The concept of a mental space is best introduced through a concrete exam-
ple. Consider (215): 
 
(215) Youssouf wants to marry some Frenchwoman. 
 
On the specific reading ('a certain Frenchwoman', say Geneviève) the 
Frenchwoman exists quite independently of Youssouf’s desire and his wish 
concerns only a particular relation between himself and Geneviève. On the non-
specific reading ('any Frenchwoman, no matter who'), however, the very 
possibility of talking about a Frenchwoman arises only because of Youssouf’s 
desire. If it makes any sense to speak about existence in this latter case, the 
     121 
Frenchwoman exists only in the world of Youssouf’s desire, or, in Fauconnier’s 
terminology, in the mental space that is set up by ‘Youssouf wants...’. 
 Mental spaces have a certain similarity to the Leibnitzian concept of POSSIBLE 
WORLDS, but in contrast to these they carry no ontological implications – they 
are purely cognitive constructs. Furthermore, alternative mental spaces are 
concerned only with a small segment of reality (hence, 'space' rather than 
'world') and are therefore psychologically plausible constructs, unlike possible 
worlds. 
 We can now describe the ambiguity in (215) in the following way (cf. 
Fauconnier 1985: § 1.5): On the non-specific reading, a referent for the phrase 
‘some Frenchwoman’ exists only in the mental space of Youssouf’s desire, 
whereas on the specific reading a referent for this phrase exists both in the 
mental space of the speaker’s reality and in the mental space of Youssouf’s 
desire. This can be represented as in Figures 16-17. 
 
Figure 16: Non-specific reading of (215) 
     Youssouf    Youssouf 
 
 
     wants     marry 
 
          Frenchwoman 
 
     speaker’s reality space   ‘want’ space 
 
Figure 17: Specific reading of (215) 
     Youssouf    Youssouf 
 
 
     wants     marry 
 
    Frenchwoman    Frenchwoman 
 
     speaker’s reality space   ‘want’ space 
 
In these diagrams the large circles symbolize mental spaces, the black nodes 
symbolize entities, and the white nodes symbolize relations between entities. 
Broken lines connect relations with entities, and continuous lines symbolize 
pragmatic connectors that link entities in different spaces. (In the examples 
cited here, only referentially identical entities are linked by such connectors. See 
Fauconnier (1985) for more complicated cases, and detailed justification of the 
notion of a pragmatic connector.) 
 The ‘want’ space is set up by the meaning of the non-reality verb ‘want’ 
(sometimes called an 'intensional verb' in the philosophical literature). Elements 
that set up spaces can be of very different types, to be illustrated below. All 
such elements are called SPACE-BUILDERS. Spaces which are set up within other, 
'superordinate' spaces are called DEPENDENT SPACES. Thus, the ‘want’ space in 
Figure 13-14 is dependent on the speaker’s reality space. Fauconnier applies the 
notion of mental spaces to a wide variety of cases, some of which are illustrated 
by (216a-e). 
 
(216) a. Lisa, who has been depressed for months, is smiling in this picture. 
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  b. Len believes that the girl with blue eyes has green eyes. 
  c. In 1929, the lady with white hair was blonde. 
  d. If he had listened to his mother, this criminal would be a saint. 
  e. In that movie, Clint Eastwood is a villain. 
 
Thus, mental spaces can be of quite different sorts: for instance picture spaces 
(a) in (216), belief-spaces (b), time spaces (c), hypothetical spaces (d), theater 
spaces (e). 
 Fauconnier’s theoretical constructs allow us to make precise the intuition 
behind the widespread characterization of (non-)specificity according to which 
with a specific phrase, the speaker has a particular entity in mind, whereas with 
a non-specific phrase, this is not the case (e.g. Partee 1972: 415, Ioup 1977: 234, 
Hawkins 1978: 204). Evidently, what is meant by this informal description is 
that in the case of a specific phrase, the referent exists within the speaker’s 
reality space, whereas it does not exist there in the case of a non-specific phrase. 
 We  can  now also explain two of the three specificity tests mentioned in § 
3.2.3, discourse referents and existential paraphrases. A sequence like (217a) is 
impossible because the referent of the NP a paper on phonological iconicity is in 
Irene’s ‘want’ space, whereas the referent of the anaphoric pronoun ‘it’ is in the 
speaker’s reality space. A condition on pronominalization is that the anaphoric 
pronoun and its antecedent must be in the same mental space. Thus, (217b), 
where ‘it’ is also in the ‘want’ space, is perfectly acceptable. 
 
(217) a. *Irene wants to write a paper about phonological iconicity. It is  
   brilliant. 
  b. Irene wants to write a paper about phonological iconicity. She  
   wants it to be brilliant. 
  
 Existential paraphrases are only possible with specific phrases because only 
in a reality space can the existence of entities be presupposed by the speaker, 
and a presupposition of existence is a necessary prerequisite for an existential 
paraphrase. 
 
5.4.2. A definition of (non-)specificity 
 
On the basis of what was said above, I propose the preliminary definitions in 
(218), to be revised below. 
 
(218) A SPECIFIC phrase is a phrase that has a referent in the speaker’s  
  reality space. 
  A NON-SPECIFIC phrase is a phrase which does not have a referent in  
  the speaker’s reality space. 
 
Note, incidentally, that this definition does not make reference to the syntactic 
category NP (noun phrase) because adverbial phrases may also show this 
distinction (e.g. example (74) above). Also, this definition is not restricted to 
indefinite phrases, because definite phrases may also be specific or non-specific 
(pace Hawkins 1978: 204). This is illustrated in (219). ‘The referee’ is non-spe-
cific in (219a), and non-specific in (219b). (We will see further examples below, 
e.g. (225-28).) 
 
(219) a. (non-specific) 
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   We should go to a hockey game tomorrow. [I don’t care which  
   one.] I want to take a picture of the referee. 
  b. (specific) 
   We should go to a hockey game tomorrow. [It’s Lahore against  
   Rawalpindi.] I want to take a picture of the referee. [It’s Hanif  
   Abdul Nasir, my brother-in-law.] 
 
Notice further that the definition in (218) does not deny the existence of a 
referent of a non-specific phrase, so non-specific is not the same as NON-
REFERENTIAL. (This latter term is sometimes used in the sense in which I use 
non-specific, e.g. in Givón (1973, 1978), Bakker (1988), Ladusaw (1993). I would 
reserve the term non-referential for predicative noun phrases or dependent 
compound members.) 
 The definition in (218) would also describe ambiguities as in (220) in terms of 
the (non-)specificity distinction. The phrase ‘a dragon’ may have a referent only 
in the space set up by ‘Alice believes...’. 
 
(220) Alice believes that a dragon ate her petunias. 
 
Such a terminological choice is sometimes made in the literature (e.g. Fodor 
1970, Ioup 1977; see footnote 6 of this chapter), but I prefer a definition of the 
term non-specific which allows it to be used for characterizing the behavior of 
certain indefinite pronoun series in some languages (cf. § 3.2.3, and see Croft 
1985). The non-specific indefinites in the languages that I have come across are 
not used in sentences like (220), but only in contexts where their unique 
identifiability is not presupposed by the speaker. These include, above all, other 
dependent spaces which describe unrealized situations like ‘want’-spaces. 
Space-builders that set up such IRREALIS SPACES are other modals like ‘can’ and 
‘must’, the future tense, and the imperative. Conditionals and questions can 
also be regarded as setting up irrealis spaces because of their semantic 
similarities to imperatives (§ 3.2.3). Furthermore, distributive quantification can 
also license non-specific indefinites, so mental spaces set up by distributive 
quantifiers (cf. especially Fauconnier 1987) should also be accounted for in the 
definition. 
 We can now revise the definition in (218) as in (221). 
 
(221) A NON-SPECIFIC phrase is a phrase which has a referent only in a  
  dependent irrealis or distributive space.  
  A SPECIFIC phrase is a phrase which also has a referent also in some  
  other space. 
 
It would of course be interesting to know exactly what it is that unites irrealis 
and distributive mental spaces, but this question is beyond the scope of this 
book. I refer to Giannakidou (1994a, b, c) for further discussion in different 
terms (Giannakidou uses the semantic notion of (non-)veridicality which 
basically corresponds to my notion of irrealis spaces). 
 
5.4.3. Advantages of the mental space approach 
 
The mental space approach and the classical logical-semantic approach show 
some obvious similarities, and one might even claim that they are largely 
notational variants of each other. Existence of a referent in a dependent space 
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corresponds to narrow scope, dependent spaces correspond to logical operators 
and opaque contexts, etc. However, mental spaces have certain advantages 
over logical semantics. 
 First, the terminology and notation of the mental-space approach is much 
more appropriate for the cognitively oriented study of language than the 
terminology and notation of predicate logic. Logic was developed by 
philosophers and mathematicians who were not concerned with language and 
cognition, and the use of logic in linguistics has sometimes given rise to 
misunderstandings. The quasi-spatial representations of Figures 16-17 are also 
much more likely to be realistic than logical formulae because there is 
considerable evidence that much of abstract thinking has a spatial dimension 
(as shown by the pervasive spatial metaphors in language). 
 Second, the mental space approach provides a unified account of a large 
number of apparently disparate phenomena, as discussed in detail by 
Fauconnier (1985). Only a small number of these phenomena are amenable to a 
logical-semantic treatment. 
 Third, and more concretely, there is nothing in Fauconnier’s theory that says 
that space builders must be of a particular form. The construction of mental 
spaces is a relatively autonomous cognitive process which makes use of 
linguistic information of various sorts, but there are few constraints on the 
expression type of this information, and even non-linguistic pragmatic 
information may be sufficient to set up a mental space. By contrast, the logical 
approach always needs some tangible element in the logical formula to 
represent scope differences. As we saw in § 5.2.2, this forced logicians and 
linguists to introduce abstract elements into the representation. While this is 
certainly a possible strategy, it has an unpleasant flavor of artificiality. The 
solution (first proposed in Jackendoff (1972a: ch. 7) and adopted by Fauconnier) 
to separate the representation of syntactic structure from the representation of 
mental-space structure (in Jackendoff’s terms, 'modal structure'), seems more 
adequate. 
 Fourth, there are some semantic phenomena that can only be expressed in 
the mental space framework. Thus, Fauconnier points out that a sentence like 
(222) has at least four readings, whereas a logic-based description can only 
capture three of these readings.  
 
(222) Every child wants to see a movie. 
 




5.5. Pragmatic Scales and Scale Reversal 
 
An approach to the meaning and distribution of free-choice and negative-
polarity indefinites like any that differs radically from the logical-semantic 
approach of § 5.2.1 has been advanced in a series of papers by Gilles Fauconnier 
(1975a, 1975b, 1977, 1979, 1980) (and see Krifka (1992) for further refinements). I 
believe that this is the most successful treatment of free-choice and negative-
polarity indefinites proposed so far, and I will discuss it in some detail. 
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5.5.1. Pragmatic scales 
 
The key concept of Fauconnier’s theory is that of a PRAGMATIC SCALE, which 
may lead to pragmatic SCALAR IMPLICATURES. The notion of a pragmatic scale is 
also crucial in the domain of SCALAR FOCUS PARTICLES (cf. König 1991), and 
scalar focus particles may be used to illustrate what is meant by a pragmatic 
scale. Consider (223), where (223a) shows the non-scalar focus particle ‘also’, 
and (223b) shows the scalar focus particle ‘even’. 
 
(223) a. Véronique also speaks Dutch. 
  b. Natasha even speaks Dutch. 
 
The meaning difference between the two sentences is that whereas (223a) only 
implies that Véronique speaks some other language in addition to Dutch, (223b) 
also implies that Dutch is a particularly surprising or unlikely language for 
Natasha to speak. The focus value ‘Dutch’ and the included implicit 
alternatives (i.e. other languages) are taken to constitute a (partially) ordered 
scale, e.g. (224). 
 
(224) (1) Russian, (2) English, (3) German, (4) French,... (n) Dutch 
 
‘Even’ characterizes its focus value as ranking high on such an ordered scale, so 
(223b) is only appropriate if a scale like (224) is taken for granted. 
 
5.5.2. Scalar implicatures 
 
Semantic and pragmatic scales often give rise to scalar implicatures. Consider 
sentence (225), which has two readings: one in which the weakest cow is specific 
(a), and one in which it is non-specific (b).xii 
 
(225) The weakest cow can swim through this river. 
  a. (specific) ‘A certain cow, who is weaker than all others, can swim  
   through this river.’ 
  b. (non-specific) ‘Any cow can swim through this river.’ 
 
Note that the paraphrase of the second reading contains the free-choice in-
definite ‘any’, suggesting that this reading is quantificational in some way. 
Fauconnier calls superlatives with readings like (225b) QUANTIFYING SUPERLA-
TIVES. This sense arises by scalar implicature. On the quantifying reading, (225) 
is associated with a scale of cow weakness, as illustrated in Figure 18. 
 
Figure 18. Pragmatic scale of cow weakness 
  |———|———|———|———|———|———| 
      m  x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 M 
 weakest cow      strongest cow 
 low end      high end 
 
Pragmatically, it is assumed that if a cow xn can swim through a river, then any 
cow xn+m who is higher on the weakness scale (i.e. is stronger) can also swim 
through it. Superlatives specify an extreme value on a scale, so the weakest cow 
implicates that all cows can swim through the river, and the resulting meaning 
is similar to that of universal quantifiers like ‘every’ and ‘all’. Note that this 
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universal reading is based on pragmatic implicature, not on logical entailment: 
Logically, a weaker cow could of course be able to swim through a river (e.g. by 
compensating weakness by special swimming skills), whereas a stronger cow 
could be unable (e.g. because of hydrophobia).  It is important to note that 
not any superlative gives rise to a universal reading, but only superlatives that 
express the lowest point on the relevant scale. Thus, in (226-28) only the (a) 
cases allow a universal reading (marked by '+U'), whereas the (b) cases, which 
express the highest point on the relevant scale, do not (marked by '–U'). Thus, 
in the (b) cases only the specific reading (analogous to (225a)) is possible. 
 
(226) a. (+U) The weakest cow can swim through this river. 
  b. (–U) The strongest cow can swim through this river. 
(227) a. (+U) The most popular politician can plummet in the ratings by  
    raising the gasoline tax. 
  b. (–U) The least popular politician can plummet in the ratings by  
    raising the gasoline tax. 
(228) a. (+U) My friend will review the cheapest book. 
  b. (–U) My friend will review the most expensive book. 
 
Similar scalar implicatures arise also in cases like (229), where an individual 
that is well-known for some extreme property is taken to represent an extreme 
point on the relevant scale. 
 
(229) a. Even Croesus would hesitate to buy this house. 
  b. Even Kasparov could lose this game. 
  c. Even Saddam Hussein would have been impressed by this  
   diplomat. 
 
5.5.3. Scale reversal 
 
Now observe what happens to the quantificational reading if the examples of § 
5.5.2 occur in a negated sentence or in a (rhetorical) question: 
 
(230) a. (–U) The weakest cow cannot swim through this river (so we  
    must leave it behind). 
  b. (+U) The strongest cow cannot swim through this river (so we  
    cannot even think about crossing it). 
(231) a. (–U) Can the weakest cow swim through this river? (Then we  
    wouldn’t have to leave it behind when crossing the river.) 
  b. (+U) Can the strongest cow swim through this river? (And you are  
    proposing that we should cross it!) 
(232) a. ?*Even Croesus would not hesitate to buy this house. 
  b. OK: Even a beggar would not hesitate to buy this house. 
 
We see that suddenly the superlative that gave rise to the universal implicature 
(‘the weakest cow’) does not have this implicature anymore, and the 
superlative that denotes the other end of the scale acquires it. The explanation 
for this is that in negated and conditional clauses, pragmatic scales are 
reversed. Consider the examples in (233-34), where Squeaky and Lowy are two 
cows, and Squeaky (e.g. x1 in Figure 18) is weaker than Lowy (e.g. x4 in Figure 
18). 
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(233) a. Squeaky can swim through this river. 
   ⇒ Lowy can swim through this river. 
  b. Lowy can swim through this river. 
    /  Squeaky can swim through this river. 
(234) a. Lowy cannot swim through this river. 
   ⇒ Squeaky cannot swim through this river. 
  b. Squeaky cannot swim through this river. 
    /  Lowy cannot swim through this river. 
     
Similar examples could be given for conditionals or questions. The fact that the 
pragmatic implicatures are reversed in negative, conditional and interrogative 
sentences, as shown in (233-34), explains the reversal of the pragmatic scales 
and the disappearance of universal scalar implicatures in (230-32) (a). 
 The reversal of pragmatic implicatures in negative and conditional clauses is 
closely related to the reversal of entailment relations that has been highlighted 
in Ladusaw (1980: ch 6). He observes that a sentence like (235a) entails (235b), 
whereas in negative and conditional clauses the opposite entailment holds, cf. 
(236-37). 
 
(235) a. Johanna ate brussels sprouts for dinner. 
  ⇒ b. Johanna ate a green vegetable for dinner. 
(236) a. Johanna didn’t eat a green vegetable for dinner. 
  ⇒ b. Johanna didn’t eat brussels sprouts for dinner. 
(237) a. If Johanna eats a green vegetable for dinner, she will stay healthy. 
  ⇒ b. If Johanna eats brussels sprouts for dinner, she will stay  
     healthy. 
 
Since the entailment is from hyponyms to hyperonyms in (235), and the other 
way round in (236-37), Ladusaw calls contexts like (235) upward-entailing, and 
contexts like (236-37) downward-entailing. However, since the scale-reversing 
effect of these contexts is their crucial property in the present context, I will call 
them SCALE-REVERSING. 
 As Fauconnier notes (1975a: 195-6, 1977: 24-35; cf. also Ladusaw 1980: 147-
71), the scale-reversing contexts are precisely those contexts that license 
negative-polarity items. In addition to overt negation and conditionals, these 
include the standard of ordinary comparison (238) and excessive comparison 
(‘too’, 237), emotive verbs like ‘be surprised’ (240), implicit negation (241), and 
others.xiii In the following examples (238-41), the scale-reversing effect of each 
context is illustrated by the scale of cow weakness, where the weakest cow gives 
rise to universal scalar implicatures in non-reversing contexts (cf. 225), but the 
strongest cow results in such universal implicatures in scale-reversing contexts 
(e.g. 230-31 (b)). 
 
(238) standard of ordinary comparison 
  The dog can swim through wider rivers than the strongest cow. 
(239) standard of excessive comparison 
  The river is too wide for the strongest cow to swim through. 
(240) emotive verbs 
  I’m surprised that the strongest cow can swim through this river. 
(241) implicit negation 
  She denies that the strongest cow can swim through this river. 
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Characterizing the licensing contexts for negative-polarity items as scale-
reversing accounts better for the observed restrictions than all other alternatives 
proposed so far (cf. Ladusaw 1980: 147). It avoids the arbitrariness of the 
syntactic feature [+affective] of Klima (1964), and it is more adequate than 
attempts to reduce all cases of negative-polarity licensing to negation in one 
way or another (Baker 1970, Linebarger 1987, 1991, Progovac 1988), because the 
context of universal quantifiers (ex. 197), for one, clearly does not involve nega-
tion. And, most importantly for my goals, it allows us to explain many formal 
properties of negative-polarity items, in particular negative-polarity indefinites. 
Somewhat surprisingly, this point has rarely been addressed (though see 
Linebarger (1981: ch. 8) for a subset of negative-polarity items), but it is my ma-
jor concern here. 
 
5.5.4. Negative polarity items express the low point on a scale 
 
As Fauconnier (1975b: 196) notes, the distribution of many negative-polarity 
items can be explained in the same way as the distribution of quantifying 
superlatives once we recognize that negative polarity items are generally id-
iomatic expressions for a low point on a pragmatic scale. This is particularly 
clear with negative polarity items that denote a MINIMAL UNIT, e.g. a red cent, a 
jot, a tittle, and equivalents in other languages, as in (242-43) (for more 
examples, see Horn 1989: 452-3, von Bergen and von Bergen 1993: 139-54). 
 
(242) a. She didn’t give a red cent to him. 
  b. If she gives a red cent to him, I’ll be surprised. 
  c. Everybody who gives a red cent to him must be pretty stupid. 
(243) a. *She gave a red cent to him. 
  b. *She would give a red cent to him. 
 
Since they express the low point on a pragmatic scale, these minimal-unit 
expressions also have universally quantified readings, quite analogously to 
quantifying superlatives (she didn’t give a red cent = she gave nothing at all). The 
perfect parallelism is best illustrated by examples (244-45), corresponding to 
(242-43). 
 
(244) a. (+U) She didn’t give the smallest sum to him. 
  b. (+U) If she gives the smallest sum to him, I’ll be surprised. 
  c. (+U) Everybody who gives the smallest sum to him must be pretty  
     stupid. 
(245) a. (–U) She gave the smallest sum to him. 
  b. (–U) She would give the smallest sum to him. 
 
The main difference is of course the ungrammaticality of negative-polarity 
items (cf. 243) in contexts where the corresponding superlative simply lacks a 
quantifying reading (245). This non-quantifying reading is not available for 
negative-polarity items because they are idiomatic expressions in which the 
function of expressing the low point on a scale has become fixed.xiv To put it 
differently: Minimal-unit expressions that are restricted to scale-reversing 
contexts have been grammaticalized as inherently non-specific (cf. Ladusaw 
1993), so they do not have the specific non-quantifying reading exemplified by 
(225a) and (245). 
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 Perhaps not all negative-polarity items can be shown to express a low point 
on a scale (cf. Fauconnier (1975b: 198), who points out cases like English yet), 
but in the case of negative-polarity indefinites it is not difficult to make this 
plausible considering the form of the indefinites. In particular, the expression 
types in (246), to be discussed in greater detail in the following chapters, are 
motivated by the basic value ‘low point on a scale’. 
 
(246) a. ‘one, single’: Latin ullus, English any, etc. (§§ 7.5.2, 8.3.2.1) 
  b. generic nouns: French personne, Hebrew isˇ , etc. (§§ 7.5.1, 8.3.2.1) 
  c. scalar focus particles: Japanese nani-mo lit. ‘even what’, 
   Modern Greek kan-énas lit. ‘at least one’, Russian ni-kto 
   lit. ‘not even who’ (§§ 7.1, § 8.3.1) 
  d. minimal-unit expressions like ‘a trace’, ‘a tittle’ (§ 8.3.2.1) 
  e. maximal-unit expressions like ‘my life’, ‘eternity’, ‘the world’  
   (§ 8.3.2.2) 
  
5.5.5. Free-choice indefinites express the low point on a scale 
 
Fauconnier (1975a) has explored in great detail the parallels between the free-
choice indefinite any and quantifying superlatives. He observes that the (a) and 
(b) sentences of (247-48) are virtually synonymous (1975a: 354-5). 
 
(247) a. My uncle can hear the faintest noise. 
  b. My uncle can hear any noise. 
(248) a. She would give the largest sum to him. 
  b. She would give any sum to him. 
 
In addition to the near synonymy of these sentences, there is another striking 
parallel between quantifying superlatives and free-choice indefinites, which 
Fauconnier fails to mention but which is observed in Bakker (1988: 30-6) and 
König (1991). Quantifying superlatives are possible in precisely those contexts 
where free-choice indefinites are licensed, i.e. mainly possibility contexts, 
generic contexts, and contexts expressing a sufficient condition (cf. § 3.2.5). 
While (249-50) (a) have a quantifying reading, which can be paraphrased by 
‘any’, (251-52) (a) do not have such a reading, and the corresponding sentences 
with ‘any’ are unacceptable. 
 
(249) a. (+U) The youngest beaver can swim. 
  b. Any beaver can swim. 
(250) a. (+U) The smallest amount is enough. 
  b. Any amount is enough. 
(251) a. (–U) The youngest beaver swam across the river. 
  b. *Any beaver swam across the river. 
(252) a. (–U) The largest/smallest amount is necessary. 
  b. *Any amount is necessary. 
 
Again, free-choice indefinites are licensed in contexts where superlatives give 
rise to a quantifying reading. This completely parallel behavior of quantifying 
superlatives and free-choice indefinites suggests that free-choice indefinites, 
too, express a low point on a scale. 
 But we saw in the preceding section that negative-polarity items express the 
low point on a scale, and clearly negative-polarity indefinites and free-choice 
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indefinites are not synonymous. About half of the languages of my 40-language 
sample employ different indefinite series for the free-choice function and 
negative-polarity functions. On the other hand, also roughly half of the 
languages allow the same indefinite series to be used to express free choice and 
in negative-polarity contexts, which confirms the suspicion that there is a 
strong similarity. 
 In the framework advocated here, the solution to this dilemma is quite 
straightforward: Free-choice indefinites express the low point on a non-re-
versed scale, whereas negative-polarity indefinites express the low point on a 
reversed scale. We saw in § 5.5.3 that scale-reversing contexts license negative-
polarity items, which follows from the fact that these express a low point on a 
reversed scale. 
 Thus, we can say that in a sense both negative-polarity indefinites and free-
choice indefinites express the low point on a scale, albeit on opposite scales. 
Already Fauconnier (1975a: 373) proposed to 'interpret the function of any as 
being the indication of a low point on an arbitrary scale'. 
 We can now also solve the puzzle of ambiguous sentences like (253), which 
have baffled proponents of the univocal universal any view, and which 
advocates of the two-any view have cited as crucial evidence in their favor. 
 
(253) If she can solve any problem, she’ll get a prize. 
  a. ('existential') ‘If there is any problem she can solve...’ 
  b. ('universal') ‘If she can solve every problem...’ 
 
The scalar approach allows us to have our cake and eat it too. Consider again 
the equivalent sentences with quantifying superlatives. There are two different 
sentences, one corresponding to each of the readings of (254). 
 
(254) a. ('existential') If she can solve the simplest problem, she’ll get a  
   prize. 
  b. ('universal') If she can solve the most difficult problem, she’ll get a  
   prize. 
 
These paraphrases clearly show what is going on in (253). Any each time ex-
presses the low endpoint on a scale: the low endpoint of the non-reversed scale 
in (253b) (= ‘the most difficult problem’), and the low endpoint of the reversed 
scale, i.e. the opposite endpoint, in (253a) (= ‘the simplest problem’). Thus, we 
can capture both the insight of the univocal universal any theory that the two 
uses of any are closely related, and at the same time account for the ambiguity 
of sentences like (253) which motivated the two-any theory. 
 
5.5.6. Widening and strengthening 
 
Another recent proposal for a unified account of negative-polarity and free-
choice indefinites is found in Kadmon and Landman (1993). These authors 
propose that polarity-sensitive and free-choice any are the same element, which 
induces semantic WIDENING along a contextual dimension and functions to 
STRENGTHEN the statement that it occurs in. For example, they note that (255a) 
differs from (255b) in that its domain is wider (for example, (255b) might still be 
true if a wet match does not light, but in (255a) even wet matches are included 
in the domain of quantification). 
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(255) a. Any match I strike lights. 
  b. Every match I strike lights. 
 
They propose that any is licensed only if the widening that it induces fulfills its 
function of creating a stronger statement, i.e. if the statement on the wide 
interpretation entails the statement on the narrow interpretation. This happens 
in downward-entailing contexts. Thus, Kadmon and Landman can account for 
why any is licensed precisely in such contexts. In addition, they propose that 
free-choice any arises when widening and strengthening are combined with a 
generic interpretation.  
 Although Kadmon and Landman make use of the completely new concepts 
of widening and strengthening, their explanation is not all that different from 
Fauconnier's. Their notion of widening corresponds to the extreme point on a 
scale, the contextual dimension corresponds to the pragmatic scale, and their 
notion of strengtehning corresponds to scalar implicature. On their account, a 
sentence like *I have any matches is ungrammatical because strengthening is not 
satisfied, i.e. the widened statement I have matches of some kind (dry or wet) does 
not entail the statement on the narrower interpretation I have dry matches. In 
Fauconnier's theory, one would say, quite analogously, that *I have any matches 
is ungrammatical because any is inherently non-specific and expresses and 
endpoint on a scale, but when the scale is not reversed, no universal scalar 
implicature results and hence the inherently non-specific any cannot be 
interpreted. Thus, Fauconnier's proposal and Kadmon's and Landman's 
proposal are more similar to each other than the very different terminology 
suggests.  
 In my view, Fauconnier's theory has three advantages: (i) It makes use of 
theoretical constructs that are independently motivated (pragmatic scales and 
scalar endpoints), whereas widening and strengthening are theoretical 
innovations; (ii) in many cases, there is a direct connection between the 
meaning of a scalar endpoint and the form of negative-polarity items (see 246), 
whereas there is no such connection with widening; and (iii) the frequent 
connection with focusing (see § 5.7) is also explained by Fauconnier's theory 
(because scales are a typical instantiation of the range of alternations that 
focusing evokes), whereas there is no such natural connection between 
widening and focusing.  
 In any event, Kadmon's and Landman's analysis of any, which is more 
detailed than Fauconnier's and addresses a number of notorious difficulties in 
the analysis of negative polarity, is successful in demonstrating that a semantic-
pragmatic approach to negative polarity and free choice is on the right track. 
 
 
5.6. Explaining the Implicational Map 
 
After discussing the various theoretical perspectives on the functions of 
indefinite pronouns, I will now put the pieces together and propose an 
explanation for the implicational map of chapter 4, reproduced in (256). 
 
(256) The implicational map for indefinite pronoun series 
     direct 
   question indirect negation 
specific specific irrealis  negation  
known unknown non-specific  
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    conditional comparative  
      free-choice 
 
Why are the various functions arranged in this particular configuration? The 
present section will answer this question by demonstrating that the functions 
that are most similar to each other semantically and pragmatically are adjacent 
on the map. 
 There are four binary features that can be used to characterize all the nine 
functions on the map. Two of the four features have just been discussed in de-
tail, and the other two are, I trust, self-explanatory. 
 
(257) (i) known to the speaker  vs. unknown to the speaker 
  (ii) specific     vs. non-specific   (cf. § 5.4) 
  (iii) scalar endpoint  vs. no scalar endpoint  (cf. § 5.5) 
  (iv) in scope of negation   vs. not in scope of negation 
 
In addition, there is one binary feature that applies only to the functions with 
the feature value ‘scalar endpoint’: 
 
(258) (v) endpoint on non-reversed scale vs. 
    endpoint on reversed scale   (cf. § 5.5.5) 
 
I assume that the implicational map should be arranged in such a way that all 
functions that share some relevant characteristics, i.e. that have the same value 
on one of the features in (257-58) form a contiguous area on the map. This 
general requirement together with the distribution of the features over the map 
explains a considerable part of the explanandum. 
 First, the feature ‘known vs. unknown’ is distributed as shown in (259). 
 
(259) known vs. unknown 
     direct 
   question indirect negation 
specific specific irrealis  negation  
known unknown non-specific  
    conditional comparative  
      free-choice 
 
In only one function is the referent known to the speaker, while it is unknown 
in all others, so this function must be at the periphery of the map (otherwise all 
other functions could not form a contiguous area). As was observed in § 3.2.4, 
all ‘non-specific’ functions are automatically also ‘unknown’, because what 
exists only in an irrealis or a distributive space cannot be known in principle. 
 Second, the feature ‘specific vs. non-specific’ is distributed as shown in (260). 
 
(260) specific vs. non-specific 
     direct 
   question indirect negation 
specific specific irrealis  negation  
known unknown non-specific  
    conditional comparative  
      free-choice 
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As was also observed earlier, an expression denoting a scalar endpoint must be 
non-specific in order to give rise to quantificational implicatures (§ 5.5.2), so not 
only the ‘irrealis-non-specific’ function, but also all scalar-endpoint (i.e. 
negative-polarity and free-choice) functions are non-specific. The ‘known’ 
function, by contrast, cannot be non-specific because identifiability by the 
speaker and non-specificity are in principle incompatible. 
 Third, the feature ‘scalar endpoint vs. no scalar endpoint’ is distributed as 
shown in (261). The subclassifying feature ‘scale reversal vs. no scale-reversal’ 
is also shown in (261). 
 
(261) scalar endpoint vs. no scalar endpoint;  
  scale reversal vs. no scale reversal 
     direct 
   question indirect negation 
specific specific irrealis  negation  
known unknown non-specific  
    conditional comparative  
      free-choice 
 
We saw in § 5.5 that a negative-polarity expression with a quantificational read-
ing is possible only in a scale-reversing context or in a free-choice context. This 
yields the basic binary distinction in (261): Only one of the six ‘scalar-endpoint’ 
functions has the value ‘no scale reversal’, so that value must again be in a 
peripheral position. 
 Fourth, the feature ‘in scope of negation vs. not in scope of negation’ is 
distributed as shown in (262). 
 
(262) in scope of negation vs. not in scope of negation 
     direct 
   question indirect negation 
specific specific irrealis  negation  
known unknown non-specific  
    conditional comparative  
      free-choice 
 
Only the two negation functions have the value ‘in scope of negation’, so these 
must also be at the periphery of the map. The feature 'scope of negation' can 
also be subdivided into two subclassifying features, corresponding to the 
Boolean properties anti-additive and anti-morphic, as discussed insightfully in 
van der Wouden (1994: ch. 1) (a discussion of these notions would take us too 
far afield here). Both direct and indirect negation have the property of anti-
additivity, but only direct negation is anti-morphic as well. Clearly, direct 
negation is in some sense 'more strongly negative', which explains its 
peripheral position on the map. 
 Given the distribution of the four main features and the two subclassifying 
features over the nine functions, there are not many possibilities left. Only the 
relative position of the functions 'question', 'conditional', and 'comparative' to 
each other must be explained. 
 The explanation for the closer relationship between questions and negation 
is straightforward: In questions, negation is neutralized, whereas it is not in 
conditionals. Can you hear nothing? and Can you hear anything? have identical 
truth conditions, but if you hear nothing is radically different from if you hear 
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anything. And it is also clear why conditionals should be closer to free choice. 
Conditionals with scalar-endpoint indefinites are pragmatically quite normal, 
just more emphatic than conditionals with non-emphatic indefinites. However, 
questions with scalar-endpoint indefinites are somewhat odd, and make best 
sense as rhetorical questions. A question like Did you hear the slightest noise? 
could hardly be meant as an information question, because it is very unlikely 
that the speaker should be interested in information about an extreme value.xv  
 The crucial difference between the question and conditional functions and 
the comparative function is that only the latter context allows both non-specific 
indefinites (which are interpreted as scalar endpoints and yield a quan-
tificational reading) and specific indefinites (which are not interpreted as scalar 
endpoints), whereas indefinite noun phrases are necessarily non-specific in 
questions and conditionals. This results in the fairly dramatic semantic 
difference between (263a) and (263b), whereas the difference between the (a) 
and (b) readings in (264-65) is rather small (the truth conditions are not 
affected, whereas (263a) and (263b) have very different truth conditions). 
 
(263) a. Leoluca is smarter than anyone. 
  b. Leoluca is smarter than someone. 
(264) a. If you hear something, wake me up. 
  b. If you hear anything, wake me up. 
(265) a. Did you hear something? 
  b. Did you hear anything? 
 
In this respect, the comparative is like the free-choice function: In free-choice 
contexts, too, both ‘scalar-endpoint’ and ‘non scalar-endpoint’ indefinites are 
admitted, but with a big meaning difference. 
 
(266) a. Leoluca can do anything. 
  b. Leoluca can do something. 
 
 Another similarity between the free-choice function and the comparative 
function is that in both contexts universal pronouns have a very similar 
meaning to scalar-endpoint indefinites, whereas this is not the case in questions 
and conditionals.xvi 
 
(267) a. Leoluca can do anything (≈everything). 
  b. Leoluca is smarter than anybody (≈everybody). 
  c. If you hear anything (≠ everything), wake me up. 
  d. Did you hear anything (≠ everything)? 
 
 This completes my account of the implicational map. It has been shown that 
there are independent semantic reasons why the map should be arranged 
precisely in this fashion: Only in this way are semantically related functions 
adjacent to each other. That indefinite pronoun series show only polysemy 
patterns that cover adjacent areas on the map (as we saw in § 4.4) is completely 
as expected, if we assume that polysemy patterns are not random but reflect 
semantic relationships.  
 I should perhaps point out that the map has originally been established 
inductively. I hope that this chapter has shown that the deductive perspective 
leads to the same results, so that explanatory success has been achieved. 
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5.7. Focusing and Sentence Accent 
 
Before we look at the diachronic sources of indefinite pronouns in the next two 
chapters, I would like to point out the intimate connection between focusing 
and certain types of indefinite pronouns. 
 
5.7.1. Sentence accent 
 
In § 5.5.1 I illustrated the notion of a pragmatic scale with the example of scalar 
and non-scalar focus particles. This was not accidental: Focusing plays an 
important role in all scalarity phenomena. It seems that every pragmatic scale 
presupposes focusing (whereas there is of course focusing without scalarity, as 
in (223a)). Quite generally, a focus establishes a relation between the value of a 
focused expression and a set of alternatives (see König (1991: 32), who cites 
earlier work by Joachim Jacobs). In the case of a pragmatic scale, the non-
extreme values constitute this set of alternatives. 
 In this section, I would like to point out a common type of surface mani-
festation of focusing that is often observed in scalar-endpoint indefinites in 
English and typologically similar languages: sentence accent. This is also 
characteristic of other types of focusing, as illustrated in (268) (cf. König 1991: 
12). 
 
(268) sentence accent on focused element 
  a. (contrastive focus) COLLOR won the election, not Lula. 
  b. (focus particle) Only FRANCESCA bought a new bike.  
  c. (attitudinal verb) I regret that PALME was shot./ 
   I regret that Palme was SHOT. 
  d. (question) Is MOTHER home?/Is mother HOME? 
 
 Constituents have to bear sentence accent in order to be interpreted as scalar 
endpoints. This is true not only for true superlatives (269) and ‘pragmatic 
superlatives’ (270), but also for free-choice indefinites (271). Sentences with 
superlatives and pragmatic superlatives simply lose the scalar universal 
interpretation when the stress is not on these elements (cf. 269b, 270b), but 
sentences with free-choice indefinites become odd (271b). 
 
(269) superlatives 
  a. (+U) She would review the CHEAPEST book for that prestigious  
   journal. 
  b. (–U) She would review the cheapest book for that prestigious  
   JOURNAL. 
(270) ‘pragmatic superlatives’ 
  a. (+U) The Dalai LAMA would apply force in such a situation. 
  b. (–U) The Dalai Lama would apply FORCE in such a situation. 
(271) free-choice indefinites 
  a. You may invite ANYONE to our party. 
  b. ?*You may INVITE anyone to our party. 
 
 Free-choice indefinites contrast with specific indefinites in a particularly 
striking way, because specific and other non-scalar-endpoint indefinites never 
bear accent, even when they are in a position that normally bears sentence 
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accent. In English, for example, the sentence accent is normally on the direct 
object. (272) shows that free-choice indefinites are marked in that they attract 
stress, and (273) shows that non-scalar-endpoint indefinites are marked in that 
they reject stress. 
 
(272) a. Ram may buy a BOOK. 
  b. ANYONE may buy a book.  (?*Anyone may buy a BOOK.) 
  c. Someone may buy A BOOK. 
(273) a. You may invite SANGITA. 
  b. You may invite ANYONE. 
  c. You may INVITE someone. (?*You may invite SOMEONE.) 
 
I have not investigated stress systematically, but it appears that a similar sit-
uation obtains in many other languages. Below examples from Russian and 
German are given.xvii 
 
Russian 
(274) a. KTO UGODNO mozˇ et kupit’ knigu.  
   (?*Kto ugodno mozˇ et kupit’ KNIGU) 
   ‘Anyone may buy a book.’ 
  b. Kto-nibud’ mozˇ et kupit’ KNIGU. 
   (?*KTO-NIBUD’ mozˇ et kupit’ knigu.) 
   ‘Someone may buy a book.’ 
(275) a. Ty mozˇ esˇ ’ priglasit’ KOGO UGODNO. 
   (?*Ty mozˇ esˇ ’ PRIGLASIT’ kogo ugodno.) 
   ‘You may invite anyone.’ 
  b. Ty mozˇ esˇ ’ PRIGLASIT’ kogo-nibud’. 
   (?*Ty mozˇ esˇ ’ priglasit’ KOGO-NIBUD’.) 
   ‘You may invite someone.’ 
German 
(276) a. IRGEND JEMAND kann ein Buch kaufen.  
   ‘Anyone can buy a book.’ 
   (≠ Irgend jemand kann ein BUCH kaufen. 
   ‘Someone can buy a book.’) 
  b. Jemand kann ein BUCH kaufen. 
   (?*JEMAND kann ein Buch kaufen.) 
   ‘Someone may buy a book.’ 
(277) a. Du darfst IRGEND JEMANDEN einladen. 
   ‘You may invite anyone.’ 
   (≠ Du darfst irgend jemanden EINLADEN. 
   ‘You may invite someone.’) 
  b. Du darfst jemanden EINLADEN. 
   (?*Du darfst JEMANDEN einladen.) 
   ‘You may invite someone.’ 
 
5.7.2. Emphatic vs. non-emphatic indefinites 
 
Since the contrast with respect to sentence accent that was just exemplified is so 
striking, I will occasionally use the terms EMPHATIC INDEFINITE and NON-
EMPHATIC INDEFINITE.xviii These terms are used in a deliberately loose way here 
because it is not always possible to pay attention to all details, but it is often 
useful to have this distinction. The functions ‘specific (known or unknown)’ 
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and ‘irrealis non-specific’ require non-emphatic indefinites, and the functions 
‘free choice’ and ‘comparative’ require emphatic indefinites. The functions 
‘indirect negation’, ‘question’ and ‘conditional’ are interesting in that they 
allow both emphatic and non-emphatic indefinites without a difference in the 
truth conditions. In (278-79) the distinction between emphatic and non-
emphatic indefinites is only marked by the stress.xix 
 
(278) conditional  
  a. If you HEAR anything, wake me up. 
  b. If you hear ANYTHING, wake me up. 
(279) questionxx 
  a. Can you SEE anything? 
  b. Can you see ANYTHING? 
 
There is a clear meaning difference between the (a) and (b) sentences: In the (b) 
case, a scale of alternative values is present of which the chosen value is the 
endpoint. No such scale is present in the (a) sentences, where non-emphatic 
any-indefinites are used.xxi 
 Many languages use two different indefinites to render these two meanings. 
If these indefinites are used in other functions as well, the emphatic indefinite 
(corresponding to the (b) case) is used in other emphatic functions (comparative 
and free choice), and the non-emphatic indefinite is used in other non-emphatic 




  a. Si quelqu’un vient, réveille-moi. 
   if someone comes wake-me 
   ‘If anyone COMES, wake me up.’ 
  b. Si qui que ce soit vient, réveille-moi.  
   if anyone comes wake-me 
   ‘If ANYONE comes, wake me up.’ 
(281) Polish 
  a. Jez%eli co-s´  zobaczysz, odrazu mnie obudz´ . 
   if what-INDEF see:2SG immediately me wake:IMPV 
   ‘If you SEE anything, wake me up immediately.’ 
  b. Jez%eli co-kolwiek zobaczysz, odrazu mnie obudz´ . 
   if what-INDEF see:2SG immediately me wake:IMPV 
   ‘If you see ANYTHING, wake me up immediately.’ 
(282) Hindi/Urdu 
  a. Agar koii fon kare, mujhe bataanaa.  
   if someone phone calls I:DAT tell:IMPV 
   ‘If anybody CALLS, tell me.’ 
  b. Agar koii bhii fon kare, mujhe bataanaa.  
   if someone INDEF phone calls I:DAT tell:IMPV 
   ‘If ANYBODY AT ALL calls, tell me.’ 
(283) Chinese (Fengxiang Li, p.c.) 
 a. Woˇ  bù xiangxin shénme rén lái le. 
   I not think what man come PFV 
   ‘I do not think that anyone CAME.’ 
 b. Woˇ  bù xiangxin rènhé rén lái le. 
   I not think any man come PFV 
   ‘I do not think that ANYONE came.’ 
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More examples of this can be found in Appendix A, e.g. in Russian, Hungarian, 
Bulgarian, Italian. 
 One might say that these examples show that it is not sufficient to have one 
question/conditional function, but that two such functions have to be 
distinguished: first, ‘question/conditional + scalar endpoint’, and second 
‘question/conditional + no scalar endpoint’. The first would be located next to 
the irrealis-non-specific function, and the second would be located next to the 
indirect-negation and comparative functions on the implicational map. I have 
not adopted this proposal because the semantic distinction between the (a) and 
(b) sentences in (278-83) is very subtle and is not easy to identify across 
languages. However, future research along these lines should take this 
possibility very seriously. 
 
5.7.3. Further meaning differences associated with sentence accent 
 
In addition to the semantic differences illustrated in (278-79), even more 
dramatic distinctions can be coded by sentence accent. In particular, quite a few 
languages have indefinites that may be used both in clearly emphatic and in 
clearly non-emphatic functions. It appears that in such cases sentence accent in 
general disambiguates the two readings. Thus, the German irgend-series is used 
both in the free-choice function and in the irrealis-non-specific function. Which 
function is intended is determined by the location of sentence accent. 
 
(284) German 
  a. Du kannst irgend etwas KAUFEN. 
   you can INDEF something buy 
   ‘You may buy something (or other).’ 
  b. Du kannst IRGEND ETWAS kaufen. 
   you can INDEF something buy 
   ‘You may buy anything.’ 
 
The situation is quite parallel in Portuguese: 
 
(285) Portuguese 
  a. Você pode COMPRAR qualquer coisa. 
   you can buy INDEF thing 
   ‘You may buy something (or other).’ 
  b. Você pode comprar QUALQUER COISA. 
   you can buy INDEF thing 
   ‘You may buy anything.’ 
 
 In Spanish, a particularly dramatic distinction can be observed with the 
expression en mi vida ‘in my life’ (and several related expressions). This phrase 
has been idiomaticized as a negative-polarity item meaning ‘ever’, as illustrated 
in (286a) (see also § 8.3.2.2). By analogy with indefinites like nunca ‘never’, en mi 
vida may now also be used preverbally, and since preverbal negative indefinites 
do not cooccur with verbal negation in Spanish (cf. § 8.2.2), there is no verbal 
negation in (286b) (see Vermeylen 1984). However, (286b) has this negative 
interpretation only when it is stressed, so that a scalar interpretation becomes 
possible. Otherwise, it simply means ‘in my life’, as in (286c). (I am grateful to 
Brenda Laca for native speaker judgments.) 
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(286) Spanish 
  a. No lo he visto EN MI VIDA. 
   NEG it have:1SG seen in my life 
   ‘I haven't ever (< in my life) seen it.’ 
  b. EN MI VIDA  lo he visto. 
   in my life it have:1SG seen 
   ‘Never have I seen it.’ 
  c. En mi vida LO HE VISTO. 
   in my life it have:1SG seen 
   ‘In my life I have seen it.’ 
 
 Hungarian has the lexical item valamennyi which has the two very different 
meanings ‘some, several’ and ‘all’. There is probably no synchronic way in 
which these two meanings can be unified, but I would propose the following 
diachronic scenario to account for the synchronic polysemy: Originally the vala-
series had the free-choice function (as expected given its etymology: val- ‘be’, cf. 
§ 6.2.3), which later developed into a non-emphatic meaning (‘some’) in the 
manner outlined in § 6.4.2. But independently, it also developed into a 
universal meaning, as outlined in § 6.5. Although the contemporary universal 
meaning is no longer scalar, valamennyi preserved its original stress properties: 
When it means ‘all’, it must bear sentence accent, but when it means ‘some’, it 
cannot (Hunyadi 1981). 
 
(287) Hungarian 
  a. Valamennyi fiú TANULT. 
   some boy learned 
   ‘Some of the boys were learning.’  
  b. VALAMENNYI fiú tanult. 
   all boy learned 
   ‘All of the boys were learning.’ 
 
 Finally, in Modern Greek the indefinites of the típota-series may be stressed 
or unstressed. If they are stressed (and thus focused, cf. Tsimpli and Roussou 
1993), they are strictly limited to the direct-negation function, but they may also 
have that function if they are unstressed, much like English any-indefinites. (See 
Tsimpli and Roussou (1993: 147-50) for the subtle difference in interpretation 
between the two variants of (288b).) 
 
(288) Modern Greek 
  a. An dhís kanéna/ *KANÉNA,... 
   if see:2SG anyone anyone 
   'If you see anybody,...' 
  b. Dhen ídha kanéna/ KANÉNA. 
   not saw:1SG anyone anyone 
   'I didn't see anybody.' 
 
 All these facts once more underline the point that the notions of focusing and 
scalarity are central for our understanding of both meaning and form of 
indefinite pronouns. 
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i Veyrenc merely speaks vaguely of '-nibud’, indicateur de l’indéterminé virtuel du 
particulier', as opposed to '-libo, indicateur de l’indéterminé du général', not even 
attempting a detailed justification of his classification. To be fair, however, I must add 
that Veyrenc’s prose text contains a lot of original useful observations and 
interpretations, and that the classification in (165) is perhaps not the main point of his 
paper. 
ii For the earlier discussion within the generative semantics debate, see Jackendoff 
(1972a), Carden (1976), Aldridge (1982). For a later standard treatment within 
Chomsky’s Government-Binding framework, see May (1985).  
iii Universal pronouns and determiners are therefore often called universal quantifiers in 
the linguistic literature. The analogous use of existential quantifier for 'indefinite 
pronoun' is much rarer, but is also occasionally found (e.g. König 1991: 32). 
iv Here I use restricted quantifiers (following McCawley 1981: §4.5) for convenience. 
Strictly speaking, also the quantifiers in (166-168) should be restricted: (166a') (∃: thing 
x) (Pavlina saw x); (167a') (∀: thing x) (Waldemar ate x); (168a') (∀: person x) (x 
knows this secret). Natural languages have no expressions corresponding to variables 
bound by unrestricted quantifiers – even the most general expressions, pronouns, 
incorporate the meaning of an ontological category. 
v The situation is similar to the analysis of the focus particle even (cf. König 1991: 
§4.2.1), which may characterize its focus value as maximal or minimal. In a question 
like Can she even speak French?, either reading is possible, and here, too, a univocal 
analysis would be highly desirable. See § 5.5, § 8.3.1 for more parallels between even 
and any. 
vi Fodor (1970: ch. 2) claims that (186) allows a specific and a non-specific reading of a 
friend of mine, whereas a sentence like A friend of mine is a busdriver allows only a 
specific reading. I do not follow this. It is true that (186) may be construed in two ways, 
(a) meaning that there is some particular friend of mine such that Mary believes he or 
she is a busdriver, and (b) meaning simply that Mary believes that there is a friend of 
mine who is a busdriver, though she may not know, or may not be concerned with, 
which particular friend it is. But these two readings do not depend on the embedding in 
a propositional-attitude verb and are also available in the simple sentence A friend of 
mine is a busdriver. A similar example is discussed in Ioup (1977: 236): I talked to a 
logician. This may mean (a) that I talked to a person who is independently identifiable 
but happens to be described as a logician in (ii), or (b) that all that matters is that the 
person I talked to was a logician. Ioup also characterizes these two readings as 
specific/non-specific, but this terminological usage is infelicitous. The two readings 
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should rather be distinguished as the VALUE reading and the ROLE reading, see the 
discussion in Fauconnier (1985: § 2.2). Non-specific expressions can only have a role 
reading, so there is a relation here, but the non-specific/specific distinction must not be 
collapsed with the role/value distinction. 
vii A further insurmountable problem for the classical logical-semantic analysis is 
discourse anaphora (cf. Jackendoff 1972a: 281-4, Fodor 1977: 186-93, Lyons 1977: 
191-2). In response to these problems, Jackendoff's (1972a) theory of modal structure, 
Fauconnier's (1985) mental-space theory, and Kamp's Discourse Representation Theory 
(Kamp and Reyle 1993) were developed. 
viii Note that the more abstract notion of 'binding' that can account for both pronouns 
and negative-polarity items has nothing to do with coreference – obviously, negative-
polarity items cannot be said to be coreferential with negation or an empty polarity 
operator. (In addition, Progovac works within the 'generalized binding' framework of 
Aoun (1986). The technical details need not concern us here.) 
ix Turkish is not a good example because hiç-indefinites are allowed in one non-neg-
ative environment, questions (cf. Appendix A, Section 23 for data). Progovac’s attempt 
to explain this away by saying that the question particle mu/mü/mi/mı is 'negative' in 
some way (1994: 151) is unconvincing. However, there are other languages where an 
indefinite series is restricted to clausemate and indirect negation, e.g. the Maltese ebda-
series (Appendix A, Section 30), or the Hebrew af/sˇ um-series (Section 31), etc. 
Progovac could have chosen one of these languages to make her point. 
x Progovac does discuss free-choice indefinites (1994: ch. 7), but she makes the crucial 
mistake of considering Serbian/Croatian bilo-indefinites as representing unambiguous 
free-choice indefinites in all their uses, although these can be used in non-free-choice 
functions like questions and conditionals (see Appendix A, Section 14 for the data). 
xi The same criticism applies to Chomskyan treatments of reflexive and ordinary pro-
nouns. These studies have rarely addressed the question why reflexive pronouns are so 
often identical to emphatic reflexives (cf. König (1995) for an explanation in semantic-
pragmatic terms). 
xii There is also a suprasegmental difference between the two readings; see § 5.7.1 
below for discussion. (Note, incidentally, that (225) shows the need to recognize 
definite non-specific phrases, as argued in § 5.4.2 above.) 
xiii For a detailed discussion of pragmatic implicature in questions, see Fauconnier 
(1980). (Note that questions are a problem for Ladusaw’s downward-entailment 
approach, but they are not for Fauconnier’s pragmatic-implicature approach.)  
xiv Quantifying superlatives may also become idiomaticized or lexicalized and thus turn 
into negative polarity items. For example, the Russian synthetic superlative malejsˇ ij 
‘the smallest’ can only be used in negative-polarity environments (the analytic 
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superlative samyj malen’kij has no restrictions). An example is polnoe otsutstvie 
malejsˇ ix priznakov nacionalizma ‘the complete absence of the slightest signs of 
nationalism’.  
 Hoeksema (1994) discusses the process of fixing or grammaticalization of 
expressions which denote a scalar endpoint or are frequently associated with negative 
polarity for other reasons. 
xv I am grateful to Ekkehard König for pointing this out to me. 
xvi The ambiguous status of any in comparatives between 'free-choice/universal any' and 
'existential any' has sometimes been noted in the literature (Carlson 1981: 13, 
Hoeksema 1983: 408-10). The intermediate location on the map is a reflection of this 
status in my approach. 
xvii The 'focus gemination' that we find in Chechen indefinites (see (26) above) seems to 
have a function similar to sentence accent, iconically reflecting the pragmatic emphasis. 
xviii Note that emphasis was the usual term for ‘focus’ until Chomsky (1970) used this 
latter term. The term emphasis is of course associated with all sorts of other meanings, 
but this is not a big disadvantage here because my use of this term is deliberately 
somewhat loose. 
xix In the direct-negation function, too, both emphatic and non-emphatic indefinites 
seem to be possible: I didn’t SEE anything vs. I didn’t see ANYTHING. However, it is not 
clear to me whether one can say that only the second involves a scale. But intuitively, 
the second sentence is ‘stronger’ than the first in much the same way as (278-79) (b) are 
‘stronger’ than (278-79) (a). 
xx The same contrast is found with the Dutch cognate enig ‘any’, e.g. Heeft hij enig 
success gehad met al zijn pogingen? This may mean (with enig stressed) ‘Has he had 
any success at all with all his attempts?’, or it may mean (with enig unstressed) ‘Has he 
had some success with all his attempts?’ 
xxi This was pointed out to me by Ekkehard König. The relevance of stress in examples 




of Indefinite Pronouns 
 
 
6.1. Diachronic Typology 
 
In this and the following chapter, I study the ways in which indefinite 
pronouns arise and change over time in different languages and the regularities 
in these changes. There are two main reasons for engaging in such a study of 
diachronic typology. First, for the sake of diachrony itself. Language change is a 
universal and essential feature of human language, and by studying the general 
laws of language change, we learn a lot about human language. 
 But secondly, diachronic typology also helps us understand synchronic 
language states better. All languages are constantly in a process of change, in a 
kind of flux, and many features that do not fit neatly into a synchronic system 
begin to make sense once a diachronic point of view is taken. This applies both 
to recent innovations and to remnants of earlier regularities that are no longer 
synchronically motivated. Languages can carry around such synchronic 
irregularities for many generations of speakers, and if our goal is the 
explanation of linguistic structures, we have to take diachronic explanations 
into account. 
 Most importantly for my purposes, there is often a close correspondence 
between the generalizations obtained from synchronic and from diachronic 
typological studies, so that the results from such studies reinforce each other. 
For instance, in Hawkins’s (1983) study of word order universals, the 
implicational hierarchies that account for the cross-linguistic distribution of 
word order patterns also make correct predictions about possible diachronic 
changes, as Hawkins shows. If a language acquires new word order patterns, it 
acquires them in accordance with the order of the implicational hierarchy. 
Quite analogously, implicational maps that account for the cross-linguistic 
distribution of different functions of grammatical categories also constrain the 
possible diachronic changes: A category can acquire a new function only if that 
function is adjacent on the semantic map to some function that the category 
already covers. Semantic change of grammatical categories is 'incremental' (cf. 
Croft et al. 1987), and grammatical categories gradually extend their uses along 
the paths allowed by the map. 
 This correspondence between synchronic and diachronic typology can 
also be observed in the case of indefinite pronouns. As I will show in this 
chapter (especially § 6.4), the extension of indefinite series to new functions 
proceeds along the paths permitted by the implicational map of chapter 4. 
 One problem for the diachronic-typological study of indefinite pronouns 
at this stage is that there are very few specialized studies on diachronic change 
in indefinite pronouns in individual languages. While I was able to make use of 
quite a few studies on individual languages for the synchronic distribution, I 
had to rely on other kinds of evidence for the diachronic study. First, some of 
the large historical grammars of the major European languages do contain a 
limited amount of relevant information. Second, I use comparative evidence 
from closely related languages. And third, etymological information, which is 
available for many languages, also gives us valuable insights, especially about 
the source construction from which an indefinite pronoun was derived. 
 A key concept for understanding the genesis and later development of 
indefinite pronouns is the concept of grammaticalization (cf. Lehmann 1982a, 
Heine et al. 1991, Hagège 1993, Hopper and Traugott 1993, among many others). 
Research in diachronic typology is to a large extent concerned with various 
types of grammaticalization. Grammaticalization is the unidirectional gradual 
diachronic change by which a lexical-syntactic source construction loses its 
autonomy and is integrated into the grammar. In the following section (§ 6.2), I 
identify four main source constructions from which the grammaticalization of 
indefinite pronouns started. In a next step (§ 6.3-4), I will relate these changes to 
general properties of grammaticalization, and discuss the consequences for 
different theoretical accounts of grammaticalization changes. 
 In this and the following chapter mainly non-negative pronouns will be 
treated. The discussion of the diachrony of negative indefinites will be reserved 
for chapter 8 (especially § 8.3). 
 
 
6.2. Source Constructions for Indefiniteness Markers 
 
The grammaticalization processes are particularly interesting in the case of a 
large subclass of interrogative-based indefinite pronouns. Accordingly, I will 
concentrate the discussion on such indefinites in the following subsections. In 
chapter 7, I will then discuss further diachronic sources of indefinite pronouns 
that cannot be subsumed under grammaticalization. 
 
6.2.1. The ‘dunno’ type 
 
6.2.1.1. The source construction. Some indefiniteness markers that combine 
with interrogative pronouns have arisen from a clause with the meaning ‘I 
don’t know’, or similar. This type is especially well-attested in European 
languages. Some cases are shown in (289). (Here and in many of the following 
examples, one indefinite pronoun, often the one denoting a person, stands for 
the whole indefinite series.) 
(289) ‘dunno’-indefinites from ‘I don’t know wh-’ 
  a. Middle High German neizwer ‘somebody’ 
   < ne weiz wer ‘(I) don’t know who’ 
  b. Old English nthw‘somebody’ 
   < ne wt hw‘(I) don’t know who’ 
  c. Old Norse nekkver ‘somebody’  
   (> Swedish någon, Icelandic nokkur) 
   < *ne wait ik hwarir ‘I don’t know who’ 
  d. Romanian (dialectal) nes3tine ‘some’  
   < Latin nescio quis ‘I don’t know who’ 
  e. Bulgarian (dialectal) na(m)koj ‘somebody’ (cf. Paov 1965) 
   < ne znam koj ‘I don’t know who’ 
  f. Old Church Slavonic nkto ‘somebody’ 
   < *ne vkto ‘I don’t know who’ 
  g. French je ne sais quel ‘some kind of’ 
   cf. je ne sais (pas) quel ‘I don’t know which’ 
 
 A variant of the explicit negation ‘I don’t know’ is the rhetorical question 
‘who knows?’, which by way of a conversational implicature renders the same 
meaning. This type of source construction has been strongly grammaticalized 
in Lithuanian, while in the other languages where I have found it it is quite rare 
and highly expressive, i.e. it is still weakly grammaticalized. 
 
(290) ‘dunno’-indefinites from ‘who knows wh-?’ 
  a. Lithuanian kakas (kainkas, kanokas) ‘somebody’ 
   < kas ino kas ‘who knows who’ 
  b. Czech kdovíkdo 
   < kdo ví kdo ‘who knows who’ 
  c. German wer weiß wer ‘someone or other’ 
   cf. wer weiß wer ‘who knows who’ 
 
In Albanian, the strongly grammaticalized indefiniteness marker di- (e.g. di-
kush ‘somebody’, di-ç ‘something’, di-ku ‘somewhere’, etc.) is identical to the 
root di- ‘know’. It is unclear whether this goes back to type (289) (with the 
negation omitted) or to type (290) (with ‘who’ omitted) or perhaps to some 
third type (e.g. a rhetorical polar question like ‘do I know who?’). 
 Another highly expressive variant of this type is an expression like ‘God 
knows wh-’ or even ‘the devil knows wh-’. I know of no case where such a 
source construction has been grammaticalized strongly. 
 
(291) ‘dunno’-indefinites from ‘God (etc.) knows wh-’ 
  a. Russian Bog vest’ kto ‘God knows who’ 
   ert znaet kto ‘the devil knows who’ 
  b. Serbian/Croatian bogzna ko ‘God knows who’ 
  c. Slovak bohvie kto ‘God knows who’ 
  d. French Dieux sait qui ‘God knows who’ 
  e. Swedish Gud vet vad ‘God knows what’ 
 
 The scarcity of attested cases of ‘dunno’-indefinites outside of Europe 
might lead one to suggest that such indefinites are an areal feature typical of 
Europe. But in view of the unsatisfactory documentation of most non-European 
languages, this conclusion may turn out to be premature. 
 It is not difficult to see why an expression like ‘I don’t know’ should 
come to mark an indefinite pronoun: Indefinite pronouns are typically used 
when the referent is unknown to the speaker (though it need not be unknown, 
cf. § 3.2.4). The diachronic scenario of its development is also easy to 
reconstruct: The original source structure is an indirect parametric (or 'wh-') 
question embedded in the matrix clause ‘I don’t know’ where the greater part 
of the embedded question is omitted because it is obvious from the context (this 
type of contextual omission was called 'sluicing' in Ross (1969); cf. also von 
Bremen (1983: 118-19)). 
 
(292)  (She told him somethingi.) I don’t know what [iti was]. 
 
In a next step, this sentence is inserted into another sentence where the 
interrogative pronoun occupies some syntactic position. 
 
(293) She told him I don’t know what. 
 
This is a kind of 'syntactic amalgam' of the type studied in Lakoff (1974) (cf. 
Lakoff’s example I saw you’ll never guess how many people at the party). One could 
propose a constituent structure as in (294) for it (cf. Espinal 1991: 748-9), where 
there are two separate structures with their own root node that share one 
constituent (the NP what). 
 
(294)  S   S 
 
  NP  VP NP  VP 
 
 
   V NP  V   NP 
 
  She told him I don’t know what. 
 
Whatever the best syntactic analysis of such constructions is, they are obviously 
highly marked and prone to reanalysis. The erstwhile matrix clause ‘I don’t 
know’ is reanalyzed as an indefiniteness marker, and when this way of 
expressing indefinite pronouns becomes more frequent, it may undergo quite 
radical phonological reduction, as shown by the Bulgarian, Romanian and 
especially the Old Norse example. 
 
6.2.1.2. The original meaning. Now let us ask what kind of indefinite meaning 
we get from the source ‘I don’t know’. Obviously we do not get the meaning 
‘known to the speaker’, but can we be more specific? We can: In all the other 
functions distinguished in § 3.3, the referent is unknown to the speaker, but this 
source only gives rise to the specific-unknown function. The reason is that in all 
the non-specific functions, it would be nonsensical for the speaker to state that 
he or she does not know the referent because if the referent is non-specific, 
nobody could possibly know it. This can also be illustrated by the impossibility 
of adding I don’t know wh- when the referent of the indefinite pronoun is non-
specific. Thus, while (295a-b) are possible (like 292), (296a-c) are anomalous. 
 
(295) specific 
  a. Susanne is thinking about something. I don’t know what. 
  b. She wants to marry an Ainu speaker. I don’t know whom. 
(All I  




  a. (irrealis: imperative) #Take some apple. I don’t know 
which one. 
  b. (interrogative) #Did you see anybody? I don’t know whom. 
  c. (free choice) #You can take any apple. I don’t know which 
one. 
 
 When we look at the way ‘dunno’-indefinites are used, we see that the 
prediction that they have the specific-unknown function is confirmed. 
(297) a. French 
   Il nous reste encore je ne sais quel désir
 vague,  
   it us remains still indef which desire vague 
   je ne sais quelle  inquiétude. (Voltaire) 
   indef which restlessness 
   ‘We are left with some kind of vague desire, some kind of  
   restlessness.’ 
  b. Old English (Rissanen 1987: 417) 
   pær on innan giong / niDa nat-hwilc, 
   there on inside went of.men indef-which 
    se pe neh gefeng / hæDnum horde. 
(Beowulf 2214-16) 
   he that near caught heathen treasure 
   ‘Some man or other crept inside it, who reached out 
toward the  
   heathen treasure.’ 
  c. Lithuanian (Pilka 1984: 29) 
   Ka-kas atejo. 
   indef-who came 
   ‘Someone came.’ 
 
6.2.2. The ‘want/pleases’ type 
 
6.2.2.1. The source construction. Some indefiniteness markers that combine 
with interrogative pronouns go back to an expression meaning ‘want’ or 
‘pleases’ or similar. Examples are given in (298). (Again, the indefinite pronoun 
denoting a person generally represents its series.) 
 
(298) Latin qui-vis ‘anybody’ vis ‘you want’ 
  qui-libet ‘anybody’ libet ‘it pleases’ 
 Spanish cualquiera ‘any’ quiera ‘wants (subjunctive)’ 
 Italian qualsivoglia ‘any’ voglia ‘wants (subjunctive)’ 
 Russian kto-libo ‘anybody’ libo < ljubo ‘dear, pleasing’ 
  kto ugodno ‘anyone’ ugodno ‘suitable’ 
 Romanian cine-va ‘somebody’ va < vrea ‘wants’ 
 Albanian kushdo do ‘wants’ 
 Bulgarian koj-gode ‘anyone’ gode <  
   Old Church Slavonic god‘suitable’ 
 Ossetic i-fændy ‘anyone’  fændy ‘you want’ 
 Slovak vol’a-kto ‘anyone’  vol’a ‘wanting’ 
 Serbian/Croatian  ko mu drago ‘anybody’ drago mu ‘dear to him’ 
 
For these indefinite pronouns, I hypothesize the source constructions in (299) as 
the starting point of the grammaticalization process. 
 
(299) a. You may take what you want [to take]. 
 b. You may take what it pleases (you) [to take]. 
 
(299a) and (299b) are semantically equivalent and differ only in that the 
addressee is the subject of the predicate ‘want’ in (299a), but the object of the 
predicate ‘please’ in (299b). The predicate (‘want/pleases’) is in both cases the 
predicate of a non-specific free relative clause which serves as an argument of 
the main clause. 
 In contrast to the previous case, this source construction does not require 
any syntactic restructuring before it can be turned into a grammatical marker, 
the reason being, of course, that the original construction consists of a 
subordinate clause, rather than a superordinate clause as in § 6.2.1. 
 The hypothesized source constructions also explain why the 
indefiniteness markers in this section are suffixes, whereas the indefiniteness 
markers from ‘I don’t know’ are prefixes. And that these indefinites, too, are 
based on interrogative pronouns finds a natural explanation in the fact that in 
many languages, non-specific free relative clauses are formed with an 
interrogative-based relative pronoun (cf. Lehmann 1984: 326) 
 
6.2.2.2. The original meaning. As in ‘dunno’-indefinites, it is pretty obvious 
why source constructions like (299a-b) should be chosen for an indefinite 
pronoun. A sentence like (299a) is a close paraphrase of a sentence with a free-
choice indefinite pronoun like You may take anything, and in § 3.3.3 we saw that 
languages lacking free-choice indefinites use precisely such constructions to 
render the same meaning. 
 Thus, we expect ‘want/please’-indefinites to express the free-choice 
meaning initially, and this is indeed what we find in many cases: 
 
(300) a. Spanish 
   Puedes traerme cualquier libro. 
   can:2sg bring:me any book 
   ‘You can bring me any book.’ 
  b. Latin 
   Utrum-libet elige; alterum incredibile est,
 alterum nefarium  
   which-indef choose:impv other incredible is other
 sinful 
   ‘Choose either; one is incredible, the other sinful.’ (Quint. 
81) 
  c. Russian 
   Ty moe’ sprosit’ to ugodno. 
   you can ask what indef 
   ‘You may ask anything.’ 
 
6.2.3. The ‘it may be’ type 
 
6.2.3.1. The source construction. Many indefiniteness markers contain an 
element that goes back to form of the verb ‘be’. Why this should be so is 
perhaps not immediately obvious, but there is a straightforward account for it, 
which will be presented immediately below. Consider the examples in (301). 
 
(301) Russian kto by to ni bylo ‘anyone’ 'who it not be',  
      i.e. ‘whoever it may be’ 
    kto-nibud’ ‘any-/some-one’ < kto ni budi 
      ‘whoever it may be’ 
  Bulgarian kojto i da e ‘anyone’  'who also it be', i.e. 
      ‘whoever it may be’ 
  Serbian/Croatian  ko bilo ‘anyone’ 'who it be' 
  French qui que ce soit ‘anyone’ ‘whoever it may be’ 
  Icelandic hver sem er ‘anyone’  'whoever it is' 
  Hebrew mi-e-hu ‘someone’  'who that it (is)", i.e. 
      ‘whoever it may be’ 
  Korean mues-i-n-ka ‘someone’ mues ‘what?’, i-n- ‘be’, -ka 
      ‘question particle’ 
  Lezgian wuajit’ani ‘anyone’ ‘whoever it may be’ 
    (wu‘who’, a-ji- ‘be’ -t’a conditional, -ni ‘also’) 
  Kannada yaar-aadaruu ‘anyone’ ‘whoever it may be’ 
    (yaaru ‘who’, aa-d- ‘be’ -ar conditional, -uu ‘also’) 
  Czech kdo-si ‘someone’  < *kto sit ‘whoever it be’ 
 
The hypothesized source construction for these indefinites is a parametric 
concessive conditional clause, as shown in (302) (cf. von Bremen 1983). 
 
(302) You can take somethingi, whatever iti may be. 
 
One might ask why the source construction cannot contain a non-specific free 
relative clause, as in the ‘want’-type that we saw in the preceding section. This 
would look as in (303). 
 
(303) You can take whatever it may be. 
  
The problem is that the subject ‘it’ (which appears overtly in Russian (to), 
French (ce), and Hebrew (hu)) in this hypothetical source construction is 
unmotivated, so I assume that (302) is correct. But eventually some kind of ill-
understood restructuring takes place and turns (302) into (303), which is then 
grammaticalized, yielding the indefiniteness markers in (301). The replacement 
of (302) by (303) may also be facilitated by the fact that in many languages, 
parametric concessive conditional clauses and non-specific free relative clauses 
are structurally quite similar (cf. Haspelmath and König (to appear)). 
 The typical structural features of parametric concessive conditional 
clauses are also reflected in the resulting indefinite pronoun. Thus, the verb is 
typically in some kind of subjunctive mood in concessive conditional clauses, 
and this is what we find in the indefiniteness markers: French soit, Russian 
bud’/by...bylo, Bulgarian da e, Proto-Slavic *sit (in Czech kdo-si) are all 
subjunctive forms of the verb ‘be’. Russian parametric concessive conditional 
clauses are marked by the pleonastic negator ni, and this is carried over to the 
indefiniteness markers by to ni bylo and -nibud’.  
 A common formal feature of concessive conditional clauses is the focus 
particle ‘also, even’ (cf. König 1988). In Lezgian and Kannada, this focus particle 
follows the verb, which is in the conditional mood, cf. (304). 
 
(304) a. Lezgian (Haspelmath 1993a: 399) 
   Hiniz wun fe-ji-t’a-ni, zun wa-qh galaz fi-da. 
   where you:abs go:aor.ptcp-cond-even I:abs you-postess with
 go-fut 
   ‘Wherever you go, I will go with you.’  
  b. Kannada (Sridhar 1990: 912) 
   Aval5u es5t5u heel5i-d-ar-uu keel5-al-ee illa. 
   she how.much tell-past-cond-even listen-inf-emph neg 
   ‘However much she was told, she didn’t listen.’ 
 
Accordingly, the particle ‘also, even’ (-ni/-uu) also appearsin this place in the 
Lezgian and Kannada indefiniteness markers. In European languages, by 
contrast, the focus particle tends to occur after the interrogative pronoun, 
before the verb, as for instance in Bulgarian: 
 
(305) Bulgarian 
  Kakvo-to i da kae tja,  toj te mâli. 
  what-indef also that says she he fut be.silent 
  ‘Whatever she says, he will remain silent.’ 
 
As a result, we find the focus particle i in the Bulgarian indefiniteness marker 
(WH-to) i da e ‘any-’ between the interrogative pronoun and the verb. 
 There are four further structural features that parametric concessive 
conditionals commonly display, in addition to those already mentioned ((i) 
subjunctive mood, (ii) pleonastic negator, (iii) focus particle ‘also, even’, (iv) 
conditional marker): (v) a temporal adverb like ‘ever’, (vi) an additional general 
subordinator (‘that’), (vii) an expression meaning ‘want’, (viii) other emphatic 
particles like ‘now’, ‘only’ (cf. von Bremen 1983, Haspelmath and König (to 
appear)). These are exemplified in the following sentences: 
 
(306) temporal adverb 
  a. German (focus particle auch, temporal adverb immer), 
   Wohin auch immer du gehst, ich werde dich
 nicht verlassen. 
   whither also ever you go I will you not
 leave 
  b. English (temporal adverb ever) 
   Wher-ever you go, I will not leave you. 
   
(307) general subordinator 
  a. Italian (che) 
   Quali che siano le sue protezioni, dovrà
 scontare la pena. 
   which that be the his protections must:fut
 serve the sentence 
   ‘Whatever his protection is, he will have to serve his 
sentence.’ 
  b. Standard Arabic (maa) 
   Wa-ÌayQu-maa daxal-tum bayt-an  fa-?aqiim-
uu fii-hi 
   and-where-sbor enter:perf-2pl house-acc and-remain:impv-2pl
 in-3sg 
   ?ilaa ?anna ta-rÌal-uu. 
   until sbor 2-depart:impf-pl 
   ‘In what place soever ye enter into an house, there abide till 
ye  
   depart from that place.’  
(308) ‘want’ 
  a. Spanish (-quiera from querer ‘want’, que general 
subordinator) 
   No abras la puerta, quien-quiera que sea. 
   not open:impv the door who-want that be 
   ‘Don’t open the door, whoever it may be.’ 
  b. Hungarian (cf. akar ‘want’) 
   Akár-ki  tanul-t, túl hangos-an tanul-t. 
   want-who learn-past(3sg) too loud-adv learn-
past(3sg) 
   ‘Whoever was learning, he was learning too loudly.’ 
(309) other emphatic particles 
  Swedish 
  Han måste lyckas, hur det nu skal  gå  till. 
  he must succeed how that now will come about 
  ‘He has to succeed, however that will come about.’ 
 
 It is not my task here to explain this astonishing variety of structural 
means associated with parametric concessive conditionals (cf. Haspelmath and 
König (to appear) for an attempt at an explanation). But we need to be aware of 
the components of the source constructions in order to understand the 
components of the resulting indefinite pronouns. Thus, the French 
indefiniteness marker que ce soit contains a general subordinator (French que), 
which is explained by the fact that it has arisen from a source construction with 
a subordinator, cf. (307). 
 In quite a few cases, indefiniteness markers consist of the same structural 
components as parametric concessive conditional clauses, but show no trace of 
the verb ‘be’. Nevertheless, I claim that these, too, can be understood as arising 
from such clauses. Examples are given in (310-14). 
 
(310) temporal adverb 
  German wer auch immer ‘anyone’ immer ‘always’ 
  Polish kto-kolwiek ‘anyone’ < *koli ‘ever’, wiek ‘age’ 
  French quiconque ‘anyone’ < qui qu’ onques  
      (< Latin umquam ‘ever’) 
    quelque ‘some’ < quel que 
  M. Greek opjos-dhí-pote ‘anyone’ poté ‘(n)ever’ 
(311) focus particle ‘also, even’ 
  German  wer auch immer ‘anyone’ auch ‘also, even’ 
  Dutch  wie dan ook ‘anyone’ ook ‘also’ 
(312) general subordinator 
  Hebrew miehu ‘someone’ e ‘that’ 
(313) conditional marker 
  Turkish kimse ‘someone, anyone’ -se ‘conditional marker’ 
  Udmurt kin ke ‘someone’ ke ‘conditional marker’ 
(314) ‘want’ 
  Hungarian akár-ki ‘anyone’ akar ‘want’ 
  Romanian ori-cine ‘anyone’ ori- < *volet ‘wants’ 
  Spanish cual-quiera ‘any’ quiera ‘wants (3sg subjv) 
 
A well-documented case of this development is French quelque, whose 
evolution is traced in detail in Foulet (1919). 
 In descriptive grammars of European languages, the identity between 
indefinite pronouns in (310-14) and the pronouns introducing parametric 
concessive conditional clauses is often described as if the indefinite pronouns 
were primary and their function in concessive conditionals secondary. 
However, the opposite is in fact the case: The indefinite pronouns in (310-14) 
are derived from the same kind of source construction that was discussed 
above (see 302), with the difference that the verb ‘be’ has also been ellipted. 
Although the verb ‘be’ cannot be reconstructed from the context (unlike the 
ellipted parts in the earlier source constructions (see 292, 299)), it does not carry 
much informational weight and is therefore dispensable. 
 
(315) You can take something, whatever [it may be]. 
 
Such source constructions are not entirely hypothetical, as shown by (316) from 
Dutch. 
 
(316) Dutch (Paardekooper 1978: 572) 
  Je mag  iemand anders vragen, wie dan ook. 
  you may somebody else ask who indef 
  ‘(lit.) You may ask somebody else, whoever.’ 
 
6.2.3.2. The original meaning. What kind of indefiniteness meaning do we get 
from a parametric concessive conditional source construction? As in the ‘want’ 
type of the previous section, the original meaning is that of free choice. While 
the source construction in the ‘want’ type explicitly leaves the choice to the 
hearer, the same effect is achieved more indirectly by the concessive conditional 
source construction. Concessive conditionals express a conditional relationship 
between a consequent and a series of antecedent conditions, but in contrast to 
ordinary conditionals, they entail their consequent. The antecedent conditions 
are therefore irrelevant for the consequent, and concessive conditionals have 
also been called 'irrelevance conditionals' (cf. König 1985). Thus, a parametric 
concessive conditional clause like whoever it may be states that the identity of the 
person in question is irrelevant, which amounts to the same as free choice. This 
close semantic relationship between the two meanings is also reflected in 
similar cooccurrence restrictions. For example, neither free-choice indefinites 
nor the two source constructions can be used in contexts that allow only 
specific reference (in (318-19), a non-habitual reading of the past tense is 
intended): 
 
(317) a. You may take any apple. 
  b. *You took any apple. 
(318) a. You may take whichever apple you want. 
  b. *You took whichever apple you want(ed).’ 
(319) a. You may take an apple, whichever it may be. 
  b. *You took an apple, whichever one it may be. 
 
Here are some examples of ‘it may be’-indefinites in their original (i.e. free-
choice) meaning: 
 
(320) a. Bulgarian 
   Moe da vzeme koj-to i da e moliv. 
   you:may sbjv you:take which-indef pencil 
   ‘You may take any pencil.’ 
  b. Lezgian (Haspelmath 1993a: 195) 
   Bilbildi-kaj mani ni-waj ajit’ani tük’ür-iz
 e-da. 
   nightingale-subel song who-adel indef compose-inf
 can-fut  
   ‘Anyone can compose a song about a nightingale.’ 
  c. Dutch 
   Je mag wie dan ook uitnodigen.  
   you may who indef invite 
   ‘You may invite anyone.’ 
 
6.2.4. The ‘no matter’ type 
  
6.2.4.1. The source construction. In indefinite pronouns of this type, the 
indefiniteness marker is derived from an expression meaning ‘it does not 
matter wh-’, ‘it’s all the same wh-’. Some examples are given in (321). 
 
(321) French n’importe qui  ‘anyone’  
     cf. il n’importe (pas) ‘it does not matter’ 
  Dutch  onverschillig wie  ‘anyone’ 
     cf. onverschillig ‘indifferent’ 
  German gleich welcher ‘any’ 
     cf. gleich ‘equal, same’ 
  English no matter who  
 
I know of no indefinite pronoun of this type that has been strongly 
grammaticalized, so the indefiniteness markers of this type are fairly 
transparent. The source construction is shown in (322). 
 
(322) You may take something. It does not matter what [you take]. 
 
Since the future indefiniteness marker is a superordinate clause here, as in the 
‘dunno’-type of § 6.2.1, the source construction has to be 'amalgamated', 
yielding a structure as in (323). 
 
(323) You may take it does not matter what. 
 
As the it does not matter clause is turned into an indefiniteness marker, it may 
undergo simplification, especially omission of the copula (thus, German es ist 
gleich w- ‘it is the same wh-’ becomes gleich wer). 
 In this type we see again an overlap with an earlier type: In some 
languages, parametric concessive conditionals are expressed by means of a ‘no 
matter’ expression, as for example in (324). 
 
(324) Dutch, English 
  a. Onverschillig wat je wilt kopen  je zult
 het te duur vinden. 
   no.matter what you want buy you will it
 too expensive find 
  b. No matter what you want to buy, you will find it too expensive. 
 
However, it seems an unnecessary complication to assume that the 
development of the indefiniteness markers of the ‘no matter’ type proceeded 
via concessive conditionals. The source construction in (322) must be posited 
anyway because not all languages with ‘no matter’ indefinites have ‘no matter’ 
concessive conditionals. For example, in French there is no evidence that a 
n’importe-concessive conditional ever existed that could have given rise to the 
indefiniteness marker n’importe: 
 
(325) *N’importe qui vient, n’ ouvre pas la porte! 
  no.matter who comes neg open not the door 
  ‘No matter who comes, don’t open the door!’ 
 
6.2.4.2. The original meaning. Since ‘no matter’ indefinites are all weakly 
grammaticalized, they all have the expected free-choice meaning 
synchronically, as exemplified by (326). 
 
(326) a. Dutch (Geerts et al. (eds.) 1984) 
   Kinderen van onverschillig welke leeftijd, kunnen
 hier hun  
   children of irrelevant which age can here
 their  
   hart ophalen. 
   heart pull.up 
   ‘Children of any age can enjoy themselves here.’ 
  b. French 
   N’importe qui peut venir à  la réunion
 demain. 
   indef who can come to the meeting tomorrow 
   ‘Anyone can come to the meeting tomorrow.’  
 
 
6.3. Grammaticalization  
 
6.3.1. Grammaticalization theory 
 
Let us now see in what way the changes described in the previous section can 
be subsumed under the general phenomenon of grammaticalization. A 
comprehensive and systematic description and discussion of the various 
individual aspects of grammaticalization changes is Lehmann (1982a), 
summarized in Lehmann (1985). Lehmann identifies three main parameters: 
weight, cohesion, and variability, each of which has a paradigmatic and a 
syntagmatic aspect. The six resulting parameters are shown in Table 7. 
 













   variability 
– syntagmatic 
   variability 
 
A plus sign in front of a parameter means that with increasing 
grammaticalization, the degree to which this parameter is present increases, 
and a minus sign means that the degree to which a parameter is present 
decreases. In principle, all of these parameters are affected simultaneously by 
grammaticalization changes, and there is a high degree of correlation among 
them. However, in each particular case there may be circumstances that make a 
parameter inapplicable, so not all parameters can be observed in every change. 
But what is strictly disallowed by Lehmann's theory is for different parameters 
to change in opposite directions. 
 Three well-known paradigm cases of grammaticalization are the change 
from a modal construction like cantare habeo ‘I have to sing’ in late Latin to the 
Romance synthetic future, e.g. Portuguese cantarei ‘I will sing’; the development 
of a suffixed definite article in Bulgarian (kniga-ta ‘the book’) from a 
demonstrative determiner (cf. Old Church Slavonic kniga ta ‘that book’); or the 
development of a comitative/instrumental case suffix in Turkish (aaçla ‘with 
the tree’) from an earlier postposition (aaç ile). These examples serve to illustrate 
what is meant by each of the six parameters.  
 Integrity is the most conspicuous parameter of grammaticalization. It 
has two aspects, a phonological one and a semantic one. Loss of phonological 
integrity or erosion means that an expression loses phonological substance (loss 
of segments or whole syllables) or distinctiveness (loss of stress, assimilation), 
as exemplified by all three examples above. Loss of semantic integrity or 
desemanticization means that an expression loses semantic features, is 
'bleached', generalized, or weakened (for alternative views, see § 6.4). For 
example, the meaning of the definite article is weaker than and included in the 
meaning of a demonstrative pronoun. 
 Reduction of (syntactic) scope means that an item that earlier combined 
with constituents of arbitrary complexity is increasingly restricted to a word or 
stem. For instance, the Latin verb habeo ‘have’ in its modal sense combined with 
a verb phrase, whereas the Portuguese suffix -ei combines with a verb stem. 
 Increasing paradigmaticity means the integration into an increasingly 
small and tightly organized paradigm. For example, the Turkish postposition 
ile was part of a large paradigm of postpositions with little coherence, but by 
becoming a case affix it joins the small Turkish case paradigm which consists of 
only six cases (including the new comitative/instrumental). 
 Increase of bondedness means that an item is more tightly attached to a 
host. In all three examples cited above, an erstwhile independent word 
becomes an inseparable affix. 
 Loss of paradigmatic variability means that an item is increasingly 
obligatory, more dependent on grammatical rules than on communicative 
intentions. Thus, Bulgarian nouns have to have a definite article when its 
conditions (uniqueness and inclusiveness) are met, independently of the 
speaker’s communicative intentions. 
 And finally, loss of syntagmatic variability means an increasingly fixed 
word order. In Latin, the verb habeo could precede or follow its complement, 
but in the Romance future, the future suffixes may only follow the stem. 
 Let us now consider the way in which the various parameters of 
grammaticalization are manifested in the development of indefinite pronouns 
as presented in § 6.2. First of all, grammaticalization changes are always 
unidirectional, and indefiniteness markers are no exception. No changes 
whereby an indefiniteness marker turns into a superordinate clause of the 
‘dunno’ or ‘no matter’ types, or into a free relative or concessive conditional 
clause, have been attested. In the following sections we will consider each of 
Lehmann’s six parameters of grammaticalization in turn. 
 
6.3.2. Integrity  
 
The semantic aspect of loss of integrity, desemanticization, will be treated in 
detail in the next section (§ 6.4). So far we have only seen the original meanings 
of the indefiniteness markers: ‘specific-unknown’ for the ‘dunno’-type (§ 6.2.1), 
and ‘free choice’ for the other three types (§ 6.2.2-4). These are the meanings 
that I assume for the earliest stage of the new indefiniteness markers, and they 
are not very far away from the meanings of the source constructions yet. But 
later desemanticization is amply attested, as shown in § 6.4. 
 Phonological attrition (the phonological aspect of the loss of integrity) is 
especially radical in ‘dunno’-indefinites. We find phonological changes like ne 
weiz > neiz (Middle High German), ne znam > nam (Bulgarian), *ne v> n, kas ino 
kas > kakas (Lithuanian), or even *ne wait ik hwarir > nekkver (Old Norse). These 
reductions go well beyond regular sound changes, but this is a frequent feature 
of phonological attrition as part of grammaticalization changes and is therefore 
not surprising. Phonological attrition is less conspicuous in the other three 
types of indefinites, although it can be observed in some cases (e.g. Romanian -
va < vrea). The reason for this probably has to be sought in their basic free-
choice meaning. As was mentioned above (§ 3.2.6, § 5.7), free-choice indefinites 
are typically stressed, and stressed expressions are naturally more resistant to 
phonological reduction. This seems to apply also to the expressions of the type 
‘God knows wh-’ (cf. 291) which have an emphatic value, are therefore stressed 
and are not reduced phonologically. 
 However, free-choice indefinites are of course not immune to semantic 
change, as will be documented below (§ 6.4.2). Once they are no longer 
restricted to the free-choice function, they are unstressed and therefore subject 
to more substantial changes. Thus Romanian -va (< vrea) is a general indefinite 
with non-specific and specific uses and no longer has the free choice meaning. 
Similarly, Russian -libo (< ljubo) and -nibud’ (< ni budi) no longer have the free 
choice meaning and show some phonological reduction. Another suggestive 
case from the ‘dunno’-type is Lithuanian kakas (cf. 290), which contrasts with 
the other indefinites of its type (Czech kdovíkdo, German wer weiss wer, and 
others) both formally (it is reduced) and functionally (it is not emphatic, cf. 
Appendix A, Section 17). In order to prove the correlation between 
desemanticization and phonological attrition one would have to study a large 
number of examples, devise a measure for the degree of deseman-ticization and 
phonological attrition, and perform a statistical analysis (as is done for futures 
in Bybee et al. 1991). Such an investigation is beyond the scope of the present 
work, but the few examples just cited show that this approach seems to be 
promising. 
 
6.3.3. Scope  
 
The next parameter of grammaticalization is the reduction of syntactic scope. 
This can also be observed in indefiniteness markers. For example, in older 
French the indefiniteness marker n’importe combined with prepositional 
phrases, as is evident from its position in front of the preposition in (327a) 
(Grevisse 1986: § 373). 
 
(327) a. (older French) n’importe à quelle heure  ‘at any hour’ 
  b. (modern French) à n’importe quelle heure 
 
In the contemporary language, only (327b) is possible, where the indefiniteness 
marker is combined directly with the noun phrase (or the pronoun). Thus, its 
scope, which used to extend over a prepositional phrase, has been reduced. 
 Similarly, in Old Church Slavonic the indefiniteness marker n- could 
precede a preposition, as shown in (328a). In modern Russian, this is no longer 
possible (328b). Again, the scope of n- has been narrowed. 
 
(328) a. Old Church Slavonic 
   nna koje msto ‘at some place’ 
  b. Russian 
   na nekoe mesto (*ne na koe mesto) 
 
 Indefiniteness markers show a tendency to stand as close as possible to 
the pronominal stem, i.e. to have the narrowest possible scope. Suffixal 
indefiniteness markers often switch places with suffixal case markers after the 
indefiniteness marker has become an affix. Thus, the Georgian suffixed 
indefiniteness marker -me, which used to be a case-external extrafix (cf. § 3.1.1), 
may now also occur in internal position. This type of change, the 
externalization of inflection, is not motivated by grammaticalization, but 
grammaticalization is responsible for creating the structures that are affected by 
it (cf. Haspelmath 1993b for detailed discussion).  
 
(329) Georgian (Vogt 1971: 44-6) 
   old  new 
Nom. ra-me  ra-me 
Dat.  ra-s-me  ra-me-s 
Instr.  r-it(i)-me  ra-me-ti 
Adv.  ra-d-me  ra-me-d 
 
 Again, it should in principle be possible to rigorously test the prediction 
that the parameter of scope correlates with the others. Some anecdotal but 
suggestive evidence for a correlation comes from Lezgian, which has two non-
negative indefiniteness markers, jat’ani and ajit’ani. Both belong to the ‘it may 
be’-type (cf. 301), and the only difference is that jat’ani is based on the copula ja 
‘be’, whereas ajit’ani is based on the full verb un ‘become, be’. However, there is 
a striking meaning difference between them: ajit’ani, evidently the younger 
form, has free-choice meaning, but jat’ani has only functions further to the left 
on my implicational map. This correlates with different scopes: The 
functionally younger form ajit’ani occurs in phrase-external position, i.e. has 
scope over the phrase, whereas the older form jat’ani always stands next to the 
interrogative word, i.e. has scope only over this word. 
 
(330) Lezgian (Haspelmath 1993a: 194) 
  a. hitin mani ajit’ani 
   what.kind song indef 
   ‘any kind of song’ 
  b. sa hitin jat’ani mani 
   one what.kind indef song 
   ‘some kind of song’ 
 
 Analogously, in Japanese the indefiniteness marker -ka occurs inside case 
particles, whereas -mo and -demo occur outside. The marker -ka, which has uses 




  a. dare-ka-ni  ‘to somebody’ 
  b. dare-ni-mo ‘to nobody’ 
  c. dare-ni-demo ‘to anybody’ 
 
6.3.4. Paradigmaticity  
 
There is usually a very small set of indefiniteness markers (at most four or five) 
that are strongly grammaticalized, but there is a much larger set of 
indefiniteness markers with a low degree of grammaticalization in many 
languages. For example, English has a core system consisting only of some-, any- 
and no-, but at the periphery there are various forms such as wh-ever, God knows 
wh-, no matter wh-, and others. Sometimes these weakly grammaticalized, 
peripheral forms are not fixed in their internal structure. For example, in older 
Latin there is not only the form qui-vis ‘anyone’, with the indefiniteness marker 
vis (2nd singular indicative of velle ‘want’), but similar expressions with other 
tense-mood forms of velle are attested as well: 
 
(332) Latin 
  a. Dominus vino quid volet faciet. (Cato R.R. 47) 
   lord wine:dat what wants do:fut:3sg 
   ‘The lord will do what he wants (=anything) with the wine.’ 
  b. Facile cuj velles tuam causam probares. (C. Verr. 
4.28) 
   easy whom:dat want:2sg your cause prove:2sg 
   ‘You can easily prove your cause to anyone (=to whom you 
want).’ 
 
Similarly, in modern French there is not only the weakly grammaticalized je ne 
sais qu- ‘I don’t know wh-’ (e.g. 297a), but other pronominalized subjects (on 
‘one’, elle ‘he’) are also possible, or different tense forms of the verb savoir 
‘know’ (Grevisse 1986: § 373). 
 
(333) French 
  a. J’ ai peur du sommeil comme on a
 peur d’ un grand  
   I have fear of.the sleep as one has fear
 of a big  
   trou... menant on ne sait où. (Baudelaire) 
   hole leading one neg knows where 
   ‘I’m afraid of sleep as one is afraid of a big hole that leads 
one  
   doesn’t know where.’ 
  b. Ce mariage, c’ était un point de
 départ vers  
   this wedding it was a point of
 departure toward  
   elle ne savait quelle vie. 
   she neg knew what life 
   ‘This wedding was the beginning of she didn’t know what 
kind of  
   life.’ 
 
This freedom of choice is no longer possible in indefiniteness markers with a 
high degree of grammaticalization. 
 
6.3.5. Bondedness  
 
Increase of bondedness between two expressions is the gradual transition from 
juxtaposition (where both are independent words) to cliticization and affixation, 
and possibly on to internal modification. It is often hard to tell which degree of 
bondedness an indefiniteness marker has, but there is no doubt that 
indefiniteness markers start out as (sequences of) independent words and end 
up as affixes. To give just one example, the Russian marker by to ní bylo (e.g. in 
gdé by to ní bylo ‘anywhere’) still has its own stress, whereas the marker -nibud’ 
(e.g. in gdé-nibud’ ‘somewhere, anywhere’) is stressless and thus at least a clitic, 
if not a suffix. The higher degree of bondedness of -nibud’ (which is also 
reflected in its spelling) again correlates with its higher degree of 
desemanticization. 
 
6.3.6. Paradigmatic and syntagmatic variability  
 
With increasing grammaticalization, the items undergoing the change become 
increasingly obligatory, and there is less and less choice between different 
members of a paradigm. This parameter is not so easy to illustrate in the 
domain of indefiniteness markers because there are no syntactic environments 
that require an indefinite pronoun (in contrast to cases or agreement categories, 
for instance, which are obligatory under certain syntactic conditions, 
independently of their meaning). But one might perhaps say that, for example, 
weakly grammaticalized free-choice pronouns leave the speaker more freedom 
to select between them (e.g. between Dutch wie dan ook, wie ook, wie ook maar, 
onverschillig wie, om het even wie, gelijk wie, all meaning ‘anyone’), whereas 
strongly grammaticalized ones allow fewer alternatives (e.g., there is no 
alternative to Dutch iemand ‘someone’ in iemand is gekomen ‘someone came’). 
 Syntagmatic variability, i.e. increasing fixation of order, cannot be 
observed in indefiniteness markers because the source constructions already 
show fixed word order, so this parameter is vacuous in our case. 
 
6.3.7. The explanatory power of grammaticalization  
 
The paths of grammaticalization that we have seen in this section allow us to 
formulate two types of diachronic explanations: parochial and universal 
explanations. The parochial explanations concern facts of individual languages 
that become clear once they are viewed against the background of 
grammaticalization theory, e.g. the fact that the Russian indefiniteness marker -
nibud’ contains the negative marker ni and the root bud’ ‘be’, or the fact that the 
Albanian indefiniteness marker -do is homonymous with do ‘want’. These facts 
are of course not part of the linguistic knowledge of the speakers of these 
languages, but in the present context that does not mean that they are 
automatically uninteresting. 
 At another level, grammaticalization also explains universal or cross-
linguistically widespread properties of indefinite pronouns. For example, the 
fact that indefinite pronouns are so often based on interrogative pronouns is 
explained (at least in part) by the source structures identified in § 6.2, which 
contain embedded interrogative, free relative and parametric concessive 
conditional clauses, and these three clause types usually contain an 
interrogative pronoun. But the strongest predictions are made by the general 
tenet of grammaticalization theory that there is a correlation between the 
degrees of grammaticalization of the six parameters of § 6.3.1. The overall 
prediction is that if an element is more grammaticalized than another element 
on some parameter, then it is grammaticalized also on all other parameters (or 
at least not less grammaticalized). We have already seen some examples of such 
correlations in § 6.3.2-6, and some more evidence will be presented in § 6.4.   
 
 
6.4. Desemanticization:  
The Semantic Side of Grammaticalization 
 
6.4.1. Three competing theories of semantic grammaticalization 
 
In Lehmann’s systematization of grammaticalization processes, the semantic 
aspects are subsumed under 'loss of integrity', i.e. Lehmann stresses those 
aspects of semantic development that have been characterized as 'bleaching' 
(Givón 1975), 'generalization', or 'weakening' (Bybee and Pagliuca 1987) of 
meaning. Other authors have put the emphasis on other aspects of semantic 
grammaticalization. Thus, Heine et al. (1991) see metaphorization as the main 
driving force behind semantic change associated with grammaticalization. For 
example, often concrete spatial expressions like ‘head’ come to be used as local 
relators with abstract meanings like ‘on’, ‘in front of’, or ‘before’, or a concrete 
spatial verb like ‘go (to)’ comes to express future meaning. Traugott (1988), by 
contrast, emphasizes the role of 'pragmatic strengthening' in the development 
of grammatical meaning. For instance, she assumes that the semantic extension 
of English while from a strictly temporal subordinator to an adversative one 
(‘whereas’) has to do with grammaticalization. It would be nice if the evidence 
of grammaticalization of indefinite pronouns helped to resolve the theoretical 
issue, and indeed it does. 
 Most of the semantic changes that are found in indefinite pronouns and 
that are part of the grammaticalization process are clear instances of weakening 
or generalization of meaning, so the evidence from indefinite pronouns favors 
the views of Lehmann, Bybee and Pagliuca, and Givón. In contrast, there is no 
evidence whatsoever for metaphorization in indefinite pronouns – the source 
structures of § 6.2 are already rather abstract, so there is no change from 
concrete to abstract here. And those instances of pragmatic strengthening that 
we do find in indefinite pronouns are not connected with grammaticalization – 
appreciative meanings like ‘some important person’ for someone, and 
depreciative meanings like ‘an unimportant person’ for anyone are not linked to 
grammaticalization. Indeed, they are rarely conventionalized, so that there is 
rarely any semantic change. (These senses are discussed in § 7.5.4 below.) 
 None of the three theories of semantic grammaticalization has made 
crucial use of indefinite pronouns (although Lehmann (1982a: 51-6) discusses 
them), so the fact that the weakening/generalization hypothesis can 
accommodate this new case is a point in its favor.  
 The semantic development of indefinite pronouns can be characterized 
as 'generalization' in that indefinite series are often diachronically extended to 
more functions on the implicational map of chapter 4, thus becoming more 
general. As mentioned in § 4.4, the implicational map makes predictions about 
the route of the change: Indefinite series can extend only to functions that are 
adjacent to those that it already covers, and the extension is incremental, i.e. the 
marker is extended only to one new function at a time (cf. Croft et al. (1987) for 
a programmatic proposal along these lines). 
 
6.4.2. Extension from ‘free choice’ 
 
The clearest cases of generalization of the meaning of indefinite pronouns 
involve indefinites whose original function was that of free choice, and which 
were then extended to other functions to the left of ‘free choice’ on the map. 
The extension thus proceeds from right to left on the scale in Figure 19. This 
scale is identical to the map of chapter 4 except that the two negation functions 
are missing. Below the scale, I give some examples of indefiniteness markers 
whose original function must have been ‘free choice’ because they come from 
one of the sources in § 6.2.2-4. 
 
Figure 19. Diachronic extension of indefinite series from ‘free choice’ 
 specific irrealis- question/ comparative  free choice 
   non-specific conditional  
         |———————| 
         Russian ugodno 
      |—————————————| 
      Czech -koli, Lezgian ajit’ani 
     |——————————————————| 
                  French que ce soit 
   |—————————————————| 
               Russian -libo 
   |———————————| 
              Russian -nibud’ 
 |————————————————| 
     Lezgian jat’ani, French quelque 
 |—————| 
    Czech -si 
 
The first three examples show different stages of extension to the left. The 
fourth example, Russian -libo, covers one more function on the left, but on the 
other hand, it no longer has the original free-choice function. Russian -nibud’ 
has even lost the comparative function. The next two examples, Lezgian ajit’ani 
and French quelque, in addition have the ‘specific’ function (see Foulet (1919) for 
the semantic development of quelque), and Czech -si only has the ‘specific’ 
function (but recall that its etymology is not certain, cf. § 6.2.3.1). 
 Thus, an original free-choice indefinite may be extended all the way to 
the opposite end of the scale. However, generalization of the meaning is clearly 
not the whole story, because indefinites that have been extended to functions in 
the left part of the scale lose some of the original functions in the right part. 
Rather than growing larger and larger, the area covered by an indefinite shifts 
to the left, like a window that opens up the view on a limited area of the 
semantic space. But the shift of the window from right to left is apparently 
unidirectional – indefinites do not acquire the comparative or free-choice 
functions by semantic extension. How can we understand this leftist orientation 
of indefinites if it is not motivated by generalization? 
 Here we have to make use of the notion of 'weakening'. The functions on 
the right side of the scale are in some sense 'stronger' than the functions in the 
middle and on the left, and a change from right to left means a loss of 'strength', 
just as predicted by the weakening view of semantic grammaticalization. To 
express this visually, the scale in Figure 19 can be represented as a 'trough' (cf. 
Figure 20), where the stronger functions are above the weaker functions. The 
diachronic extension is restricted to a downward movement in this 
visualization. 
 
Figure 20. Diachronic extension of indefinite functions from ‘free choice’: 
   the 'trough' model 
           
   free choice 
 
           
 comparative 
 
         question/ 
         conditional 
  weakening 
      irrealis 
  specific   non-specific 
 
 
6.4.3. Semantic change as weakening 
 
After these rather abstract considerations, let us now ask what 'weakening' 
means in semantic terms. 
 
6.4.3.1. Loss of focusing and scalarity. If we just look at the free-choice function 
and at the irrealis-non-specific function, it is immediately clear that semantic 
substance has been lost. Consider the minimal contrast in (334). 
 
(334) a. (free choice) You may invite anyone. 
  b. (irrealis non-specific) You may invite someone. 
 
The free-choice indefinite in (334a) expresses the endpoint of a pragmatic scale, 
as we saw in § 5.5.5, but no pragmatic scale is associated with the simple non-
specific indefinite in (334b). Both share the feature of non-specificity – recall 
that free-choice indefinites are also non-specific (cf. § 3.2.6). In those cases 
where an original free-choice indefinite has acquired the irrealis non-specific 
function, we can say that the semantic development consists in the loss of 
focusing and thereby of the semantic component of the pragmatic scale and its 
endpoint. Only the semantic component of non-specificity is preserved. This 
development must have taken place, for example, in Russian -nibud’- and -libo-
indefinites. 
 
6.4.3.2. Loss of non-specificity. Desemanticization may also be understood as 
loss of semantic substance in the further development from the simple non-
specific function to the ‘specific-unknown’ function. Consider the minimal 
contrast in (335). 
 
(335) a. (irrealis non-specific) She may go somewhere. 
  b. (specific unknown) She went somewhere (I don’t know 
where). 
 
If an indefinite that has the simple non-specific function is extended to the 
‘specific-unknown’ function, it loses the feature of non-specificity. Since the 
referents of non-specific indefinites are also necessarily unknown to the speaker, 
the ‘unknown’ feature is common to both, and it is the only feature that is left 
after non-specificity has been lost. This development must have taken place in 
Portuguese qualquer-indefinites, for example. 
 
6.4.3.3. Loss of unknownness. Finally, even the feature of unknownness may 
be lost, and then the indefinite may even be used in the specific-known 
function. This development must have taken place, for example, in Romanian -
va-indefinites. (Of course, one could also think of this change as the acquisition 
of the new feature 'unknown', so this extension is not a strong argument for the 
view that semantic change in indefinites generally means loss of semantic 
features.) 
 
6.4.3.4. The comparative. In the preceding subsections, I hope it has become 
plausible that the extension of the functions of original free-choice indefinites 
can be understood as the loss of semantic substance. The developments are 
summarized in (336). 
 
(336) loss of semantic substance of original free-choice indefinites 
  free choice > simple non-specific  : loss of focusing 
and scalarity 
  simple non-specific > specific unknown : loss of specificity 
  specific unknown > specific known : loss of 
unknownness 
 
But so far I have not accounted for the two intermediate functions ‘comparative’ 
and ‘question/conditional’. Unfortunately, the semantics of the comparative 
function is not clear to me, so I cannot say much on its semantic development 
here. However, it has been remarked several times in the literature that the 
comparative function is intermediate between free choice and negative polarity 
(cf. § 5.6), and if that is correct, then whatever explains the shift from free choice 
to negative polarity will also explain the shift from the free-choice function to 
the comparative function, and from the comparative to the 
question/conditional function. 
 
6.4.3.5. Negative polarity: questions and conditionals. The semantic difference 
between free-choice and negative polarity has been described above as the 
difference between non-reversed and reversed pragmatic scales. It is not clear 
that this difference can be described as 'weakening' in any way, and I can see no 
other reason why there should be a unidirectional development from non-
reversed to reversed scales. Thus, I have to admit that I have no good 
explanation for the fact that free-choice indefinites commonly acquire the 
negative-polarity function, whereas negative-polarity indefinites are not 
generally extended to the free-choice function. 
 However, semantic weakening can be observed in questions and 
conditionals in a different way. Recall from § 5.7.2 that both emphatic and non-
emphatic indefinites may occur in these contexts, where they have the same 
truth conditions but subtly different meanings, as in (337). 
 
(337) Russian 
  a. Esli ty uslyi  to-nibud’, razbudi menja. 
   if you hear what-indef wake:impv me 
   ‘If you hear anything, wake me up.’  
  b. Esli ty uslyi  to by to ni bylo, razbudi
 menja. 
   if you hear what indef wake:impv me 
   ‘If you hear anything at all, wake me up.’ 
 
In § 5.7.2 we saw that the meaning difference between these sentences can be 
characterized as 'presence vs. absence of scalarity'. In (337b), to by to ni bylo is 
the endpoint of a pragmatic scale, hence a more emphatic reading results ('if 
you hear the slightest noise, e.g. if a cat meows'). At some stage the indefinite in 
(337b) may lose its emphatic value and become equivalent to (337a) – this must 
indeed have happened in Russian, because etymologically -nibud’ is completely 
analogous to by to ni bylo (§ 6.2.3.1). 
 Thus, the question and conditional functions serve as a bridge between 
the obligatorily scalar free-choice and comparative functions, and the 
obligatorily non-scalar irrealis-non-specific function. 
 
6.4.4. Extension from ‘dunno’ 
 
In addition to the source constructions that yield scalar-endpoint indefinites (§ 
6.2.2-4), there is also one source construction that yields specific indefinites: the 
‘dunno’ type of § 6.2.1. As I showed in § 6.2.1.2, the original function of recently 
grammaticalized ‘dunno’-indefinites is ‘specific unknown’. Like the scalar-
endpoint indefinites, ‘dunno’ indefinites undergo semantic extension when 
they are strongly grammaticalized, and as a result they may come to cover a 
substantial portion of the implicational map, and perhaps lose their original 
function. However, here it is much more difficult to make generalizations 
because such cases are not common. In the modern European languages, only 
Lithuanian ka-, and Albanian di-, and perhaps Slavic n-, Scandinavian någon 
(Swedish)/nokkur (Icelandic) represent strongly grammaticalized ‘dunno’ 
indefinites. It appears that ‘dunno’ indefinites resist stronger 
grammaticalization for some reason. 
 But Lithuanian ka- and Albanian di- can also be used in non-specific 
functions and in questions and conditionals, and so can neiz-indefinites in older 
German. This is exemplified in (338-39). 
 
(338) Lithuanian 
  a. Ar tu ka-ka matai? 
   q you indef-what you:saw 
   ‘Did you see anything?’ 
  b. Jei tu ka-ka matai, pasaky-k man. 
   if you indef-what you:saw tell-impv me 
   ‘If you see anything, tell me.’ 
(339) older German neiz- (neusz) (Grimm’s dictionary, s.v. neizwaz) 
  a. Nach solchem rumor... fraget er seinen
 nachbarn, ob ihm  
   according such rumor asks he his neighbor
 whether he  
   neusz was gebrest. 
   indef what lacks 
   ‘According to this rumor he asks his neighbor whether he 
lacks  
   anything.’ 
  b. Ich müeste mich wol imer schamen, solte ich
    
   I should refl prt always be.ashamed should I
  
   fürhten neizwaz. 
   fear something 
   ‘I would have to be ashamed forever if I were afraid of 
anything.’ 
 
Thus, in addition to the right-to-left extension of Figure 20, we also have to 
assume left-to-right extension as shown in Figure 21. 
 
Figure 21. Diachronic extension of indefinite functions from ‘dunno’ 
 
  specific  irrealis  question/ 
  unknown non-specific conditional 
  —––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––> 
 
If there is both right-to-left extension and left-to-right extension on the map, 
does that mean that the semantic grammaticalization is not unidirectional? I do 
not think so. I have argued above that the most important semantic change in 
the grammaticalization of indefinites is semantic weakening, and this is a 
dimension that is not directly represented in Figure 21. In the weakening of the 
original ‘dunno’ meaning, the most important change is that the speaker’s lack 
of knowledge is no longer emphasized, and similarly, in the weakening of free-
choice indefinites, the most important change is the loss of scalarity. Thus, 
instead of two opposite movements in one dimension, what seems to be going 
on is unidirectional movement in two dimensions, from strong (or emphatic) to 
weaker (or less emphatic). This can be represented by the ‘trough model’ in 
Figure 22. 
 
Figure 22. Diachronic extension of indefinite functions from ‘free-choice’ and ‘dunno’: 
a trough model 
 
emphatic/ emphatic        free choice 
stronger  unknown      
 comparative 
      specific irrealis  question/ 
weaker/      non-specific conditional 
non-emphatic 
 
It must be admitted that this visual representation cannot capture all the 
relevant details. But it does seem useful as an approximation, and it drives 
home the point that semantic grammaticalization of indefinite pronouns is 
primarily weakening of emphasis, not metaphorization or pragmatic 
strengthening. 
 In addition, the model in Figure 22 helps us understand an observation 
that was made above in § 4.5 (Principle 1): In the middle of the implicational 
map, indefinite pronoun series always express more than two adjacent 
functions. This seems to be due to the fact that the functions in the middle, 
which are the functions at the bottom of the trough in Figure 6.4, are ‘weakest’, 
i.e. least distinctive, and hence least likely to be expressed by a unique 
indefinite series that has no other functions. 
 
 
6.5. From Free-Choice Indefinite to Universal Quantifier 
 
In some languages, the indefinites that express the free-choice functions can 
also be used as true universal quantifiers, corresponding to English every, 
everyone, everything, etc. Since the meaning distinction between ‘any’ and ‘every’ 
is often quite subtle, we can be sure that we are dealing with a truly universal 
use only if the expression can be used in contexts that do not allow free-choice 
indefinites, as in (340). 
 
(340) German 
  a. Der Vater gab jedem Kind einen Apfel. 
   ‘The father gave every child an apple.’ 
  b. Jeder Mensch muss sterben. 
   ‘Every human being must die.’ 
 
But how can we be sure that the German determiner jeder is also a free-choice 
indefinite? True, it can be used to translate English free-choice any, as in Jeder 
Idiot würde das sehen ‘Any idiot would see that’. But we saw in § 3.3.4 that some 
languages do not have special free-choice indefinites and use universal 
quantifiers in their place. In the case of German, a convincing argument is that 
jeder may also be used in the indirect-negation function, where it cannot be 




  a. ohne jede Hilfe 
   ‘without any help’ 
  b. Sie leugnete jede Schuld. 
   ‘She denied any guilt.’ 
 
Thus, German jeder spans the four functions ‘indirect negation’, ‘comparative’, 
‘free choice’, and ‘universal’. We thus have reasons to add an additional 
function to our implicational map, which would now look as in Figure 23, 
where the distribution of jeder is shown. 
 
Figure 23. German jeder on the extended implicational map 
      direct 
    question indirect negation 
 specific specific irrealis  negation  
 known unknown non-specific  
     conditional comparative   
       free-choice universal 
 
I have not found many languages where one expression covers both the 
indirect-negation function and the universal function, but it is intuitively highly 
plausible that ‘universal’ should be located next to ‘free choice’ on such an 
extended implicational map. 
 This would also account for the fact that free-choice indefinites may 
diachronically evolve into universals, as I argued in Haspelmath (1995). Again, 
the evidence for this development is rather indirect, but a number of languages 
have universal quantifiers which consist of the same formal elements as (free-
choice) indefinite pronouns and hence must go back to one of the source 
constructions identified in § 6.2.2-3 and § 7.1. Compare the following cases: 
 
(342) a. Romanian fiecare ‘every(one)’ 
  care ‘who, which’ fie ‘be (3sg subjunctive)’ 
 b. Latin quisque ‘every’ 
  quis ‘who, which’ -que ‘and, also’ 
 c. Gothic hwarjizuh ‘every’ 
  hwarjis ‘which’ -uh ‘and, also’ 
 d. Old Church Slavonic  
  ku-ido ‘every’ 
  ku  ‘which’ -ido [meaning unknown] 
 e. English each 
  < Old English ælc < *a-whilc ‘ever-which’ 
  (the strengthened form ever-each later became every) 
   
The semantic change from ‘any’ to ‘every’, which must be posited to account 
for these cases, also involves the loss of the semantic feature of scalarity, like 
the change from ‘any’ to ‘some’ that was posited in § 6.4.2. However, in this 
case the semantic feature of non-specificity is also lost, and the implicature of 
universal quantification is strengthened to a semantic component (in contrast to 
the change from ‘any’ to ‘some’, where the universal implicature is also lost, but 
non-specificity is preserved). 
 Thus, the meaning of free choice can develop in two directions: to ‘some’, 
and to ‘every’. Both these developments seem to be unidirectional. ‘Some’ 
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Further Sources of Indefinite Pronouns 
 
 
This chapter deals with diachronic sources of indefinite pronouns that cannot 
be accounted for by grammaticalization. First I discuss indefinite pronouns 
marked by scalar focus particles like ‘even’ and ‘at least’ (§ 7.1), and then I 
discuss and reject the possibility that the disjunctive conjunction ‘or’ may be 
used as an indefiniteness marker (§ 7.2). In § 7.3 I look at bare interrogatives 
that are used as indefinites, and in § 7.4 I treat reduplicated indefinite 
pronouns. These last two types are not so common in European languages, but 
they are widespread elsewhere. Although I do not have a good explanation for 
the form-meaning relation in either of these form types, I formulate a number 
of interesting generalizations. Finally, § 7.5 deals with some further diachronic 
issues, such as the change from generic nouns and ‘one’ into indefinite 
pronouns, and the borrowing of indefinite pronouns. 
 
7.1. Indefinite Pronouns Marked by Scalar Focus Particles 
 
7.1.1. The facts 
 
In many languages there are indefiniteness markers that are identical to scalar 
focus particles meaning ‘even’. Since normal additive focus particles like ‘also’ 
often have a scalar value, too (König 1991: 68), it is not necessary or even 
possible to strictly separate the meanings ‘also’ and ‘even’. As a rule, when an 
indefiniteness marker is identical to a form that is glossed ‘also’ in a grammar 
or dictionary, I assume that its scalar use (‘even’) is responsible for its 
functioning as an indefiniteness marker. (Such particles often also have the 
meaning ‘and’, König 1991: 6-66.)  
 Below is a selection of such cases from a wide variety of languages 
(supplementing the earlier lists in Coyaud and Aït Hamou (1972, 1976), König 
(1991: 67), Gil (1993)). In most cases, focus particles are added to interrogative 
pronouns. 
  
(343) additive focus particles on interrogative pronouns 
  Serbian/Croatian  i-ko ‘anyone’ i ‘and, also, even’ 
  Indonesian siapa-pun ‘anyone’ -pun ‘also, even’ 
  Tagalog kahit na sino ‘anyone’ kahit (na) ‘even’ 
  Hittite kuisˇ -ki ‘someone’ -ki ‘and, also’ 
  Even Ni-de ‘someone’ -da/-de ‘and, also’ 
  Kannada yaar-uu ‘anyone’ -uu ‘and, also’ 
  Ancash Quechua ima-pis ‘anything’ -pis ‘also, even’ 
  Selkup ämtä kuty  ‘nobody’ ämtä ‘even’ 
  Nivkh aN-hagin ‘nobody’ hagin ‘even’ 
  Gooniyandi ngoorndoo-ngaddaya ‘someone’ -ngaddaya ‘also’ 
  Sanskrit kas´  cana ‘anyone’ cana ‘even’ 
  Japanese nani-mo ‘nothing’ -mo ‘also’ 
    nan-demo ‘anything’ -demo ‘even’ 
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Less frequently we find scalar additive focus particles added to generic nouns 
or the numeral ‘one’ (cf. 344), or to (non-derived) indefinite pronouns (cf. 345). 
 
(344) additive focus particles on generic nouns and ‘one’ 
  Chechen addam a ‘nobody’ cf. adam  ‘person’ 
       a ‘also’ 
  Hebrew af eÌad ‘nobody’ cf. eÌad ‘one’ 
       af ‘even’ 
  Lezgian (sa) kas-ni ‘nobody’ cf. (sa) kas ‘(one) person’ 
       -ni ‘and, also’ 
 
(345) additive focus particles on (non-derived) indefinite pronouns 
  Hindi/Urdu  koii bhii ‘anybody’ cf. koii ‘someone’ 
       bhii ‘also, even’ 
  Dutch ook maar iemand ‘anybody’ cf. iemand ‘someone’ 
    (cf. Paardekooper 1979)  ook maar ‘even, at least' 
 
 While the use of a focus particle meaning ‘even’ as an indefiniteness marker 
is probably most common, some languages use a scalar focus particle meaning 
‘at least’. A typical example is Russian xot’, which is used as in (346) (cf. Parsˇ in 
(1987, 1988) for detailed discussion of Russian xot’). 
 
(346) Russian (cf. Parsˇ in 1987: 72) 
  a. Skazˇ ite xot’ slovo. 
   say at.least word 
   ‘Say at least a word.’ 
  b. Ja rabotaju s utra do vecˇ era, soderzˇ u tebja, – mogu zˇ e ja
  
   I work from morning till evening support you can PRT I  
   imet' xot’ to udovol’stvie, cˇ tob obo mne zabotilis’. 
   have at.least that pleasure that about me care:3PL 
   ‘I work from morning till evening, I support you, – so I should at  
   least have the pleasure that somebody cares for me.’ 
  c. Ona gotova xot’ v pustynju bezˇ at’ so mnoj. 
   she ready even in desert run with me 
   ‘She is ready to run away even into a desert with me.’ 
 
As example (346c) shows, xot’ can also mean ‘even’ in certain environments. In 
contrast to English even and corresponding expressions in other languages like 
German sogar, French même (also Russian dazˇ e), which characterize the value of 
its focus as high on a pragmatic scale, Russian xot’ can also be used when the 
value of its focus is characterized as low on a pragmatic scale, as in (346a-b), i.e. 
only medial scalar values are not possible.  
 In several languages, words that also serve as focus particles of the xot’ type 
are used as indefiniteness markers, as the examples in (347) show. 
 
(347) xot’-type focus particles on interrogative pronouns 
  Russian xot’ kto ‘anyone’ xot’  ‘at least’ 
  Finnish vaikka kuka ‘anyone’ vaikka ‘at least’ 
  Modern Greek kan-énas ‘anyone’ kan ‘at least’ 
  Latvian kaut kas ‘something’ kaut ‘at least’ 
  Hungarian akár-ki ‘anybody’ akár ‘at least’ 
  Nenets xibja-xart ‘nobody’ -xart ‘at least’ 
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  Lezgian wuzˇ xˆ ajit’ani ‘anybody’ xˆ ajit’ani ‘at least’ 
  Kannada yaar-aadaruu ‘anybody’ -aadaruu ‘at least’ 
  W. Greenlandic suna-luunniit ‘anything’ -luunniit ‘at least’ 
  Yakut kim eme ‘somebody’ eme ‘at least’ 
 
7.1.2. Two possible pathways 
 
It is not immediately obvious why a focus particle meaning ‘even’ or ‘at least’, 
when combined with an interrogative pronoun, should yield an indefinite 
pronoun. One avenue of explanation that one might try is to relate the use of 
focus particles as indefiniteness markers seen in § 7.1.1 to the well-understood 
cases of § 6.2.2-3. Indeed, additive focus particles are also widely used in 
parametric concessive conditional clauses (e.g. 304-06), so perhaps the cases of 
additive focus particles in (343) can be accounted for in the same way as the 
indefiniteness markers in (310-14). That is, the focus particles are used to mark 
concessive conditional clauses, and then become associated with the 
interrogative word. Indefinite pronouns containing the focus particle result 
from the reduction of concessive conditionals. König (1991: 67-8) seems to opt 
for such an explanation. 
 Similarly, based on the observation that many of the xot’-type focus particles 
in (347) derive from ‘want’ or ‘it may be’, one could suggest that these cases 
should also be related to the well-understood cases of § 6.2.2.-3. The etymology 
of some of the xot’-type focus particles of (347) is given in (348-50). 
 
(348) ‘want’ 
  Russian xot’(< xotja) < converb of xotet’ ‘want’ 
  Hungarian akár < some form of akar ‘want’ 
  Lithuanian  nors < noris, converb of noreti ‘want’ 
 
(349) ‘it may be’ 
  Lezgian xˆ ajit’ani < xˆ a-ji-t’a-ni (lit.) ‘even if it is’ 
  Kannada -aadaruu < aa-d-ar-uu (lit.) ‘even if it becomes/is’ 
 
(350) ‘even if’ 
  M. Greek kan < Classical Greek kán < kaì eán ‘even if’ 
 
Thus, the similarity between indefiniteness markers and xot’-type focus par-
ticles noted in (347) could be explained through their common origin. 
Schematically, we have the following possible pathways that would explain the 
formal parallels between indefiniteness markers and focus particles: 
 
(351) ‘even’-type focus particles: two possible pathways 
  a. focus particle → indefiniteness marker 
  b. focus particle → marker of non-specific relative pronoun/ 
   concessive conditional clause → indefiniteness marker 
 
(352) xot’-type focus particle:i two possible pathways 
  a. focus particle → indefiniteness marker 
            focus particle 
  b. ‘you want/it may be’  
            indefiniteness marker 
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Option (b) of (351) and (352) is more attractive than option (a) for two reasons: 
First, option (b) would allow us to reduce the occurrence of focus particles as 
indefiniteness markers to the pathways established in § 6.2, so that no 
additional source for indefinite pronouns has to be posited. Secondly, option (a) 
is not as well understood semantically. In Haspelmath (1991, 1995) I assumed 
that the pathway in (b) was universally correct, but I now realize that option (a) 
must be possible, too. Several reasons speak in favor of this. 
 First, it will be shown in § 8.3.1 that negative scalar focus particles play an 
important role in deriving negative indefinites, and in that case the direct 
combination of a focus particle with its base (corresponding to the (a) option 
above) is the only plausible possibility. So there is independent evidence that 
indefinite pronouns can be formed by simply combining a focus particle and its 
base, without an intermediate source construction as in § 6.2. 
 Second, the source constructions of § 6.2 can only explain indefinite pro-
nouns based on interrogative pronouns, not indefinite pronouns based on 
generic nouns or (non-derived) indefinite pronouns that we saw in (344-45). 
(But of course, it could also be that interrogative-based indefinites are derived 
according to (b), whereas non-interrogative-based indefinites are derived 
according to (a).) 
 Third, and perhaps most importantly, the clausal source constructions of § 
6.2 cannot account for the forms of the resulting indefinite pronouns. 
 Consider first the case of an additive focus particle, which according to op-
tion (b) is first used in a parametric concessive conditional clause, which is later 
reduced, as shown schematically in (353) (in pseudo-English). 
 
(353) You can go [somewhere], where even it may be. > 
  You can go where-even. 
 
This scenario can explain indefinites like Dutch wie dan ook, German wer auch 
immer, because parametric concessive conditional clauses do show the additive 
focus particle ook/auch in the same place, i.e. after the WH-word. But a problem 
arises with indefinites like Tagalog kahit na sino and Serbo-Croatian i-ko, where 
the focus particle precedes the WH-pronoun. In these languages, parametric 
concessive conditional clauses are not marked by additive focus particles 
preceding the WH-pronoun, and there is no evidence that they ever were. 
 Fourth, in many verb-final languages, parametric concessive conditional 
clauses are formed by suffixing an additive focus particle to the whole clause, 
i.e. to the verb, as exemplified in (354) (see Haspelmath and König (to appear)). 
 
(354) Huallaga Quechua (Weber 1989: 370) 
  May-ta aywa-r-pis yus-ninchi ayura-yka:-ma-nchi. 
  where-ACC go-CONV-even God-1PL.INCL help-IMPF-1.OBJ-1PL.INCL 
  ‘Wherever we go, God is helping us.’ 
 
It seems somewhat less likely that a clause like mayta aywar-pis in (354) should 
be reduced to mayta-pis, because the WH-word mayta and the focus particle -pis 
are not adjacent in the presumed source structure. And consider the case of 
Kannada, where concessive conditionals have the same form as in Quechua: 
 
(355) Kannada (Sridhar 1990: 312) 
  Avalu estu heeli-d-ar-uu keel-al-ee illa. 
  she how.much tell-PAST-COND-even listen-INF-EMPH NEG 
  ‘No matter how much she was told, she didn’t listen.’ 
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By turning such a clause with ‘be/become’ as its predicate into an indefinite 
pronoun, we get yaar-aadaruu ‘anyone’, completely as expected. But notice that 
Kannada also has yaar-uu, with the additive focus particle suffixed directly to 
the WH-pronoun. It seems unlikely that the same source construction should 
have led to two quite different resulting indefinites. 
 Fifth, consider indefiniteness markers that are identical to xot’-type focus 
particles. One problem for option (6352b) is again the position of the indefi-
niteness marker. If indefiniteness markers of the types ‘want’/‘it may be’ arise 
through the scenario in (356), as proposed in § 6.2.2-3, then one would expect 
them to become frozen in the position after the interrogative pronoun. 
 
(356) a. You can go [somewhere], where(ever) it may be. > 
   You can go where-it-may-be. 
  b. You can go where(ever) you want. 
   You can go where-you-want. 
 
This is indeed the case in five languages in (347) (Nenets, Lezgian, Kannada, 
West Greenlandic, Yakut), but not in Russian, Finnish, Latvian, and Hungarian, 
which argues against option (352b) at least for these languages. 
 Sixth, according to option (352b), the same source construction would have 
led independently to the indefiniteness marker and the focus particle in all the 
cases in (347). It is certainly possible to imagine this, but it would constitute a 
remarkable coincidence. For even if a language chooses essentially the same 
source construction for both structures, it is by no means guaranteed that they 
will end up having the same form. For example, in French and in Spanish, the 
resulting forms are somewhat different despite the similar source constructions: 
 
(357) French (< ‘it may be’) 
  a. (indefiniteness marker) qui que ce soit 
  b. (focus particle)  
   L’ homme doit oublier, ne serait-ce que pour un bref instant,
  
   the man must forget at.least for a brief moment
  
   son souci du pain quotidien. 
   his concern of:the bread daily 
   ‘A human being has to forget, at least for a short while, his or her  
   concern for the daily bread.’ 
 
(358) Spanish (< ‘want’) 
  a. (indefiniteness marker) cual-quiera 
  b. (focus particle)  
   Diga siquiera una palabra. 
   say at.least a word 
   ‘Say at least a word.’ 
 
By contrast, in all nine cases of (347) the form of the indefiniteness marker is 
exactly identical to that of the focus particle. 
 Seventh, some of the forms of (347) clearly show that they originated as focus 
particles. In (357-58) (b), the focus particle is still overtly marked as conditional: 
In Spanish by means of the prefix si- (cf. si ‘if’), in French by means of the 
conditional verb form serait and subject-verb inversion in serait-ce (cf. English 
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were it). The scenarios in (369) seem to represent plausible paths by which such 
focus particles arise. 
 
(359) a. Say [something], (even) if it is (only) one word. > 
   Say if-it-is(-only) one word.   (= ‘Say at least (xot’) one word.’) 
  b. Say something, (even) if you want (only) one word. > 
   Say if-you-want(-only) one word. (= ‘Say at least (xot’) one word.’) 
 
Three of the forms in (347) show traces of the source constructions in (359): The 
clearest case is Greek kan, which comes from kaì eán ‘even if’ and is derived via 
(359a) by omission of ‘it is’. Russian xot’ and Hungarian akár are also naturally 
explained in terms of (359b), because both forms are originally imperative 
forms of ‘want’.ii Now an imperative form of the prototypically non-agentive 
verb ‘want’ seems to be a strange thing, until we recall that imperative 
sentences are commonly interpreted as conditionals if the right pragmatic 
conditions are present (cf. also König (1985) on the concessive conditional 
interpretation of imperative sentences). Thus, for several of the forms of (347) 
we have conclusive evidence that they were originally created by a scenario like 
(359) as focus particles, so option (352a) must be correct for these forms. 
 All these arguments only show that at least SOME of the indefiniteness 
markers of (343) and (347) must have been created by direct combination of the 
base and the focus particle. For several indefiniteness markers, both scenarios  
seem  equally  plausible,  e.g.  for  Lezgian  xˆ ajit’ani  and  Kannada -aadaruu. 
These both have a conditional component (Lezgian -t’a ‘if’, Kannada -ar- ‘if’), 
but this is not decisive evidence for the focus-particle-first account because in 
these languages, parametric concessive conditional clauses also make use of the 
conditional verb form, unlike in typical European languages. 
 
7.1.3. Towards an explanation 
 
As the discussion of the preceding section has shown, some indefinite pro-
nouns are created by combining an interrogative pronoun with a scalar focus 
particle of the type ‘also, even’ or of the type 'at least’. It is somewhat puzzling 
that interrogative pronouns should be used in such combinations, and I cannot 
offer a completely satisfactory explanation for this fact here. The use of 
interrogative pronouns has been satisfactorily explained for the indefiniteness 
markers arising from one of the source constructions in § 6.3, hence the 
temptation to reduce the cases of § 7.1.1 to these source constructions (to which 
I succumbed in Haspelmath 1991, 1995). But as we have just seen, this does not 
account for several formal properties of the resulting indefinite pronouns. 
 In approaching the question of why interrogative pronouns should be used 
with focus particles, one has to take into account the widespread use of bare 
interrogative pronouns as indefinite pronouns in the world’s languages, as 
documented and discussed in § 7.3. No conclusive explanation for this will be 
offered there, but at least one puzzle can be subsumed under another, 
independently existing puzzle. We can thus assume that in the cases of (343) 
and (347), we are not dealing with combinations of an interrogative pronoun 
plus a focus particle, but with combinations of an indefinite pronoun (which 
happens to be identical to an interrogative pronoun) plus focus particle. In this 
way, the indefinites of (343) and (347) are assimilated to the indefinites of (344-
45), which clearly consist of indefinites plus focus particle. 
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 Why scalar focus particles should combine with indefinite pronouns to yield 
indefinite pronouns with a special meaning is much easier to understand. We 
saw in § 5.5.5 that free-choice indefinites must be understood as denoting the 
low point on a pragmatic scale. But this is precisley the function of scalar focus 
particles: expressing an extreme point on some scale. If we look at the meanings 
of the indefinites in (343) and (347), we see that most of them express free-
choice functions, negative functions, or negative-polarity functions, i.e. 
precisely those functions that are associated with a scalar endpoint. This is not 
true for all such indefinites, however. For example, Evenki Ni-de means 
‘someone, kto-to’ (‘anyone/kto-nibud’ is Ni-wul), and Latvian kaut kas may mean 
‘something’ or ‘anything’ (cf. Appendix A, section 18 for details). In such cases, 
it must be assumed that a semantic change analogous to that described in § 6.4 
has intervened. 
 Let us now consider how focus particles that are used as indefiniteness 
markers contribute to the meaning of indefinite pronouns. It does not seem to 
be an accident that many of the indefinites in (343-45) are primarily used in 
negative functions. In a negative context, pragmatic scales are reversed, and 
expressions denoting the low point on a scale acquire the meaning of non-
existence by implicature: 
 
(360) Jebba did not see even something. 
  = ‘Jebba did not see anything.’ 
 
In this respect, indefinite pronouns (especially, apparently, bare interrogatives 
used as indefinites) may function like minimal-unit expressions (‘a jot’, ‘a soul’, 
etc.). While such minimal-unit words are generally more colorful expressions 
for insignificant entities, indefinite pronouns are also suitable for this function 
because their semantic content is also minimal. For almost any X, the statement 
Jebba saw X tells us more about Jebba’s visual impressions than the statement 
Jebba saw something. Thus, the negation of this statement, Jebba did not see 
something, can carry the implicature that Jebba saw nothing, especially if the 
scalar-endpoint value is reinforced by the scalar focus particle ‘even’. The same 
can of course be said for other negative-polarity (i.e. scale-reversing) 
environments like conditionals and questions. Xot’-type focus particles are 
semantically quite similar to ‘even’-type focus particles, and in some languages 
they are not even distinguished (cf. (64c), where Russian xot’ is translated by 
English ‘even’). 
 It is of course not an accident that similar formal elements appear in the two 
different pathways that I have contrasted in this section. The fundamental 
semantic component contributed by the indefiniteness markers considered here 
is the endpoint of a pragmatic scale, and although this may be expressed by 
syntactically different means (concessive conditional clauses, free relative 
clauses, focus particles), the basic building blocks for expressing this idea are of 




7.2. Indefinite Pronouns from ‘Or’? 
 
It has long been known to logicians that there is a close relationship between 
universal quantification and logical conjunction on the one hand, and between 
existential quantification and logical disjunction on the other (cf. Reichenbach 
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(1947: 92), Rohrer (1973), among many others). For a finite number of entities x, 
a universal statement is equivalent to a conjunction, and an existential 
statement is equivalent to a disjunction: 
 
(361) a. (∀x) f(x) ≡ f(x1) & f(x2) ... & f(xn) 
  b. (∃x)  f(x) ≡ f(x1) ∨ f(x2) ... ∨ f(xn) 
 
 Now it looks as if in natural languages there may also be a connection be-
tween these logical types. A particularly intriguing example comes from 
Japanese, where both universal pronouns and indefinite pronouns are derived 




  a. dare-mo ‘everyone’ mo ‘and, also’ 
   nani-mo ‘everything’  
  b. dare-ka ‘someone’ ka ‘or’ 
   nani-ka ‘something’ 
 
The distribution of mo ‘and’ and ka ‘or’ is exactly as suggested by (361). At first 
blush, it seems unlikely that this should be an accident. But can we say that 
Japanese mo expresses an extremely general meaning ‘universality/ con-
junction’, and ka expresses an extremely general meaning ‘existentiality/ 
disjunction’?iii In this section I argue against such a hypothesis, and I will in-
deed claim that the pattern in (362) is a coincidence (at least to some extent). 
 In § 6.2.3 and § 7.1 we saw possible ways of explaining the use of ‘and, also’ 
in indefinite pronouns (especially of the free-choice type), and in § 6.5 we saw 
that free-choice indefinites may become universal pronouns. The explanations 
offered there took as their point of departure the use of ‘and, also’ as scalar 
focus particles (‘even’), not the use of ‘and, also’ as a coordinating conjunction. 
This analysis is thus incompatible with the hypothesis that there is a close 
connection between the pattern in (362) and (361). When we go beyond the 
Japanese data, the empirical evidence confirms that there is no direct formal 
connection between 'or' and existential indefinites, and between 'and' and 
universal pronouns. 
 First of all, although many languages have indefiniteness markers that are 
formally identical to disjunctive conjunctions, the situation in Japanese is quite 
exceptional. Consider the examples of indefiniteness markers that are identical 
to ‘or’ in (363). 
 
(363) Indefinites whose marker is identical to ‘or’ (all interrogative-based) 
  Japanese dare-ka ‘someone’ ka ‘or’ 
  Kannada yaar-oo ‘someone’ -oo ‘or’ 
  Korean nwukwu-na ‘anyone’ -(i)na ‘or’ 
     nwukwu-tunci ‘anyone’ -(i)tunci ‘or’ 
  Russian kto-libo ‘anyone’ libo ‘or’ 
  Hungarian akár-ki ‘anyone’ akár...akár  ‘whether..or’ 
  Portuguese qual-quer ‘any’ quer...quer ‘either...or’  
 Basque edo-nor ‘anyone’ edo ‘or’ 
  Latvian jeb-kas ‘anything’ jeb ‘or’ 
  Rumanian ori-cine ‘anybody’ ori ‘or’ 
  Ossetic cˇ i-fændy ‘anyone’ fændy ‘or’ 
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  Nanay uj-nuu ‘someone’ -nuu ‘or’ 
  Hausa kóo-mée ‘anything’ kóo ‘or’ 
  W. Greenl. sumi-luunniit  ‘anywhere, somewhere or other’ 
        -luunniit ‘or’ 
 
Most of the ‘or’-indefinites in (363) are primarily free-choice indefinites, not 
non-emphatic indefinites like Japanese WH-ka. The only exceptions are 
Kannada and Nanay, which are specific (and partially Russian and West 
Greenlandic, insofar as these forms can also be used in irrealis-non-specific 
functions). Now this is not necessarily a conclusive argument against a 
connection of ‘or’-indefinites with (361b), as long as one assumes that free-
choice indefinites express existential quantification rather than universal 
quantification (cf. § 5.2.1).iv 
 But not all languages with ‘or’-indefinites also have ‘also’-indefinites, and in 
those that do, the meaning relation between the two only occasionally 
corresponds to the equivalences in (361). In Figures 24.1-6, I repeat the 
distribution of ‘or’- and ‘also’-indefinites in the six languages of the 40-
language sample that have them. 
 
Figure 24.1. Japanese 
      direct 
    question indirect negation 
specific specific irrealis  negation  
known unknown non-specific  
    conditional comparative  
      free choice 
 
Figure 24.2. Korean 
      direct 
    question indirect negation 
specific specific irrealis  negation  
known unknown non-specific  
    conditional comparative  
      free choice 
 
Figure 24.3. Kannada 
      direct 
    question indirect negation 
specific specific irrealis  negation  
known unknown non-specific  
    conditional comparative  
      free choice 
 
Figure 24.4. Nanay 
      direct 
    question indirect negation 
  specific irrealis  negation  
   non-specific  
    conditional comparative  
      free choice 
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Figure 24.5. Ossetic 
      direct 
    question indirect negation 
  specific irrealis  negation  
   non-specific  
    conditional comparative  
      free choice 
Figure 24.6. Yakut 
      direct 
    question indirect negation 
  specific irrealis  negation  
   non-specific  
    conditional comparative  
      free choice 
       
It is quite striking how different the ‘or’-indefinites and the ‘also’-indefinites are 
in different languages. While Kannada, Nanay and Yakut are like Japanese at 
least in that the ‘or’-indefinite is further to the left on the map and the ‘also’-
indefinite is further to the right, not even that is true for Korean and Ossetic. 
Thus, the Japanese situation does not even seem to represent a tendency. 
 But if (361) is not the explanation for ‘or’-indefinites, why is ‘or’ used in 
indefinite pronouns at all? Again, as in the discussion of xot’-type focus par-
ticles in § 7.1, there is an obvious alternative to the most straightforward option 
(364a). It could be that both ‘or’ and the indefiniteness marker arise from the 
same source independently, as shown in (364b). 
 
(364) a. ‘or’ → indefiniteness marker 
  b.    ‘or’ 
   X 
      indefiniteness marker 
 
In this case, I will argue that (364b) is correct. The 'X' of (364b) is to be filled by 
one of the two expressions ‘want’ or ‘it may be’ that we have already seen twice 
(§ 6.2, § 7.1). 
 Explaining how ‘or’ arises from ‘want’ or ‘it may be’ is a fairly straightfor-
ward matter. An abstract scenario like (365) seems immediately plausible.v 
 
(365) a. Jebba (may come), if you want Jawro may come. > 
   Jebba or Jawro may come. 
  b. (Someone) may come, it may be Jebba, it may be Jawro. > 
   Jebba or Jawro may come. 
 
It is not difficult to find cases of ‘or’ that evidently go back to similar source 
constructions: 
 
(366) a. ‘or’ from ‘if (you) want’ 
   Ossetic fændy ‘or’ < fændy ‘you want’ 
   Russian libo ‘or’ < ljubo ‘pleasant ("one wants")’vi 
   Rumanian ori ‘or’ < late Latin *volet (< vult) ‘wants’ 
   Hungarian akár ‘or’ < imperative of akar ‘want’ 
   Latin vel ‘or’ < imperative of velle ‘want’ 
   Portuguese quer ‘or’ < quer ‘wants’ 
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  b. ‘or’ from ‘it may be’ 
   Korean -(i)na ‘or’ < -na-mood of i- ‘be’ 
   French soit ‘or’ < soit 3sg subjunctive of être ‘be’ 
   Lango òˆò ‘or’ < 3sg perfective of ˆòo ‘be possible’ 
 
 Now I have to show that for those cases of ‘or’/indefiniteness marker whose 
etymology is known the change from ‘want’/‘it may be’ to an indefiniteness 
marker is plausible. The most straightforward case are indefiniteness markers 
that follow the interrogative root, because these have already been explained in 
§ 6.2.2-3. 
 
(367) a. indefiniteness marker (identical to ‘or’) from ‘want’ 
   Russian kto-libo ‘anyone, someone’ 
   Ossetic cˇ i-fændy ‘anyone’ 
   Portuguese qual-quer ‘any’ 
 
  b. indefiniteness marker (identical to ‘or’) from ‘it may be’ 
   Korean nwukwu-na ‘anyone’ 
 
We can safely assume a similar explanation for those ‘or’-indefiniteness 
markers which are suffixed and whose origin is unknown, e.g. Japanese -ka, 
Kannada -oo, Nanay -nuu, West Greenlandic -luunniit. But what about the 
prefixed markers, whose function as indefiniteness markers cannot be ex-
plained by the source construction in § 6.3.2-3 (e.g. Hungarian akár-, Basque edo-
, Latvian jeb, Rumanian ori-, Hausa kóo)? 
 For these cases, my hypothesis is that they developed their function as 
indefiniteness markers via a function as focus particles of the type ‘at least’, so 
that the complete set of possible changes looks as in (368). 
 
(368)      ‘or’ 
 ‘want’/‘it may be’ indefiniteness marker 
      xot’-type focus particle → indefiniteness 
         marker 
 
This hypothesis not only accounts well for the data without any additional 
assumptions, it is also independently motivated by the fact that some of the 
particles of (363) are attested as having the additional meaning ‘at least’, in 
particular Hungarian akár, West Greenlandic -lunniit (cf. § 7.1), and probably 
also Hausa kóo (although Meyers (1974) describes only the meaning of positive 
‘even’, which is more salient for speakers of English, since English lacks a 
precise equivalent of Russian xot’). For the remaining cases, in particular 
Latvian jeb and Basque edo, it can be assumed that these had the meaning ‘at 
least’ at an earlier stage. 
 This completes my proposed account of the observed homonymy of ‘or’ and 
indefiniteness markers. It is essentially a diachronic-typological account: This 
homonymy is so common because the sources and pathways of change are so 
common, not because there is a synchronic common meaning that must be 
captured by a synchronic semantic analysis. Seen in this way, the massive 
parallel homonymy of (363) is not an accident (which would be excluded by the 
laws of statistics, as observed by Haiman (1974)), because there is a diachronic 
semantic relation, but in each individual language it may well be that speakers 
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no longer see the similarities. Therefore indefiniteness markers may change 
their meaning (along the lines of § 6.4) independently of other meanings that 
are historically closely related, which results in the quite diverse patterns that 
were illustrated in Figure 24.1-6. 
 
 
7.3. Bare Interrogatives as Indefinites 
 
7.3.1. Bare interrogatives and strategies for disambiguation 
 
In many languages, some indefinite pronouns are formally identical to in-
terrogative pronouns. In other words, these languages use bare interrogatives 
(as opposed to interrogatives plus an indefiniteness marker, the most 
widespread type of indefinite in my 40-language-sample) as indefinite pro-
nouns. Some examples of such languages are given in (369). 
 
(369) a. Classical Greek 
   tís ‘who?’ tis ‘someone’ 
   pou$ ‘where?’ pou ‘somewhere’ 
  b. Chinese 
   sheí ‘who?’ sheí ‘someone’ 
   shénme ‘what?’ shénme ‘something’ 
  c. Hopi (Uto-Aztecan; Malotki 1979: 110) 
   hak ‘who?’ hak ‘someone’ 
   haqam ‘where?’ haqam ‘somewhere’ 
  d. Newari (Sino-Tibetan; Korolev 1989: 62) 
   su  ‘who?’ su ‘nobody (with verbal neg.)’ 
   chu ‘what?’ chu ‘nothing (with verbal neg.)’ 
  e. Dyirbal (Pama-Nyungan; Dixon 1972: 265) 
   wanya ‘who?’ wanya ‘someone’ 
   minya ‘what?’ minya ‘something’ 
  f. Khmer (Austro-Asiatic; Huffman 1967: 153-6) 
   qw´y ‘what?’ qw´y ‘something’ 
   naa ‘where?’ naa ‘somewhere’ 
 
 Disambiguation is usually achieved by syntactic differences and/or 
suprasegmental means. For instance, in Classical Greek and in Modern 
German, the interrogative pronoun is usually clause-initial, whereas the 
indefinite pronoun must cliticize to the preceding word and hence cannot be 
clause-initial. 
 
(370) Classical Greek 
  a. Tís e$lthen? 
   who came  
   ‘Who came?’ 
  b. Elthén tis.  (*Tis elthen.) 
   came who  
   ‘Someone came.’ 
(371) Modern German 
  a. Wer kommt da?  
   ‘Who is coming?’ 
  b. Da kommt wer. (=Jemand <*wer> kommt da.) 
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   ‘Someone is coming.’ 
 
 In Lakhota, questions are marked by a sentence-final particle he, which 
marks the difference in (372). 
 
(372) Lakhota (Van Valin 1990: 210) 
  a. Wicˇ hásˇ a ki táku nax?ú. 
   man the what heard 
   ‘The man heard something.’ 
  b. Wicˇ hásˇ a ki táku nax?ú he? 
   man the what heard Q 
   ‘What did the man hear?’ 
 
 In Chinese, only intonation disambiguates the two sentences in (373) (Frei 
1940: 14). Rising intonation indicates a question, and normal falling intonation 
indicates a statement. 
 
(373) Chinese (Tsai 1990: 41) 
  a. Ta¯  baˇ  shénme shu¯  diu¯  le? 
   she ACC what book throw PFV 
   ‘What books did she throw away?’ 
  b. Ta¯  baˇ  shénme shu¯  diu¯  le. 
   she ACC what book throw PFV 
   ‘She threw away a certain book.’ 
 
In Classical Greek, the interrogative tís is always stressed, and the indefinite tis 
is always unstressed, as shown in the spelling. According to Kang (1988: 188), 
stress is also the main factor in disambiguating sentences with interrogative-
indefinites in Korean. 
 
7.3.2. Bare interrogatives in Indo-European 
 
Bare interrogatives as indefinites are an option in several western Indo-
European languages which normally use interrogative-derived indefinites: 
Vedic Sanskrit, Latin, German, Gothic (Behaghel 1917), Lithuanian, and most of 
the Slavic languages (cf. Krˇ ízˇ ková (1974) for a special study of bare in-
terrogatives in Slavic languages). Since Classical Greek also uses bare inter-
rogatives, this could be a very old feature, although it is doubtful that it could 
be reconstructed for Proto-Indo-European, because the oldest Indo-Iranian texts 
show it only sporadically (Delbrück 1893: 511). Independently of the genetic 
relationships, the conditions for the use of bare interrogatives in these 
languages are remarkably similar. It does not seem possible to attribute these 
similarities only to common inheritance, especially since indefinite pronouns 
are otherwise known to change at a fast rate. 
 In most of the western Indo-European languages, bare interrogatives may be 
used as indefinites in conditional clauses, e.g. 
 
(374) a. Latin 
   Si quis mortuus fuerit non habens filium,... (NT, Mt 22.24) 
   if who dead becomes not having son 
   ‘If someone dies, having no children...’ 
  b. Old Church Slavonic  (Krˇ ízˇ ková 1974: 91) 
   Asˇ te ku˘ to xosˇ tetu˘  po mi˘ ne iti... (NT, Mt 16.24) 
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   if who wants after me go:INF 
   ‘If anyone wants to come after me...’ 
  c. Ukrainian (Krˇ ízˇ ková 1974: 91) 
   Koly maesˇ  suproty mene jakyj sumniv — skazˇ y... 
   if you:have against me which doubt say:IMPV 
   ‘If you have any doubt with respect to me, tell me...’ 
 
They may occur in questions: 
 
(375) a. Old High German (Behaghel 1917) 
   Habet ir hier waz, thaz man ezzan mugi? 
   have you here what that one eat might 
   ‘Do you have anything to eat here?’ 
  b. Slovene (Krˇ ízˇ ková 1974: 90) 
   Se je zatreskala v kaksˇ nega fanta? 
   REFL is fallen in which young.man 
   ‘She fell in love with some young man.’ 
 
 Bare interrogatives as indefinites also occur in other non-specific functions, 
such as non-specific free relative clauses (cf. 376), other irrealis clauses (cf. 377), 
and indirect negation (cf. 378). 
 
(376) non-specific free relative clauses 
  Old High German (Behaghel 1917; O. III, 16, 19) 
  Ther fon imo saget waz, ther suachit io thaz sinaz. 
  who from him says what he seeks always the own 
  ‘Whoever says something of him, he always seeks his own (thing).’ 
(377) irrealis subordinate clauses 
  a. Old High German (Behaghel 1917; Tat. 145,3) 
   Gisehet ir, thaz wer iuuuih ni forleite. 
   see you that who you not lead.astray 
   ‘Take care that someone does not lead you astray.’ 
  b. Ukrainian (Krˇ ízˇ ková 1974: 91) 
   Ozyralasja, sˇcˇ oby xto ïï ne pidsluxyvav. 
   looked.around that who her not eavesdrop 
   ‘She looked around so that someone would not eavesdrop on her.’ 
(378) indirect negation 
  a. Latin 
   neque Patrem quis novit, nisi filius (NT, Mt 11.27) 
   and:not Father:ACC who knows if:not son 
   ‘neither knoweth any man the Father, save the Son’ 
  b. Gothic 
   Ni manna in analaugnein hwa taujip (NT, John 7.4) 
   not man in secret what does 
   ‘Nobody does anything in secret.’ 
 
Further non-specific functions where bare interrogatives occur are the 
imperative (cf. 379) and future and uncertain statements (cf. 380). 
 
(379) imperative  
  a. Slovene (Krˇ ízˇ ková 1974: 91) 
   Pisˇ i kaj iz Pariza. 
   write:IMPV what from Paris 
   ‘Write something from Paris.’ 
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  b. Belorussian (Krˇ ízˇ ková 1974: 91) 
   Njaxaj jana paprosic’ kago pamagcˇ y. 
   let her ask whom to:help 
   ‘Let her ask somebody to help her.’ 
(380) future/uncertain statements 
  a. Gothic 
   skal pus hwa qipan (NT, Lk 7.40) 
   I:must to:you what say 
   ‘I must tell you something.’ 
  b. Polish 
   Moz%e on jeszcze kiedy przyjedzie. 
   maybe he still when will:arrive 
   ‘Perhaps he will still arrive sometime.’ 
 
 Thus, western Indo-European bare interrogatives may occur practically in all 
non-emphatic non-specific functions. They are generally excluded from past or 
current present affirmative declarative clauses, where indefinites must be 
specific. 
 This situation is rather puzzling. Why should bare interrogatives used as 
indefinites be restricted in this way? I have no answer to this question, but the 
facts from the western Indo-European families which I have cited are rather 
robust, and the generalizations cannot be due to coincidence.  
 Moreover, a restriction of bare interrogatives to non-specific functions can be 
found outside of Indo-European as well. Li (1992) reports that Chinese bare 
interrogatives (especially shénme ‘what, which’) may be used as indefinites in 
questions, conditionals, negative sentences and other contexts where it can be 
interpreted non-specifically (in embedded clauses of non-factive verbs), but not 
in ordinary declarative sentences: 
 
(640) Chinese (Li 1992: 127-9) 
  a. (question) Ta¯  xiˇ huan shénme ma? 
      he like what  Q 
      ‘Does he like anything?’ 
  b. (negation) Ta¯  bù wèi shénme rén zuò shi. 
      he not for what person work thing 
      ‘He does not work for anyone.’ 
  c. (non-factive) Woˇ  xi¯ wàng ni xiˇ huan shénme (do¯ ngxi). 
      I hope you like what thing 
      ‘I hope that you like something.’ 
  d. (factive) *Woˇ  hòuhuiˇ  zuo shénme (shìqing). 
      I regret do what thing 
      ‘I regret having done something.’ 
 
The similarity between the Chinese situation and the one in Indo-European is 
too striking to be due to accident. The only explanation for these restrictions 
that I can think of is that bare interrogatives are perhaps less easily mistaken for 
true question pronouns in such environments, but it is hardly sufficient. 
 
7.3.3. Why are indefinites often identical to interrogatives? 
 
We have seen that in many cases, interrogatives are derived from indefinites 
because they arose by grammaticalization from an indirect question or a non-
specific free relative clause (cf. chapter 6). So one possible way of explaining the 
use of bare interrogatives as indefinites is the hypothesis that bare 
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interrogatives also come from these sources but their indefiniteness marker has 
gotten reduced to the point of disappearing. However, this hypothesis must be 
rejected.  
 One problem with it is that there is absolutely no positive evidence for it. I 
do not know of a single case of a language whose earlier stages are attested 
where we see an indefiniteness marker being reduced to zero, resulting in a 
bare interrogative pronoun.  
 Secondly, one does not get the impression that bare interrogatives arise as an 
accident of language change, and that they are subject to quick change. 
Speakers seem quite happy with them and not too concerned about removing 
them (although they did disappear in modern Romance, modern Greek, and 
modern Scandinavian).  
 Thirdly, and most importantly, bare interrogatives are extremely widespread 
in the world’s languages. In my 100-language sample, there are 64 languages 
whose indefinites are based on interrogatives. Of these 64 languages, 31 
languages or almost one third of the whole sample have bare interrogatives. It 
is extremely unlikely that zero-grammaticalization should happen so often, and 
so systematically. The typological facts show conclusively that we are dealing 
with systematic polysemy rather than with accidental homonymy. 
 Since it cannot be shown that bare interrogatives as indefinites are di-
achronically derived from interrogatives, we are well advised to look for 
synchronic functional similarities that justify the systematic polysemy. Such 
functional similarities are not hard to come by: It is clear that the sentences 
(382a) and (382b) have a lot in common. 
 
(382) a. Someone stole my bike. 
  b. Who stole my bike? 
 
As pointed out by Karcevski (1969) and many others (e.g. Wierzbicka 1980b), 
the common element in the meaning of indefinite and interrogative pronouns is 
ignorance (hence Karcevski’s term 'ignorative pronouns'). Similarly, Bhat (1993) 
says that both are characterized by an 'information gap'. In indefinites such as 
(382a), the speaker either does not know who stole the bike or does not want 
the hearer to know who stole it. In interrogatives such as (382b), the speaker 
does not know who stole the bike either, but here she or he wants the hearer to 
supply the missing information. 
 Given this common meaning element, one might suspect that an inter-
rogative-indefinite pronoun could actually be vague rather than polysemous. 
Indeed, Dixon (1980: 372) reports that speakers of Australian languages will 
often translate a sentence with an interrogative-indefinite pronoun as in (383), 
suggesting that it is simultaneously an indefinite specification, and a request for 
further information.vii 
 
(383) Someone stole my bike – who did it? 
 
But vagueness at the utterance level is not the general case – in most languages, 
it seems, sentences containing interrogative-indefinite pronouns are clearly 
either interrogative or indefinite (cf. the disambiguation strategies mentioned in 
§ 7.3.1). 
 Another way of formulating the similarity between (382a) and (382b) is to 
say that (382a) is presupposed by (382b) (Lyons 1977: 758), so in a way the 
indefinite meaning is contained in the interrogative meaning. Attempting to ac-
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count for the formal relationship between interrogatives and indefinites found 
in many languages, Lyons suggests that the interrogative variant of (382a), the 
polar question (384), might also be construed as a parametric question, 
presupposing (382a) and expecting the hearer to respond by supplying a value 
for ‘someone’ (cf. already Paul (1920: 136) for similar considerations). 
 
(384) Someone stole my bike? 
 
 Somewhat similarly, Klima (1964: 252-3) derived interrogative pronouns like 
what by 'incorporation' of indefinites (in this case, something) into the abstract 
question operator wh (wh...something is transformed to wh+something, which is 
spelled out as what).7a  
 In this line of reasoning, interrogatives are derived from indefinites. It is 
therefore natural to ask whether the formal similarities between interrogatives 
and indefinites can perhaps be explained (even if only partially) by a diachronic 
change from an indefinite to an interrogative pronoun. Such a change was 
indeed posited speculatively by several linguists several decades ago (e.g. 
Meunier 1875, Gardiner 1932: 307-8; cf. the discussion in Frei 1940: 7-9). This 
hypothesis is interesting, but it must be rejected. There is no positive evidence 
for it, although it should be quite easy to find such evidence: There should be 
plenty of languages whose interrogative-indefinite pronouns go back 
etymologically to generic ontological-category nouns or to the numeral ‘one’. 
These are the sources of indefinites in many languages, and we would expect 
cases where such indefinites become interrogatives. Furthermore, we would 
expect at least some of the numerous indefinites consisting of root plus 
indefiniteness marker to become interrogative pronouns, but we never observe 
any traces of such earlier indefiniteness markers in interrogatives. What we 
find, instead, is that in language family after language family, interrogative 
pronouns prove resistant to etymological analysis. In fact, interrogative 
pronouns are among the slowest-changing elements in any language. Consider, 
for instance, interrogatives in Indo-European languages: The reconstructed 
original root is *kwi-/*kwo-, and reflexes of this root are still found in all modern 
languages, e.g. English what, Russian cˇ to, Modern Greek ti, Yazgulami cˇ ig´ , 
Irish cad, Punjabi ki, Italian che, etc. These words have undergone phonological 
and morphological changes, but the root was never replaced. Interrogative 
pronouns are generally so old that their root cannot be etymologized.viii  
 So neither can interrogative-indefinite pronouns go back to interrogative 
pronouns in a well-understood way, nor can they go back to indefinite pro-
nouns in the way just sketched. We can only conclude that somehow the 
functional similarity between them which was noted above must be responsible 
for the systematic polysemy.  
 But one thing we know for sure: The interrogative function is always 
primary, and the indefinite function is secondary. An interrogative pronoun 
may lose its indefinite function (e.g. Latin quis/quem ‘who(m)’, which survived 
into modern Romance, but can no longer be used as an indefinite; similarly, 
Classical Greek tís ‘who?’ can no longer be used as an indefinite in Modern 
Greek). Unfortunately, I know of no good case where an interrogative pronoun 
that lacks the indefinite sense acquires it at some later stage. Such cases could 
give us hints for explaining the mechanism the rise of indefinites from 
interrogatives. 
 
7.3.4. The multiple partitive use of bare interrogatives 
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There is one special type of indefinite use of bare interrogatives which is more 
widespread than the use of bare interrogatives as ordinary indefinites, as 
discussed in the preceding sections (§ 7.3.1-3). For lack of a better term, I call 
this the MULTIPLE PARTITIVE construction. It occurs in three variants. 
 A typical example of the first variant is (385). 
 
(385) Georgian 
  Vin pul-s eloda, vin c’eril-s, vin gazet-eb-s. 
  who money-DAT waits who letter-DAT who newspaper-PL-DAT 
  ‘Some (people) are waiting for money, some for a letter, some for  
  newspapers.’ (Lit. ‘Who is waiting for money, who for a letter,...’) 
 
The bare interrogative in this construction always occurs together with at least 
another instance of the same interrogative pronoun in a parallel coordinate 
clause (hence 'multiple'), and each indefinite denotes a subset (hence 'partitive') 
of a larger contextually given set, so the translation ‘some (people)’ is more 
appropriate than ‘someone’. The verb is often gapped in all clauses except one. 
The multiple partitive construction can be found in a wide variety of languages, 
a selection of which is illustrated in (386). 
 
(386) a. French (Grevisse 1986: §729) 
   Qui apportait un fromage, qui un sac de noix, qui un quartier de chèvre. 
   ‘Some brought a piece of cheese, some a bag of nuts, some a piece of  
   goat meat.’ 
  b. Russian 
   Gde ubirajut sveklu, gde pasˇ ut losˇ ad’mi. 
   where reap:3PL beet where plow3PL horses:INSTR 
   ‘In some places people are reaping beet, in some places people are  
   plowing with horses.’ 
  c. Finnish (Karttunen and Peters 1980: 194) 
   Tuuli puhaltaa milloin länne-stä, milloin idä-stä. 
   wind blows when west-ELAT when east-ELAT  
   ‘The wind blows sometimes from the west, sometimes from the  
   east.’ 
  d. Mansi (Finno-Ugrian; Beke 1913-14: 150) 
   Xot xum xan´s´ i, xot xum at xan´s´ i. 
   who person knows who person not knows 
   ‘Some people know, some people don’t know.’ 
  e. Turkish (Xovratovicˇ  1989: 35) 
   Kimi adak, kimi matem için topla-n-dı. 
   who sacrifice who mourning for gather-REFL-PAST(3SG) 
   ‘Some gathered for a sacrifice, some for mourning.’ 
  f. Kilivila (Austronesian: Oceanic; Senft 1986: 63) 
   Te-vila  e-sisu-si va simla te-vila  
   G(MALE)-how.many they-stay-PL at island G(MALE)-how.many  
   e-sila-si. 
   they-go.by.ship-PL 
   ‘Some of them stay at the island, the others keep on sailing.’ 
 
 In the second variant of this construction, the multiple partitive indefinite 
pronoun is not an independent element of the clause, but a kind of 
discontinuous modifier of another (semantically plural) phrase. 
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(387) a. French (Grevisse 1986: § 729) 
   Les clients de l’ hôtel prenaient, qui du thé, qui du porto,  
   the guests of the hotel take who ART tea who ART port  
   qui un cocktail. 
   who a cocktail 
   ‘Of the hotel guests, some drank tea, some port, some a cocktail.’  
   (Lit.: ‘The hotel guests drank, who tea, who port,...’) 
  b. Hebrew (Glinert 1989: § 7.8) 
   Et zot ro?im, mi be-mida raba u-mi be-mida peÌuta, 
   ACC this they:see who in-degree big and-who in-degree less  
   ke-¿erex bifney ¿acmo. 
   as-value before itself 
   ‘They regard this as a value in itself, some to a greater and some to  
   a lesser extent.’ 
  c. Hungarian (Beke 1913-14: 150) 
   Az ország-á-ban lak-ó ember-ek, ki kocsi-n, ki szekér-en 
   the country-3SG-IN live-PTCP person-PL who cart-by who coach-by
  
   hoz-t-ák a temérdek tülk-öt. 
   bring-PAST-3PL the loads horn-ACC 
   ‘The people living in his country brought the innumerable horns,  
   some by cart, some by coach.’ 
 
 In the third variant of this construction, two different bare interrogatives are 
used in this way, i.e. not as independent elements of the clause. In this 
construction, there are not two parallel coordinate structures, but the resulting 
meaning is similar. 
 
(388) a. Russian 
   Oni rassypalis' kto kuda. 
   they dispersed who whither 
   ‘(Lit.) They dispersed, some in some direction, some in another  
   direction (i.e. different people in different directions).’ 
  b. Finnish (Karttunen and Peters 1980: 194) 
   Tuuli puhaltaa milloin mistäkin sunna-sta. 
   wind blows when which  direction-ELAT 
   ‘(Lit.) The wind blows, sometimes from some direction, sometimes  
   from another direction (i.e. from different directions at different  
   times).’ 
  c. Romanian 
   Acestia se împra˘ stiara˘  ca puii de potîrniche,  
   these REFL dispersed like young of partridges 
   caresi pe unde. 
   which to where 
   ‘These dispersed like young partridges, different people in different  
   directions.’ 
 
 I note these constructions here without offering so much as the beginning of 
an explanation. I find them quite puzzling, but their wide cross-linguistic 
distribution (at least in Europe and northern Asia) makes it impossible to 
regard them merely as marginal curiosities. 
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7.4. Indefinite Pronouns Derived by Reduplication 
 
In many languages, indefinite pronouns have a reduplicated form. The most 
common case are indefinites consisting of two full instances of the 
corresponding interrogative pronoun. I know of no case of partial reduplica-
tion, or of triple reduplication. Reduplicated indefinites of this form occur 
commonly all over the world (cf. Pott 1862, Gonda 1949, 1954-55, Coyaud and 
Aït Hamou 1971, 1972, 1976, Moravcsik 1978: 319). 
 
(389) a. Moksha Mordva (Finno-Ugrian; Feoktistov 1966: 207) 
   kije ‘who?’ kije-kije ‘somebody, anybody’ 
   meze ‘what?’ meze-meze ‘something, anything’ 
   kodama ‘which?’ kodama-kodama ‘any’ 
  b. Ila (Bantu) 
   oni  ‘who?’ oni-oni ‘whoever, anyone’ 
   ukwi ‘where?’ ukwi-ukwi ‘anywhere’ 
  c. Vietnamese (Coyaud and Aït Hamou 1972) 
   ai  ‘who?’ ai ai ‘anybody, everybody’ 
  d. Latin  
   quis ‘who?’ quis-quis ‘anybody, whoever’ 
   ubi  ‘where?’ ubi-ubi ‘anywhere, wherever’ 
  e. Bugis (Austronesian; Sirk 1979: 116) 
   niga ‘who?’ niga-niga ‘anyone’ 
   aga  ‘what?’ aga-ga ‘anything’ 
  f. Ainu (Refsing 1986: 104) 
   nen ‘who?’ nen-nen ‘whoever, nobody’ 
  g. Khasi (Mon-Khmer; Moravcsik 1978: 319) 
   ka?ey ‘who?’ ka?ey-ka?ey ‘someone’ 
   kumnu ‘how?’ kumnu-kumnu ‘somehow’ 
  h. Kristang (= Malacca Creole Portuguese; Baxter 1988: 54) 
   keng ‘who?’ (< quem) keng keng ‘anybody’ 
   ki  ‘what?’ ki ki ‘anything’ 
 




  e5ni  ‘person’ e5ni-k-e5ni ‘anybody’ 
  ohun  ‘thing’ ohun-k-ohun ‘anything’ 
 
 And one also finds reduplicated combinations of an interrogative pronoun 
and an indefiniteness marker (na also means ‘or’ and ‘although’, cf. § 7.2): 
 
(650) Malagasy 
  iza ‘who?’ na iza na iza ‘anyone’ 
  inona  ‘what?’ na inona na inona ‘anything’ 
 
 How can this formal strategy for creating indefinite pronouns be related to 
their meaning? Unfortunately, the answer is not clear to me, although 
reduplication is sometimes regarded as one of the most iconic ways of signaling 
meaning. According to Moravcsik (1978: 317), 'the most outstanding single 
concept that reduplicative constructions recurrently express in various lan-
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guages is the concept of increased quantity'. She distinguishes two subtypes of 
this meaning, 'quantity of referents' and 'amount of emphasis', and subsumes 
indefinite pronouns under the first of these two general categories, noting 
further that the plurality of referents expressed by reduplicative constructions 
is usually distributive rather than collective.ix The iconic motivation of 
reduplication for the expression of distributive plurality is easy to see. But in 
what respect is the meaning of indefinite pronouns related to distributive 
plurality? 
 When we look at the meanings of reduplicated indefinites more closely, we 
see that most of them have a free-choice or at least negative-polarity meaning, 
rather than a specific meaning. The similarity between the free-choice function 
and the distributive universal function has been highlighted earlier (cf. § 3.2.6, § 
6.5), and indeed reduplication is widely used to express the meaning ‘every’, as 
illustrated in (392-93) (cf. Gonda 1949: 176). 
 
(392) Tagalog taon-taon ‘every year’ 
  Manggarai leso leso ‘every day’ 
  Sanskrit ahany-ahani ‘every day’ 
(393) Hungarian ki ki ‘everyone’ (ki ‘who’) 
  Hindi/Urdu ek ek ‘every’ (ek ‘one’) 
 
 But there are some additional facts that suggest that reduplication may 
somehow express the notion of irrelevance by itself. Thus, in some languages, 
reduplicated interrogatives are used primarily or exclusively as non-specific 
free relative pronouns, in free relative clauses or in parametric concessive 
conditional clauses, e.g. 
 
(394) a. Da’a (Austronesian, Central Sulawesi; Barr 1988) 
   Sema-sema na-rata ri ja’i-na kana ni-tarima-na. 
   who-who REAL-come to.him must OF.REAL-receive-he 
   ‘Whoever comes to him will be received by him.’ 
  b. Latin 
   Quid-quid id est, timeo Danaos et dona ferentes.  
   what-what that is I:fear Danaans even gifts bringing 
   ‘Whatever that is, I fear the Danaans even if they bring gifts.’ 
  c. Bagandi (Australian; Hercus 1982: 171) 
   Gila yuri-wa-yiga-ayi, mina-mina yawara Nadu 
   not hear-ASP-3PL-SUBJ-1SG.OBJ what-what word I:ERG  
   gulba-ra-na-ama. 
   speak-TOP-PTC-2SG.OBJ 
   ‘They don’t understand me, whatever words I may be saying to  
   you.’ 
 
Not only interrogative pronouns may be reduplicated in such sentences, but 
also relative pronouns, as in Sanskrit (whose interrogative and relative 
pronouns are distinct), and even verbs, as in Sicilian: 
 
(395) a. Sanskrit 
   Yo yas tad karoti sa (sa) mu¯ rkhah5. 
   who who that does that (that) fool 
   ‘Whoever does this is a fool.’ 
  b. Sicilian (Bollée 1978: 329) 
   Unni vaju vaju, tutti mi salutunu. 
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   where I:go I:go all me they:greet 
   ‘Wherever I go, everyone greets me.’ 
 
 As we saw in § 6.2.3, indefinite pronouns may have their source in non-
specific relative pronouns. So a possibility is that the reduplicated indefinites of 
(389) in general come from non-specific relative pronouns as in (394-95). At 
least for Latin, where the use of reduplicated interrogatives as indefinite 
pronouns is quite limited and evidently secondary, this looks like a plausible 
scenario. 
 However, in view of examples like (390), where a non-interrogative-based 
indefinite is formed by reduplication, one should perhaps resist the temptation 
to derive interrogative-based indefinites in general from clausal sources. (Cf. 
also the completely analogous dilemma in § 7.1 and the discussion there.) But 
even if the non-specific clauses in (394-95) cannot be regarded as the single key 
to reduplicated indefinites, they suggest that the meaning of distributive 
plurality is not the only starting point for understanding reduplicated 
indefinites.  
 While distributive plurality can probably also be detected in (394-95), an-
other important meaning element is that of free choice, negative polarity, and 
non-specificity. There is independent evidence that these meanings are also 
somehow inherent in reduplicated constructions. Steever (1988) describes 
verbal 'echo compounds' (i.e. partial reduplications) in several Dravidian 
languages (Tamil, Toda, Kannada, Kodagu, Telugu), which are used only in 
'affective contexts such as questions, negatives and modals' (1987: 63). An 
example from Tamil is given in (396).x 
 
(396) Tamil 
  Pa¯ ttiratai ut5ai-tt-a¯ y kit5ai-tt-a¯ y en2r2-a¯ l to¯ lai uri-pp-e¯ n2. 
  pots break-PAST-2SG RED:break-PAST-2SG say-COND you skin-FUT-1SG 
  ‘If you broke the pots or did any such stupid thing, I’ll skin you alive.’ 
 
 
7.5. Some Further Diachronic Issues  
 
7.5.1. Generic nouns turned pronouns 
 
As I have already observed, many languages use generic nouns like ‘person’, 
‘thing’, ‘place’, ‘time’, etc. to express notions like ‘someone’, ‘something’, 
‘somewhere’, ‘sometime’, etc. (but not, of course, for the free-choice sense of 
‘anyone’, ‘anything’, etc.). In my 100-language sample, 42 languages use this 
strategy. As was also mentioned above, it is not always easy to tell whether we 
are really dealing with pronouns, or whether true nouns are used as 
alternatives to indefinite pronouns (cf. § 3.3.1), because the differences are 
sometimes quite subtle (cf. also § 2.2.2). 
 The diachronic process by which a generic noun is turned into an indefinite 
pronoun is quite straightforward, so not much needs to be said here. A generic 
noun is first used in a noun phrase without modifiers to render meanings like 
‘somebody’, ‘something’, and it gradually acquires phonological, 
morphological and syntactic features that set it off from other nouns. The last 
doubts about its new pronoun status are dispelled when the original generic 
noun falls into disuse, as in the case of English somebody/anybody, where body 
can no longer be used in the sense ‘person’; French rien ‘nothing’, which can no 
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longer be used in the sense of ‘thing’ (cf. Latin rem ‘thing(ACC)’); or Maltese xi 
mkien ‘somewhere’, where mkien (cf. Arabic makaan ‘place’) can no longer be 
used in the sense of ‘place’. 
 In some cases, an indefinite determiner like ‘one’, ‘some’ or ‘any’ is com-
bined with a generic noun in a new pronominal form, as in Italian qualcosa 
‘something’ (< qualche ‘some’ + cosa ‘thing’), Maltese xi mkien ‘somewhere’ (xi 
indefiniteness marker < sˇ ay? ‘thing, something’ + mkien ‘place’). Again, this is 
so straightforward that it need not be commented on further. 
 It should be pointed out, however, that there is an interesting tendency for 
generic-noun-based indefinites to be restricted to negative-polarity or negative 
functions, e.g. French personne ‘person; nobody’, Hebrew davar ‘thing; anything, 
nothing’. This tendency will be discussed further in § 8.3.2. 
 
7.5.2. Indefinite pronouns from ‘one’ 
 
Not much needs to be said on the numeral ‘one’ as a source of indefinite 
pronouns either. This source is also very widespread, but ‘one’ is usually re-
stricted to the use as an indefinite determiner or an indefinite pronoun of the 
ontological category ‘person’ (presumably because individuality is generally 
associated with people). It is often used in the same series as generic nouns, e.g. 
 
(397)    'one':    generic noun: 
  French quelqu’un    quelque chose 
  English some-one    some-thing 
  Catalan ningú ‘anybody’   res/gens ‘anything’ 
     (< nec-unus)  
  Maltese xi Ìadd ‘someone’  xi Ìaga ‘something’ 
     (Ìadd < ‘one’)   (Ìaga ‘thing’) 
  Kabyle yiwen ‘one; someone’ kra ‘thing; something’  
  Dongolawi wEr ‘one; someone’  ha¯gˇ a ‘thing; something’ 
  Welsh rhyw-un ‘someone’  rhyw-beth ‘something’ 
     (un ‘one’)    (peth ‘thing’) 
 
But ‘one’ is occasionally also found in series that are otherwise based on in-
terrogative pronouns, e.g. 
 
(398) M. Greek kan-énas ‘anybody’  (énas ‘one’) 
     tí-pota ‘anything’  (ti ‘what’) 
  Latvian ne-viens ‘nobody’ (viens ‘one’) 
     ne-kas ‘nothing’   (kas ‘what’) 
 
 Somewhat surprisingly, ‘one’ is sometimes also found as an indefiniteness 
marker together with interrogative pronouns, e.g. 
 
(399) Pashto yaw cok ‘somebody’  yaw ‘one’  
           cok ‘who; somebody’ 
  Lezgian sa wuzˇ  jat’ani ‘somebody’ sa ‘one’ 
           wuzˇ  ‘who’ 
  Udmurt og-kin ‘somebody’  og ‘one’ 
           kin ‘who’ 
  Icelandic ein-hver ‘somebody’  ein ‘one’ 
           hver ‘who’ 
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  Uighur bir nemä ‘something’ bir ‘one’ 
           nemä ‘what’ 
  Khmer qw´y-mu´y ‘something’ qw´y ‘what’  
           mu´y ‘one’ 
   
 An interesting case of reanalysis in terms of 'one' is reported by Haegeman 
(1991) for a West Flemish dialect, where the older opaque indefiniteness marker 
e(n)t- was reanalyzed as containing the numeral een 'one', so that besides eentwa 
'something' (i.e. een-twa, earlier e(n)t-wa) it is also possible to say een schuon twa 
'something nice', lit. 'a nice something'. 
 Like generic nouns, ‘one’ has a tendency to become restricted to negative-po-
larity and negative functions – see § 8.3.2.1. 
 
7.5.3. Borrowing of indefiniteness markers 
 
Although indefinite pronouns are part of the grammatical system and 
grammatical markers are relatively resistant to borrowing, a surprisingly large 
number of cases have been attested where an indefiniteness marker was taken 
over from another language, either by direct borrowing or by calquing. 
 
7.5.3.1. Direct borrowing. I know of no cases where a complete indefinite 
pronoun has been borrowed,xi but some languages with interrogative-based 
indefinites have indefiniteness markers that were adopted from other 
languages with interrogative-based indefinites. This usually happens only in 
languages that are under very strong influence of another language (cf., e.g., 
Majtinskaja (1969: 250-1) and Beke (1913-14: 174-7) for Finno-Ugrian 
languages). 
 
(400) Hungarian né- (in né-mi ‘some’, né-hol ‘here and there’, etc.) 
      < Slavic neˇ - (e.g. Russian ne-cˇ to ‘something’, Czech neˇ co, 
       Serbo-Croatian nesˇ to) 
  Mordva  koj- (in koj-kov ‘somewhere’, koj-kosˇ ta ‘sometime’, etc.)
  
      < Russian koe- (e.g. koe-gde ‘somewhere’) 
      -buti (in kije-buti ‘somebody’, meze-buti ‘something’, etc.) 
      < Russian -(ni)bud’ (e.g. kto-nibud’ ‘somebody’) 
  Hill Mari  ta- (in ta-ma ‘something’, tä-gü ‘somebody’, etc.) 
      < Chuvash ta- (e.g. ta-kan ‘somebody’, te-me˘ n ‘sth’) 
  Udmurt  kot’- (in kot’-kin ‘anybody’, kot’-ma ‘anything’) 
      < Russian xot’ (e.g. xot’ kto ‘anyone’) 
  Slovak  bár- (in bár-kto ‘anyone’) 
      < Hungarian bár- (e.g. bár-ki ‘anyone’) 
 
Widespread borrowing of indefiniteness markers has been documented for 
Romani dialects of eastern Europe by Boretzky and Igla (1991). Romani dialects 
have adopted indefiniteness markers from practically all the surrounding 
languages of the region, e.g. 
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(401) Romani indefinites based on interrogatives  
  (ko ‘who’, so ‘what’, kaj ‘where’, etc.) (Boretzky and Igla 1991: 21-3) 
  bilo kaj ‘anywhere’  < Serbo-Croatian bilo 
  i-so  ‘anything’  < Serbo-Croatian i- 
  kaj-godi ‘anywhere’  < Bulgarian -gode  
  vare-so ‘something’ < Rumanian oare- 
  chocˇ -so ‘anything’  < Polish choc´ (= Russian xot’)  
  so-nebud’ ‘anything’  < Ukrainian -nebud’ (= Russian -nibud’) 
  akar-so ‘anything’  < Hungarian akár 
 
7.5.3.2. Calquing. Indefiniteness markers are often relatively weakly gram-
maticalized and can still be related to other elements in the grammar, so that 
calquing is possible.  
 An example comes from Yiddish, which has been heavily influenced by 
Slavic languages (espacially Polish and Ukrainian). For non-emphatic non-
specific uses, Yiddish employs the indefiniteness markers -(s’)-nit-iz (lit. ‘not is’) 
and -es-iz (lit. ‘it is’), which are probably modeled on Slavic forms like 
Ukrainian -nebud’ and Polish (nie) ba4dz´ (lit. ‘(not) be’) . Of course, it cannot be 
excluded in principle that these forms arose independently in the manner 
described in § 6.3.3, but the fact that German, the closest relative of Yiddish, has 
nothing of this sort, and that Slavic influence is strong elsewhere in Yiddish 
grammar, makes it highly plausible that this is a calque. Examples are given in 
(402). 
 
(402) Yiddish (Sˇ apiro et al. 1984: 103, 206) 
  a. Mir veln vu-nit-iz ibernekhtikn. 
   we want where-INDEF spend.the.night 
   ‘We’ll spend the night somewhere.’  
  b. mer vi ven-s’-nit-iz 
   more than when-INDEF 
   ‘more than ever’ 
 
 A particularly intriguing example of calquing is described by Subbarao and 
Arora (1988) for the Dakkhini dialect of Hindi/Urdu. This dialect has been in 
close contact with Telugu (Dravidian) for centuries, and its grammatical system 
is now in many ways identical to Telugu. At some point, Dakkhini speakers 
equated the Hindi/Urdu particle ki (‘that, whether’, a subordinator borrowed 
originally from Persian ke) with the Telugu particle -oo, which is used as a 
subordinator in embedded questions, as a disjunctive coordinator (‘or’), and as 
an indefiniteness marker on interrogatives (cf. the Kannada cognate -oo in 
Appendix A, Section 35). As a result, Dakkhini now uses interrogative-based 
indefinites marked with -ki, in contrast to standard Hindi, which has a special, 
synchronically non-derived series of indefinites (cf. Appendix A, Section 22, 
and (28c) in § 3.1.1). Compare the parallel examples in (403-04) (standard Hindi 
would use koii and kuch here). 
 
Dakkhini Hindi (D), Telugu (T) (Subbarao and Arora 1988: 105) 
(403) D. Kon ki aayaa. 
   who INDEF came 
  T. Ewaru-oo wacceru. 
   who-INDEF came 
   ‘Someone came.’ 
(404) D. Mere abbaa kyaa ki leko aaye. 
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   my father what INDEF taking came 
  T. Maa naannagaaru emiti-oo tecceru. 
   my father  what-INDEF brought 
   ‘My father brought something.’ 
  
 Another example of calquing, provided to me by David Gil, comes from 
Singlish, a variety of English spoken in Singapore which exhibits strong 
influence from southern Chinese. In Singlish, the combination which also is used 
in the free-choice function: 
 
(405) Singlish 
  Which way also can? [from a taxi driver] 
  'Can (I take) any route?' 
 
This construction is evidently based on a Chinese construction corresponding 
to Mandarin shénme yeˇ  'which also, i.e. any' (cf. Appendix A, Section 36). 
 Calquing probably occurs widely in indefinite pronouns, but in most cases it 
is hard to prove that language contact played a role in the creation of a 
particular type of indefiniteness marker because it might as well have been 
arisen independently. Thus, rather than being an exotic phenomenon, the clear 
cases of Yiddish, Dakkhini and Singlish may well represent the tip of an 
iceberg. 
 
7.5.4. Semantic enrichment by implicature:  
Appreciative and depreciative meanings 
 
In many languages, indefinite pronouns may be used with secondary quali-
tative meanings, both positive (‘someone important’, ‘something remarkable’) 
and negative (‘an unimportant person’, ‘in a negligent manner’). I will call these 
uses APPRECIATIVE and DEPRECIATIVE (following Stoffel’s (1899) terminology). 
These uses have often been noted in the literature, but no cross-linguistic 
comparison has ever been made to my knowledge. 
 Appreciative and depreciative uses of indefinite pronouns are interesting for 
linguistic theory because they are an example of semantic enrichment based on 
conversational implicatures. More specifically, Grice’s first maxim of Quantity, 
'make your contribution as informative as is required for the current purposes 
of the exchange', comes into play here. Indefinite pronouns are intrinsically 
uninformative because their semantic content is quite minimal in comparison to 
most other words, and when speakers nevertheless use them in situations 
where they do not contribute any additional information, hearers are entitled to 
make additional inferences. Such interpretative enrichment may then be 
conventionalized and lead to semantic change. However, I know of no case 
where a whole indefinite series is only used in appreciative or depreciative 
senses. Clearly, semantic change by conversational implicature is not nearly as 
widespread and important for indefinite pronouns as semantic change by 
grammaticalization (§ 6.4), and languages do not differ as radically in this 
respect as they differ with respect to the patterning of other indefinite pronoun 
meanings. It appears that most the examples cited in this section generally 
illustrate special contextual interpretations based on converstional implicature 
rather than additional truly semantic readings.  
 
7.5.4.1. Appreciative meanings. The examples in (406) illustrate the apprecia-
tive interpretation of indefinite pronouns. In general, the meaning of ap-
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preciative indefinites can be described as ‘remarkable, important’. The fact that 
all the examples in (406) are from European languages should not be taken to 
imply that this phenomenon is restricted to European languages, or even 
particularly characteristic for them. It just reflects the fact that I happen to have 
much better access to data from European languages, and that appreciative and 
depreciative meanings are not often noted in grammars of non-European 
languages. I would not expect languages to differ significantly in the extent to 
which they show such meanings. 
 
(406) a. German 
   Wir sind wieder wer. 
   ‘We are somebody (important) again.’ 
  b. French 
   Il lui sembla qu’ il entrait dans une vie nouvelle et charmante, 
  it him seemed that he entered in a life new and charming  
   qu’ il devenait quelqu’un, qu’ il était sauvé. 
   that he became somebody that he was saved 
   ‘It seemed to him that he began a new and charming life, that he  
   became somebody (important), that he was saved.’ 
  c. Polish 
   On byl kiedy-s´  czym-s´ , ale dzis´  jest niczym. 
   he was when-INDEF what-INDEF but today is nothing 
   ‘He was something (important) once, but today he is nothing.’ 
  d. English (informal, especially American) (Quirk et al. 1985: 6.52[c])  
   That was SOME meal! (‘a very good meal’) 
  e. Latin 
   Nunc iste se ali-quem putat. (Seneca Dial. 5.37.3) 
   now that self INDEF-whom considers 
   ‘Now he considers himself (to be) somebody.’ 
  f. Basque (Aulestia 1989: 432) 
   Nor-bait zen alkatea gu-re herri-an. 
   who-INDEF he:was mayor:the we-GEN country-LOC 
   ‘The mayor in our country was someone (important).’ 
  g. Hungarian 
   Ö vala-ki a gyár-ban. 
   he INDEF-who the factory-at 
   ‘He is somebody at the factory.’ 
 
 In all these cases the indefinite pronoun is (part of) the predicate nominal in 
a copular clause with some kind of copular verb (‘be’ in (a), (c-e), (g-h), 
‘become’ in (b), ‘consider’ in (f)). As predicate nominal, an indefinite pronoun is 
not just relatively uninformative, but actually creates a tautology, a blatant 
violation of the first maxim of Quantity (cf. Levinson 1983: 110-11 on 
tautologies). The informative inference in all these examples is 'appreciative', 
i.e. the speaker is understood as referring to something important or special. 
 Furthermore, all these indefinite pronouns also have the ‘specific’ function. 
Non-specific indefinites are apparently never used appreciatively, but tend to 
have depreciative meaning (cf. § 7.5.4.2). This is particularly nicely illustrated in 
(407) from Latin, where the specific indefinite quidam ‘some(one)’ is contrasted 
with the free-choice indefinite quilibet ‘any(one)’. Example (407) is not a copular 
sentence, but it is also a tautology, because necessarily life is led in some way or 
other. 
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(407) Latin 
  Vita agenda est certo genere quo-dam, non quo-libet.  
  life to.be.led is certain way which-INDEF not which-INDEF 
  ‘Life must be led in a certain (special) way, not (just) anyhow.’ 
  (Cicero Fin. 3.24) 
 
Fijn van Draat (1898) observes that English any-indefinites can also have an 
appreciative interpretation. However, all his examples involve negative-po-
larity contexts, where we would expect any-indefinites anyway, e.g. 
 
(408) English (Fijn van Draat 1898: 153-4) 
  a. Nobody who is anybody doubts it. 
  b. an illustrated paper, which is the first to publish portraits of everybody who  
   becomes anybody 
  c. There was absolutely no natural foundation on which a building of any  
   size could be erected. 
  d. Stamps are liable to deterioration when exposed to view for any length of  
   time. 
 
Here, too, examples (c-d) are not copular clauses, but the pragmatic enrichment 
is also due to a tautology because ‘size’ and ‘length (of time)’ specify only a 
dimension and do not constitute information in themselves (necessarily, any 
building has a size, and any event take some time). 
 
7.5.4.2. Depreciative meanings. When an indefinite pronoun with primarily 
non-specific functions is used in a specific tautological context, the inter-
pretative enrichment is generally in the opposite direction, i.e. a depreciative 
meaning results (‘unimportant’ or ‘bad’). This is illustrated in (409). 
 
(409) a. Russian 
   On vsë delaet kak-nibud’. 
   he all does how-INDEF 
   ‘He does everything badly (‘anyhow’).’ 
  b. Lithuanian 
   Jis viska daro bet kaip/ kaip nors. 
   he all does INDEF how how INDEF 
   ‘He does everything badly (‘anyhow’).’ 
  c. Spanish (Lombard 1938-39: 196) 
   No sean tan cualquieras. 
   not be(IMPV) so any 
   ‘Don’t be such good-for-nothings.’ 
  d. Basque (Aulestia 1989: 153) 
   Edo-nola ezarri du. 
   INDEF-how leave she:it:AUX 
   ‘He has left it in a mess (‘anyhow’).’ 
  e. Yakut (Ubrjatova (ed.) 1982: 201) 
   Baahynajdar sebileniilere daVany xannyk eme ete. 
   peasants arms PT what.kind INDEF were 
   ‘The arms of the peasants were pretty bad (‘any kind’).’ 
  f. English (Stoffel 1899: 147) 
   Who on earth can it be? It is somebody for us to a certainty, and my hair is  
   anyhow, and my eyes are red,... 
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Note that most of these indefinites would not be grammatical in their normal 
meaning, because they are not allowed in contexts that do not admit a non-
specific interpretation. Thus, the additional meaning also leads to additional 
cooccurrence possibilities. 
 Stoffel (1899: 147) attempts a pragmatic explanation of this interpretative 
enrichment: 'Taught by sad experience, speakers are convinced that, with 
respect to qualitative statements, their hearers are apt to suspect the worst', 
hence the depreciative interpretation. But this not only presupposes that all 
hearers are pessimists, but also leads one to expect that all interpretative en-
richments are depreciative. As we saw in the preceding section, this is not the 
case. 
 The cross-linguistically observable correlation between specific functions 
and appreciative interpretations, and between non-specific functions and 
depreciative interpretations suggests an alternative explanation: Non-specific 
indefinites, especially free-choice indefinites, refer to an arbitrary element of 
their class. Given that all people are choosy (a much likelier supposition than 
that all people are pessimists), it is normal that hearers expect the worst if they 
are told that the referent has been selected randomly. 
 However, occasionally specific indefinites must also be interpreted in a 
depreciative sense. 
 
(410) a. Russian 
   Rabota sdelana koe-kak. 
   work done INDEF-how 
   ‘The work was done badly.’ 
  b. Macedonian 
   Se druzˇ i so ne-kakov neranimajko. 
   REFL befriends with INDEF-which [?] 
   ‘She is friends with some bad person.’ 
 
Some individual indefinites seem to have conventionalized the depreciative 
meaning, e.g. English anyhow ‘in a bad manner’ or Russian koe-kak ‘anyhow’. 
Dictionaries generally list these forms and translate them, whereas this is the 
case much more rarely with appreciative meanings as in (664).  
 
7.5.4.3. Anti-depreciative meanings. The third type of interpretatively enriched 
reading, called ANTI-DEPRECIATIVE here, represents the negation of the 
depreciative sense that we saw in the preceding subsection. It comes close to 
the meaning of appreciative indefinites (‘She is not anybody’ ≈ ‘She is 
somebody.’). Anti-depreciative readings are treated separately here because 
they seem to be much more readily available than depreciative readings. For 
example, in German (411a) the depreciative reading is hard to get, but in (411b) 
is it the only possible reading. 
 
(411) German 
  a. Sie hat die Arbeit irgendwie gemacht. 
   ‘She did the work somehow.’/??‘She did the work anyhow.’ 
  b. Sie hat die Arbeit nicht irgendwie gemacht. 
   ‘She did the work not anyhow.’ 
 
This fact, too, points to a stronger tendency towards lexicalization of the de-
preciative interpretation. 
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 Like the depreciative interpretation, the anti-depreciative interpretation is 
generally found with non-specific and free-choice indefinites, as illustrated by 
the examples in (412) (where Chuvash takam ‘somebody (specific)’ is the only 
exception). 
 
(412) a. German 
   Ich verpacke doch nicht irgendwelche Brücken und Gebäude, einfach so.  
   I wrap PRT not any bridges and buildings simply so 
   ‘I don’t wrap just any bridges and buildings, just like that.’ (Christo) 
  b. Latin 
   ...virtutes-que non quas-libet faciebat Deus per manum Pauli.  
   miracles-and not which-INDEF did God through hand of:Paul 
   ‘And God wrought special (‘not just any’) miracles by the hands of  
   Paul.’ (Act. 19.11) 
  c. Bulgarian (Guentchéva 1981: 411) 
   Cˇ ovek-ât ne iska kakvato i da e ovca, a si târsi ovca-ta. 
   man-the not wants which INDEF shep but REFL seeks sheep-the 
   ‘The man doesn’t want just any sheep, but is looking for his sheep.’ 
  d. Serbian/Croatian (Progovac 1990: 130) 
   Milan nije video bilo koga, vec´  predsednika. 
   Milan NEG:has seen INDEF whom but president 
   ‘Milan did not see just anyone, but the president.’ 
  e. Chuvash (Skvorcov (ed.) 1985: 438) 
   Va˘ l takam mars´ ke, xama˘ r s´ yn. 
   he someone not.is ourselves person 
   ‘He is not just anyone, but one of ours.’ 
 
These anti-depreciative cases also differ from the depreciative cases of § 7.5.4.2 
in that they are not restricted to tautological environments. Apparently the 
negation somehow licenses the occurrence of free-choice indefinites in these 
environments. 
 In languages like English where free-choice indefinites are also used in the 
direct-negation function, sentences with anti-depreciative indefinites threaten 
to be ambiguous between the negative and the anti-depreciative interpretation. 
However, there is an intonational difference between the two interpretations 
(see Ladd 1980: 145-62, Horn 1989: 230): The anti-depreciative reading is 
associated with a fall-rise (cf. 413a), while the negative meaning is associated 
with a simple falling contour (cf. 413b). 
 
(413) English 
  a. I don’t want to talk to ˇ anyone. 
  b. I don’t want to talk to ´ anyone. 
 
This fall-rise contour of anti-depreciative indefinites is also found in languages 
in which there is no potential ambiguity, e.g. in German. The simple falling 
contour is simply odd in (414). 
 
(414) German 
  Ich möchte nicht mit ˇ irgend jemandem sprechen. 
  ‘I don’t want to talk to ˇ anyone.’ 
 
The similar facts in Hungarian are discussed by Hunyadi (1987: 133). 
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i In a few languages, another possibility is that a xot’-type focus particle is used to mark 
concessive conditionals, e.g. in Hungarian (cf. 308b) and Romanian. A route of 
development analogous to (351b) is also a possible option for these languages. 
ii Compare also Latin vel ‘even; at least; or’, which derives from the imperative of velle 
‘want’. However, vel is not used to form indefinite pronouns. 
iii The most explicit defense of a unified semantic analysis in the literature is Gil (1993), 
who analyzes elements such as Japanese mo as 'conjunctive operators'. However, he 
does not say whether there is a unified analysis of elements like ka as 'disjunctive 
operators'. 
iv Indeed, Manoliu-Manea (1966: 445) and Jackendoff (1972b) suggest that the 
distinction between ‘every’ and ‘any’ can be captured by paraphrases along the lines of 
(361): (i) You can invite any friend. = You can invite Joan or Bill or Henry or Julie 
or... (ii) You can invite every friend. = You can invite Joan and Bill and Henry and 
Julie and... See also Hunyadi (1987) on Hungarian mind- 'every; and' and akár 'any; or'. 
v It is interesting that Sannikov (1989), in the only semantic analysis of ‘or’ (Russian 
ili) that I am aware of, proposes to analyze ‘A or B’ as ‘A is possible, B is possible’. 
The source construction in (365b) comes quite close to Sannikov’s analysis (which was 
arrived at completely independently, without regard to the form of ‘or’), while (365a) is 
basically a hearer-oriented variant of (365b). 
vi Vasmer (1953-58) rejects this etymology, found in Miklosich (1886), for 
phonological reasons and derives it from li ‘whether’ and the particle bo. If that were 
the case, the homonymy between -libo (indefiniteness marker) and libo ‘or’ would be 
accidental, which is of course possible. I have no stake in the etymology of libo ‘or’ 
offered in (366), but I am convinced that Vasmer is too strict in demanding 
phonological regularity even for such grammatical items as ‘or’ (cf. also Haiman 
(1974), who makes the same point). 
vii Compare also Givón’s (1990: 818) continuum between declarative and parametric 
question, moving gradually from certainty through uncertainty to question: Joe 
called/What’s-his-name called/Whoever it was that called.../I don’t know who 
called/Who knows who called/Who called? 
7a  Li (1992) and Postma (1994) are more recent attempts of configurational analyses 
within formal syntactic frameworks which assign the same meaning to WH-expressions 
and derive the different resulting meaning from the syntactic structure.  
viii I know only of four cases where one could think of a diachronic origin of an 
interrogative root in an indefinite pronoun:  
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 (i) Italian cosa ‘what?’ is of course related to cosa ‘thing’, but it derived from che 
cosa? ‘which thing?’ (cf. the analogous reduction in qualcosa ‘something’ from 
qualche cosa); 
 (ii) Maltese xi ‘what?’, which seems to be related to Arabic sˇ ay? ‘thing’ – probably 
a similar explanation as in the Italian case can be given; 
 (iii) Coptic u ‘what?’ has been claimed to go back to Ancient Egyptian w¿j ‘one’ 
(Gardiner 1932: 307-8). This etymology is anything but certain. 
 (iv) Acehnese (Austronesian)  pat ‘where?’ apparently derives historically from 
teumpat ‘place’ (Mark Durie, personal communication). This case is the most intriguing 
one, since it is part of a complex system of ‘epistemological classifiers’ (Durie 1985: 
ch. 6), where pat can also mean something like ‘place’, e.g. with dum ‘every’ (dum=pat 
‘everywhere’) and sa= ‘one, same’ (e.g. sa=pat ‘same place’). 
ix In some languages, reduplicated interrogatives have simple plural meaning, e.g. in 
Ainu, Khmer, Mongolian (juu juu 'what what', i.e. 'what kinds of things'), and Tagalog 
(sinu-sino 'who-who', i.e. 'who(PL)'). 
x In addition to being restricted to negative-polarity contexts, these Dravidian echo 
compounds also express the nuance of contempt. This is a widespread function of 
reduplication (cf. Moravcsik 1978), which is also represented in English in the 
construction book-shmook borrowed from Yiddish. Contempt is semantically close to 
irrelevance and hence to free choice, so there is another possible connection here. 
Unfortunately, I have no concrete proposal for a way of integrating all these 
interconnections and must leave this topic for future research. 
xi Except for some languages where a generic noun was borrowed, e.g. Turkish bir sey 
‘something’ < ‘one thing’ (sey from Arabic sˇ ay? ‘thing’) or Dongolawi ha¯gˇ a 
‘something, thing’ (from Arabic Ìaagˇ at ‘thing’) 
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8  
 
Negative Indefinite Pronouns 
 
 
While this work is the first in-depth typological study of indefinite pronouns in 
general, negative pronouns in particular have been the object of two recent 
large-scale cross-linguistic investigations, Bernini and Ramat (1992) and Kahrel 
(1989). I will focus my attention on the relation between negative indefinites 
and other indefinites, as well as on explanations of the observed universal 
tendencies that were not yet given in the works cited. 
 In § 8.1, I discuss the received taxonomy of negated indefinites, demonstrat-
ing that it is inadequate and that the implicational map of chapter 4 provides 
for a better classification. § 8.2 deals with one important aspect of the syntax of 
negative indefinites, the cooccurrence with a negative element associated with 
the verb. I will formulate a number of cross-linguistic generalizations and will 
propose functional explanations for them. Finally, in § 8.3 I examine various 
diachronic sources of negative indefinites, in particular negative scalar focus 
particles and minimal-unit expressions. 
 
 
8.1. The Main Syntactic Types of Negative Indefinites 
 
8.1.1. The consensus: four types 
 
There is general agreement that there are four main syntactic ways of ex-
pressing negated indefinites, or in my terms, the direct-negation function of 
indefinite pronouns (Dahl 1979, Kahrel 1989: 3,i Bernini and Ramat 1992: 109-
10). These four strategies are illustrated in (415a-d). 
 
(81) a. Verbal negation plus (ordinary) indefinite 
   Turkish (cf. bir s3ey 'something') 
   Bir s3ey duy-ma-dı-m. 
   something hear-NEG-PAST-1SG 
   ‘I didn’t hear anything.’ 
  b. Verbal negation plus 'special indefinite' 
   Basque (cf. nor-bait 'somebody', i-nor 'anybody') 
   Ez dut inor  ikusi. 
   NEG I:have:him anybody seen 
   ‘I have not seen anybody.’ (Saltarelli 1988, ex. 525) 
  c. Verbal negation plus 'negative indefinite' 
   Polish (cf. kto-s´  'somebody') 
   Nikt nie przyszedΩ. 
   nobody NEG come:PAST:3SG 
   ‘Nobody came.’ 
  d. 'Negative indefinite' without verbal negation 
   Latin 
   Nihil obstat. 
   nothing hinder:PRES:3SG 
   ‘Nothing stands in the way.’ 
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While this typology is useful at a rather superficial level, it is problematic in 
several ways. In order to apply it consistently, one would have to know 
precisely (a) what counts as verbal negation, (b) how a 'negative indefinite' is 
defined, and (c) how a 'special indefinite' is defined. In the following sections, 
we will see that none of these questions are easily answered. The discussion of 
question (a) will be deferred till § 8.2.1, and questions (b) and (c) will be 
discussed first. 
 
8.1.2. Negative indefinites and elliptical contexts 
 
How should we define 'negative indefinite pronouns'? Intuitively, what is 
meant by saying that an indefinite pronoun is negative is that it somehow 
expresses the negative sense by itself, inherently, without needing an additional 
verbal negation. Brown (1985) tries to make this intuition explicit by proposing 
that negative indefinites like nobody and nothing refer to an empty set. However, 
this semantic description does not seem to conform to our intuitions.  It is not 
the same to say I heard nothing and I heard an empty set (of sounds). In the first 
sentence it is conveyed that no hearing event took place, whereas in the second 
sentence, it is implied that such an event took place. In natural languages, the 
use of negated indefinite pronouns invariably leads to the first sense, whether 
the indefinite is inherently negative or not. Thus, despite the widespread 
intuition that there is something 'inherently negative' about (e.g.) Polish nikt 
‘nobody’ as opposed to Basque inor ‘anybody’, it seems difficult to make it 
explicit in semantic terms. Since indefinite pronouns are interpreted within 
clauses, and at the clause level inor and nikt have the same meaning, the 
semantics does not seem to help. 
 A better way of identifying inherently negative pronouns is the purely 
syntactic criterion of negative meaning in ELLIPTICAL CONTEXTS. Bernini and 
Ramat (1992: 115) explicitly adopt this criterion to distinguish negative from 
non-negative indefinites. According to this criterion, indefinites are considered 
inherently negative if they may occur in elliptical contexts (where the verb with 
its negation is ellipted) and still convey the negative meaning. I will also speak 
of free-standing indefinites in such cases. A typical elliptical context is provided 
by negative answers to parametric questions. In Polish and Spanish, the 
indefinite can be used in this way (cf. 416), but in Turkish and Hindi/Urdu, it 
cannot (cf. 417). 
 
(416) free-standing indefinites conveying negative meaning 
  a. Polish 
   A: Kto przyszedΩ?  B: Nikt. 
    who came    nobody 
    ‘Who came?   Nobody.’ 
  b. Spanish 
   A: ¿Qué viste?   B: Nada. 
    ‘What did you see?  Nothing.’ 
(417) free-standing indefinites not conveying negative meaning 
  a. Turkish 
   A: Ne duy-du-n?   B: *Bir s3ey. 
    what hear-PAST-2SG   one thing 
    ‘What did you hear?  Nothing.’ 
      241 
  b. Hindi/Urdu 
   A: Aaj kaun aayaa? B: *Koii bhii. 
    today who came   someone INDEF 
    ‘Who came today? Nobody.’ 
 
 Another context where the verb with its negation is typically ellipted is in 
the standard of comparison. Thus, Rumanian nimeni and Russian nikogda are 
inherently negative by this criterion, as shown in (418). 
 
(418) free-standing negative indefinite in the standard of comparison 
  a. Romanian 
   M’ a nenorocit ca  nimeni altul. 
   me has made.unhappy like nobody other 
   ‘She has made me unhappy like nobody else.’ 
  b. Russian 
   Ona cˇ uvstvuet svoju silu kak nikogda ran’sˇ e. 
   she feels her strength like never before 
   ‘She feels her strength like never before.’ 
 
In addition, there are various other elliptical contexts that allow free-standing 
inherent negatives. For example, in French the following structures are 
possible: 
 
(419) French (Gaatone 1971: 135, 160, 173) 
  a. à une vitesse jamais atteinte de mémoire d’ homme 
   at a speed never reached from memory of man 
   ‘at a speed never reached in human memory’ 
  b. Je vous assure, je ne me permets rien. Absolument rien. 
   I you assure I NEG me permit nothing absolutely nothing 
   Aucune désinvolture... 
   no casualness 
   ‘I assure you, I allow myself nothing. Absolutely nothing. No  
   casualness...’ 
 
 The ellipsis criterion yields clear results in most cases. However, it has a 
decisive drawback that Bernini and Ramat do not address: Indefinites that must 
be characterized as inherently negative by this criterion are not associated with 
negative interpretations in all contexts. Consider the cases of Catalan and 
Turkish. Both languages have a series of indefinites which are inherently 
negative by the ellipsis criterion (Catalan ningú ‘nobody/anybody’, gens/res 
‘nothing/anything’, etc.; Turkish hiç kimse ‘nobody/anybody’, hiç bir s3ey 
‘nothing/anything’, etc.). 
 
(420) a.  Catalan (Lleó 1983: 298) 
   Ells  ho tenen  tot,  nosaltres res. 
   they it have all we  anything/nothing 
   ‘They have got everything, we nothing.’ 
  b. Turkish 
   A: Kim geldi? B: Hiç kimse. 
    who come-PAST(3SG)  INDEF anyone/no one 
    ‘Who came?  Nobody.’ 
 
But in both languages, this 'negative indefinite' is also found in non-negative 
sentences, e.g. in questions, and in Catalan also in conditionals. 
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(421) Catalan 
  a. Hi ha res de nou? 
   there exists anything of new 
   ‘Is there anything new?’ 
  b. Si dius res, et castigaran. 
   if you:say anything you they:will:punish 
   ‘If you say anything, they’ll punish you.’ 
(422) Turkish 
  Hiç kimse gel-di mi? 
  INDEF anyone come-PAST(3SG) Q 
  ‘Did anyone come?’ 
 
An analogous situation is also found, e.g., in French (the personne-series), Italian 
(the nessuno-series), Spanish (the ninguno-series), and Persian (the hicˇ -series). 
Thus, it would seem that in these languages, the indefinite series in question is 
not inherently negative after all, and that the negative meaning in elliptical 
situations like (420a-b) results from the fact that when the ellipted part is 
mentally restored by the hearer during the interpretation process, she or he 
restores the verb together with the negation, so that the correct negative 
meaning is obtained. This is possible because the association with verbal 
negation is strong enough in these cases, the non-negative uses of (421-22) be-
ing rather rare. By contrast, in the cases in (417) the non-negative uses of the 
indefinite (Turkish bir-series, Hindi/Urdu bhii-series) are much more 
prominent, so that the negation cannot be restored in ellipsis. 
 This hypothesis, which makes use of the seemingly vague notion of 
'association', receives support from the validity of the two implicational 
generalizations in (423). 
 
(423) Negative interpretation of elliptical indefinites: absolute universals 
  a. (negative) If an indefinite series that is used in the direct-negation  
   function is also used in the free-choice function or a specific  
   function, it may not be used elliptically with a negative  
   interpretation. 
  b. (positive) If an indefinite series that is used in the direct-negation  
   function is not used in any other function, it may be used elliptically  
   with a negative interpretation. 
 
In fact, the observed regularities are even stronger, but (423a-b) are the 
strongest statemenst that are exceptionless in my data. Implication (423a) 
cannot be formulated more strongly because of Modern Greek. In this 
language, the típota-series is used in the irrealis-non-specific function (cf. 424a), 
but it has a negative interpretation when it is free-standing (cf. 424b). 
 
(424) Modern Greek 
  a. Pés mu típota. 
   say:IMPV me anything 
   ‘Tell me something!’ 
  b. Tí tis ípes? — Típota! 
   what her you:told anything 
   ‘What did you tell her? — Nothing!’ 
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Modern Greek is my only counterexample to the stronger generalization that a 
free-standing direct-negation indefinite may not be interpreted negatively if it 
is also used in a function other than the negative-polarity functions.ii 
 Implication (423b) cannot be formulated more strongly because of Icelandic, 
Italian and Basque. In Icelandic, the indefinite nein- is only used for direct and 
indirect negation (cf. 425a-b), but it cannot be used with a negative in-
terpretation in elliptical answers (cf. 425c). The same is true for Italian alcuno 
‘any(body), (no)body’. 
 
(425) Icelandic (Halldór SigurDsson, p.c.) 
  a. Ég sá ekki neinn. 
   I saw not anybody 
   ‘I saw nobody.’ 
  b. Ég held ekki aD neinn hafi komiD, 
   I think not that anybody have come 
   'I don't think that anybody has come.' 
  c. Hver er er viD dyrnar? — *Neinn. 
   who is there at door:the anybody 
   ‘Who is at the door? — Nobody.’ 
 
Icelandic and Italian are my only counterexamples to the stronger general-
ization that a free-standing direct-negation indefinite may be interpreted 
negatively if it is only used in a negative function. And Basque is my only 
counterexample to the even stronger statement that a free-standing direct-
negation indefinite may be interpreted negatively if it is only used in a nega-
tive-polarity function (the i-series is not used in a free-choice or irrealis-non-
specific function, but it may still not be used in elliptical answers with a 
negative interpretation). 
 Thus, the generalizations in (423) are the strongest descriptive statements 
that seem to hold universally. But given the rarity of some other cases, as just 
discussed, the stronger formulation in terms of tendencies in (426) captures the 
linguistic reality better. 
 
(426) Negative interpretation of elliptical indefinites: tendencies 
  a. (negative) The more additional functions a direct-negation  
   indefinite is used in, the less likely it is that it may be used  
   elliptically with a negative interpretation. 
  b. (positive) The fewer additional functions a direct-negation  
   indefinite is used in, the more likely it is that it may be used  
   elliptically with a negative interpretation. 
 
The generalizations in (423) and (426) are not sufficient to make exact predic-
tions about the availability of a negative interpretation for free-standing in-
definites in every case. For example, the Basque i-indefinites have the same 
range of functions as the Catalan cap-indefinites, but only the latter can be used 
elliptically. Thus, there is some degree of language particular conven-
tionalization. 
 This is also confirmed by cases of language-internal variation, as exhibited 
by the Hebrew af-series (Glinert 1982: 454). This series is restricted to the direct- 
and indirect-negation functions, and according to (426b) this makes it quite 
likely that it may occur elliptically with a negative interpretation. This is true in 
the colloquial language, but purists favor the use of lo ‘not’ in elliptical answers: 
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(427) Hebrew (Glinert 1982: 454) 
  A: Mi ba? — B: Af eÌad/ af eÌad lo. 
   who came   INDEF one INDEF one NEG 
  ‘A: Who came? — B: Nobody.’ 
 
That conservative speakers (purists) favor the construction with lo ‘not’ can be 
understood as a reflection of the relatively recent restriction of af eÌad to 
negative functions. Af originates in (and is still homonymous with) the focus 
particle af ‘even’, so formally there is nothing inherently negative about this 
series. However, the new constraints on the non-elliptical uses of this series 
have made the elliptical use in (427) possible, which is a nice confirmation of 
the reality of the generalization in (426b). 
 The generalizations in (423) and (426) have a straightforward functional ex-
planation: If an indefinite series also has another function in addition to those 
listed above (i.e. free-choice, irrealis-non-specific, or specific), elliptical 
expressions would be potentially ambiguous, so they cannot receive a negative 
interpretation. Thus, the English any-series, while being the major strategy for 
expressing negated indefinites in English, cannot be used in elliptical answers 
because it also has the free-choice function: 
 
(428) English  
  A: What would you do? B: Anything. 
  (Only: ‘I would do anything’; Not: ‘I wouldn’t do anything.’) 
 
 From the preceding discussion I draw the conclusion that it does not make 
much sense to single out a special type (415c) 'verbal negation plus negative 
indefinite'. One can of course define 'negative indefinite' in various ways, e.g. 
using the ellipsis criterion, or as 'indefinite whose functions include the direct-
negation function', but these definitions are incapable of distinguishing 
between the three types (415a-c). 
 In this chapter, I use the term negative indefinite pronoun in the deliberately 
vague sense 'indefinite pronoun that has ‘direct negation’ as an important func-
tion'. 
 
8.1.3. 'Special indefinites' 
 
Even more problematic is the definition of 'special indefinites',iii because there is 
not even an intuitive basis for it. Bernini and Ramat (1992: 124-6) define them as 
indefinites that occur in affirmative or negative questions, but do not occur in 
negative elliptical answers or in affirmative elliptical answers. This seems to be 
a rather arbitrary definition, and one might suspect that it is due to the 
influence of English (a suspicion which is confirmed by the abbreviations used 
by Bernini and Ramat: A stands for 'generic quantifier' (any), N stands for 
'negative quantifier' (no), and S stands for 'existential quantifier' (some), cf. § 4.6) 
 In the data of my 40-language-sample (§ 4.4), it is easy to see that there are 
many ways in which an indefinite series that also expresses the direct-negation 
function can be 'special': it may express also the indirect-negation function (e.g. 
Portuguese n-), the question function (e.g. Italian n-), the comparative function 
(e.g. Finnish -kaan), the conditional function (e.g. Catalan cap/res/ningú), the 
irrealis-non-specific function (e.g. Quechua -pis, Greek típota), the specific-
unknown function (e.g. Portuguese qualquer, Turkish herhangi), and even the 
specific-known function (Hindi/Urdu koii, Persian -i, Swedish någon). If one 
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wishes, one can of course arbitrarily divide this list of functions into three sets 
and assign the three types in (415a-c) to these sets, but I see no motivation for 
such a move. 
 Thus, the three types of (415a-c) can be dispensed with and reduced to the 
implicational map of chapter 4. There is no significant further distinction that is 
not already captured by the map. In addition, the approach adopted here al-
lowed me to formulate implicational generalizations about the possibility of 
negative elliptical constructions (see 423, 426) that cannot be detected if the pos-
sibility of elliptical constructions is used as a classifying criterion. 
 The only aspect of the taxonomy in (415) that is not captured by my implica-
tional map is the (non-)occurrence with verbal negation. The next section (§ 8.2) 
will be devoted to a discussion of this parameter. 
 
 
8.2. Negative Indefinites and Verbal Negation 
 
8.2.1. What counts as verbal negation 
 
In this section, we first have to take up the first question posed in § 8.1.1: What 
counts as verbal negation? Many languages require two separate (often 
discontinuous) elements for verbal negation (cf. Dahl 1979: 88-9), and 
sometimes one of them cooccurs with a negative indefinite, while the other one 
must be absent. This is the case, for example, in French and Maltese: 
 
(429) French 
  a. Phuoc ne la voyait pas. 
   Phuoc NEG her saw not 
   ‘Phuoc did not see her.’ 
  b. Phuoc ne voyait (*pas) rien. 
   Phuoc NEG saw not anything 
   ‘Phuoc did not see anything.’ 
 
(430) Maltese 
  a. Patricia ma rat-x lit-tifel. 
   Patricia NEG she:saw-NEG ACC:the-boy 
   ‘Patricia did not see the boy.’ 
  b. Patricia  ma rat(*-x) xejn. 
   Patricia NEG saw nothing 
   ‘Patricia did not see anything.’ 
 
Do these cases show verbal negation or not? Bernini and Ramat (1992: 203) as-
sign them to the type that lacks verbal negation, claiming that the postverbal 
negative element, which is absent when a negative indefinite is present, is the 
main part of the negation. This is plausible for French, where ne is never 
stressed and is often omitted in the colloquial language,iv but less so for 
Maltese, where the postverbal negative element -x clearly has less phonological 
weight than preverbal ma. Anyway, since both the French and the Maltese 
situation is due to Jespersen’s Cycle (§ 8.2.3.1), which seems to reflect a gradual 
change, it is quite likely that at least in some languages we are dealing with real 
ambiguity (i.e. ambiguity for speakers, not just for linguists). 
 Thus, the classificatory criterion of cooccurrence with verbal negation is not 
unproblematic either. But the source of the fuzziness is well-understood, and 
the distinction cannot be reduced to anything else, so it remains as an 
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important distinction that will be discussed in greater detail in the next sec-
tions. 
 
8.2.2. Main subtypes with respect to verbal negation 
 
Negative indefinites can be divided into three subtypes depending on their 
relation to verbal negation: 
 
(431) Type NV-NI 
  negative indefinites that always cooccur with verbal negation 
  e.g. the Polish ni-series (nikt ‘nobody’, nic ‘nothing’, etc.) 
 
  a. Nikt nie przyszedΩ.  ‘Nobody came.’ 
   nobody NEG came 
  b. Nie widziaΩam nikogo.  ‘I saw nobody.’ 
   NEG saw nobody 
   
(432) Type V-NI 
  negative indefinites that never cooccur with verbal negation 
  e.g. the standard English no-series 
 
  a. Nobody came. 
  b. I saw nobody. 
 
(433) Type (N)V-NI 
  negative indefinites that sometimes cooccur with verbal negation 
  and sometimes do not 
  e.g. the Spanish n-series 
 
  a. Nadie vino.    ‘Nobody came.’ 
   nobody came 
  b. No vi a nadie.  ‘I saw nobody.’ 
   not I:saw ACC nobody 
 
 In cases like (431), (433b), traditional linguistics has often spoken of 'double 
negation'. This is a rather misleading way of talking, because semantically there 
is of course only one negation in such sentences. However, in languages like 
Latin and standard English, which represent type V-NI, it is possible (though 
rather unusual) to express semantically double negation in one sentence: 
 
(434) English 
  Nobody didn’t come. 
(435) Latin 
  Nemo non venit. 
  nobody NEG came 
  ‘Nobody didn’t come.’ 
 
Thus, from the point of view of the Latin norm, which has long dominated 
grammatical thinking in Western linguistics, a Polish sentence like Nikt nie 
przyszedΩ (431a) sounds as if the opposite were meant. But rather than being 
'illogical', Polish speakers just speak a language of a different type. 
 When we turn to the cross-linguistic distribution of the three types in (431-
33), we are immediately struck by the strong skewing in favor of type NV-NI, 
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and the rarity of types V-NI and (N)V-NI. In my biased 40-language-sample, 32 
languages have negative indefinites of type NV-NI, 7 languages have 
indefinites of type V-NI, and 3 languages have indefinites of type (N)V-NI.v In 
Bernini and Ramat’s (1992) study, which is restricted to European languages, 
the skewing is less strong: 28 languages belong to type NV-NI, 10 languages 
belong to type V-NI, and 7 languages belong to type (N)V-NI.  
 In my sample, the Latin type (V-NI) is only represented by European lan-
guages, suggesting that it is an areal phenomenon. This idea is confirmed by 
the distribution within Europe, which is almost confined to a contiguous area 
from Iceland to the Alps and southern France: Within Europe, the 10 languages 
of this type are Icelandic, Norwegian, Swedish, Danish, English, Frisian, 
German, French, Occitan, and Maltese (Bernini and Ramat 1992: 205). That the 
type V-NI is rather rare is most convincingly shown by Kahrel’s (1989) 
representative world-wide sample of 38 languages. In this sample, only four 
languages show this type (Dutch, Mangarayi (Australian), Yidiny (Australian), 
and Nama (Khoisan)), while 34 languages show type NV-NI and (N)V-NI 
(Kahrel does not distinguish between these two). Thus, type V-NI is so rare that 
we must ask why it is disfavored. An answer to this question will be proposed 
in the next section (§ 8.2.3). 
 It is ironic that the cross-linguistic investigation reveals a picture that is 
almost opposite to the older prejudice against the 'illogical' type NV-NI. The 
typological perspective leads to a rather dramatic change of our world view: 
What used to be regarded as the norm of correct thinking turns out to be a 
rather rare phenomenon in some peripheral areas such as southern Africa, 
northern Australia, and the extreme west of Eurasia. The fact that speakers of 
Latin, English, French and German, all V-NI languages, were extremely 
successful economically, militarily, and culturally, has meant that the general 
preference for the type NV-NI has gone unnoticed for a long time. 
 Since the type NV-NI seems to be the default, its discussion will be deferred 
to § 8.2.5. The next two sections are devoted to type V-NI (§ 8.2.3) and (N)V-NI 
(§ 8.2.4). 
 
8.2.3. Type V-NI: No cooccurrence with verbal negation 
 
I would like to advance the hypothesis that the relative rarity of type V-NI can 
be explained by the discrepancy between the semantics, which is that of 
ordinary sentence negation (or nexus negation, in Jespersen’s terms), and the 
surface expression of negation, which is on a participant rather than on the verb 
in this type.vi This form-meaning mismatch is tolerated by some languages, but 
since such mismatches are generally dispreferred (as expressed in Haiman’s 
(1980) principle of isomorphism), the proportion of languages that violate the 
preference for a close association between form and meaning is rather small. 
 But if the type V-NI is dispreferred, why does it exist at all? I would like to 
suggest a diachronic explanation: An unrelated diachronic change which led to 
a preferred structure elsewhere in the grammar has had the undesirable side 
effect of creating the V-NI pattern. Since language change generally results only 
in local optimization, such apparently counterproductive changes are possible 
and do not contradict the general rule that language change is language 
improvement (cf. Vennemann 1988). 
 There seem to be two types of diachronic change that lead to the V-NI type: 
Jespersen’s Cycle (§ 8.2.3.1) and diachronic negative absorption (§ 8.2.3.2). 
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8.2.3.1. Jespersen’s Cycle and type V-NI. As Bernini and Ramat (1992: 205) ob-
serve, the ten V-NI languages in Europe form not only an areally compact 
group, but there is also an interesting typological correlation within Europe: All 
and only the V-NI languages have postverbal negation elements that arose by 
Jespersen’s Cycle. From this correlation it is only a small step to the hypothesis 
that Jespersen’s Cycle is responsible for the V-NI pattern in these languages. 
 Jespersen’s Cycle is the name for the well-known cyclic weakening and 
simultaneous reinforcement (i.e., the grammaticalization) of the sentence 
negator, as exemplified by the history of French and of English (Jespersen 
(1917, 1924: 335-6); see also the discussion in Horn (1989: 452-9), Bernini and 
Ramat (1992: ch. 1-3), Ladusaw (1993) and the literature cited there). This cyclic 
development is shown schematically in (436). 
 
(436) Jespersen’s Cycle:   French  English 
  I. original situation:   jeo ne di  ic ne secge 
  II. negation reinforced:  je ne dis pas  I ne seye not 
  III. loss of original negator:  je dis pas  I say not 
 
Like all grammaticalization changes, this change is motivated by the tension 
between a least-effort tendency toward weakening and an information-pre-
serving tendency toward strengthening (cf. Horn 1989: 457, Lüdtke 1980), i.e. it 
has identifiable motivations that are unrelated to the syntax of negation or 
negative pronouns. But it has an effect on these: Since the reinforcement of the 
negation is achieved by grammaticalizing minimal-unit expressions (e.g. 
French pas) or indefinite pronouns (e.g. English naught > not), which occur 
postverbally in VO languages, the language ends up with a postverbal negator 
once the old negator (ne) is lost. It can be shown that the postverbal negator 
derives from a strengthening element that underwent Jespersen’s Cycle in all 
the ten European languages that have postverbal negation (West Germanic and 
Gallo-Romance). 
 The effect of Jespersen’s Cycle on indefinite pronouns is the creation of the 
V-NI pattern: Like minimal-unit expressions, indefinite pronouns denote an 
extreme value on a pragmatic scale, so at stage II of Jespersen’s Cycle, sentences 
with negative indefinites do not need the reinforcing element. Thus we have, 
side by side, (437) (a) and (b), (438) (a) and (b). 
 
(437) French 
  a. Je ne dis pas. 
   I NEG say not 
   ‘I don’t say.’ 
  b. Je ne dis rien. 
   I NEG say nothing 
   ‘I don’t say anything.’ 
(438) Middle High German (Wolfram von Eschenbach, Parzival) 
  a. Ich en tuons niht. (266.10) 
   I NEG do:it not 
   ‘I won’t do it.’ 
  b. Er en-dorfte niemen vrâgen wâ. (69.18) 
   there NEG-needed nobody ask where 
   ‘No one needed to ask where.’ 
 
 At stage III, after the loss of the original negator, the V-NI pattern results: 
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(439) Colloquial French 
  c. Je dis rien. 
   I say nothing 
   ‘I don’t say anything.’ 
(440) Modern German 
  c. Es brauchte niemand fragen wo. 
   it needed nobody ask where 
   ‘No one needed to ask where.’ 
 
Thus, the introduction of type V-NI in European languages can be understood 
as an undesirable but unavoidable side effect of the desirable reinforcement of 
the negation. From a functional point of view, we now expect speakers to do 
something about the undesirable side effect, and a straightforward remedy 
seems available: The addition of the new negator (French pas, German nicht, 
etc.) to negative sentences with negative indefinites. This is indeed what we see 
in many languages in the later development (441-44), although such 
constructions were not in general admitted into the standard languages – the 
Latin model, defended as 'logical' by purists, seems to have been a very 
powerful influence (see Vachek 1947, 1962). 
 
(441) African-American Vernacular English (Labov 1972: 785) 
  Ain’t nobody ever thought about pickin’ up nothin’. 
(442) Broken (= English-based Torres Strait creole; Shnukal 1988: 72) 
  a. Nobody no go kam.  ‘Nobody will come.’ 
  b. Ai no speak nating.  ‘I said nothing.’ 
(443) Quebec French (Muller 1991: 262) 
  Le samedi soir au mois de juillet, y a pas personne  
  the Saturday night in.the month of July there has not nobody  
  en ville à Québec. 
  in town at Quebec 
  ‘On Saturday nights in July there’s nobody in Quebec city.’ 
(444) dialectal German  
  Nichts Genaues weiss man nicht. 
  nothing precise knows one not 
  ‘Nothing precise is known.’ 
 
8.2.3.2. Diachronic negative absorption and the Negative First Principle. It 
seems that not all cases of type V-NI can be explained by Jespersen’s Cycle, so 
some additional explanation must be sought. In this sub-section I will try to 
motivate another diachronic mechanism by which the V-NI pattern may arise: 
NEGATIVE ABSORPTION. 
 It appears that the following generalization holds: All V-NI indefinites, 
except possibly in those languages that recently underwent Jespersen’s Cycle, 
contain a negation marker that is identical to the verbal negator. This can be 
explained if a diachronic scenario analogous to Klima’s transformations of 
negative attraction and incorporation is assumed, where the verbal negation is, 
so to speak, 'absorbed' into the indefinite. Schematically: 
 
(445) Diachronic negative absorption 
  a. ‘Nobody came’: 
   I. Person not-came.  > 
   II. Not-person came. 
  b. ‘She saw nothing.’ 
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   I. She thing not-saw. > 
   II. She not-thing saw. 
 
The motivation for this shift of the negator seems to be Jespersen’s Negative 
First Principle (so dubbed by Horn 1989: 293):  
 
(446) The Negative First Principle (Jespersen 1917) 
  There is a tendency to put the negative element as early as possible in  
  an utterance because the contribution of the negation to the meaning  
  of a larger constituent is particularly dramatic and the hearer needs to  
  get this information as soon as possible. 
 
If this principle is correct, we expect the shift in (445) to occur only where the 
negative indefinite precedes the verb (and thus also precedes the negator 
associated with the verb), i.e. we expect it to occur with all indefinites in verb-
final languages, only with pre-verbal indefinites in verb-medial languages, and 
not at all in verb-initial languages. This prediction seems to be borne out by 
what diachronic evidence I have. 
 Consider first Arabic. Classical Arabic belongs to type NV-NI, i.e. the verb is 
always accompanied by a negator (laa, lam, or maa, depending on the tense). 
The basic word order is VSO. 
 
(447) Classical Arabic 
  Lam yasta?jˇ ir-naa ?aÌadun. (NT, Mt 20.7) 
  NEG hired-us one 
  ‘Nobody hired us.’ 
 
In modern Arabic dialects, the verbal negator is usually maa, regardless of the 
tense, and the basic word order is SVO (cf. 448a). In Baghdad Arabic, when the 
indefinite is in subject position, the negator ma is prefixed to the indefinite, not 
to the verb (cf. 448b), but when the indefinite is in post-verbal position, the 
negation is on the verb (cf. 448c). 
 
(448) Baghdad Arabic (Ali 1972: 54, 53, 48) 
  a. Saalim ma raÌ i-sˇ uf-ni hnak. 
   Salim NEG FUT he-see-me there 
   ‘Salim will not see me there.’ 
  b. Ma-Ìad kis´r il sˇ ibbacˇ . 
   NEG-one broke the window 
   ‘No one broke the window.’ 
  c. Saalim ma sˇ af ?æy-waÌid hnak. 
   Salim NEG saw INDEF-one there 
   ‘Salim did not see anyone there.’ 
 
Similarly, in Cairene Arabic the discontinuous verbal negation ma ...-
sˇ (cf. 449a)  may be associated with the indefinite only if it is in pre-verbal 
position, as in (449b). 
 
(449) Cairene Arabic (Mitchell 1962: 107, 111; Bernini and Ramat 1992: 181) 
  a. Ma t-xaf-sˇ ! 
   NEG 2SG-worry(IMPV)-NEG 
   ‘Don’t worry!’ 
  b. Ma Ìaddi-sˇ  yi-¿raf yi-?ra xåt5t5-i. 
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   NEG one-NEG 3SG.M-can(IMPF) 3SG.M-read(IMPF) writing-1SG 
   ‘Nobody can read my writing.’ 
  c. Ma sˇ uf-ti-sˇ  Ìadd. (*Sˇ ufti ma Ìaddisˇ .) 
   NEG saw-1SG-NEG one 
   ‘I didn’t see anybody.’ 
 
 The Arabic case is particularly interesting because it is clear that the negator 
on the indefinite pronoun is the verbal negator: Constituent-focusing negation 
has a different form (mu in Baghdad Arabic, musˇ /misˇ  in Cairene Arabic). This 
is clear evidence that we are really dealing with a shift of the verbal negation to 
the indefinite, not with some kind of constituent-focusing negation or a 
negative focus particle (as in the cases of § 8.3.1). 
 Another case that can be explained by diachronic negative absorption is the 
situation in several Uto-Aztecan languages (Tümpisa Shoshone, Hopi, Yaqui). 
In Tümpisa Shoshone (Dayley 1989: 320-3), whose basic word order is SOV, the 
sentence negator kee usually stands immediately after the subject, as in (450a). 
When it occurs together with an indefinite pronoun in object position, no word 
order change is necessary to yield a sentence like (450b). But according to 
Dayley, the combination kee-hinna in (450b) is a lexicalized compound. Sentence 
(450c) shows a negative indefinite containing kee- in clause-initial position, 
demonstrating that a shift like (445a) has taken place (though exceptionally kee 
may also occur clause-initially elsewhere, Dayley 1989: 321-2). 
 
(450) Tümpisa Shoshone (Uto-Aztecan; Dayley 1989: 321, 324, 44)   
  a. Nü kee sukkwa punitü. 
   I NEG that:ACC see 
   ‘I didn’t see that.’  
  b. Nü kee-hinna punitü. 
   I NEG-what:ACC see 
   ‘I saw nothing.’ 
  c. Kee-hii nanangkanna. 
   NEG-what make.noise 
   ‘Nothing is making noise.’ 
 
Although no diachronic evidence is available in this case, the most plausible 
explanation for the V-NI pattern of Tümpisa Shoshone is clearly negative 
absorption. 
 The situation is similar in the related language Hopi. In Hopi, sentences are 
negated by putting qa ‘not’ immediately before the predicate (cf. 451a). When a 
negative indefinite is present in the sentence, qa- is attached to the indefinite (cf. 
451b-c). In contrast to Tümpisa Shoshone, word order change must be assumed 
for all cases in Hopi.  
 
(451) Hopi (Uto-Aztecan; Kalectaca 1978: 41, Malotki 1979: 123) 
  a. Pam wuuti kuuyit qa wéhekna. 
   that woman water NEG spilled 
   ‘That woman didn’t spill the water.’  
  b. Qa-háqaqw kwii-kwitsi. 
   NEG-whence RDP-smoke 
   ‘Smoke comes out nowhere.’ (Lit. ‘It smokes from nowhere.’) 
  c. Qa-hak pu-t aw may ’ta. (NT, John 8.20) 
   NEG-who he-ACC to.it hands laid 
   ‘Nobody laid hands on him.’ 
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 Another variant of this situation is found in the related language Yaqui 
(Lindenfeld 1973: 26-31). Ordinary sentence negation and negative absorption 
are quite analogous to Tümpisa Shoshone (with some phonological changes in 
indefinites with incorporated indefinites: kaa ‘not’ + habe ‘who’ > ka-abe, kaa + 
hita ‘what’ > ka-ita), cf. (452a-c). 
 
(452) Yaqui (Uto-Aztecan; Lindenfeld 1973: 31) 
  a. Nee kaa Maria-ta bicˇ a-k. 
   I not Maria-DEP see-REAL 
   ‘I didn’t see Maria.’ 
  b. Ka-abe ne-u nooka-k. 
   NEG-who me-to speak-REAL 
   ‘Nobody spoke to me.’ 
  c. Ka-ita beete-k. 
   NEG-what burn-REAL 
   ‘Nothing burned.’ 
 
But there is an alternative construction to (452b-c): Instead of the ka-indefinites 
with incorporated negation, indefinites marked by huni (‘even’) may be used in 
negative sentences. But here the sentence negator kaa must cooccur with the 
indefinites. The resulting meaning is more emphatic negation (‘at all’). 
 
(453) Yaqui (Lindenfeld 1973: 31) 
  a. Habe huni kaa ne-u nooka-k. 
   who INDEF NEG me-to speak-REAL 
   ‘There is nobody at all who spoke to me.’ 
  b. Hita huni kaa beete-k. 
   what INDEF NEG burn-REAL 
   ‘Nothing whatsoever burned.’ 
 
Yaqui reminds us that the taxonomy of § 8.2.2 refers to individual indefinites, 
not to whole languages. Yaqui ka-indefinites belong to type V-NI, while huni-
indefinites, which cannot have arisen by absorption, belong to type NV-NI. I 
take this to be confirming evidence for the hypothesis that absorption is the 
cause for the V-NI pattern. 
 Now let us go back to Europe and see whether negative absorption can be 
found here, too. The Yaqui case is of course reminiscent of English: English no- 
and any-indefinites are quite similar in their behavior to Yaqui ka- and huni-
indefinites. But recall that English has long been an SVO language, so negative 
absorption as stated above could not account for English sentences like She saw 
nothing. Furthermore, in earlier English the old negative particle ne cooccurred 
with the no-indefinites, contrary to what we would expect if it had been 
absorbed by them. English, as indeed most other modern European languages, 
is adequately accounted for by Jespersen’s Cycle (§ 8.2.3.1), and we should not 
yield to the temptation of overextending the application of negative absorption. 
 However, there are two possible cases of negative absorption in Europe, 
after all. First, in colloquial Frisian the older nimmen ‘nobody’ (cf. Dutch 
niemand, German niemand) has been replaced by the form net ien (lit. ‘not one’), 
cf. (454). 
 
(454) Frisian (Bernini and Ramat 1992: 84, 138, 219) 
  a. Jan yt net fisk. 
   Jan eats not fish 
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   ‘Jan doesn’t eat fish.’ 
  b. Jan het  net ien.  (older: Jan het nimmen.) 
   Jan has not one 
   ‘Jan has nobody.’ 
 
However, no dramatic change in type results from this replacement because the 
old form nimmen belongs to type V-NI (resulting from Jespersen’s Cycle), just 
like the new net ien. 
 The other possible case is Latin. Although Latin shows traces of having 
undergone Jespersen’s Cycle (non ‘not’ < ne-oen(um) ‘not-one’, Jespersen 1924: 
336), there is no evidence whatsoever that the original negator ne, which was 
inherited from Proto-Indo-European, got lost as it did in French, English, or 
German. Instead, it seems that it was absorbed into the negative indefinites. 
Since the older Latin word order was verb-final, we expect no subject-object 
asymmetries in the effect of negative absorption, and indeed none are found. 
As predicted by the absorption hypothesis, Latin negative indefinites contain 
the element n(e)-. 
 
(455) Origin of Latin negative indefinites 
  a. ne¯ mo ‘nobody’  < *ne-hemo  < *ne-homo, cf. homo ‘man’ 
  b. nihil ‘nothing’  < *ne-hil < *ne hi¯ lum, cf. hi¯ lum ‘thread’ 
  c. nu¯ llus ‘no’   < *ne-u¯ llus < *ne-oinelos, cf. u¯ llus ‘any’ 
  d. numquam ‘never’ < *ne-umquam, cf. umquam ‘ever’ 
  e. nusquam ‘nowhere’ < *ne-usquam,  cf. usquam ‘anywhere’ 
 
 Like the changes of Jespersen’s Cycle, negative absorption is motivated 
independently (by the Negative First Principle) but leads to the dispreferred V-
NI pattern. The expectation again is that speakers will remedy this state of 
affairs at some stage if given enough time. For Arabic and Uto-Aztecan lan-
guages, it is probably too early to expect a new round of changes. But in Latin, 
the expectation is borne out fully: According to the standard view (Posner 1984: 
1), Proto-Romance belonged to the NV-NI type, i.e. verbal negation was 
reintroduced. In the next section (§ 8.2.4), I will discuss the Romance languages 
in more detail. 
 
8.2.3.3. The range of functions of negative indefinites of type V-NI. For the 
seven negative indefinites of type V-NI in my sample (German, Dutch, English 
no-, Swedish ingen, Icelandic enginn, Latin n-, Ossetic ma-/ni-), the following 
implication holds: 
 
(456) If a negative indefinite never cooccurs with verbal negation, it has  
  only the direct-negation function. 
 
The implication appears to hold also for the other languages that were men-
tioned in this section (§ 8.2.3), and I know of no counterexamples. Of course this 
universal can be easily motivated functionally: If a V-NI indefinite occurred in 
non-negative functions, these would be understood as negative. 
 However, the reverse does not hold: Some negative indefinites that do not 
have functions other than direct negation nevertheless belong to type NV-NI, in 
particular negative indefinites in the Slavic and Baltic languages. And the 
Georgian negative indefinite, which also does not have other functions, belongs 
to type (N)V-NI. 
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8.2.4. Type (N)V-NI: Variation in cooccurrence with verbal negation 
 
Some negative indefinites sometimes cooccur with verbal negation and 
sometimes do not, as illustrated by Portuguese (cf. 457) and New Testament 
Greek (cf. 458). 
 
(457) Portuguese  
  a. Ninguém veio. 
   nobody came 
   ‘Nobody came.’ 
  b. Não veio ninguém. 
   NEG came nobody 
   ‘Nobody came.’ 
(458) New Testament Greek 
  a. Oudeìs he¯ mãs emistho¯ sato. (NT, Mt 20.7) 
   nobody us hired 
   ‘Nobody hired us.’ 
  b. Ego¯  ou kríno¯  oudéna. (NT, John 8.15) 
   I NEG judge:1SG nobody:ACC 
   ‘I judge nobody.’ 
 
I have found variation of this kind in the following languages: several Romance 
languages (Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, colloquial Catalan, cf. Posner 1984), 
older Slavic (especially Old Church Slavonic, Old Russian, Old Czech, cf. Krˇ ízˇ 
ková 1968), Albanian, New Testament Greek, non-standard English (Labov 
1972), non-standard German (Tanaka 1994: 196) and Georgian. In all these 
languages, the negative indefinites that show this variation do not have many 
non-negative functions, of course, because otherwise sentences lacking verbal 
negation would possibly be ambiguous (cf. the discussion in § 8.1.2). 
 The following rule seems to capture the distribution of the V-NI pattern and 
the NV-NI pattern for all these languages (except for Georgian, for which I do 
not know what determines the variation): 
 
(459) Cross-linguistic generalization for V-NI/NV-NI variation 
  Whenever a negative indefinite may be associated either with the  
  V-NI pattern or with the NV-NI pattern, the V-NI pattern tends to be  
  used when the negative indefinite occurs preverbally, and the NV-NI  
  pattern tends to be used when the negative indefinite occurs  
  postverbally. 
 
The motivation for this generalization is again straightforward: It is Jespersen’s 
Negative First Principle (cf. § 8.2.3.2), as noted in Krˇ ízˇ ková (1968: 31)vii and 
Horn (1989: 450). If rule (459) is strictly observed, as it is in some languages, the 
result is that the hearer is always informed of the negative character of the 
sentence before he or she hears the verb, i.e. rather early in an SVO language. 
(Note that the languages with (N)V-NI indefinites almost all have the basic 
order SVO.) 
 But notice that the effect of a rule like (459) would be more easily achieved 
by adopting the NV-NI pattern uniformly, as is done in the large majority of 
the world’s languages. Against this background, the diachronic development of 
Slavic is easily understood: While older Slavic showed variation along the lines 
of (850), all modern Slavic languages uniformly show the NV-NI pattern 
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(Mathesius 1937, Krˇ ízˇ ková 1968). That is, the change from (N)V-NI to NV-NI 
restored the universally preferred state of affairs. 
 As Krˇ ízˇ ková (1968) documents, only the NV-NI pattern is attested with 
postverbal indefinites in Old Church Slavonic and Old Russian (e.g. 460a). With 
preverbal indefinites, both V-NI and NV-NI are possible (Old Church Slavonic 
showing a slight preference for NV-NI, Old Russian a slight preference for V-
NI), cf. (460b-c). 
 
(460) Old Russian (Krˇ ízˇ ková 1968: 24) 
  a. (NV-NI) i  ne idjasˇ e s nimi nikto zˇ e 
     and NEG went with them nobody PT 
     ‘And nobody went with them’ 
  b. (V-NI) Nicˇ ego zˇ e sja bojat’ beˇ si, tokmo kresta. 
     nothing PT self fear demons only cross 
     ‘The demons are afraid of nothing, except the cross.’ 
  c. (NV-NI) jako svoego nikto zˇ e ne xulit’ 
     because self’s:ACC nobody PT NEG abuses 
     ‘because nobody abuses his own’ 
 
Similar tendencies are attested for Old Czech. In the modern languages, 
sentences like (460b) are impossible, and only the NV-NI pattern is acceptable. 
 But when we get to Romance, we seem to be faced with a puzzle: It appears 
that the reverse development can be observed, from a uniform NV-NI pattern 
to variation along the lines of (459). Such a reverse development would 
contradict my thesis that the NV-NI pattern is universally preferred. How can 
we understand this change? The facts are as follows (see the summary in 
Posner 1984). In the majority of Romance languages, only the NV-NI pattern is 
possible (Romanian, standard Catalan, Friulian, Ladin, Romansh, Vegliot, 
French with reservations), but in Italian (especially central and southern), 
Sardinian, Spanish, and Portuguese, the sentence negator is omitted when the 
negative indefinite occurs preverbally. The standard assumption is that this is 
an innovation and that Proto-Romance was uniformly NV-NI, not only because 
most Romance languages still belong to this type, but mainly because older 
texts of (N)V-NI languages have the NV-NI pattern even with preverbal 
indefinites, e.g. (461a-b). 
 
(461) a. Old Spanish (Llorens 1929: 86) 
   Vio que ninguno non pud  ffallar. 
   saw that nobody NEG could speak 
   ‘She saw that nobody could find.’ 
  b. Old Portuguese (Llorens 1929: 89) 
   Nenhuu o nom podia acordar de seu pensar. 
   nobody him NEG could wake from his thought 
   ‘Nobody could awaken him from his thoughts.’ 
 
Posner (1984) suggests that Spanish and Portuguese may have been influenced 
by Italian, and that the Latin model played a role in supporting the V-NI 
pattern in Italian (and Sardinian). However, the Latin influence does not, of 
course, account for the asymmetry described in (459), which must have a 
universal basis. 
 I would like to propose that the puzzle can be solved in the following way: 
The assumption that Proto-Romance was uniformly NV-NI should be given 
up.viii The Latin V-NI pattern was replaced by the NV-NI pattern first in the 
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case of postverbal indefinites, which violate not only the form-meaning 
isomorphism, but also the Negative First Principle, and are hence doubly 
dispreferred. This change leads to the (N)V-NI pattern as described above. 
Central and southern Italian and Sardinian stopped at this stage, while most 
other languages extended the NV-NI pattern also to preverbal indefinites. 
Before the standard languages were codified, there was a lot of variation, and 
in the process of codification, Spanish and Portuguese were influenced by 
Italian, and all three languages were to some extent influenced by Latin (cf. 
Posner 1984). The change from uniform NV-NI to (N)V-NI that we see in the 
texts would then only be a superficial change, resulting from system-external 
sociolinguistic factors, and not a deep change in the system. If this 
interpretation is correct, my general account can be maintained. Note that a 
change from NV-NI to (N)V-NI is predicted not to occur, because it would 
mean that a structure that is optimal on two preference parameters (Negative 
First and form-meaning isomorphism) is turned into a form that is less 
preferred on one of these parameters. 
 It is instructive to compare the change from Latin (V-NI) to Romance ((N)V-
NI > NV-NI) with the analogous change from standard English to dialectal 
English. As documented in Labov (1972), there are many dialects of English 
which have not extended the NV-NI pattern to indefinites in subject position 
and can be compared to Sardinian or Italian. For example, New York City 
White Vernacular allows NV-NI with postverbal no-indefinites, but not with 
preverbal no-indefinites: 
 
(462) New York City White Vernacular English (Labov 1972: 785-6) 
  a. We don’t ever see none of them guys. 
  b. *Nobody don’t know. 
 
But sentences like (462b) are possible in other white dialects, and quite common 
in African-American dialects. But even in African-American English the 
tendency of (459) finds a reflection: While the NV-NI pattern is normally 
obligatory with no-indefinites, it is always optional if the no-indefinite is in 
preverbal position (Labov 1972: 806). 
 
(463) African-American Vernacular English (Labov 1972: 785-6) 
  a. Nobody don’t know where it’s at. 
  b. Nobody fights fair. 
 
Thus, different non-standard dialects of English have diverged from the 
standard V-NI pattern to various degrees, just like different Romance lan-
guages have diverged from Latin to various degrees. And just like the Latin 
influence on Romance was strong, the standard English influence on English 
dialects is strong. At the present stage, the most innovative English dialects 
seem to be further advanced than Italian (in that they allow (463a)), but none is 
as advanced as Romanian or standard Catalan (in that none disallows (463b)). 
 
8.2.5. Type NV-NI: Obligatory cooccurrence with verbal negation 
 
As we saw in § 8.2.2, the type NV-NI, where the indefinite pronoun cooccurs 
with verbal negation, is the most widespread type cross-linguistically, as is to 
be expected because sentence negation should be expressed on the verb.ix When 
a negative indefinite pronoun of this type appears to contain a negative marker 
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(e.g. Russian ni-kto ‘nobody’), Western linguists have traditionally spoken of 
'double negation', but I have noted that this is a mistake due to the prejudice of 
V-NI languages like Latin that do allow real double negation. This was pointed 
out already by van Ginneken (1907), and Mathesius (1937) proposed that we 
are instead dealing with a kind of agreement in such cases, or 'negative 
concord'. Of course, this case is rather different from standard agreement (e.g. 
in gender, number, or case), and probably we would not want to water down 
the notion of agreement unnecessarily by subsuming these cases under it. 
 In any event, there are many negative indefinites that do not contain a 
negative marker, and although they are not so prominent in Europe, they seem 
to be prevalent outside of Europe. With respect to these indefinites, it seems 
best not to ask simply whether they are 'inherently negative', but to ask in 
which other functions they are used besides the direct-negation function (as I 
proposed in § 8.1). We can then formulate the generalization in (464): 
 
(464) If an indefinite pronoun series that is used in the direct-negation  
  function is also used in a non-negative function other than  
  the comparative, question and conditional functions, it occurs in the  
  NV-NI pattern. 
 
The condition 'other than the comparative, question and conditional functions' 
is necessary in order to exclude Romance indefinites like Italian nessuno and 
Spanish nada, which are possible in these functions but belong to the (N)V-NI 
type. The generalization in (464) captures the intuition that indefinites that are 
not 'inherently negative' cannot do without verbal negation and at the same 
time avoids the problems associated with the notion 'inherently negative' (cf. § 
8.1). 
 Let us now look at an interesting restriction on negative indefinites that are 
also used in non-negative functions. In some SVO languages, such indefinites 
cannot be used in subject position, as illustrated in (465-70). This restriction is 
rarely found in negation-only indefinites like Russian ni-kto, etc.x 
 
(465) English 
  a. I didn’t see anybody. 
  b. *Anybody didn’t come. 
(466) Swedish 
  a. Jag har inte sett någon. 
   I have not seen anybody 
   ‘I didn’t see anybody.’ 
  b. *Någon har inte kommit. 
   anybody has not come 
   ‘Nobody came.’ 
(467) French (Muller 1991: 314) 
  a. Je n’ ai (pas) vu qui que ce soit. 
   I NEG have not seen who indef 
   ‘I didn’t see anybody.’ 
  b. *Qui que ce soit n’ est (pas) venu. 
   who indef NEG is not come 
   ‘Nobody came.’ 
(468) Swahili 
  a. Si-ku-ona mtu. 
   1SG-NEG.PERF-see person 
   ‘I did not see anybody.’ 
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  b. *Mtu ha-kufa. 
   person NEG-die 
   ‘Nobody has died.’ 
(469) Hausa (Ma Newman 1990: 11, 181) 
  a. Bà mù hàdú dà kóowáa à hányàa bá. 
   NEG we meet with anyone on road NEG 
   ‘We didn’ meet anyone on the road.’ 
  b. *Kóowáa bài zóo bá. 
   anyone NEG-he come NEG 
   ‘Nobody came.’ 
(470) Chinese (Li 1992: 127)  
  a. Ta¯  bù xiˇ huan shénme. 
   she NEG like what 
   ‘She doesn’t like anything.’ 
  b. *Shénme rén bù xiˇ huan ta¯ . 
   what person NEG like she 
   ‘Nobody likes her.’ 
 
 In order to express the ideas of the (b) sentences, these languages have to 
resort to a different indefinite series (e.g. 471), to an existential construction (e.g. 
472), or to a change of the word order (e.g. 473). 
 
(471) a. English 
   Nobody came. 
  b. Swedish 
   Ingen har kommit. 
   nobody has come 
   ‘Nobody came.’ 
  c. French 
   Personne n’ est venu. 
   nobody NEG is come 
   ‘Nobody came.’ 
(472) a. Swahili 
   Ha-kuna mtu a-li-ye-tu-ajiri. (NT, Mt 20.7) 
   NEG-exist person 3SG.SUBJ-PAST-REL-1PL.OBJ-hire 
   ‘There’s nobody who hired us.’ 
  b. Hausa 
   Báà kóowáa wandà yá zóo. 
   NEG:exist anyone REL 3SG came 
   ‘There’s nobody who came.’ 
(473) a. Swahili 
   Ha-kufa mtu. 
   NEG-die person 
   ‘Nobody died.’ 
  b. French 
   Il n’ est pas venu qui que ce soit. 
   it NEG is not come who INDEF 
   ‘Nobody came.’ 
 
The reason for the unacceptability of the (b) sentences in (465-70) is the lack of 
focusing of the indefinite pronoun: In order to be interpreted negatively, an 
indefinite pronoun that also has non-negative uses needs to be focused (cf. § 5.7 
on focusing and scalar endpoints), and in many SVO languages only postverbal 
constituents can be focused. By contrast, all preverbal constituents can be fo-
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cused in verb-final languages, so these languages do not show asymmetries like 
those in (465-70).xi 
 This explanation, which relates the subject-object asymmetries in (465-70) to 
focusability rather than to structural relations with the negative element, 
receives support from Modern Greek. In this language, postverbal indefinites in 
the direct-negation function may be either stressed or unstressed (i.e. focused 
or unfocused). 
 
(474) Modern Greek (Veloudis 1982: 179) 
  a. Dhen érxete kanís IPOPSÍFJOS. 
   NEG comes any candidate 
   ‘No candidate comes.’ 
  b. Dhen érxete KANÍS ipopsífjos. 
   NEG comes any candidate 
   ‘Id.’ 
 
However, in the pre-verbal position only stressed negative indefinites are 
admitted (Veloudis 1982: 194), as shown in (475). Structurally, kanís occurs in 
the same position in (475a) and (475b), but it must be focused in order to be 
licensed. 
 
(475) a. *Kanís dhen tin ENDHIAFÉRI. 
   anyone NEG her interests 
   ‘Nobody interests her.’ 
  b. KANÍS dhen tin endhiaféri. 
   anyone NEG her interests 
   ‘Nobody interests her.’ 
 
 The tendency for negative indefinites to occur postverbally extends even to 
indefinites that are 'inherently negative' and are not categorically excluded 
from the subject position. As Labov (1972) notes, in African-American 
Vernacular English, sentences like (476a) are possible, but subject-verb inver-
sion as in (476b-c) is also a common option. 
 
(476) African-American Vernacular English (Labov 1972: 786, 811)xii 
  a. Nobody don’t know where it’s at. 
  b. Don’t no average motherfucker make no fifty dollars a day. 
  c. Ain’t no white cop gonna put his hands on me! 
 
 However, this tendency to bar from the subject position negative indefinites 
that are not 'inherently negative' is not universal – it is only a tendency. 
Compare the following example from Hebrew, an SVO language that is 
otherwise much like Swahili or Chinese in the relevant aspects. 
 
(477) Hebrew 
  a. Lo ra?iti isˇ . 
   NEG I:saw anybody 
   ‘I didn’t see anybody.’ 
  b. Isˇ  lo ba la-mesiba. 
   anybody NEG came to:the-party 
   ‘Nobody came to the party.’ 
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Quite analogous are sentences like Personne n’est venu ‘Nobody came’ in older 
French, at a time when ne was still the primary negation marker. And compare 
sentences like (478) in English, where a lexical scalar endpoint is used to 
express negation. In (478b), the subject must bear sentence accent in order to be 




  a. He wouldn’t kill A FLY. 
  b. A ROCKEFELLER could not afford to pay for this.  
 
Thus, the restriction on any- in such environments must be regarded as an 
idiosyncratic fact about any- (and cannot be predicted from the low position of 
negation, as claimed by Progovac (1994) and Laka (1994)). 
 
8.2.6. Cooccurrence of several negative indefinites in one clause 
 
When several negated indefinites occur in one clause, some languages have 
restrictions on certain combinations. In the unmarked case, illustrated by (479-
81), the same negative indefinite series is used for all the indefinites. 
 
(479) Spanish 
  Nadie hizo nada. 
  nobody did nothing 
  ‘Nobody did anything.’ 
(480) Swahili 
  Ha-wa-kumw-ambia mtu neno. (NT, Mt 16.8) 
  NEG-they-him-say person word 
  ‘They didn’t say anything to anybody.’ 
(481) Basque (Saltarelli 1988: 306) 
  Ez digu i-nor-k e-zer esan-go. 
  NEG he:it:to.us:AUX INDEF-who-ERG INDEF-what say-FUT 
  ‘No one will say anything to us.’ 
 
But some languages show restrictions on the possible combinations of negative 
indefinites, as we will see in this section. 
 
8.2.6.1. Cooccurrence restrictions of V-NI indefinites. In many languages with 
V-NI indefinites, only the first indefinite is from the series that is normally used 
in the direct-negation function. The other indefinites are from the series that is 
used in the indirect-negation function, as exemplified in (482-84). 
 
(482) Latin 
  Nemini quidquam <*nihil> dixerunt. 
  to:nobody anything nothing they:said 
  ‘They didn’t say anything to anybody.’ 
(483) English (standard) 
  They said nothing to anybody <*nobody>. 
(484) standard German 
  Sie sagten niemandem etwas <*nichts>. 
  they said nobody something nothing 
 ‘They didn’t say anything to anybody.’ 
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The fact that the other orders are not possible (*Cujquam nihil dixerunt, *They 
said anything to nobody) is of course another manifestation of Jespersen’s 
Negative First Principle. 
 The starred variants of (482-84) are impossible only on the intended reading, 
but they are grammatical on a different reading in these languages, cor-
responding to the reading of 'real double negation' of (434-35) in § 8.2.2. 
 
(485) English 
 They said nothing to nobody. 
 i.e. They said something to everybody. 
 
The fact that this doubly negated reading is available explains the impossibility 
of two (or more) V-NI indefinites cooccurring with each other – otherwise 
sentence (485) would be ambiguous. Thus, we have the following typological 
correlation: 
 
(486) a. If in a language negative pronouns do not cooccur with verbal  
   negation, they also do not cooccur with each other, and conversely, 
  b. if negative pronouns do not cooccur with each other, they do not  
   cooccur with verbal negation, either. 
 
 Unfortunately, I know of two counterexamples to the first generalization 
(886a), whereas no counterexample to the second generalization (886b) has 
come to my attention yet. The first of these counterexamples, Occitan, can 
perhaps be explained by its history. In Occitan, sentences like (887a) are 
possible, although Occitan belongs to type V-NI (cf. 887b). 
 
(487) Occitan (Bernini and Ramat 1992: 208, 188) 
  a. Degun vegué ren. 
   nobody saw anything 
   nobody saw anything 
   ‘Nobody saw anything.’ 
  b. Ai ges d’ amic. 
   I:have nothing of friend 
   ‘I have no friend.’ 
 
Occitan has recently undergone Jespersen’s Cycle (Bernini and Ramat (1992: 
208) note that some dialects like Gascon still retain the preverbal negation), 
which means that negative indefinites like degun ‘nobody’ and ren ‘nothing’ 
have only recently become inherently negative. So probably sentences like I 
didn’t say nothing (i.e. ‘I said something’) are not yet possible,xiii so that the 
motivation for the impossibility of cooccurrence does not apply. 
 In contrast to Occitan, the negative indefinites of Latin may be assumed to 
have arisen by negative absorption (§ 8.2.3.2), which would of course lead to 
structures like (482), because the verbal negation can be absorbed only into one 
indefinite pronoun. Thus, the different origin of the Latin and Occitan V-NI 
pattern also results in different behavior when a clause contains more than one 
negated indefinite. The fact that standard English and standard German behave 
like Latin although they underwent Jespersen’s Cycle could be attributed to 
influence from Latin, or it might be due to the fact that a longer time has passed 
since the preverbal negation got lost, so that there is no danger of 
misunderstanding sentences like Nobody didn’t come. 
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 However, there is a second counterexample, Ossetic, and I can think of no 
way of explaining it away. In Ossetic, negative indefinites are marked by the 
prefixes ni- and ma-, which are so similar to the verbal negations næ and ma that 
an origin by negative absorption seems plausible. This would also account for 
the V-NI pattern, illustrated in (488a). But unfortunately, several negative 
indefinites may cooccur in one clause, cf. (488b). 
 
(488) Ossetic (Axvlediani (ed.) 1963: 197) 
  a. Ma-kædæm acu. 
   NEG-whither go:IMPV 
   ‘Don’t go anywhere.’ 
  b. Ma-kæmæn ma-cy zæV. 
   NEG-to:whom NEG-what say:IMPV 
   ‘Don’t say anything to anybody.’ 
 
I have no explanation for this unexpected situation, but I think that the 
generalization in (486) is still valid as a strong tendency, and that the expla-
nation is also on the right track. 
 
8.2.6.2. Cooccurrence restrictions in NV-NI languages. In some languages that 
have several different negative indefinites belonging to type NV-NI, there is a 
restriction to the effect that a non-inherently negative indefinite may not 
precede an inherently negative indefinite. For example, in Persian either the i-
series (which is used in many other functions, including specific functions) or 
the hicˇ -series (which occurs only in negative functions and in questions) may 
be used in the direct-negation function, cf. (489). When two negative indefinites 
cooccur in one clause, only three of the logically possible four combinations are 
acceptable, cf. (490). 
 
Persian 
(489) Hicˇ  kas(-i)/ kas-i zang na-zad. 
  INDEF person-INDEF person-INDEF phone NEG-struck 
  ‘Nobody phoned.’ 
(490) a. Kas-i cˇ iz-i na-sˇ anid. 
  b. Hicˇ  kas hicˇ cˇ iz na-sanid. 
  c. Hicˇ  kas cˇ iz-i na-sˇ anid. 
  d. *Kas-i hicˇ cˇ iz na-sˇ anid. 
   ‘Nobody heard anything.’ 
 
The same restriction is found in Turkish, which borrowed the negative 
indefiniteness marker hicˇ  from Persian and seems to have borrowed and 
preserved the complete pattern. 
 This restriction, which has not to my knowledge been noted before in the 
literature, is similar to the restriction of the preceding subsection (§ 8.2.6.1) in 
that the 'inherently negative' indefinite must precede the other indefinite, 
which is clearly another manifestation of the Negative First Principle. If any of 
the four combinations is impossible, the Negative First Principle predicts that 
the (d) combination is impossible. But given that (489) is acceptable, why 
cannot all four combinations be possible? 
 I would like to venture the following speculation: Persian *Kas-i hicˇ cˇ iz na-sˇ 
anid and its Turkish equivalent are ungrammatical because kas-i cannot be 
interpreted as falling in the scope of negation (in this sense there is a similarity 
to (465-70) (b) in § 8.2.5). The reason is that the following hicˇ -indefinite, which 
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is more emphatic than the corresponding hicˇ -less form in (490a), is au-
tomatically focused and 'absorbs the focus', so to speak, so that kas-i can no 
longer be the focus (as in 490d). 
 
 
8.3. Diachronic Sources of Negative Indefinites 
 
Diachronic sources of indefinite pronouns that are used in the direct-negation 
function have already been discussed in earlier parts of this work (especially § 
7.1, § 8.2.3). In this section, two sources that deserve more discussion will be 
treated: negative scalar focus particles (§ 8.3.1) and minimal and maximal unit 
expressions (§ 8.3.2). Then § 8.3.3 will briefly summarize the diachronic sources 
of negative indefinites, and in § 8.3.4 I discuss and reject the hypothesis that 
overtly negative indefinites can be reanalyzed as 'non-negative' indefinites. 
 
8.3.1. Negative scalar focus particles 
 
It is often taken for granted that negative indefinite pronouns like those in (491) 
incorporate a negation, so that they are 'inherently negative' not only from a  
semantic, but also from a formal point of view. 
 
(491) Russian  ni-kto ‘nobody’ 
  Lithuanian nie-kas ‘nobody’ 
  Rumanian nici-odata˘  ‘never’ 
  Classical Greek oud-eís ‘nobody’ 
  Hungarian sen-ki ‘nobody’ 
 
However, this way of speaking is misleading at best. In this type of negative 
indefinite, which is particularly widespread in Europe, the indefiniteness 
marker is not a simple negation marker, but a NEGATIVE SCALAR FOCUS PARTI-
CLE. Thus, I claim that negative indefinites of the type in (491) are more closely 
related to the indefinites in § 7.1, which are also formed by means of a scalar 
focus particle, than to the negative indefinites in § 8.2.3.1, which arise by 
negative absorption. The important point is that although the negative focus 
particles in (491) and (492) are 'negative' in some sense, they are quite 
independent of (and sometimes formally unrelated to) the verbal negator which 
expresses sentence negation. 
 The examples in (492) show that indefiniteness markers in negative indef-
inites are often identical to negative focus particles meaning ‘nor, not even’, but 
different from the sentence negator associated with the verb. 
 
(492) negative indefinites from negative scalar focus particles 
  Russian ni-kto ‘nobody’ ni ‘nor, not even’ (< ne + i) 
  (and other Slavic languages) ne ‘not’ 
  Classical Greek oud-eís ‘nobody’ oudé ‘nor, not even’ (< ou + de) 
        ou(k) ‘not’ 
  Hungarian sem-mi ‘nothing’ sem ‘nor, not even’ (< is + nem) 
        nem ‘not’ 
  Lithuanian nie-kas ‘nobody’ ne% ‘nor, not even’ (> nie-) 
        ne- ‘not’ 
  Albanian as-njeri ‘nobody’ as ‘nor, not even’ 
        s’, nuk ‘not’ 
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  Finnish milloin-kaan ‘never’  -(kA)An ‘nor, not even’ 
        ei ‘not’ 
  Spanish ninguno ‘(no)body’ 
    < *nec-unus  Latin neque  ‘nor, neither’ 
        Latin non ‘not’ 
  Cairene Arabic wala Ìaaga ‘nothing’ wala ‘nor, neither’ 
        ma ...-sˇ  ‘not’ 
  Ancash Quechua ni-ima ‘nothing’ ni   ‘nor, not even’ (< Spanish) 
        mana ... -tsu ‘not’ 
  Selkup sˇ i-kuty ‘nobody’ sˇ i ‘nor, not even’ (<Russian) 
        asˇsˇ a ‘not’ 
  Mansi nem-xotti ‘nobody’ nem ‘nor, not even’ 
        at ‘not’ 
  Rumanian nici-un ‘no’ nici ‘nor, not even’ 
        nu ‘not’ 
 
These negative scalar focus particles are used just like the scalar additive focus 
particles discussed in § 7.1: They convey the meaning that everything that is 
higher on the relevant pragmatic scale than their focus value is included, i.e. 
negated. In (493) I give some examples where they are used in contexts other 
than indefinite pronouns. 
 
(493) a. Russian 
   Ja ne skazˇ u ni slova. 
   I not say not.even word 
   ‘I won’t say even a word.’ 
  b. Rumanian 
   Nici ma˘ car unul n-a sca˘ pat. 
   not.even at least one NEG-has escaped 
   ‘Not even one escaped.’ 
  c. Cairene Arabic 
   Ma m¿-ii-sˇ  wala waÌda. 
   NEG with-1SG-NEG even one 
   ‘I haven’t a single one on me.’ 
  d. Finnish 
   Emme saaneet yhtä-än kalaa. 
   NEG:1PL receive one-even fish 
   ‘We didn’t receive even a single fish.’ 
 
 If the focus value is the low endpoint of a pragmatic scale, the resulting 
meaning is that of universal negation. Some of the negative indefinites in (492) 
are based on the numeral ‘one’, which is of course the low endpoint of the scale 
of numbers (Greek oud-eís, Albanian as-njeri, Spanish ning-uno, Rumanian nici-
un). Others are based on generic nouns (Arabic Ìaaga ‘thing’), indefinite 
pronouns (Mansi xotti ‘somebody’), or most often bare interrogatives used as 
indefinites. The semantic mechanism is always the same (cf. also § 7.1): These 
bases are understood as low endpoints of the relevant pragmatic scale, and 
together with the sentence negation the meaning of universal negation results. 
 In most of the cases of (492), the negative indefinite cooccurs with verbal 
negation (i.e. belongs to type NV-NI of § 8.2.2).xiv Thus, in these cases there can 
be no question of 'negative attraction and incorporation'. 
 But why do some languages use non-negative scalar focus particles (§ 7.1), 
whereas others use negative scalar focus particles to form their negative 
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indefinites? A first answer is: Because different languages use different focus 
particles in contexts like (493), where no indefinite pronouns are involved. An 
interesting contrast is provided by the closely related languages Finnish and 
Estonian. Finnish has two different focus particles for ‘even’ (-kin) and ‘not 
even’ (-kAAn) (cf. 494a-b), whereas Estonian uses the same focus particle -gi/-ki 
‘even’ (the cognate of Finnish -kin) in both contexts (cf. 495a-b). 
 
(494) Finnish 
  a. Se voi maksaa 100-kin markkaa. 
   that can cost 100-even marks 
   ‘That can cost even 100 marks.’ 
  b. Hän ei edes tahtonut kuulla-kaan mitä minulla olisi ollut sanomista. 
   he NEG even wanted listen-even what on.me was been to.say 
   ‘He didn’t even want to listen to what I had to say.’ 
(495) Estonian 
  a. Lapsed-ki teavad seda. 
   children-even know it 
   ‘Even children know it.’ 
  b. Ta ei julge piuksatada-gi. 
   he NEG dare make.sound-even 
   ‘He doesn’t dare to even make a sound.’ 
 
This difference correlates with a difference in the use of the corresponding 
indefinite series: In Finnish, the -kAAn-series is used in the direct-negation 
function, whereas Estonian uses its -gi-series there: 
 
(496) Finnish 
  Hän ei palannut milloin-kaan. 
  she NEG:3SG returned when-INDEF 
  ‘She never returned.’ 
(497) Estonian 
  Ta ei kohanud keda-gi. 
  she NEG met whom-INDEF 
  ‘She did not meet anybody.’ 
 
 Focus particles and indefinites based on them also show parallels with re-
spect to cooccurrence with verbal negation. In Greek,  neither oudeís (me¯ deís) 
‘nobody’ etc. nor oudé (me¯ dé) ‘not even’ cooccurred with verbal negation in the 
classical period, e.g. 
 
(498) Classical Greek (Herodotus) 
  a. speírousi dè oudén, all’ apò kte¯ néo¯ n zo¯ ousi kaì ikhthúo¯ n  
   they:sow PT nothing but from cattle they:live and fish 
   ‘They sow nothing, but live on cattle and fish.’ (Hdt. 1.216.3) 
  b. hoi dè de¯  hirées kuámous oudè horôntes anékhontai  
   the PT PT priests beans not.even looking tolerate 
   ‘The priests do not tolerate even to look at beans.’ (Hdt 2.37.5) 
 
 Thus, the problem has been pushed back somewhat: A question about 
indefinite series has been reduced to a question about focus particles, but no 
definitive solution has been found. A detailed investigation of the typology of 
scalar focus particles is beyond the scope of this work. But I would like to 
present some initial evidence showing that such a typology would apparently 
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look intriguingly similar to the typology of 'scalar indefinites' (i.e. indefinites 
that express a low endpoint on a pragmatic scale) proposed here. 
 Consider only the systems of Russian, German, and English. In the (a), (b), 
(c), and (d) contexts of (499-501), German uses four different focus particles, 




  a. Sie hat sogar die Anmerkungen gelesen. 
   she has even the notes read 
  b. Wenn sie wenigstens/ auch nur die Schlagzeilen gelesen hat,  
   if she at.least be.it the headlines read has  
   weiss sie Bescheid 
   knows she knowledge  
  c. Sie hat nicht einmal eine Seite gelesen. 
   she has not even a page read 
  d. Lies wenigstens/ *auch nur die Sschlagzeilen! 
   read at.least be.it the headlines 
(500) Russian 
  a. Ona procˇ itala dazˇ e snoski. 
   she read even headlines 
  b. Esli ona procˇ itala xot’ zagolovki, ona znaet ob ètom. 
   if she read even headlines she knows about it 
  c. Ona ne cˇ itala ni stranicy. 
   she not read not.even page 
  d. Procˇ itaj xot’ zagolovki! 
   read at.least headlines 
(501) English 
  a. She even read the notes. 
  b. If she even/at least read the headlines, she is informed. 
  c. She hasn’t even read a page. 
  d. At least read the headlines! 
 
In order to describe the cross-linguistic variation among German, Russian, and 
English, one might propose the semantic map in Figure 25. 
 
Figure 25. Semantic map for scalar focus particles 
       (c) negative 
  (d) imperative  (b) conditional 
       (a) assertive 
 
The distribution of German, Russian and English focus particles over this map 
is shown in Figure 26a-c. 
 
Figure 26. 
a. German     b. Russian    c. English 
   negative     negative     negative 
imper. conditional   imper. conditional  imper. conditional 
   assertive     assertive     assertive 
 
Although this map is very preliminary and needs a lot of cross-linguistic testing 
before it can be considered universally valid, the similarity to the implicational 
map for indefinite pronouns is quite striking. The similarity exists both at the 
universal level (where Figure 25 shows obvious paralles with the map in Figure 
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8 in chapter 4), and apparently also at the level of individual languages. 
Especially these latter similarities are surprising, because they are not restricted 
to cases where an indefinite series is marked by a focus particle (like the 
Russian ni-series, whose parallel behavior to the focus particle ni is expected). 
In particular, there is an intriguing parallel between English even and any-, and 
between at least and some-, between German nicht einmal and the n-series 
(niemand, nichts, etc.), and between Russian xot’ and the -nibud’-series. If these 
parallels are not accidental (as they may well turn out to be after more 
languages are examined), there must be higher-level regularities that have to be 
captured somehow. I cannot pursue these matters any further in the present 
work and leave them as a challenge for future typological research. 
 
8.3.2. Minimal-unit and maximal-unit expressions 
 
In the preceding section we saw that scalarity is an important starting point for 
the creation of negative indefinite pronouns. In addition to scalar focus 
particles, in which the semantic components of scalarity and a scalar endpoint 
are inherent, languages grammaticalize minimal-unit and maximal-unit 
expressions, like ‘single’ or ‘eternity’. These expressions inherently denote an 
endpoint, and they give rise to scalar implications when they are used non-
specifically and in the right environment (in particular, in scale-reversing 
contexts, cf. § 5.5.3). Such minimal-unit and maximal-unit expressions are in 
principle possible in all negative-polarity contexts, but there seems to be a 
general tendency for them to become restricted to negative contexts (cf. 
Ladusaw 1993). 
 
8.3.2.1. Minimal-unit expressions. The simplest case are minimal-unit nouns 
that originally refer to small things that are used metonymically, such as ‘trace’, 
‘jot’, ‘bit’, ‘tittle’, ‘atom’. For example, the Irish nouns dath ‘trace’ and dada ‘iota, 
jot, tittle’ are commonly used in negative-polarity contexts with the meaning 
‘anything’. 
 
(502) Irish (Ó Dónaill (ed.) 1977, de Bhaldraite (ed.) 1959) 
  a. An bhfuil dada/ a dhath le rá agat? 
   Q is jot ART trace to say at:you  
   ‘Do you have anything to say?’ 
  b. Má tá a dhath bainne agat,... 
   if is ART trace milk at:you 
   ‘If you have any milk,...’ 
  c. Má bhíonn dada ag cur ort,... 
   if is jot on troubling on:you 
   ‘If anything troubles you,...’ 
  d. Ní bhfuaireas dada/ a dhath. 
   NEG I:got jot ART trace 
   ‘I got nothing.’ 
 
 In English, sentences like I didn’t get a bit are very emphatic, but in Irish the 
above expressions have lost their emphatic flavor. 
 Such metonymic expressions for humans are also not uncommon, sometimes 
containing the attribute ‘living’, e.g. English a living soul, French âme qui vive (lit. 
‘a soul that lives’), Irish aon duine beo or aon duine cruthaithe (lit. ‘a living man, a 
created man’). Spanish nada ‘nothing’ derives from Latin (res) nata ‘born 
(thing)’. Unlike the Irish expressions in (502), Spanish nada has become virtually 
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restricted to the negative functions (although it is not excluded from the 
comparative and question functions yet), e.g. No vi nada ‘I didn’t see anything’, 
Nada vi! ‘Nothing I saw!’, ¿Qué viste? — Nada! ‘What did you see? — Nothing!’ 
 Besides such colorful metonymic expressions, the ordinary generic nouns 
may also function as minimal-unit expressions and become restricted to 
negative-polarity contexts. This has happened, for example, in the cases in 
(503). 
 
(503) generic nouns as scalar-endpoint indefinites 
 French personne ‘anybody < person’ rien ‘anything < thing’ 
 Catalan res ‘anything < thing’ enlloc ‘anywhere < place’ 
 Hebrew isˇ  ‘anybody < man’ davar ‘anything < thing’ 
 Maltese xejn ‘anything < thing’ imkien ‘anywhere < place’ 
 Lezgian sa kas-ni ‘nobody < even one person’ sa zat’-ni ‘nothing < even one thing’ 
 
Generic nouns are 'minimal' in a somewhat different sense than the ‘small 
things’. In sentences like I will not yield an inch, a scalar-endpoint interpretation 
is so readily available because it is so unlikely that the speaker should mean the 
literal interpretation. Utterances like I will not yield an inch, I will yield as much as 
two centimeters are theoretically possible, but are rarely needed for pragmatic 
purposes. By contrast, sentences like I did not do a thing do not describe unlikely 
situations, but they are simply uninformative unless they are given a scalar-
endpoint interpretation. Thus, the fact that a scalar-endpoint interpretation is 
often conventionalized with them can be attributed to pragmatic strengthening 
(cf. Traugott 1988). 
 In French, Catalan and Hebrew the indefinites in (503) may be used not only 
negatively, but also in questions and conditionals. However, in elliptical 
contexts the French and the Catalan indefinites all can do without a negative 
element, and their use in questions and conditionals appears to be receding.xv 
In Maltese the only non-negative use is the comparative use, and Lezgian sa 
kas-ni and sa zat’-ni are always negative. 
 A third type of minimal-unit expression is the numeral ‘one’ and its em-
phatic variants like ‘single’. Examples of languages where this has been 
conventionalized for negative-polarity environments are given in (504). 
 
(504) ‘one’ as a scalar-endpoint indefinite 
  English any  < Old English ænig, based on an ‘one’ + -ig 
  Latin  ullus ‘any’   < un-elos, based on unus ‘one’ 
  Irish  aon  ‘any’    < ‘one’ 
  Maltese Ìadd ‘anyone’   < ‘one’ 
  Persian hicˇ   ‘any-, no-’ < Old Persian aiva ‘one’ + cˇ iy 
             (emphatic particle) 
 
While the English, Latin and Irish indefinites are also used in questions, 
conditionals and in part even in the free-choice function, Maltese Ìadd (like xejn 
and imkien of (503)) and Persian hicˇ  are practically restricted to the negative 
functions. 
 It should be noted that these three types (‘small things’, generic nouns and 
‘one’) are not incompatible with each other and with scalar focus particles, but 
can be combined freely. Thus, Lezgian sa zat’-ni ‘nothing’ contains a scalar 
focus particle (-ni), the numeral ‘one’ (sa), and a generic noun (zat’ ‘thing’). 
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8.3.2.2. Maximal-unit expressions. Finally, we have to consider maximal-unit 
expressions like ‘in the world’, ‘in eternity’, ‘in my life’. Such expressions are 
used as indefinites much more rarely than minimal-unit expressions, but 
especially in the ontological category ‘time’ they are attested in several 
languages. 
 
(505) ‘(n)ever’ form ‘eternity/life’ 
  Hebrew me-¿olam ‘never (in the past)’ lit. ‘from eternity’ 
     le-¿olam ‘never (in the future’ lit. ‘until eternity’ 
  Cairene Arabic ¿umri ‘never’    lit. ‘my life’ 
  Spanish en mi vida ‘never’    lit. ‘in my life’ 
  Irish go brách ‘never, (for)ever’  lit. ‘until eternity’ 
 
Indefinites that make use of the expression ‘in the world’ are rare, and I know 
only one case, Irish, where ar bith ‘in the world’ serves as a regular negative-
polarity indefiniteness marker, as illustrated in (506).  
 
(506) Irish 
  a. An bheiceann tú in áit ar bith é? 
   Q see you in place on world it 
   ‘Can you see it anywhere?’ (< ‘in a place in the world’) 
  b. Má tá airgead ar bith agat,... 
   if is money on world at:you 
   ‘If you have any money,...’ (< ‘money in the world’) 
  c. Níor labhair sé focal ar bith. 
   NEG said he word on world 
   ‘He didn’t say a word.’ (< ‘a word in the world’) 
 
Maximal-unit expressions are similar to minimal-unit expressions in that they 
are not likely to be given a non-scalar interpretation because otherwise they 
would not be relevant. A sentence like In my life I have been to Mekka is 
tautological, whereas a sentence like Have you been to Mekka in your life?, with a 
scalar interpretation, makes perfect sense. 
 
8.3.3. Summary of diachronic sources 
 
I have identified five main types of sources of negative indefinites: 
 
(i) non-negative scalar focus particles (§ 7.1.1), e.g. 
  Selkup ämtä kuty ‘nobody’ < ‘even who’ 
(ii) negative scalar focus particles (§ 8.3.1), e.g.  
  Hungarian sem-mi ‘nothing’ < ‘not even what’ 
(iii) diachronic negative absorption (§ 8.2.3.2), e.g. 
  Yaqui ka-abe ‘nobody’ < *kaa habe ‘not anybody’  
  Latin nemo ‘nobody’ < *ne homo ‘not a man’ 
(iv) minimal-unit expressions (§ 8.3.2.1), e.g. 
  Irish dada ‘nothing’ < ‘tittle’ 
  French personne ‘nobody’ < ‘person’ 
  Maltese Ìadd ‘nobody’ < ‘one’ 
(v) maximal-unit expressions (§ 8.3.2.2), e.g.  
  Spanish en mi vida ‘never’ < ‘in my life’ 
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Thus, negative indefinites have rather heterogeneous sources. Unlike free-
choice indefinites, which can be weakened and eventually be extended to all 
other functions (§ 5.4.2), negative indefinites which are used only in the 
negation functions are never extended to other functions. In the next section, 
apparent counterexamples to this generalization are discussed. 
 
8.3.4. From negative to non-negative indefinite? 
 
8.3.4.1. A challenge to unidirectionality. In § 8.3.2. we saw how a non-negative 
expression like ‘person’, ‘thing’, may under certain conditions become a 
negative indefinite, as shown schematically in (507a). In this section, I will 
discuss and reject the claim that the reverse of this process, shown schemat-
ically in (507b), is also a possible diachronic change. I try to show that the 
proposed instances of this change can be explained differently, and that the 
unidirectionality of the path of change in (507a) can be maintained. 
 
(507) a. NEG V ... (non-NEG) indefinite —> NEG V ... NEG-indefinite 
  b. NEG V ... NEG-indefinite   —> NEG V ... (non-NEG) indefinite 
 
The hypothesis of a change like (507b) has been advanced occasionally for some 
indefinites in some Indo-European languages, and most focefully for Semitic 
languages by Faber (1988). For Indo-European languages, Brugmann (1911: 
351) lists the indefinite pronouns in (508) and notes that they appear to contain 
a negative marker (Proto-Indo-European *ne). 
 
(508) Old Irish nech ‘somebody’ 
  Welsh nep ‘anybody’ 
  Old Church Slavonic neˇ -ku˘ to ‘somebody’ 
  Lithuanian nekas ‘something’ 
     nekada ‘sometimes’ 
 
Delbrück (1893: 514-18) and Brugmann (1911) suggest that the non-negative 
meaning of these indefinites resulted from a reanalysis of a negative indefinite 
cooccurring with verbal negation as a non-negative indefinite. Since the two 
(Pseudo-English) sentences in (509a-b) are equivalent, the (a) sentence may be 
reanalyzed as (b) and vice versa. 
 
(509) a. She not saw anything. 
  b. She not saw nothing. 
 
The reanalysis from (a) to (b) is historically attested in the paradigm case of 
French personne ‘person’ > ‘nobody’. Delbrück’s and Brugmann’s etymologies 
for the indefinites in (508) imply the claim that this type of change is not 
unidirectional, and that the reverse reanalysis from (b) to (a) is also possible. 
 This claim is made explicitly by Faber (1988). She discusses indefinite pro-
nouns characterized by the suffix *-ma in various Semitic languages, among 
others the forms in (510). As Faber notes, they all have mainly negative-polarity 
meaning. 
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(510) Akkadian mim-ma ‘anything’ 
  Hebrew m´?umå ‘anything’ 
  Phoenician mn-m ‘anything’ (vowels not attested) 
  Syriac moto:-m ‘ever, always’ 
  Amharic man-´m ‘anybody’ 
  Arabic kayfa-maa ‘however’ (non-specific relative pronoun) 
 
Faber claims that the indefiniteness marker *-ma was originally identical to the 
negator *ma ‘not’:  
 
Only after the loss of transparency of -ma in these forms, as the ma negative was 
replaced in some or all contexts by other negative markers (*la?, *?al, *?ain, *?i, etc.) 
did they acquire negative polarity: as, for example, *mah-ma ceased to be analyzed 
as ‘nothing’, in order to avoid misunderstanding, it needed to be supplemented by 
another, more transparent, negative, becoming, in effect, ‘any-thing’. (1988: 232).  
 
She notes that if this reconstruction of the diachronic development is correct, 
then the reanalysis of (509a) to (509b), well-known from French, 'cannot reflect 
a universal, unidirectional process' (1988: 223). 
 
8.3.4.2. Unidirectionality saved. There is a theoretical reason why I am re-
luctant to accept Faber’s conclusion: Many linguistic changes have turned out 
to be unidirectional, and the unidirectionality of change is one of the most 
important aspects of language change from the point of view of linguistic 
theory. 
 But more importantly, there are no actually attested parallels – all the above 
cases were merely reconstructed. It is a general rule of diachronic typology that 
reconstructed changes can never disprove a proposed universal – on the 
contrary, the burden of proof that the proposed change is possible is on the 
reconstructer. But instead of just shrugging off these examples as invalid, I will 
present some specific arguments that alternative etymologies are preferable. 
 First, let us look at Semitic. Here the derivation of the indefiniteness marker 
*-ma from ma ‘not’ is very problematic because of the word order: -ma is a 
suffix, whereas negative ma always precedes the constituent it negates. In fact, I 
know of no language where an indefiniteness marker that derives from an 
absorbed negator (§ 8.2.3) or from an overtly negative focus particle (§ 8.3.1) 
follows rather than precedes its basis. Second, the evidence from Semitic for a 
Proto-Semitic negator *ma is not strong – it occurs mainly in Arabic, where it 
may well be a recent innovation. By contrast, an item deriving from *ma(h) 
‘what?’ is found in almost all Semitic languages, so it seems promising to ask 
whether this could be a source for the indefiniteness marker *-ma. Indeed, there 
are parallels for this kinds of indefiniteness marker elsewhere: e.g., Russian koe- 
also means ‘which, what’. Note also that the interrogative pronoun ‘what?’ is 
used as a general complementizer in some languages (e.g. Russian cˇ to ‘what?; 
that’), and that some indefiniteness markers incorporate a general complemen-
tizer (cf. § 6.2.3), which tends to follow the interrogative basis, as Semitic *-ma 
does. Thus, while I cannot commit myself to a concrete proposal, it is clear that 
Faber’s etymology is by no means the only option. 
 Of the Indo-European cases in (508), Old Church Slavonic neˇ -ku˘ to 
‘somebody’ is better explained as resulting from *ne veˇ  ku˘ to ‘I don’t know who’ 
(cf. § 6.2.1), for purely phonological reasons: The Delbrück-Brugmann 
hypothesis cannot account for the long vowel in neˇ -. The Lithuanian forms like 
ne-kas, ne-kada etc. most commonly occur in the reduplicative combinations kas 
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nekas, kada nekada, etc. It is not clear to me what the function of the negation ne- 
is in such combinations, but the highly expressive nature of these indefinites 
makes it unlikely that they originated in reanalysis.xvi  Thus, I do not see a 
compelling motivation to accept the possibility of a reanalysis along the lines of 
(507b), and the universal unidirectionality of (507a) can be maintained. 
 
8.3.4.3. A Romance counterexample? Let us now briefly consider an apparently 
attested case where a negative indefinite which resulted from negative 
absorption or a negative focus particle is indeed extended to non-negative 
functions. This is the non-negative use of some Romance negative indefinites 
like Italian nessuno, niente, Spanish ninguno, Catalan ningú. In Italian and 
Spanish, they seem to be restricted to comparatives and questions, whereas 
Catalan ningú may also be used in conditionals, as illustrated in (511-13). 
 
(511) Spanish 
  a. A Roberto le gusta la sopa de ajo más que a ningun
  
   to Roberto to.him pleases the soup of garlic more than to any  
   otro amigo mío. 
   other friend mine 
   ‘Roberto likes the garlic soup more than any other friend of mine.’ 
  b. ¿Cuándo ha venido nadie aquí? 
   when has come anyone here 
   ‘When did anyone come here?’ 
(512) Italian 
  Hai visto nessuno? 
  have:you seen anybody 
  ‘Did you see anybody?’ 
(513) Catalan (Lleó 1983:309) 
  Si hagués vingut ningú, t’ haurien avisat. 
  if had come anybody you would.have informed 
  ‘If anyone had come, they would have informed you.’ 
 
In Latin, n-indefinites were still restricted to the direct-negation function. So 
aren’t these cases examples of just the kind of change hypothesized by 
Delbrück, Brugmann, and Faber? I do not think so, for the following reason. In 
these Romance languages, we are witnessing a merger of two indefinite series 
of different origins. On the one hand, there are indefinites of non-negative 
origin like Italian mai, Spanish nada, nadie, Catalan res, cap, mai, and on the other 
hand, there are negatives inherited from Latin (or late Latin), like Italian 
nessuno, Spanish ninguno, etc. These two indefinite series merged into one at 
some point. Synchronically, the members of the series in (514) behave alike, and 
their different origins are not relevant. 
 
(514) negative and negative-polarity series in Romance 
  (° = originally negative, † = originally non-negative, p. = postposed) 
    Italian  Spanish  Catalan 
person:  °nessuno †nadie   °ningú 
thing:   °niente  †nada   †res, †gens 
place:   —  —   †enlloc 
time:   †mai  °nunca, †jamás †mai 
determiner: °nessuno, †alcuno °ninguno, †alcuno (p.) †cap 
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The originally non-negative members came to be used as negative indefinites 
by the process described in § 8.3.2, but they retained some non-negative uses, 
e.g. in questions and conditionals. As they merged with originally negative 
indefinites, these non-negative uses were also extended to these new members 
of the series. Thus, my claim is that uses as in (511-13) are due to analogical 
pressure rather than to any kind of reanalysis. 
 
 
8.4. Concluding Remarks 
 
In this chapter I treated one functional type of indefinite pronouns, negative 
indefinites, in greater detail. Although negative indefinites have received a 
great deal of attention in the earlier literature, I hope to have shown that the 
overall outlook of this book, in particular the typological implications and the 
diachronic perspective, lead to new insights about negative indefinites. 
 Negative indefinites cannot be divorced from the other functions on the 
implicational map that indefinites often have. Since negation is a semantic 
property of the whole sentence, it is not easy to pin down indefinites as being 
negative or non-negative. We saw this difficulty in the criterion of elliptical 
contexts (§ 8.1.2), and it is also evident in the recent debate between Zanuttini 
(1991) and Laka (1994) on the nature of Romance n-indefinites, which Zanuttini 
regards as 'negative quantifiers' and Laka regards as negative-polarity items. 
This controversy is quite parallel to the controversy around any, which some 
analysts regard as a universal quantifier and others regard as an existential 
quantifier (cf. § 5.2.1). In my view, the search for the true nature of these 
indefinites is beside the point. Languages are not constrained by categories 
such as 'universal quantifier', 'negative quantifier', or even 'negative polarity'. 
They are only constrained by the implicational map, which requires indefinites 
to be used only in adjacent functions. Of course, most of the semantic and 
syntactic issues discussed in the previous literature remain relevant in one way 
or another for setting up and explaining the implicational map, but the nature 
of the indefinites is expressed sufficiently by their position on the map. I 
invoked a number of additional principles that constrain the negative 
interpretation of elliptical indefinites (§ 8.1.2) and the range of functions that 
negative indefinites have depending on the cooccurrence with verbal negation 
(456, 464, 486), but these principles are only strong tendencies with a 
straightforward functional motivation. 
 The only major parameter of negative indefinite constructions that is not 
acounted for by the implicational map is the cooccurrence of negative 
indefinites with verbal negation. Here I identified three main types, V-NI, 
(N)V-NI, NV-NI, which are not on an equal footing: The NV-NI pattern is 
universally preferred because the meaning of negation (predicate denial) 
should be isomorphic with its form (verbal negation), and the other two 
patterns arise only when other motivations, such as grammaticalization 
(reinforcement of negation) and Negative First (negative absorption), come into 
play. But even then the preference for NV-NI reasserts itself, with V-NI giving 
way to (N)V-NI and finally NV-NI by reintroduction of the verbal negation. 
 The close parallels of negative indefinites with other emphatic indefinites 
were also seen in the conditions of focusing (§ 8.2.5) that some languages 
impose, and in the diachronic sources of negative indefinites (§ 8.3), which do 
not differ substantially from the kinds of sources that are also found in non-
negative indefinites (except for diachronic negative absorption). 
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i Kahrel distinguishes a fifth type ('existential'), which does not involve the use of 
indefinite pronouns. See § 3.3.2, where such cases are briefly described. 
ii However, Greek is a weak counterexample, because its típota-series comes in two 
varieties, a stressed one and an unstressed one. If típota-indefinites are stressed, they are 
restricted to the direct-negation function (see (288) above). Since the indefinite is 
stressed in elliptical answers, it cannot be mistaken for the unstressed variety. 
iii This is Kahrel’s (1989) term. Bernini and Ramat (1992: 109) call them 'generic 
quantifiers', Dahl (1979: 105) just speaks of a 'substituted pronoun'. 
iv But standard French also allows sentences like Je n’ai vu qui que ce soit. ‘I didn’t see 
anybody’ (Muller 1991: 256), where the negative interpretation cannot be due to qui 
que ce soit ‘anybody’, but must be due to ne. 
 
v The distribution is as follows: 
V-NI indefinites: German, Dutch, English (no-), Swedish (ingen), Icelandic 
(enginn),  
   Latin, Ossetic 
(N)V-NI indefinites: Portuguese (n-), Italian, Georgian 
NV-NI indefinites: English (any), Swedish (någon), Icelandic (neinn), Portuguese  
   (qualquer), Catalan, Rumanian, and all others, except for Ossetic,  
   Maltese and Georgian. 
vi The close connection between the verb and sentence negation is expected if 
Aristotle’s and Jespersen’s view of negation as predicate denial is adopted, as argued 
extensively in Horn (1989). The Fregean view of negation as a sentence operator 
contributes little to our understanding of the form of negation in natural languages. 
vii Krˇ ízˇ ková (1968) does not cite Jespersen at all, and she does not cite anyone in 
connection with this explanation, which suggests that she found this functional 
motivation independently. 
viii Posner also hints at this possibility when she says that modern dialectal usage 
'appears to have conserved Latin features', and talks about 'a pattern that survived in 
certain areas' (1984: 19), although elsewhere she seems committed to the assumption 
that Proto-Romance was uniformly NV-NI (1984: 1, 12-13). 
ix Tanaka (1994) puts it somewhat differently: This type is the unmarked case because 
both the scope and the focus of negation must be marked. The negative element on the 
verb marks the scope, and the negative indefinite marks the focus of negation. 
x A rare case of an indefinite which is limited to negative contexts but also shows the 
restriction is Icelandic neinn/neitt: 
 (i) Ég sá ekki neinn.    (ii) *Neinn sá ekki mig. 
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  I saw NEG nobody    nobody saw NEG me 
  ‘I saw nobody.’               ‘Nobody saw me.’ 
xi Progovac (1994: 35) and Laka (1994: 21) attribute the ungrammaticality of (465b) 
(*Anybody didn’t come) to the fact that the negative-polarity item anybody must be 
licensed by being c-commanded by negation. They contrast English with 
Serbian/Croatian and Basque, where the corresponding sentences are grammatical. 
They explain this difference by the position of the negation: In English, negation is 
postverbal and therefore does not c-command the subject, whereas in Serbian/Croatian 
and Basque it is preverbal and therefore c-commands the subject. This explanation 
seems to make the following prediction: Languages with postverbal negation do not 
allow negative-polarity items in subject position, whereas languages with preverbal 
negation allow them. This prediction is contradicted by Hausa, Swahili, and Chinese, 
and is confirmed only by Swedish (French is ambiguous, because it has both preverbal 
and postverbal negation). However, strictly speaking Progovac’s and Laka's explanation 
fails to generalize to Swedish and Swahili, where någon and mtu (etc.) are clearly not 
negative-polarity items. Thus, their approach both makes wrong predictions and is less 
general than my explanation. 
xii Labov (1972: 811) notes that negative inversion depends on 'negative transfer' from 
the subject indefinite to the verb: Nobody will catch us —> Nobody won’t catch us —> 
Won’t nobody catch us, whereas  *Will nobody catch us is excluded. This is an arbitrary 
restriction in his formal framework, but in the perspective of this work it finds a natural 
explanation: The Negative First Principle (cf. § 8.2.3.2) makes the latter sentence 
dispreferred. 
xiii In French, which is also near the completion of Jespersen’s Cycle (but still retains 
preverbal ne in its normative variety), sentences like (i) are possible, although 
'l’acceptabilité de telles phrases est généralement difficile' (Muller 1991: 258). But 
sentences like (ii), where verbal negation follows the negative indefinite, are still 
completely impossible. 
 (i) Ils n’ont pas rien dit.  (ii) *Personne n’est pas venu. 
         ‘They didn’t say nothing.’                ‘Nobody didn’t come.’  
xiv In fact, the only exception is Greek, where oudeís was V-NI in the classical period, 
but (N)V-NI in New Testament Greek. 
xv The cases of French personne ‘nobody’ < ‘person’ and rien ‘nothing’ < ‘thing’ are 
often explained as resulting from the weakening of the preverbal negator ne, i.e. from 
Jespersen’s Cycle (§ 8.2.3.1). It is said that the preverbal particle lost its negative force, 
which was transferred to personne. This description is not completely wrong, but there 
is no direct connection between Jespersen’s Cycle and the change from ‘person’ to 
‘nobody’. Jespersen’s Cycle may happen also with other indefinites, and a generic noun 
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may also become restricted to the negative function if the language does not undergo 
Jespersen’s Cycle. 
xvi The Lithuanian indefinites of the type kada ne-kada have an intriguing parallel in 
Hindi/Urdu, where koii na koii (lit. ‘somebody not somebody’) means ‘somebody’. But 
they also remind one of Polish indefinites like gdzieniegdzie ‘here and there’, which can 
hardly be separated from nie-indefinites, and these have a different origin (§ 6.2.1). 






This chapter summarizes the main results of this work and looks briefly at 
possible further typological connections.  
 
9.1. Summary of the Results of this Work 
 
In this study I looked at indefinite pronouns in the world’s languages with the 
goal of discovering cross-linguistic generalizations in this area of grammar and 
thereby adding to our knowledge of human language in general. Although 
indefinite pronouns are not a very conspicuous part of the grammars of human 
languages, their study has wide ramifications in semantics, pragmatics, syntax, 
morphology, and by putting special emphasis on the diachronic origin and 
development of indefinites, I enlarged the scope of this work further. Since this 
study is topic-oriented and encyclopedic in character, it is not easy to 
summarize. Nevertheless, in the following sections I will outline the main 
findings and their proposed explanations. 
 
9.1.1. Typological generalizations about indefinite pronouns 
 
9.1.1.1. Formal generalizations. Once indefinite pronouns are suitably defined 
(§ 2.2), the search for them in different languages shows that most languages 
have indefinite pronouns of some kind, and that their shapes are fairly uniform 
across languages. In particular, they are almost always of one of two types (§ 
3.1): either derived from interrogative pronouns by means of an indefiniteness 
marker (or identical to interrogatives), or based on generic nouns like ‘person’, 
‘thing’. Non-derived indefinites like Dutch iets ‘something’ are very rare. 
Whenever indefinites are formally related to another class of words and one of 
these classes is formally more complex, the indefinites are formally more 
complex. 
 The indefiniteness marker is usually an uninflected particle (or a sequence of 
particles), prefixed or suffixed. Usually an indefiniteness marker characterizes a 
whole series of indefinite pronouns. Its position is often outside of case 
inflections. Very often indefinite pronouns are formed by reduplication (§ 7.4), 
and often the bare interrogatives may also be used as indefinites (§ 7.3). The 
origin of the indefiniteness marker is often still transparent, although the 
meaning of the indefinite pronoun can never be determined purely 
compositionally. The transparency of the markers is due to the generally recent 
grammaticalization: Indefinite pronouns have a relatively short lifespan and 
are diachronically quite unstable. Closely related languages often show very 
different indefinite pronouns and indefinite systems. 
 
9.1.1.2. Functional generalizations. As in other grammatical categories, lan-
guages differ not only with respect to the forms of their indefinite pronouns, 
but also with respect to the number and the kinds of functional distinctions that 
are expressed by them. Since variation in functional distinctions is not 
unlimited, cross-linguistic comparison is possible and fruitful. For indefinite 
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pronouns, the following distinctions are often associated with cross-linguistic 
variation: 
 
 (i) known vs. unknown to the speaker (§ 3.2.4) 
 (ii) specific vs. non-specific (§ 3.2.3, § 5.2.2, § 5.4) 
 (iii) negative polarity/scale reversal (§3.2.2, § 5.5.4) 
 (iv) 'emphasis' (scalarity) (§ 5.7.2) 
 (v) free choice indefinites (§ 3.2.5, § 5.2.1, § 5.5.5) 
 (vi) direct and indirect negation (§ 3.2.1, chapter 8)  
 (vii) standard of comparison (§ 3.2.2) 
 
No language has a special indefinite series for all these distinctions – usually an 
indefinite series expresses more than one function. Whenever this is the case, 
the choice of functions that can be expressed by one series is tightly constrained 
by a series of implicational universals that can be summarized as an 
implicational map (Figure 27). This map represents the central typological 
generalization of this work. 
 
Figure 27. The implicational map of chapter 4   
            (7) 
            direct 
        (4)  (6)  negation 
        question indirect 
          negation 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
specific specific irrealis 
known unknown non-specific  
        (5)  (8) 
        conditional comparative 
            (9) 
            free choice 
 
When an indefinite series expresses two non-adjacent functions on this map, 
the prediction is that it also expresses all the other functions in between these 
two functions. Eventually a number of further functional distinctions will have 
to be drawn (§ 4.7), but more cross-linguistic evidence is required before they 
can be integrated into the map. 
 In addition, I have explored the connection between these functions and the 
additional function of expressing negation in elliptical contexts (§ 8.1.2), and the 
relation between negation on the verb and the type of indefinite pronoun used 
for the direct-negation function. 
 
9.1.1.3. Diachronic generalizations. While the diachronic development of 
indefinite pronouns is not easy to trace, I have looked at the diachronic (i.e. 
etymological) sources of indefiniteness markers in a large number of languages. 
As in other grammatical categories, the same types of source constructions give 
rise to indefinites in language after language. The most important sources are: 
 
(i) I don’t know who (§ 6.2.1) 
(ii) who you want (§ 6.2.2) 
(iii) whoever it may be (§ 6.2.3) 
(iv) no matter who (§ 6.2.4) 
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(v) even/at least someone (§ 7.1) 
(vi) not even someone (§ 8.3.1) 
 
Source constructions (i)-(iv) are subject to formal grammaticalization processes, 
and all may undergo semantic change associated with grammaticalization, i.e. 
desemanticization or semantic weakening (§ 6.4). Grammaticali-zation theory (§ 
6.3) predicts that the opposite development, semantic strengthening, is 
impossible. 
 Indefinites can also acquire new meanings by pragmatic strengthening. In 
general, specific indefinites acquire appreciative uses (§ 7.5.4.1), while non-
specific indefinites acquire depreciative uses (§ 7.5.4.2). 
 
9.1.2. Explanations of the generalizations 
 
In contrast to facts of individual languages, typological generalizations im-
mediately lead to the question: Why? While facts of individual languages can 
be due to historical accidents and may have no further relevance, cross-lin-
guistic generalizations demand general explanations that can give us valuable 
insights into the nature of human language. 
 Throughout this work, I have sought as general explanations for linguistic 
facts as possible, i.e. preferably explanations from outside the linguistic system 
proper. The explanation of the implicational map in Figure 27 (§ 5.6) consisted 
in a demonstration that those functions that are next to each other on the map 
are also functionally the most similar. Thus, it was shown that a correlation 
between form and function exists. This involved a discussion of various 
theoretical models that have been proposed for describing the functional 
distinctions (§ 5.1-5). I concluded that the theories of mental spaces and scalar 
implicatures are best suited for the description of the semantic distinctions. In 
addition, the significance of focusing and sentence accent for indefinite 
pronouns was highlighted (§ 5.7). 
 Functional explanations are also prominent in the chapter on negative 
indefinites: Several facts relating to verbal negation are related to Jespersen’s 
functionally-based Negative First principle and the general principle of 
isomorphism. 
 The regularities of diachronic change are explained by the theory of 
grammaticalization, which makes strong testable predictions about correlations 
of a large number of parameters. I have shown how the evidence of indefinite 
pronouns bears on a contentious issue within grammaticalization theory (§ 
6.4.1). 
 
9.1.3. Remaining puzzles 
 
I have not succeeded in finding explanations for all the generalizations that I 
have found. Some puzzles that remain are: What does reduplication express in 
reduplicated indefinites? (§ 7.4) What is the mechanism by which bare 
interrogatives come to be used as indefinites? (§ 7.3.3) Why are bare in-
terrogatives often restricted to specific uses? (§ 7.3.2) How can the 'multiple 
partitive' use of bare interrogatives be understood? Why do many languages 
allow bare interrogatives here, even though bare interrogatives cannot be used 
as indefinites elsewhere? (§ 7.3.4) Finally, why do indefinites show an areal 
distribution of continent size? (This question will be discussed below in § 9.2.3.) 
The last four questions have never been asked before to my knowledge, so the 
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contribution of this work consists in pointing out some puzzles for our science 
that future research must address.   
 
 
9.2. Wider Typological and Areal Connections 
 
9.2.1. Looking for typological correlations 
 
The main synchronic typological generalizations of this work took the form of 
universal implications among different functions of indefinite pronouns, 
expressed by the implicational map. Now one might ask whether there are 
perhaps some wider typological connections between other aspects of the 
linguistic system and the types of indefinites that a language has. In other 
words, are there other grammatical features that allow us to make predictions 
about indefinite pronouns? 
 The answer seems to be no. Of course, the fact that I have not found any such 
wider typological correlations does not prove that none exist. But it seems 
unlikely for two other reasons. First, indefinite pronouns show very little 
diachronic stability (as I observed in § 2.4.1), so any correlations would not 
survive long. And second, there are not many good candidates for features that 
might determine the indefinite pronoun system in a language. We would not 
expect purely formal grammatical features like word order and 
head/dependent marking to influence indefinite pronoun systems because the 
most interesting variation among indefinites is in the functional distinctions of 
different series of indefinites. It is imaginable that grammatical features having 
to do with the semantics and pragmatics of reference might be correlated with 
indefinite pronouns, for example the presence of a definite article (e.g., it might 
be that languages lacking articles, like Russian, have particularly elaborate 
systems of indefinite series to compensate the missing article). I have found no 
evidence for any such connection. Other areas where connections might be 
sought are the diachronic sources of indefiniteness markers, especially free 
relative clauses and scalar focus particles (cf. § 8.3.1). However, these 
correlations would be purely diachronic, because any synchronic connection 
between the sources and the indefinites is usually lost soon after the indefinites 
have been created. 
 One of the most intriguing questions regarding the formal makeup of in-
definites is the question why some languages use interrogative pronouns and 
others use generic nouns as the base of indefinites. One possible explanation 
would be diachronic: Languages with generic-noun-based indefinites perhaps 
did not develop interrogative-based indefinites because of some properties that 
did not allow the corresponding source constructions to be built. However, I 
am not aware of any such restrictions – the source constructions that yield 
interrogative-based indefinites (chapter 6) seem to be very common and 
probably exist in the vast majority of languages. And in any event, many 
languages use bare interrogatives as indefinites, and since all languages have 
interrogative pronouns (Ultan 1978), any language could use them as 
indefinites. 
 But when we look at the languages of Europe, a pattern seems to emerge. 
Western languages such as western Romance, Celtic and the Germanic lan-
guages tend to show generic-noun-based indefinites, or at least mixed systems, 
whereas eastern languages such as Slavic, Finno-Ugrian and Turkic languages 
as a rule show interrogative-based indefinites. However, Basque is an exception 
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in western Europe – it has only interrogative-based indefinites, like eastern 
European languages. But Basque is also in other respects an atypical western 
European language, especially with respect to the well-known word order 
parameter. Basque shows a strong tendency for head-final word order (SOV, 
genitive-noun, postpositions), whereas other western European languages 
generally have head-initial word order (SVO or VSO, noun-genitive, 
prepositions). So is there perhaps a correlation between word order type and 
indefinite pronoun type after all? 
 This suspicion is confirmed when we turn to what is known about di-
achronic change in European languages. Classical Greek, Latin and Gothic had 
almost only interrogative-based indefinites, but Modern Greek, modern 
Romance and modern Germanic have a clear preference for non-interrogative-
based indefinites. In several cases the old interrogative-based indefinites have 
been preserved (i.e. no generic nouns are used), but the synchronic connection 
with the interrogatives has become obliterated, e.g. Greek típota ‘anything’ (cf. tí 
‘what’), Portuguese alguém ‘someone’ (cf. quém ‘who’), Icelandic nokkur 
‘anyone’ (cf. hver ‘who’), German etwas, dialectal eppes ‘something’ (cf. was 
‘what’). It is also known that the older stages of these languages had much 
more head-final word order than the modern stages. Thus, the diachronic 
changes fit the putative connection between interrogative-based indefinites and 
head-final word order, and between generic-noun-based indefinites and head-
initial order. It is not clear why such a correlation should exist, but in view of 
the strong predictive power of word order in other domains of grammar, it is 
not unimaginable that such a correction will turn out to be correct. This 
hypothesis will be tested on a world-wide sample in the next section. 
 
9.2.2. Indefinite pronoun type and word order in the 100-language sample 
 
Since grammars do not normally give many details on indefinite pronouns, the 
amount of information that I could get for the languages in the 100-language 
sample is minimal – not more than the type of base of indefinites (generic noun, 
interrogative, non-derived), whether indefiniteness markers are suffixed or 
prefixed, and the basic word order in the clause, the possessive noun phrase 
and the adpositional phrase. The data are listed in Appendix B. 
 However, this information is sufficient to test the hypothesis formulated in 
the preceding section that interrogative-based indefinites are correlated with 
head-final word order and that generic-noun-based indefinites are correlated 
with head-initial word order. The relevant figures are given in Tables 8-10. (The 
columns and rows 'other' include both languages with other types and 
languages whose type is unknown. A language may belong to more than one 
base type, but each language is assigned to one word order type.) 
 
Table 8. Indefinite pronoun base and clausal word order  
    clausal word order 
base   SOV SVO V-initial other total 
generic noun  12 17 5 1 35 
interrogative pronoun 36 11 5 3 55 
other   3 5 2 0 10 
total   51 33 12 4 100 
 
 
Table 9. Indefinite pronoun base and noun phrase word order  
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    noun phrase word order 
base   GenN NGen other  total 
generic noun  14 19 2  35 
interrogative pronoun 29 13 13  55 
other   3 4 3  10 
total   46 36 18  100 
 
 
Table 10. Indefinite pronoun base and adposition phrase word order  
    adposition phrase word order 
base   preposition postposition other total 
generic noun  13  18 4 35
  
interrogative pronoun 27  14 14 55 
other   2  6 2 10 
total   42  38 20 100 
 
It appears from these numbers that a correlation between word order type and 
indefinite pronoun type indeed exists, even though it is not very strong: Head-
final word order seems to favor interrogative-based indefinites, whereas head-
initial word order favors generic-noun-based indefinites. 
 However, on closer examination this correlation turns out to be spurious. 
The numbers in Tables 8-10 are not significant because the overall trend is not 
replicated within areas. As Dryer (1989) has shown, areal effects may create the 
appearance of a typological correlation, especially if the scale of the areal effect 
is large (continent-sized). He proposes that a typological correlation is 
significant only if it obtains in all the five large areas that he proposes.           
 By this criterion, the above correlation clearly fails to be significant, because 
indefinite pronouns have a strongly areal distribution. 
 
9.2.3. Continent-sized areas of indefinite pronoun type 
 
The geographical map on p. 303 clearly shows what is going on: The indefinite 
pronoun type shows a strong areal pattern. With few exceptions, interrogative-
based indefinites occur in the languages of Eurasia, Australia and the Americas, 
while generic-noun-based indefinites occur in the languages of Africa and 
Oceania. As it happens, the languages of Eurasia, Australia and the Americas 
favor head-final word order, while Africa favors head-initial word order, and 
this results in the apparent typological correlation. But a closer look 
conclusively shows that no such correlation exists, and that the correlation is 
purely areal. 
 First, Eurasian languages have interrogative-based indefinites also if their 
word order is head-initial, like many languages in southeastern Asia (in my 
sample: Chinese, Thai, Khmer, Xinh Mul, Atayal, Tagalog) and in Europe (in 
my sample: Romansh, Upper Sorbian, Ingrian). On the other hand, the 
languages of Oceania have generic-noun-based indefinites also if their word 
order is head-final (in my sample: Takia, Amele, Kobon, Hua, Haruai). These 
patterns are remarkably consistent. Exceptions exist, but do not form a pattern.i  
 Thus, the large scale of areal distribution of indefinite pronoun types must be 
accepted as a fact, although it is a rather curious fact. As Nichols (1992) argues 
persuasively, the scale of areal patterning of a feature reflects its diachronic 
stability. Phenomena that show areality at the level of the continent can be 
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assumed to be very old and diachronically stable. This is in striking contrast 
with my earlier observation that indefinite pronouns are diachronically quite 
unstable. Thus, we certainly would not expect to find the continent-sized areas 
that my 100-language sample has demonstrated. 
 I must leave this puzzle as a challenge for future research. 
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i E.g. Amharic and Masalit have interrogative-based indefinites in Africa; Mongolian 
and Welsh have generic nouns in Eurasia. But at least the case of Welsh probably 
represents a subregularity: In those parts of Eurasia that are closest to Africa, i.e. 
southwestern Europe, generic nouns are fairly widespread. This observation is 
intriguing, because it implies the question whether this connection can be attributed to 
influence from African languages (perhaps an Afro-Asiatic substratum of Celtic?). 
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Appendix A 
The data of the 40-language sample 
 
 
The distributional schemas of the languages of the 40-language sample were presented in § 4.4. 
In this appendix I list the indefinite pronouns of the 40 languages and give examples of the 
most important uses of these indefinites. 
 These data are not complete and conclusive, especially for those languages for which I could 
not consult with native speakers (Latin, Catalan, Serbian/Croatian, Yakut, Nanay, Hausa, 
Swahili). But also the data of the 33 languages for which I consulted native speakers  are 
probably deficient in some respects. Clearly, one individual cannot control data from so many 
languages in a perfect way. As I observed in § 2.1, typological breadth necessarily implies some 
loss of depth in individual languages. 
 I add this appendix to my work in order to make it easier for the reader to link the abstract 





A.1.1. Inventory. German (Germanic, Indo-European) has three main series of indefinite 
pronouns: (i) the irgend-series, (ii) the negative n-series, and (iii) the defective etwas-series. 
 
 interrogative etwas-series irgend-series n-series 
person: wer jemand irgend-wer, irgend-jemand niemand 
thing: was etwas irgend-was, irgend-etwas nichts 
place: wo  irgend-wo nirgends 
time: wann  irgend-wann nie 
manner: wie  irgend-wie (auf keine Weise) 
determiner: welcher (ein) irgend-ein, irgend-welche kein 
 
In addition, there is the determiner jeder ‘any, every’ (§ 6.5) and the time adverb je ‘ever’, which 
do not belong to any of the series. Also, the bare interrogatives wer, was and wo (and marginally 
wann) are used as indefinites in the colloquial language (§ 7.3.1).  
A.1.2. Origins. Middle High German had three series, a non-emphatic ete-series (ete-wer 
‘someone’, ete-waz ‘something’, ete-wâ ‘somewhere’, etc.; the origin of ete- is unknown), and a 
negative-polarity series marked by ie (‘ever’) (ie-man ‘anyone’, cf. man ‘man’; iht ‘anything’ < ie-
wiht ‘ever-thing’; iergen ‘anywhere’ < ie- + hwar-gin ‘where-PT’). This distinction was given up, 
and etwas and jemand are now in the same series. A new series was created on the basis of the 
particle irgend (< iergen ‘anywhere’), combined with the bare interrogatives or with je-
mand/etwas/ein. The n-series consists of the old negator ne combined with the old ie-series. The 
negative determiner kein (< dehhein) was formerly used in all negative-polarity environments 
and became restricted to negation only 200 years ago. On the history of jeder, see Kolb (1983). 
A.1.3. Distribution. The distribution of the three series is shown in Figure A.1. The data are 
from my native speaker knowledge and observations. 
 
Figure A.1.     direct 
   question indirect negation 
 specific specific irrealis  negation  
 known unknown non-specific  
    conditional comparative  
      free-choice 
 
The etwas-series is possible in all non-emphatic functions. It can always be replaced by the 
irgend-series, except in the specific-known function. 
 
(A.1) specific known/unknown 
  a. Ich habe etwas <*irgend etwas> verloren. Rate mal, was! 
   ‘I lost something. Guess what!’ 
  b. Ich habe etwas/irgend etwas verloren, aber ich weiss nicht, was. 
   ‘I lost something, but I don’t know what.’ 
(A.2) irrealis non-specific (imperative, ‘want’) 
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  Sie möchte jemanden/irgend jemanden mit schwarzen Haaren heiraten. 
  ‘She wants to marry someone [non-specific/specific] with black hair.’ 
 
In the question/conditional and indirect-negation functions, a possible alternative to 
irgendwann is je ‘ever’. 
 
(A.3) question/conditional 
  a. Hast du (irgend) etwas gehört?  
   ‘Did you hear anything?’ 
  b. Ist sie irgend-wann/je in Chittagong gewesen? 
   ‘Has she ever been to Chittagong?’ 
  c. Wenn (irgend) jemand anruft, sag mir Bescheid! 
   ‘If anyone calls, tell me!’ 
(A.4) indirect negation 
  Ich glaube nicht, dass hier je/irgend-wann (irgend) jemand war. 
  'I don't think that anyone has ever been here.' 
 
In the comparative function, only the irgend-series and je are possible (the etwas-series would 
yield a different sense). The irgend-indefinite must be stressed. 
 
(A.5) Joan Baez sang besser als IRGEND JEMAND JE zuvor. 
  ‘Joan Baez sang better than anyone ever before.’ 
 
In the free-choice function, the irgend-series may occur, but it must be stressed. However, jeder 
‘any, every’ is generally preferred. 
 
(A.6) free choice 
  Dieses Problem kann IRGEND JEMAND lösen. 
  ‘This problem can be solved by anyone.’ 
 
The determiner jeder may be used in the free-choice, comparative and indirect-negation 
functions. Jeder is also used as a distributive universal pronoun/determiner, so one might claim 
that A.1.7-8 do not belong here. However, its use in the indirect-negation function indicates that 
it should also be regarded as an indefinite. 
 
(A.7) free choice  
  Dieses Problem kann jeder lösen. 
  ‘This problem can be solved by anyone.’ 
(A.8) comparative 
  Joan Baez singt besser als jede andere Sängerin. 
  ‘Joan Baez sings better than any other singer.’ 
(A.9) indirect negation 
  a. ohne jede/irgend-welche Hilfe 
   ‘without any help’ 
  b. Sie stritt jede/irgend-eine Beteilingung ab. 
   ‘She denied any participation.’ 
 
Direct negation is expressed by the n-series, which does not cooccur with verbal negation. 
 
(A.10) direct negation 
  a. Niemand ist gekommen. 
   ‘Nobody has come.’ 
  b. Ich habe niemandem (irgend) etwas gesagt. 





A.2.1. Inventory. Dutch (Indo-European, Germanic) has three series of indefinite pronouns: (i) 
the non-emphatic iets-series, (ii) the non-specific dan ook-series, and (iii) the negative niets-series.  
 
 interrogative iets-series dan ook-series niets-series 
person: wie iemand wie dan ook niemand 
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thing: wat iets wat dan ook niets 
place: waar ergens waar dan ook nergens 
time: wanneer ooit wanneer dan ook nooit 
manner: hoe  hoe dan ook 
determiner: welke een ‘one’ welke dan ook geen 
 
A colloquial variant of iets is wat, i.e. the bare interrogative (but the other interrogatives cannot 
be used as indefinites). The WH dan ook series has the alternatives WH ook and WH ook maar, 
which have the same distribution. 
 The indefinite determiner enig ‘any’ is the only member of its series. 
 
A.2.2. Origins. The forms of the iets-series originally all contained *ajw ‘ever’ (=German je): 
iemand < *ajw + *mann ‘man’; iets < *ajw + wiht ‘thing’ (cf. older German iht); ergens < *ajw + 
*hwar-gin ‘where-PT’; ooit < *ajw + jet ‘still’ (cf. English yet). The niets-series has in addition the 
negator *ne. Geen goes back to Old Saxon nigên, i.e. nih ‘neither, not even’ + ên ‘one’. The 
particle ook is ‘also’, dan is ‘then’. Enig is etymologically identical to English any. 
 
A.2.3. Distribution. The distribution of the three series is shown in Figure A.2. The data are 
from Paardekooper (1978, 1979), Geerts et al. (eds.) (1984) (G84), and from native speakers 
(Leon Stassen, Kees Hengeveld, Jan Rijkhoff). 
 
Figure A.2.     direct 
   question indirect negation 
specific specific irrealis  negation  
known unknown non-specific  
   conditional comparative  
     free-choice 
 
The iets-series is used in all non-emphatic functions, from specific-known to indirect negation. 
 
(A.11) specific known/unknown 
 Er heeft vanmorgen iemand opgebeld. (Raad eens wie./ Ik weet niet meer wie het was.) 
 ‘Someone phoned this morning. (Guess who./ I don’t remember who it was.)’ 
 
In non-specific functions, the dan ook-series is a possible alternative. 
 
(A.12) irrealis non-specific (imperative) 
 Koop iets/wat dan ook voor haar verjaardag.  
 ‘Buy something for her birthday.’ 
(A.13) question/conditional 
 a. Zou er nog iemand/wie dan ook komen? (G84: 265) 
  ‘Will anyone else come?’ 
 b. Als je iets/wat dan ook ziet, waarschuw me dan.  
  ‘If you see anything, tell me.’ 
(A.14) indirect negation (‘without’, ‘difficult’) 
 a. zonder iemand/wie dan ook 
  ‘without anybody’ 
 b. Het is moeilijk om iets/wat dan ook te zien.  
  ‘It is difficult to see anything.’ 
 
In the comparative and the free-choice functions, only the dan ook-series is possible: 
 
(A.15) comparative 
 De jongen loopt harder dan wie dan ook in zijn klass.  
 ‘The boy runs faster than anyone in his class.’ 
(A.16) free choice 
 Je mag wie dan ook uitnodigen.  
 ‘You may invite anyone.’ 
 
In the direct-negation function, niets-indefinites are used alone, without verbal negation. As in 
German and English, only one negative indefinite per clause is used in the standard language 
unless multiple negation is intended. 
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(A.17) Niemand heeft opgebeld. 
 ‘Nobody called.’ 
 




 Het is nu kouder dan in enige vorige winter. (G84: 275) 
 ‘It is now colder than in any previous winter.’ 
(A.19) indirect negation 
 zonder enige help 
 ‘without any help’ 
(A.20) question/conditional 
 a. Heeft hij enig succes gehad met al zijn pogingen? (G84: 275) 
  ‘Has he had any success with all his attempts?’ 
 b. Als hij enig succes heeft, dan komt dat door zijn goede kontakten.  





A.3.1. Inventory. English has three main series of indefinite pronouns:  the non-emphatic some-
series, (ii) the emphatic any-series, and (iii) the negative no-series. These are formed by 
combining the determiners some, any and no with generic nouns or interrogative pronouns. 
 
 interrogative some-series any-series no-series 
person: who some-body, some-one any-body, any-one no-body, no one 
thing: what some-thing any-thing no-thing 
place: where some-where any-where no-where 
time: when some-time any-time never 
manner: how some-how any-how no way 
determiner: which some any no 
 
The indefinite ever forms a series of its own. Note that English spelling does not distinguish 
between the indefinite determiner sôme [sUm] and the indefinite article sòme [sm]. The latter 
only combined with mass nouns and plurals (some sand, some books). 
 
A.3.2. Origins. On the history of English indefinites, see Einenkel (1903). Some (Old English 
sum, Gothic sums, cf. Behaghel 1917) is an old indefinite adjective and has Indo-European 
cognates meaning ‘one’ (e.g. Latin semel ‘once’). Any (Old English ænig) is derived from Old 
English an ‘one’ plus -ig (cf. § 7.3.2.1). The uses of sum and ænig in Old English were much like 
the modern English uses, so that not much can be said on the diachronic development. 
However, the free-choice use of any developed only later (Einenkel 1903). 
 
A.3.3. Distribution. The distribution of the three series is shown in Figure A.3.  
 
Figure A.3.     direct 
   question indirect negation 
specific specific irrealis  negation  
known unknown non-specific  
   conditional comparative  
     free-choice 
 
No further examples are given here, because they can be found throughout this work (cf. § 
4.3.1). There is of course an extensive literature on English indefinites. Monographic treatments 
are Sahlin (1979) and Tesch (1990), and the list of papers on English indefinites includes Stoffel 
(1899), Bolinger (1960, 1977), Klima (1960), Lakoff (1969), Borkin (1971), Lawler (1971), Horn 
(1972), Labov (1972), Warfel (1972), Ferrer (1973), Savin (1974), Fauconnier (1975a), Anthony 
(1977), McCawley (1977), Ladusaw (1980), Davison (1980, 1981), Hintikka (1980, 1986), Carlson 
(1980, 1981), Léonard (1980, 1983), Linebarger (1980, 1981, 1987), Aldridge (1982, Hirtle (1982, 
1988, Strickland (1982, Kadmon and Landman (1993). Diachronic issues are dealt with in 
Einenkel (1903), Raumolin-Brunberg (1994), Tottie (1994). 
 




A.4.1. Inventory. Swedish (Germanic, Indo-European) has three series of indefinite pronouns, 
only one of which is based on interrogatives:  the non-emphatic någon-series, (ii) the negative 
ingen-series, and (iii) the free-choice som helst-series. 
 
 interrogative någon-series ingen-series som helst-series 
person: vem någon ingen vem som helst 
thing: vad någon-ting, något ingen-ting, intet vad som helst 
place: var någon-stans ingen-stans var som helst 
time: när någon gång aldrig när som helst 
manner: hur på något vis  hur som helst 
determiner: vilken någon ingen vilken som helst 
 
The word någonsin ‘ever’ formally belongs to the någon-series, but it it used differently. 
 
A.4.2. Origins. Någon is said to go back to *ne hwait ik hwarir ‘I don’t know who’ (cf. § 5.3.1.1). 
Ingen goes back to *ain-gi- ‘one-particle’. Någon and ingen are combined with generic nouns 
(ting ‘thing’, etc.) Som helst is literally ‘that (is) dearest’, so it represents the type discussed in § 
5.3.2. Aldrig ‘never’ is from the dative of alder ‘age, time’ plus the emphatic particle -gi (also 
found in ingen). 
 
A.4.3. Distribution. The distribution of the three series is shown in Figure A.4. The data are 
from various reference works and a native speaker (Östen Dahl). See also Thelander (1980). 
 
Figure A.4.     direct 
   question indirect negation 
 specific specific irrealis  negation  
 known unknown non-specific  
    conditional comparative  
      free-choice 
 
The någon-series is used in all non-emphatic functions and in the negative functions, and also in 
the comparative function. WH som helst is a possible alternative only in the comparative 
function. 
 
(A.21) specific (known, unknown) 
 a. Jag har ännu något att tala med honom om.  
  I have still something to talk with him about 
  ‘I still have something to talk to him about.’ 
 b. Någon, jag minns inte vem, säger...  
  somebody I remember not who says 
  ‘Somebody, I don’t recall who, says...’ 
(A.22) irrealis non-specific (future) 
 Någon gång får han nog erfara.  
 some time gets he enough experience 
 ‘Sometime he will learn.’ 
(A.23) question/conditional 
 a. Har du hört något <*vad som helst>?  
  have you heard something anything 
  ‘Did you hear anything?’ 
 b. Om du hör någonting <*vad som helst>, väck mig.  
  if you hear something anything wake me 
  ‘If you hear anything, wake me up.’ 
(A.24) indirect negation 
 Jag tror inte att någon <*vem som helst> vet det. 
 I think not that anyone anyone knows that 
 ‘I don’t think that anyone knows that.’ 
(A.25) comparative 
 Den här pojken springer fortare än någon/ vem som helst  
 this here boy runs faster than anyone who INDEF 
 annan i klass-en.  
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 other in class-ART 
 ‘This boy runs faster than anyone in his class.’ 
 
In the direct-negation function, there is competition between någon (which cooccurs with verbal 
negation) and ingen (which does not cooccur with verbal negation). When the negated 
indefinite occurs preverbally, ingen must be used (cf. § 8.2.5): 
 
(A.26) direct negation 
 a. Ingen har sett mig.  (*Någon har inte sett mig.)  
  none has seen me  some has not seen me 
  ‘Nobody has seen me.’ 
 b. Jag har aldrig hört någon opera.  
  I have never heard any opera 
  ‘I never heard any opera.’ 
 
When the negated indefinite occurs postverbally, någon is now generally preferred to ingen (cf. 
Thelander (1980) for discussion of the various factors contributing to the choice).  
 
(A.27) a. Jag vet inte något.    b. Jag vet  ingenting. 
  I know not anything    I know nothing 
  ‘I do not know anything.’   ‘I know nothing.’ 
 
In the free-choice function, WH som helst is used. 
 
(A.28) free choice 
  Du kan fråga vem som helst. 
  you can ask who INDEF 
  ‘You can ask anyone.’  
 
The indefinite någonsin ‘ever’ is only used in negative-polarity environments: 
 
(A.29) a. *Jag har hört det någonsin. 
   I have heard that ever 
   ‘I ever heard that.’ 
  b. Skivor är dyrare än någonsin. 
   records are dearer than ever 





A.5.1. Inventory. Icelandic (Germanic, Indo-European) has five main series of indefinite 
pronouns, two of which are based on interrogatives:  the non-emphatic ein-series, (ii) the 
negative-polarity nokkur-series, (iii)-(iv) the negative enginn- and neinn-series, and (v) the free-
choice series marked by sem er. 
 
 interrogative ein-series nokkur-series enginn-series neinn-series sem er-series 
person: hver ein-hver nokkur enginn neinn hver sem er 
thing: hvaD eitt-hvaD nokkuD ekkert neitt hvaD sem er 
place: hvar einhvers  nokkurs hvergi  hvar sem er 
  staDar staDar  
time: hvenær einhvern nokkurn tíma aldrei  hvenær sem er 
  tíma  
manner:  einhvern  engan  nein leiD 
  veginn  vegin  
determiner:  einhver nokkur enginn neinn 
 
A.5.2. Origins. Three series use generic nouns in combination with indefinite determiners for 
the adverbial categories place, time and manner. Only in the sem er-series are all indefinites 
based on the corresponding interrogatives. Sem is a relative marker, and er is a form of the verb 
‘be’ (§ 6.2.3). The ein-series consists of ein- ‘one’ plus hver (§ 7.5.2). For nokkur, going back to Old 
Norse nekkver, it has often been claimed that it goes back to *ne wait ik hwarir ‘I don’t know who’ 
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(§ 6.2.1.1). The enginn-series was originally marked by the emphatic particle -gi, which is 
currently recognizable only in hver-gi: enginn < *ein-gi ‘even one (person)’; ekkert < *eitt-gi [?] 
‘even one (thing)’; aldrei < *aldri-gi (aldri, dative of aldr ‘age’) ‘even at age, i.e. at any time’. Neinn 
must be from the ancient negator *ne plus einn ‘one’. 
A.5.3. Distribution. The distribution of the three series is shown in Figure A.5. The data are 
from a native speaker (Halldór SigurDsson). See also Jónsdottir (1991). 
 
Figure A.5.     direct 
    indirect negation 
specific specific irrealis question/ negation  
known unknown non-specific conditional 
    comparative  
     free-choice 
 
The ein-series is used in all non-emphatic functions. However, in the specific-known function a 
generic noun would be more natural. 
 
(A.30) specific known 
  PaD hringdi ein-hver/ maDur í mig í morgun (en ég segi pér ekki hver). 
  it rang one-who man in me in morning and I say you not who 
  ‘Someone called me up this morning (but I won’t tell you who).’ 
(A.31) specific unknown  
  Strákur-inn sá eitt-hvaD  á bak viD tréD (en ég veit ekki hvaD). 
  boy-the saw one-what on back near tree and I know not what 
  ‘The boy saw something behind the tree (but I don’t know what).’ 
(A.32) irrealis non-specific (imperative) 
  Kaupta eitt-hvaD / *nokkuD  fyrir mig!  
  buy one-what anything for me 
  ‘Buy something for me!’  
 
In questions, the nokkur-series is a possible alternative (nokkur is used in questions when a 
negative answer is expected). However, nokkur is not used in conditionals, nor is it used in the 
irrealis non-specific function (see A.32). 
 
(A.33) question/conditional 
  a. Sástu nokkuD / eitt-hvaD? 
    saw:you anything one-what 
    ‘Did you see anything/something?’ 
  b. Ef ein-hver/ ??nokkur hringir, viltu pá segja aD ég sé ekki heima. 
    if one-who anyone rings will:you then say that I am not home 
    ‘If anyone calls, please say I’m not at home.’ 
 
The nokkur-series is also used in the comparative and indirect-negation functions. 
 
(A.34) comparative 
  Hann getur hlaupiD hraDar en nokkur/ *hver sem er/ *neinn annar í  
  he can run faster than anyone who that is noone other in 
  bekknum.  
  class 
  ‘He can run faster than anybody else in his class.’ 
(A.35) indirect negation 
  Hún neitaDi aD viDurkenna nokkuD . 
  she refused to accept anything 
  ‘She refused to accept anything.’ 
 
The enginn-series is used in the direct-negation function, without cooccurring verbal negation. 
 
(A.36) direct negation 
  Enginn sá mig./ PaD sá mig enginn. 
  nobody saw me it saw me nobody 
  ‘Nobody saw me.’ 
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An alternative to the enginn-series is the neinn-series, which cooccurs with verbal negation. 
However, it cannot precede the negation (cf. § 8.2.5, fn. 10), so in subject position only enginn is 
possible. Neinn is also used  in indirect negation: 
 
(A.37) indirect negation 
  Ég held ekki aD neinn hafi komiD. 
  I think not that nobody has come 
  ‘I don’t think that anybody has come.’ 
 
In the free-choice function, the sem er-series is used. 
 
(A.38) free choice 
  Pú mátt heimsækja okkur hvenær sem er. 
  you may visit us when that is 





A.6.1. Inventory. Latin (Italic, Indo-European) has a rich system of five major series of in-
definite pronouns, four of which are mostly derived from interrogatives: (i) the non-emphatic 
ali-series, (ii) the negative-polarity series marked by -quam, (iii-iv) the two free-choice series 
marked by -vis and -libet. The negative n-series (v) is not derived from interrogatives. The  bare  
interrogatives  are  also  commonly  used as indefinites.  In the following table, the -libet-series 
is omitted because it does not differ from the -vis-series. 
 
 interrogative ali-series -quam-series n-series -vis-series 
person: quis ali-quis quis-quam nemo qui-vis 
thing: quid ali-quid quid-quam nihil quid-vis 
place: ubi ali-cubi usquam nusquam ubi-vis 
time: quando ali-quando umquam numquam — 
determiner: qui ali-qui ullus nullus qui 
dual determiner: uter — — neuter uter-vis 
 
In addition, there is the specific-known determiner qui-dam ‘a certain’ (also quid-dam 
‘something’,  qui-dam  ‘somebody’);   an  old-fashioned  negative-polarity  series  marked  by  -
piam (quis-piam ‘anybody’, quid-piam ‘anything’, uspiam ‘anywhere’); and two series which are 
most commonly used as relative pronouns in non-specific free relatives, but may also be used 
as free-choice indefinites: the -cumque-series (qui-cumque ‘whoever; anyone’, ubi-cumque 
‘wherever; anywhere’, etc.), and a reduplicated series (quis-quis ‘whoever; anyone’, ubi-ubi 
‘wherever; anywhere’, etc.). 
A.6.2. Origins. The etymologies of ali-, -dam, -piam, and -quam are uncertain. The suffix -vis is 
identical to vis ‘you want’, and -libet is identical to libet ‘it pleases’. The suffix -cumque seems to 
go back to *quom-que ‘anytime, ever’. The negative indefinites consist of the old negator ne plus 
a general noun (*ne-homo ‘not man’ > nemo; ne hilum ‘not string’ > nihil), or plus 
usquam/umquam/ullus of the -quam-series (cf. § 8.2.3.3). The origin of the roots us- and um- is also 
unclear, but ullus can be traced back to an extension of unus ‘one’ (un-elos > un-lus > ullus) (cf. § 
8.3.2.1). 
A.6.3. Distribution. The distribution of the five major series and the -dam-indefinites is shown 
in Figure A.6. The data are from Kühner and Stegmann (1914, I.1: 633ff.), Orlandini (1981, 1983), 
Hahn (1933), Serbat (1985), Mellet (1992, 1994). (For convenience, many of the examples are 
from the New Testament.) 
 
Figure A.6.     direct 
   question indirect negation 
specific specific irrealis  negation  
known unknown non-specific  
   conditional comparative  
     free-choice 
 
The indefinite qui-dam is used when the referent is known to the speaker, whereas the ali-series 
is used when it is not known. Some counterexamples to this generalization can apparently 
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found in Latin texts, but I know of no better description of the distinction between ali- and -dam. 
In any event, -dam is absolutely never used non-specifically. 
 
(A.39) specific known 
 Magister, vidimus quem-dam in  nomine tuo ejicientem daemonia.  
 Master we:saw whom-INDEF in name your casting.out devils 
 ‘Master, we saw someone casting out devils in thy name.’ (NT, Mk 9.38) 
(A.40) specific unknown 
 Tetigit me ali-quis. (NT, Lk 8.46) 
 touched me INDEF-who 
 ‘Somebody hath touched me (for I perceive that virtue is gone out of me).’ 
 
The ali-series is also used non-specifically in irrealis-contexts and in questions and conditionals. 
 
(A.41) irrealis non-specific 
 At ille intendebat in eos, sperans se ali-quid accepturum ab eis  
 but that gave.heed in them hoping self INDEF-what accept:FUT from them 
 ‘And he gave heed unto them, expecting to receive something of them.’ (NT, Act. 3.5) 
 
However, in questions and conditionals the bare interrogatives are more common. But bare 
interrogatives can be used as indefinites only when they are enclitic upon an element (such as si 
‘if’, num ‘question particle’) early in the sentences as shown in (A.42-43) (a). When an indefinite 
in a question or conditional cannot be enclitic, the ali-series is used (A.42-43 (b)). 
 
(A.42) question 
 a. Num quid simile populus Romanus audierat? (Cic. Lael. 41) 
  Q what similar people Roman heard 
  ‘Had the Roman people heard anything similar?’ 
 b. Licet mihi loqui ali-quid ad te? (NT, Acts 21.37) 
  is.allowed to:me to:speak INDEF-what to you 
  ‘May I say something to you?’ 
(A.43) conditional 
 a. Si quid petieritis me in nomine meo, hoc faciam. (NT, John 14.14) 
  if what you:ask me in name my this I:will:do 
  ‘If ye shall ask anything in my name, I will do it.’ 
 b. Et si quid ali-quem defraudavi, reddo quadruplum. (NT, Lk 19.8) 
  and if what INDEF-whom I:deceived I:return fourfold 
  ‘And if I have taken anything from any man by false accusation, I restore him  
  fourfold.’ 
 
The -quam-series is used in all negative-polarity contexts, except direct negation. 
 
(A.44) question/conditional 
 a. Aut quomodo potest quis-quam intrare in  domum fortis...  
  or how can who-INDEF enter in house of:strongman  
  nisi prius alligaverit fortem? (NT, Mt 12.29) 
  unless before he:will:bind strongman 
  ‘Or else how can anyone enter into a strong man’s house...except he first bind the  
  strong man.’ 
 b. Si quis-quam est timidus in magnis periculosis-que rebus, is ego sum.  
  if who-INDEF is timid in big dangerous-and things this I am 
  ‘If anyone is timid in important and dangerous situations, it is me.’  
  (Cic. Fam. 6.14.1) 
(A.45) comparative 
 Ac videte quanto taetrior hic tyrannus Syracusanis fuerit quam  
 and you:see how.much more:horrible this tyrant for:Syracusans was than 
 quis-quam superiorum. (Cic. Verr. 4.123) 
 who-INDEF of:earlier.ones  
 ‘And you see how much more horrible this tyrant was for the Syracusans than any  
 of the earlier ones.’ 
(A.46) indirect negation  
 Et non sinebat ut quis-quam transferret vas per templum.  
 and NEG admitted that who-INDEF transferred vessel through temple 
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 ‘And he would not admit that any man should carry any vessel through the  
 temple.’ (NT, Mk 11.16) 
 
The n-indefinites occur only in the function of direct negation. As in standard English, there is 
no verbal negation in such sentences. When more than one indefinite is in the scope of 
negation, only the first is from the n-series; the others are from the -quam-series (again, as in 
standard English). 
 
(A.647) direct negation 
 a. Nemo potest duobus dominis servire. (NT, Mt 6.24) 
  nobody can two masters serve 
  ‘Nobody can serve two masters.’ 
 b. Nemini quid-quam dixerunt. (NT, Mk 16.8) 
  to:nobody what-INDEF they:said 
  ‘They did not say anything to anybody.’ 
 
Here are some examples of the free-choice function, where the -vis-series (A.48a), the -libet-
series (A.48b), the -cumque-series, and the reduplicated interrogatives can be used. 
 
(A.48) free choice 
 a. Mihi utrum-vis satis est. (Cic. Off. 3.33) 
  to:me which-INDEF enough is 
  ‘Either is sufficient for me.’ 
 b. Utrum-libet elige; alterum incredibile est, alterum nefarium. (Quint. 81) 
  which-INDEF choose one incredible is other sinful 





A.7.1. Inventory. Portuguese (Romance, Indo-European) has three major series of indefinite 
pronouns: (i) the non-emphatic alg-series, (ii) the non-specific qualquer-series, and (iii) the 
negative n-series. 
 
 interrogative alg-series qualquer-series n-series 
person: quem alguém qualquer pessoa ninguém 
thing: que alguma coisa, algo qualquer coisa nada 
place: onde algures, em algum lugar em qualquer lugar nenhures 
time: quando alguma vez em qualquer altura nunca, jamais 
manner: como de algum modo de qualquer modo  
determiner: que, qual algum qualquer nenhum  
 
A.7.2. Origins. The alg-series goes back to the Latin ali-series (cf. A.6) (algum < *alic-unus, alguém 
< *ali-quem, algo < *ali-quod, algures < alicubi). Qualquer is from qual ‘which’ plus quer ‘wants’ (§ 
6.2.2).  
 
A.7.3. Distribution. The distribution of the three series is shown in Figure A.7. The data are 
from my own observations and from a native speaker (Lourenço C. Finatti). (My data are 
mostly from Brazilian Portuguese. It is possible that European Portuguese differs from this in 
some respects.) 
 
Figure A.7.     direct 
   question indirect negation 
specific specific irrealis  negation  
known unknown non-specific  
   conditional comparative  
     free-choice 
 
The alg-series is used in all non-emphatic functions. In the specific-known function, only the 
alg-series is possible, but in other functions the qualquer-series is a possible alternative. 
 
(A.49) specific known  
 O João telefonou e disse alguma coisa/ *qualquer coisa –  
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 ART João phoned and said some thing any thing  
 adivinhe o que! 
 guess what 
 ‘João called and said something – guess what!’ 
(A.50) specific unknown 
 a. Senti que alguém me observava. 
  I:felt that someone me observed 
  ‘I felt that someone was observing me.’ 
 b. Ivan disse qualquer coisa em russo que não entendi. 
  Ivan said any thing in Russian that not I:understood 
  ‘Ivan said something in Russian that I did not understand.’ 
(A.51) irrealis non-specific (possibility) 
 Alguém/ qualquer pessoa pode passar aí e apanhar a caixa. 
 someone any person can pass here and take the box 
 ‘Someone [non-specific] can come along here and take the box.’ 
(A.52) question/conditional 
 a. Você ouve alguma coisa/ qualquer coisa?  
  you hear some thing any thing 
  ‘Can you hear anything?’  
 b. Se você ouvir alguma coisa/ qualquer coisa, acorde-me. 
  fi you hear some thing any thing wake-me 
  ‘If you hear anything, wake me up.’ 
 
In the comparative and free-choice functions, only the qualquer-series is used. 
 
(A.53) comparative 
 Eu amo minha filha mais do que qualquer outra pessoa. 
 I love my daughter more than any other person 
 ‘I love my daughter more than anyone else.’ 
(A.54) free choice 
 Pelo Bábel ele é capaz de fazer qualquer coisa. 
 for:ART Babel he is capable of doing any thing 
 ‘For Babel he is capable of doing anything.’ 
 
The qualquer-series may also be used in the negation functions (cooccurring with verbal 
negation in the direct-negation function). However, the n-series is more common in both 
functions. The n-series also cooccurs with verbal negation, except when an n-indefinite pre-
cedes the verb. 
 
(A.55) indirect negation 
 Liliana perguntou isso sem encenar qualquer/ nenhum charme sensual. 
 Liliana asked that without showing any no charm sensual 
 ‘Liliana asked this without showing any sensual charm.’  
(A.56) direct negation 
 a. Não contém qualquer sentimento nobre. 
  not contains any feeling noble 
  ‘It does not contain any noble feeling.’ 
 b. Ninguém veio./ Não veio ninguém. 
  nobody came not came nobody 
  ‘Nobody came.’ 




A.8.1. Inventory. Catalan (Indo-European, Romance) has three rather heterogeneous series of 
indefinite pronouns which are synchronically unrelated to interrogatives: (i) the non-negative-
polarity algun-series, (ii) the negative-polarity cap-series, and (iii) the qualsevol-series.  
 
 interrogative algun-series cap-series qualsevol-series 
person: qui algú ningú qualsevol 
thing: què alguna cosa res, gens qualsevol cosa 
place: on en algun lloc enlloc 
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time: quan alguna vegada mai, en ma vida 
determiner: quin algun cap qualsevol  
 
A.8.2. Origins. The algun-series is based on the determiner algun plus a general noun (cosa 
‘thing’, lloc ‘place’, etc.). Algun is from late Latin alicunus ‘some(one)’ (cf. French aucun, Latin 
aliquis). Ningú is from Latin nec unus ‘not even one’ (cf. § 8.3.1); res is from Latin res ‘thing’; gens 
is from Latin gens ‘people’; enlloc is from in loco ‘at a place’; mai is from magis ‘more’; en ma vida 
is literally ‘in my life’; cap is said to be from caput ‘head’, but the semantic development is 
obscure. Qualsevol (cf. Italian qualsivoglia) is from Latin qualis ‘which, what kind’ plus vol- 
‘want’. 
 
A.8.3. Distribution. The distribution of the three series is shown in Figure A.8. The data are 
from Lleó (1983) (L83), Solà (1973) (S73), Espósito (1988) (E88), and Hualde (1992) (H92). 
 
Figure A.8.     direct 
   question indirect negation 
specific specific irrealis  negation  
known unknown non-specific  
   conditional comparative  
     free-choice 
 
The algun-series is used in non-negative polarity contexts. 
 
(A.57) specific 
 Alguna vegada he vist algú en algun lloc. (S73: 92) 
 some time I:have seen someone in some place 
 ‘I once saw somebody somehwere.’ 
(A.58) irrealis non-specific (future) 
 Algun dia ho entendràs. 
 some day it you’ll.understand 
 ‘Some day you’ll understand.’ 
 
In negative-polarity contexts, the cap-series is used, but except in the direct-negation function, 
the algun-series is a possible alternative. 
 
(A.59) question/conditional 
 a. Hi ha res/ alguna cosa de nou? (E88: 105) 
  there exists anything some thing of new 
  ‘Is there anything/something new?’ 
 b. Si hi hagués ningú/ algú de Barcelona, li podríem demanar.  
  if there existed anyone someone from Barcelona him we:coulf ask 
  ‘If there were anyone/someone from Barcelona, we could ask him.’ (H92: 163) 
(A.60) indirect negation 
 Nega que hagui arrivat ningú/ algú. (E88: 105) 
 denies that have arrived anyone someone 
 ‘She denies that anyone has arrived.’ 
 
In the direct-negation function, only the cap-series may be used. When the indefinite follows the 
verb, it always cooccurs with verbal negation. When the indefinite precedes it, the prescriptive 
norm also requires verbal negation, but in the colloquial language, verbal negation is always 
absent (cf. Solà (1973), Espósito (1988) for discussion). 
 
(A.61) direct negation 
 a. No he vist mai ningú enlloc. (S73: 93) 
  not I:have seen ever anyone anywhere 
  ‘I have never seen anybody anywhere.’ 
 b. Ningú (no) ens ha vist. (S73: 93) 
  nobody not us has seen 
  ‘Nobody has seen us.’ 
 
In the comparative function, both the cap-series and the qualsevol-series are possible (José 
Hualde, p.c.). 
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(A.62) Aqui el clima es mes agradable que  
 here the climate is more pleasant than 
 en qualsevol altre lloc/ enlloc d’ Europa. 
 in any other place anywhere of Europe 
 ‘Here the climate is more pleasant than anywhere else in Europe.’ 
 
An example for qualsevol in the free-choice function is the following: 
 
(A.63) free choice 
 La negació expressada per l’adverbi no pot recaure no sobre tota la proposició...sinó sobre  
 una altra qualsevol de las sevas parts. (S73: 94-5) 
 ‘The negation expressed by the adverb no can have scope not over the whole  





A.9.1. Inventory. French (Romance, Indo-European) has five major series of indefinite 
pronouns: (i) the non-emphatic quelque-series, (ii) the negative-polarity series of personne etc., 
(iii) the free-choice series marked by n’importe, and (iv-v) the two emphatic series marked by 
que ce soit and -conque.  
 
 interrogative quelque-series personne-series -conque-series 
person: qui quelqu’un personne qui-conque 
thing: quoi quelque chose rien 
place: où quelque part nulle part 
time: quand (en quelque temps) jamais 
manner: comment (en quelque sorte) aucunement 
determiner: quel quelque aucun quel-conque 
 
The n’importe-series and the que ce soit series are regularly derived from the interrogatives 
(n’importe qui, n’importe quoi, etc., and qui que ce soit, quoi que ce soit, etc., but note that the 
determiner here is quelque ... que ce soit). In addition, there is a marginal je ne sais-series (cf. § 
6.2.1.1).  
A.9.2. Origins. On the origin of the determiner quelque, see Foulet (1919) (que is the general 
subordinator, § 6.2.3.1). Personne and rien go back to earlier generic nouns (Latin persona 
‘person’, rem ‘thing(ACC)’). Aucun is from late Latin alicunus (cf. Portuguese algum, Catalan 
algú). Nul continues the Latin negative pronoun nullus. Jamais is from jam ‘already, anymore’ + 
magis ‘more’. N’importe literally means ‘it doesn’t matter’ (§ 6.2.4). The indefiniteness marker -
conque seems to come from qu’onques ‘that ever’ (§ 6.2.3.1), although some have claimed that it 
goes back directly to Latin -cumque (Foulet 1919). The marker que ce soit literally means ‘that it 
be’ (§ 6.2.3.1). 
 
A.9.3. Distribution. The distribution of the three series is shown in Figure A.9. The data are 
from Gaatone 1971 (G71), Culioli (1983), and my own observations. 
 
Figure A.9.     direct 
   question indirect negation 
specific specific irrealis  negation  
known unknown non-specific  
   conditional comparative  
     free-choice 
 
The quelque-series is used in all non-emphatic functions. 
 
(A.64) specific known/unknown 
  a. Quelqu’un m’attend. C’est lui que j’épouserai. 
   ‘Someone is waiting for me. It’s him that I will marry.’ 
  b. Quelqu’un est à la porte. Je ne sais pas qui. 
   ‘Somebody is at the door. I don’t know who.’ 
(A.65) irrealis-non-specific (imperative, ‘want’) 
  Elle veut épouser quelqu’un aux cheveux noirs. 
  ‘She wants to marry someone with black hair.’ 
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However, as Culioli (1983) notes, the determiner quelque behaves somewhat differently from 
quelqu’un etc. in that it can only be used non-specifically. 
 In the question and conditional functions, the personne- and que ce soit-series are also possi-
ble, but only in rhetorical questions that imply a negative answer. 
 
(A.66) question 
  a. As-tu écouté quelque chose? 
   ‘Have you heard anything?’ 
  b. Si l’art n’était vraiment qu’un prolongement de la vie, valait-il de lui  
   rien sacrifier? (G71: 169) 
   ‘If art were really only a continuation of life, would it be worth  
   sacrificing anything for it?’ 
  c. Comment peut-on en conclure quoi que ce soit sur l’ordre de la pensée?  
   ‘How can one conclude anything from it about the order of thoughts?’ 
(A.67) conditional 
  a. Je vous rends responsable si rien/quelque chose s’ébruite dans la presse. 
   ‘I hold you responsible if anything transpires in the media.’ 
  b. Éveillez-moi s’il arrive quoi que ce soit. 
   ‘Wake me up if anything happens.’ 
 
The personne-series is most often used in the direct-negation function, cooccurring with the 
preverbal negative particle ne, but not with the postverbal negative particle pas. Furthermore, it 
is used in the indirect-negation and comparative functions. In all these functions, the que ce soit-
series is a possible alternative. 
 
(A.68) direct negation 
  a. Je ne vois rien. 
   ‘I cannot see anything.’ 
  b. Personne n’ jamais dit rien. 
   ‘Nobody ever said anything.’ 
  c. Je n’ai vu qui que ce soit. (Muller 1991: 256) 
   ‘I haven’t seen anybody.’ 
(A.69) indirect negation 
  a. Je doute que personne y réussisse. 
   ‘I doubt that anybody will succeed in it.’ 
  b. J’hésite à rien écrire sur cela/à écrire quoi que ce soit sur cela. 
   ‘I hesitate to write anything about that.’ 
(A.70) comparative 
  a. Il parle mieux qu’aucun orateur. 
   ‘He speaks better than any orator.’ 
  b. Je préfère de beaucoup fermer les yeux que lui reprocher quoi que ce  
   soit qui puisse vous ennuyer. 
   ‘I much prefer to close my eyes than to blame him for anything that could  
   annoy you.’ 
 
The que ce soit-series is also used in the free-choice function. 
 
(A.71) free choice 
  Vous pouvez dire quoi que ce soit. 
  ‘You can say anything.’ 
  
The range of functions of the -conque-series (i.e. quiconque and quelconque) is very similar to that 
of the que ce soit-series. 
 
(A.72) a. Demandez à quiconque des assistents! (free choice) 
   ‘Ask any of the assistants!’ 
  b. Je le sais mieux que quiconque. (comparative) 
   ‘I know it better than anyone.’ 
  c. Il n’est pas permis de parler de ceci à quiconque. (indirect negation) 
   ‘It isn’t possible to talk about this to anyobody.’ 
  d. Si quiconque insiste pour me parler, dites qu’on m’écrive. (conditional) 
   ‘If anyone insists on talking to me, tell them to write to me.’ 
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The n’importe-series is used in the free-choice and comparative functions. 
  
(A.73) a. Tu peux dire n’importe quoi. 
   ‘You can say anything.’ 
  b. Le général avait compris assez tôt que cette guerre, plus que n’importe quelle guerre  
   dans le passé, était une guerre de réserves d’hommes et de matériel. 
   ‘The general had understood pretty soon that this war, more than any war in  





A.10.1. Inventory. Italian (Indo-European, Romance) has a rather heterogeneous system, 
consisting of three major series. Of these only one, the free-choice series in -unque, is formally 
homogeneous, but it is quite incomplete. The other two are the negative nessuno-series and the 
general qualche-series. 
 
 interrogative qualche-series nessuno-series -unque-series 
person: chi qualcuno nessuno chiunque  
thing: che qualche cosa, niente, nulla — 
  qualcosa 
place: dove in qualche luogo in nessun luogo dovunque 
time: quando qualche volta <mai> — 
manner: come in qualche modo  — 
determiner: quale qualche nessuno qualunque 
 
There is an important determiner qualsiasi ‘any’ which forms a series of its own. Other in-
definites are archaic and therefore marginal: two forms in -chessia (chicchessia ‘anyone’, 
checchessia ‘anything’), the determiners qualsivoglia ‘any’ and veruno ‘any’, as well as the three 
negative indefinites from the stem alcun- (alcuno ‘nobody’, alcunché ‘nothing’, alcuno ‘no’).
  
 
A.10.2. Origins. The etymology of Italian qualche is analogous to French quelque. Nessuno is from 
the negation nec plus uno ‘one’. Nulla is from Latin nulla (res) ‘no (thing)’, and niente is probably 
from nec gentem ‘not people’ (cf. the discussion in Zanuttini (1987)). Mai is from Latin magis 
‘more’. The suffix -unque is identical to old Italian unque ‘ever’ (< Latin unquam ‘ever’). The 
forms in -chessia are analogous to the French forms in que ce soit. 
 
A.10.3. Distribution. The distribution of the three series is shown in Figure A.10. The data are 
from various reference works (e.g. Brunet 1981), Longobardi (1989), and native speakers (Paolo 
Ramat, Davide Ricca). See also Zanuttini (1987, 1991). 
 
Figure A.10.     direct 
   question indirect negation 
specific specific irrealis  negation  
known unknown non-specific  
   conditional comparative  
     free-choice 
 
The most general series is the qualche-series. 
 
(A.74) specific known 
 Qualcuno è venuto – indovina chi! 
 ‘Someone has come – guess who!’ 
(A.75) specific unknown 
 Non trovo la penna, eppure in qualche parte l’avrò messa.  
 ‘I can’t find the pen, and yet I must have put it somewhere.’ 
(A.76) irrealis non-specific (imperative) 
 Compra qualcosa per me. 
 ‘Buy something for your niece.’ 
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In the question (but not the conditional!) function and in indirect-negation functions, the 
nessuno-series is also possible. 
 
(A.77) question 
 Vedi qualcosa/niente?  
 ‘Can you see anything?’ 
(A.78) conditional 
 Se senti qualcosa <*niente>, svegliami.  
 ‘If you hear anything, wake me up.’ 
(A.79) indirect negation 
 Non è necessario che venga nessuno/che qualcuno venga.  
 ‘It is not necessary that anyone come.’ 
 
The -unque-series is restricted to the free-choice and comparative functions. 
 
(A.80) free choice 
 Puoi andare dovunque. 
 ‘You can go anywhere.’ 
(A.81) comparative 
 Christie ha scritto più romanzi che chiunque altro in questo secolo. 
 ‘Christie has written more novels than anyone else in this century.’ 
 
In the direct-negation function, only the nessuno-series is possible. When the negative pronoun 
follows the verb, it cooccurs with verbal negation (except in colloquial northern Italian), but 
when it precedes the verb, verbal negation is not possible. 
 
(A.82) direct negation 
 a. Non ho veduto nulla. 
  ‘I have not seen anything.’ 
 b. Nessuno (*non) è venuto. 
  ‘Nobody has come.’ 
 c. Nessun professore ha scritto mai nessun libro. 
  ‘No professor has ever written any book.’ 
 
Alcuno/alcunché may replace nessuno/niente only in the direct/indirect negation function, not in 





A.11.1. Inventory. Romanian (Indo-European, Romance) has four major series of indefinite 
pronouns, three of them derived from interrogatives: (i) the non-emphatic -va-series, (ii) the 
free-choice ori-series, (iii) the negative ni-series, and (iv) the oare-series. 
 
 interrogative -va-series ori-series oare-series ni-series 
person: cine cine-va ori-cine oare-cine nimeni 
thing: ce ce-va ori-ce oare-ce nimic 
place: unde unde-va ori-unde oare-unde nica˘ ieri 
time: cînd cînd-va ori-cînd oare-cînd niciodata˘ , nici-cînd 
manner: cum cum-va ori-cum oare-cum nici-cum 
amount: cît cît-va ori-cît oare-cît  
determiner: care care-va ori-care oare-care nici un 
 
In addition, there is the indefinite determiner vre-un ‘any’ (Graur 1939). 
 
A.11.2. Origins. The particle ori also means ‘or’ and derives from Latin velis ‘you want 
(subjunctive)’. The particle oare also occurs as a question particle and as a disjunctive particle 
(‘be it ... be it’); it derives from late Latin *volet ‘wants’ (classical vult) > voare > oare. The suffix -
va has the same origin (voare > vare > va), or perhaps it derives from vrea, which also means 
‘want’. Some of the members of the ni-series are from nici ‘neither, not even’ plus interrogative 
or general noun (data˘  ‘time’), but nimeni goes back directly to Latin nemo (Accusative neminem). 
Nimic is from nec mica ‘not even a bit’. 
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A.11.3. Distribution. The distribution of the three series is shown in Figure A.11. The data are 
from Manoliu-Manea (1966), Berea Ga˘ geanu (1980), Graur (1939), various reference works,  the 
New Testament, and a native speaker (Beatrice Primus). 
 
Figure A.11.     direct 
   question indirect negation 
specific specific irrealis  negation  
known unknown non-specific  
   conditional comparative  
     free-choice 
 
The -va-series is used in non-emphatic functions. 
 
(A.83) specific (known, unknown) 
 a. Am cumpa*rat ce-va, ghici ce! 
  I:have bought what-INDEF guess what 
  'I have bought something, guess what!' 
 b. Cine-va te-a ca*utat la telefon, dar nu i-am înt3eles numele. 
  who-INDEF you-has asked on phone but not him-have understood name 
  'Somebody asked for you on the phone, but I didn't understand the name.' 
(A.84) irrealis non-specific (‘want’) 
 As3 vrea ce-va mîncare s3i ba˘ utura˘ .  
 INTJ want what-INDEF to.eat and drink 
 ‘I want something to eat and to drink.’ 
(A.85) question/conditional 
 a. Ai fost vreodata*/ cînd-va la Chis3ina*u? 
  have been ever  when-INDEF at Chis3ina*u 
  'Have you ever been to Chis3ina*u?' 
 b. Daca˘  auzi ce-va/ *ori-ce, trezes3te-ma*.  
  if you.hear what-INDEF wake-me 
  ‘If you hear anything, wake me up.’ 
 
The ori-series is used in the comparative and free-choice functions. 
 
(A.86)  comparative 
 Niculina fuge mai repede decît ori-ce/ *vre-o fata* din clasa*. 
 Niculina runs more fast than INDEF-what INDEF-one girl in class 
 'Niculina runs faster than any girl in her class.' 
(A.87) free choice 
 Se ga˘ seste în ori-ce pra˘ va˘ lie.  
 REFL gets in INDEF-what shop 
 ‘You can get it in any shop.’ 
 
The ni-series is used for direct and indirect negation. In the direct-negation function, it cooccurs 
with verbal negation. 
 
(A.88) indirect negation 
 Nu mai îndra˘ zneau sa˘ -l întrebe nimic. (NT, Lk 20.40) 
 NEG more they.dared SBJV-him ask nothing 
 ‘They did not dare to ask him anything anymore.’ 
(A.89) direct negation 
 Nu ne angajeaza˘  nimeni. (NT, Mt 20.7) 
 NEG us hired nobody 
 ‘Nobody has hired us.’ 
 
The determiner vre-un is used in questions/conditionals, and in indirect negation (cf. Graur 
(1939) for discussion). 
 
(A.90) question 
 Ai vre-un prieten care te-ar putea ajuta? 
 you.have INDEF-one friend who you-would be.able help 
 ‘Do you have any friend who could help you?’ 
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(A.11.8) indirect negation 
 Nu este probabil sa˘  aiba˘  loc nici o/ vre-o noua˘  
 NEG is probably SBJV have place NEG one INDEF-one new 
 întrevedere cu d. Molotov. (Graur 1939: 174) 
 interview with Mr. Molotov 
 ‘It’s unlikely that there will be any new interview with Mr. Molotov.’ 
  
 
A.12. Modern Greek 
 
A.12.1. Inventory. Modern Greek (Greek, Indo-European) has three main series of indefinite 
pronouns. One of these is based on interrogative pronouns (the specific ka-series), one is based 
on relative pronouns (the free-choice series marked by -dhípote), and one is formally very 
heterogeneous (the non-specific típota-series). 
 
 interrogative ka-series típota-series -dhípote-series 
person: pjos ká-pjos kanénas, kanís opjos-dhípote 
thing: ti ká-ti típota oti-dhípote 
place: pu ká-pu puthená opu-dhípote 
time: póte ká-pote poté opote-dhípote 
manner: pos ká-pos (me kanénan trópo)  
 
A.12.2. Origins. The prefix ka- comes from kan ‘even, at least’ (< kaì eán ‘even if’). The típota-
series is quite diverse not only synchronically, but also in terms of its origins: Kanénas consists 
of kan plus énas ‘one’; the suffix -pota in típota probably goes back to poté ‘ever, never’; poté 
survives from Ancient Greek, where indefinites were identical to interrogatives except that they 
were unstressed or had final stress. Likewise, puthená is said to go back to póthen ‘whence’. The 
-dhípote-series is not originally part of the Demotic (i.e. vernacular) language – it came into the 
modern standard language from the older archaizing Katharévousa variety and can effectively 
be regarded as a borrowing from Ancient Greek de¯ pote (consisting of the ' emphatic'  particle 
de¯  plus poté ‘ever’). 
 
A.12.3. Distribution. The distribution of the three series is shown in Figure A.12. The data are 
from my own observations, Veloudis (1982), Dhelverúdhi (1989), Giannakidou (1993, 1994a, b, 
c), Tsimpli and Roussou (1993) and from native speakers (Anastasia Christofidou, Soteria 
Svorou, Axel Theofilidis, Artemis Alexiadou). 
 
Figure A.12.     direct 
   question indirect negation 
specific specific irrealis  negation  
known unknown non-specific  
   conditional comparative  
     free-choice 
 
The ka-series is used in all non-emphatic functions (except apparently ‘specific known’). 
However, in the non-specific functions (irrealis, question, conditional) the típota-series is 
preferred. 
 
(A.91) specific known/unknown 
 a. *Ká-pjos tilefónise. Mándepse pjos! 
  INDEF-who phoned guess:IMPV who 
  ‘Someone called. Guess who!’ 
 b. Ká-pjos tilefónise. Dhen kséro pjos. 
  INDEF-who phoned not I:know who 
  ‘Someone called. I don’t know who.’ 
(A.92) irrealis non-specific (imperative, ‘want’) 
 a. Fére típota/ ká-ti na fáme! 
  bring:IMPV anything INDEF-what SBJV we:eat 
  ‘Bring something to eat!’ 
 b. Théli na pandreftí kanénan/ ká-pjon pu na milái ghaliká. 
  wants SBJV she:marry anyone INDEF-whom who SBJV speak French 
  ‘She wants to marry someone [non-specific] who speaks French.’ 
(A.93) question/conditional 
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 a. Ídhes típota/ ká-ti? 
  you:saw anything INDEF-what 
  ‘Did you see anything/something?’ 
 b. An dhís típota/ ká-ti, pes mu.  
  if you:see anything INDEF-what say:IMPV me 
  ‘If you see anything/something, tell me.’ 
 
The típota-series is also used in the negation functions, cooccurring with verbal negation in the 
case of direct negation. See § 5.7.3 and § 8.2.5 for the role of stress. 
 
(A.94) direct negation 
 Kanís dhen mu ípe típota.  
 anyone not me said anything 
 ‘Nobody told me anything.’ 
(A.95) indirect negation 
 Dhen nomízo óti írthe kanís. 
 not I:think that came anyone 
 ‘I don’t think that anyone came.’ 
 
The -dhípote-series is used in the free-choice function and in the comparative function. 
 
(A.96) free choice 
 Opjos-dhípote borí na lísi aftó to próvlima. 
 who-INDEF can SBJV solve this the problem 
 ‘Anyone can solve this problem.’ 
(A.97) comparative 
 To aghóri borí na tréksi ghrighorótera apó opjon-dhípote sto sxolío tu. 
 the boy can SBJV he:run faster from whom-INDEF in:the school his 
 ‘The boy can run faster than anyone in his school.’ 
 
The -dhípote-series is also possible in the conditional function with an emphatic value, but not in 
the question function. 
 
(A.98) question/conditional 
 a. *Ídhes oti-dhípote? 
  you:saw what-INDEF 
  ‘Did you see anything at all?’ 
 b. An dhis oti-dhípote, pes mu. 
  if you:see what-INDEF say:IMPV me 





A.13.1. Inventory. Bulgarian (Indo-European, Slavic) has three major series of indefinite 
pronouns, all of them derived from interrogatives: (i) the general nja-series, (ii) the negative ni-
series, and (iii) the free choice series in -to i da e. 
 
 interrogative nja-series ni-series -to i da e-series 
person: koj nja-koj ni-koj koj to i da e 
thing: sˇ to ne-sˇ to ni-sˇ to sˇ to to i da e 
property: kakâv nja-kakâv ni-kakâv kakâv to i da e 
place: kâde nja-kâde ni-kâde kâde to i da e 
time: koga nja-koga ni-koga koga to i da e 
manner: kak nja-kak ni-kak kak to i da e 
amount: kolko nja-kolko ni-kolko kolko to i da e 
 
The nja-series has an alternative form where the particle si follows the base (njakoj si, nesˇ to si, 
etc.). The -to i da e-series has the more emphatic alternative form -to i da bilo (kojto i da bilo, etc.). 
Marginal series are the ne znam si-series (ne znam si koj ‘someone’, lit. ‘I don’t know who’), the -
gode-series (koj-gode ‘anyone’, etc.), and the -da e-series (koj da e, etc.). 
A.13.2. Origins. The nja- and ni-series go back to Old Church Slavonic neˇ - (cf. § 6.2.1) and ni- 
(cf. § 8.3.1). The -to i da e-series originates in a parametric concessive conditional clause (cf. Kojto 
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i da e, mozˇ e da vleze. ‘Whoever she is, she may come in.’). The particle si is perhaps cognate with 
Polish -s´ (cf. A.15) . 
A.13.3. Distribution. The distribution of the three series is shown in Figure A.13. The data are 
from Blazˇ ev (1980), Doncˇ eva (1970) (D70), Dogramadzˇ ieva (1974), Kirova (1986), Mostovska 
(1988), Nicolova (1972, 1978, 1986), Guentchéva (1981), and from native speakers (Tania Kuteva, 
Pavlina Vlajkova). See also Pasˇ ov (1965), Xaralampiev (1977). 
 
Figure A.13.     direct 
   question indirect negation 
specific specific irrealis  negation  
known unknown non-specific  
   conditional comparative  
     free-choice 
 
The nja-series can be specific or non-specific: 
 
(A.99) specific unknown 
 Govorix  vcˇ era s nja-koga v avtobusa.  
 I:talked yesterday with INDEF-whom in the:bus 
 ‘Yesterday I talked to someone on the bus.’ 
(A.100) specific known 
 Nja-koj se obadi, otgatni koj.  
 INDEF-who REFL called guess:IMPV who 
 ‘Somebody has called, guess who.’ 
(A.101) irrealis non-specific (‘want’) 
 Kogato edin cˇ ovek iska da vârsˇ i ne-sˇ to – daj mu rabota.  
 when one person wants SBJV he:do INDEF-what give:IMPV him work 
 ‘When a person wants to do something – give him or her work.’ (D70: 445) 
 




 a. Vidja li ne-sˇ to <*kakvo-to i da e>? 
  you:saw Q INDEF-what what-INDEF 
  ‘Did you see anything (at all)?’ 
 b. Ako vidisˇ  ne-sˇ to/ kakvo-to i da e, kazˇ i mi.  
  if you:see INDEF-what what-INDEF tell:IMPV me 
  ‘If you see anything/anything at all, tell me.’ 
 
The -to i da e-series is also used in the free-choice, comparative, and indirect-negation functions. 
 
(A.103) free choice 
 Mozˇ esˇ  da vzemesˇ  koj-to i da e moliv.  
 you:can SBJV you:take which-INDEF pencil 
 ‘You can take any pencil.’ 
(A.104) comparative 
 Na mene povecˇ e, otkolkoto i na kogo-to i da bilo  
 to me more than even to whom-INDEF  
 drug mi e cˇ uzˇ d pokaznijat patos. (D70: 449) 
 other me is alien ostentatious pathos 
 ‘Ostentatious pathos is more alien to me than to anyone else.’ 
(A.105) indirect negation 
 Momcˇ e-to go napravi bez kakva-to i da e/ ni-kakva  pomosˇ t.  
 boy-the it did without which-INDEF NEG-which help 
 ‘The boy did it without any help.’ 
 
The ni-series is used in the direct-negation function (cf. A.106), and also in some cases in the 
indirect-negation function (cf. A.105). 
 
(A.106) direct negation 
 Ni-koj ne mi kaza ni-sˇ to.  
 NEG-who not me told NEG-what 
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A.14.1. Inventory. Serbian/Croatian (Slavic, Indo-European) has four major series of indefinite 
pronouns, all of which are derived from interrogatives: (i) the non-emphatic ne-series, (ii) the 
negative-polarity series marked by i-, (iii) the free-choice and negative polarity series marked 
by bilo, and (iv) the negative ni-series. 
 
 interrogative ne-series i-series ni-series bilo-series 
person: ko ne-ko i-tko ni-(t)ko ko bilo 
thing: sˇ to ne-sˇ to i-sˇ ta ni-sˇ to sˇ to bilo 
property: kakav ne-kakav i-kakav ni-kakav kakav bilo 
place: gdje ne-gdje i-gdje ni-gdje gdje bilo 
time: kada ne-kada, ne-gda i-kad(a), i-gda ni-kada kada bilo 
manner: kako ne-kako kako ni-kako kako bilo 
determiner: koji ne-koji, ne-ki koji ni-koji koji bilo  
 
A.14.2. Origins. The prefix ne- has the same origin as Russian ne-, Bulgarian nja- and Polish nie- 
(§ 6.2.1). The prefix i- is from the conjunction and focus particle i ‘and; also; even’ (§ 7.1.1). For 
ni-, see § 8.3.1 (cf. Russian ni-). The particle bilo is the perfect tense of ‘be’, so the bilo-series is an 
example of an ‘it-may-be’ indefinite (§ 6.2.3). 
A.14.3. Distribution. The distribution of the three series is shown in Figure A.14. The data are 
from Progovac (1988, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1994) and reference works. 
 
Figure A.14.     direct 
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The ne-series is used in the specific and irrealis non-specific functions. 
 
(A.107) specific 
   Mira voli ne-koga. (P91: 569) 
   Mira loves INDEF-whom 
  ‘Mira loves someone.’ 
(A.108) irrealis non-specific  
  Daj mi ne-sˇ to!  
  give me INDEF-what 
  ‘Give me something!’ 
 
The i-series is used in negative-polarity contexts, i.e. in the question/conditional, indirect-




  a. Da li je i-ko/ bilo ko dosˇ ao? (P90: 130-1) 
   Q Q AUX INDEF-who INDEF who come 
   ‘Did anyone come?’ 
  b. Ako je i-ko/ bilo ko dosˇ ao, pocˇ n-i-te! (P90: 130) 
   if AUX INDEF-who INDEF who come start-IMPV-2PL 
   ‘If anyone has come, start!’ 
  c. Jesi li ne-koga nasˇ ao?  
   have.you Q INDEF-whom found 
   ‘Did you find anyone?’ 
(A.110) indirect negation 
  Milan ne tvrdi da je i-ko/  bilo ko/ *ni-ko  dosˇ ao.  
  Milan NEG claims that AUX INDEF-who INDEF who INDEF-who come 
  ‘Milan does not claim that anyone has come.’ (P90:130-1) 
(A.111) comparative (cf. § 4.7.1) 
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  Marija je pametnija {nego i-ko/ od bilo koga} u razredu.  
  Marija is smarter than INDEF-who from INDEF who:GEN in class 
  ‘Marija is smarter than anyone in her class.’ 
 
The bilo-series is also used in the free-choice function. 
 
(A.112) free choice 
  Bilo ko mozˇ e istuc´ i malo dete. (P90: 130) 
  INDEF who can beat small child 
  ‘Anyone can beat a small child.’ 
 
In the direct-negation function, only the ni-series is used, cooccurring with verbal negation. 
 
(A.113) direct negation 
  Milan ne voli ni-koga <*i-koga>. (P91: 568) 
  Milan NEG loves INDEF-whom INDEF-whom 





A.15.1. Inventory. Polish (Indo-European, Slavic) has three major series of indefinite pronouns, 
all derived from interrogatives: (i) the general s´ -series, (ii) the free-choice series in -kolwiek, and 
(iii) the negative ni-series. The marginal nie-series is also shown in the following table: 
 
 interrogative s´ -series -kolwiek-series ni-series nie-series 
person: kto kto-s´  kto-kolwiek ni-kto —  
thing: co co-s´  co-kolwiek nic nie-co 
quality: jaki jaki-s´  jaki-kolwiek ni-jaki nie-jaki 
place: gdzie gdzie-s´  gdzie-kolwiek ni-gdzie — 
time: kiedy kiedy-s´  kiedy-kolwiek ni-gdy nie-kiedy 
manner: jak jako-s´  jak-kolwiek ni-jak (niejako) 
determiner: który który-s´  który-kolwiek z%aden nie-który  
 
The three major series are quite regular, except for a few phonological alternations (jak :   jako-s´ , 
kiedy : ni-gdy) and the negative determiner z%aden (from a different root). The nie-series is 
incomplete. A variant of it is the X-nie-X-series: gdzie-nie-gdzie ‘here and there’, kiedy nie-kiedy 
‘once in a while’, co nie-co ‘a little something’ (§ 8.3.4.2). There are three further marginal free-
choice series, formed with byle (byle kto ‘anyone’, etc.), lada (lada kto ‘anyone’), and (nie) 
ba4dz´ (kto (nie) ba4dz´ ‘anyone’, etc.) . Finally, the bare interrogatives are commonly used as 
indefinites in the colloquial language (cf. § 7.3.2). 
A.15.2. Origins. The suffix -s´ (< -si, cf. Czech -si)  perhaps goes back to *sit ‘(it) be’ (cf. § 6.2.3). 
The origin of the suffix -kolwiek (cf. Slovak -kol’vek, Czech -koli(v(eˇ k)), Sorbian -kuli) is not clear 
(cf. Cies´ likowa (1965: 80-3) for some discussion), but a plausible possibility is that koli is 
identical to the older interrogative-indefinite pronominal adverb koli ‘when?; ever’, and -wiek is 
derived from wiek ‘age’. The prefix nie- is identical to Russian ne-, Bulgarian nja- (cf. § 6.2.1), and 
(nie) ba4dz´  is identical to Russian -nibud’. Byle (also ‘if only’) seems to be connected with the 
modal hypothetical particle by (originally a subjunctive form of byc´  ‘be’), and the origin of lada 
is unknown. 
A.15.3. Distribution. The distribution of the three series is shown in Figure A.15. The data are 
from Grzegorczykowa (1972a) (G72), various reference works, and a native speaker (Thomas 
Bak). See also Grzegorczykowa (1972b) and Mostovska (1988). 
 
Figure A.15.     direct 
   question indirect negation 
specific specific irrealis  negation  
known unknown non-specific  
   conditional comparative  
     free-choice 
 
The s´ -series is used in all functions from ‘specific-known’ to ‘indirect negation’. 
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(A.114) specific known/unknown 
 Kto-s´  do ciebie zadzwonil, [zgadnij kto/ ale nie zrozumialam nazwisko]. 
 who-INDEF to you called guess who but not I:understood name 
 ‘Someone called you, [guess who/but I didn’t understand the name].’  
(A.115) irrealis non-specific (possibility) 
 Zawsze moz5na sie czego-s´  nauczyc´ .  
 always one.can REFL what-INDEF teach 
 ‘One can always learn something.’ 
 
In the question/conditional and in the indirect-negation functions, the -kolwiek-series is a 
possible more emphatic alternative (except in questions, where it sounds a bit odd). 
 
(A.116) question/conditional 
 a. Widzisz kogo-s´  <?kogo-kolwiek>? 
  you:see whom-INDEF whom-INDEF 
  ‘Can you see anybody?’ 
 b. Jezeli co-s´ / co-kolwiek zobaczysz, odrazu mnie obudz´ .  
  if what-INDEF what-INDEF you:see immediately me wake:IMPV 
  ‘If you see anything, wake me up immediately.’ 
(A.117) indirect negation 
 Nie sadze4, ze kto-s´ / kto-kolwiek przyszedl.  
 not I:think that who-INDEF who-INDEF came 
 ‘I don’t think that anybody came.’ 
 
The -kolwiek-series is most typically used in the free-choice function, as well as the comparative 
function. 
 
(A.118) free choice 
 Moz%esz mnie odwiedzic´  o której-kolwiek godzinie. 
 you:can me visit at which-INDEF hour 
 ‘You can visit me at any time.’ 
(A.119) Graz%yna napisala wie4cej ksia4z%ek niz% jaki-kolwiek inny autor.  
 Graz%yna wrote more books than which-INDEF other author 
 ‘Grazyna has written more books than any other author.’ 
 
The ni-series occurs only in the direct-negation function, cooccurring with verbal negation. 
 
(A.120) Ni-kt ni-c nie wie. 
 NEG-who NEG-what not knows 





A.16.1. Inventory. Russian has seven major series of indefinite pronouns: (i-ii) the specific to- 
and koe-series, (iii)-(iv) then non-specific -nibud’- and -libo-series, (v) the negative ni-series, (vi) 
the negative-polarity series marked by WH by to ni bylo, and (vii) the free-choice series marked 
by ugodno. In the following table, the by to ni bylo-series is omitted for lack of space.  
 
 interrogative -to-series -nibud’-series -libo-series ni-series koe-series 
person: kto kto-to kto-nibud’ kto-libo ni-kto koe-kto 
thing: cˇ to cˇ to-to cˇ to-nibud’ cˇ to-libo ni-cˇ to koe-cˇ to 
place: gde gde-to gde-nibud’ gde-libo ni-gde koe-gde 
time: kogda kogda-to kogda-nibud’ kogda-libo ni-kogda koe-kogda 
manner: kak kak-to kak-nibud’ kak-libo ni-kak koe-kak 
amount: skol’ko skol’ko-to skol’ko-nibud’ — ni-skol’ko — 
determiner: kakoj kakoj-to kakoj-nibud’ kakoj-libo ni-kakoj koe-kakoj 
 
In addition, there are some forms of the marginal ne-series (ne-kto ‘somebody’, ne-cˇ to 
‘something’, ne-kogda ‘once’, ne-skol’ko ‘several’), and some little grammaticalized series (xot’ kto 
‘anyone’; Bog vest’ kto ‘God knows who’). The determiner ljuboj ‘any’ is the only member of its 
series. 
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A.16.2. Origins. On the diachrony of Russian indefinite pronouns, see especially Malovickij 
(1971: 60-111). The origin of -to is unclear, but it is probably identical with to ‘now’ (< Old 
Russian tu˘ , ≠ to ‘that’). The suffix -nibud’ goes back to ni budi ‘it may be’ (§ 6.2.3.1), and -libo 
(Old Russian ljubo) comes from ljubo ‘dear, pleasant’ (§ 6.2.2.1). Ni means ‘neither, not even’ (§ 
8.3.1). Koe is the neuter form of koj ‘which?’ – why it is used as an indefiniteness marker is not 
clear to me. Ugodno is from ugodno ‘suitable, pleasing’ (§ 6.2.2.1), and by to ni bylo is a more 
modern form of ni budi (§ 6.2.3.1). 
A.16.3. Distribution. The distribution of the three series is shown in Figure A.16. The data are 
from my own observations, from native speakers (especially Maria Koptjevskaja-Tamm, Vera 
Podlesskaya, Elena Kalinina), and from the huge literature on Russian indefinites. Some refer-
ences are Galkina-Fedoruk (1963), Veyrenc (1964), Seliverstova (1964, 1988), Rybák (1965, 1975), 
Dahl (1970), Malovickij (1971), Ruzˇ icˇ ka (1973), Paducˇ eva (1974, 1985), Ward (1977), Fontaine 
(1978), Ponomareff (1978), Kobozeva (1981), Markowich and Paillard (1981), Giusti (1982), 
Paillard (1983, 1984), Nikolaeva (1983, 1985), Bonnot-Saoulski (1983), Kreisberg (1986), 
Kuz’mina (1989). 
 
Figure A.16.     direct 
   question indirect negation 
specific specific irrealis  negation  
known unknown non-specific  
   conditional comparative  
     free-choice 
 
The -to-series is mainly used specifically, when the referent is not known to the speaker. 
 
(A.121) specific unknown  
  Kto-to postucˇ al v dver’. 
  ‘Somebody knocked at the door.’ 
 
In the irrealis-non-specific and question/conditional functions, normally the -nibud’-series is 
used, for which the -libo-series is a more formal alternative. 
 
(A.122) irrealis non-specific (imperative, future) 
  a. Spojte nam kakoj-nibud’/kakoj-libo romans. 
   ‘Sing some romance for us.’ 
  b. My vstretimsja gde-nibud’/gde-libo. 
   ‘We’ll meet somewhere.’ 
(A.123) question/conditional 
  a. Zvonil li mne kto-nibud’/kto-libo? 
   ‘Did anyone call me?’ 
  b. Esli cˇ to-nibud’/cˇ to-libo slucˇ itsja, ja skazˇ u mame. 
   ‘If anything happens, I’ll tell mom.’ 
  
The -to-series is also not excluded from the above contexts, though it is associated with a 
different pragmatics in questions and conditionals (§ 4.7.3). In the irrealis contexts, -to-
indefinites show a strong tendency to be interpreted specifically if such an interpretation is 
possible, cf. (A.124). However, a non-specific reading seems to be possible as well, although the 
-nibud’-series is clearly preferred in this case. 
 
(A.124) irrealis context: specific/non-specific 
  a. Ona xocˇ et vyjti zamuzˇ  za kogo-to iz Ameriki. 
   ‘She wants to marry someone [specific] from America.’ 
  b. Ona xocˇ et vyjti zamuzˇ  za kogo-nibud’/kogo-to iz Ameriki. 
   ‘She wants to marry someone [non-specific] from America.’ 
 
The -libo-series has a wider application than the -nibud’-series: it is also used in the indirect-
negation and comparative functions, where -nibud’ is not possible. However, -libo can be 
replaced by by to ni bylo in these cases. 
 
(A.125) comparative  
  Zdes’ prijatnee zˇ it’ cˇ em gde-libo/gde by to ni bylo v mire. 
  ‘Here it is more pleasant to live than anywhere in the world.’ 
(A.126) indirect negation 
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  a. Otsutstvujut kakie-libo/kakie by to ni bylo ukazanija o sposobe ix primenenija. 
   ‘Any indications about the mode of their use are lacking.’ 
  b. bez kakoj-libo/kakoj by to ni bylo pomosˇcˇ i 
   ‘without any help’ 
 
The by to ni bylo-series is also possible as an emphatic variant in conditionals, but not in 
questions. 
 
(A.127) a. Esli ty uslysˇ isˇ ’ cˇ to by to ni bylo, razbudi menja. 
   ‘If you hear anything (at all), wake me up.’ 
  b. *Slysˇ ala li ty cˇ to by to ni bylo? 
   ‘Did you hear anything (at all)?’ 
 
In the free-choice function, either the determiner ljuboj or the ugodno-series is used. Marginally 
the by to ni bylo-series is also possible. 
 
(A.128) free choice 
  Ty mozˇ esˇ ’ kupit’ ljubuju/kakuju ugodno/?kakuju by to ni bylo knigu. 
  ‘You may buy any book.’ 
 
In the direct-negation function, only the ni-series is possible. 
 
(A.129) direct negation 
  Nikogda ja ne zabudu tebja. 
  ‘I will never forget you.’ 
 
The koe-series may be used when the referent is specific and the speaker knows its identity, as 
in (A.130) (cf. § 3.2.4). 
 
(A.130) specific known 
  Nam nado pogovorit’ s toboj koe o cˇ em. 





A.17.1. Inventory. Lithuanian (Indo-European, Baltic) has five major series of indefinite 
pronouns, all of them derived from interrogatives: (i) the specific kazˇ -series, (ii) the non-specific 
nors-series, (iii) the free-choice series in bet-, (iv) the negative nie-series, and (v) the kai-series. 
 
 interrogative kazˇ -series nors-series bet-series nie-series kai-series 
person/thing: kas kazˇ -kas kas nors bet kas nie-kas kai kas 
property: koks kazˇ -koks koks nors bet koks  kai koks 
place: kur kazˇ -kur kur nors bet kur nie-kur kai kur 
time: kada kazˇ -kada kada nors bet kada nie-kada kai kada 
manner: kaip kazˇ -kaip kaip nors bet kaip nie-kaip kai kaip 
amount: kiek kazˇ -kiek kiek nors bet kiek   
determiner: kuris kazˇ -kuris kuris nors bet kuris  kai kuris 
 
There is also a marginal X-ne-X-series (kas-ne-kas ‘someone’, kuris-ne-kuris ‘some’, cf. §8.3.4), and 
the determiner joks ‘any’, which forms a 'series'  of its own. 
 
A.17.2. Origins. The prefix kazˇ - has the variant kazˇ in (kazˇ in kas, etc.), which shows that it goes 
back to kas zˇ ino k- ‘who knows wh-’ (cf. § 6.2.1). The indefiniteness marker nors is identical to 
nors ‘although; if only, at least’, and it goes back to a converb form (noris) of the verb nore%ti 
‘want’. The marker bet is identical to bet ‘but, nevertheless’, but there may also be a connection 
to bent ‘at least, even’. The prefix nie- is a phonological variant of ne ‘neither, not even’. The 
marker kai is identical to kai ‘when’. 
 
A.17.3. Distribution. The distribution of the three series is shown in Figure A.17. The data are 
from Pilka (1984) (P84), Ambrazas (1985), and native speakers (Emma Geniusˇ iene%, Greta 
Lemanaite%) . 
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Figure A.17.     direct 
   question indirect negation 
specific specific irrealis  negation  
known unknown non-specific  
   conditional comparative  
     free-choice 
 
The kazˇ -series is primarily used in the specific-unknown function, but it is also possible in the 
question/conditional function. In non-specific functions, the nors-series is generally used, see § 
3.2.3, examples (69), (71), (75), (77), (79), (82). In questions (cf. ex. 88) and conditionals, the nors-
series is normal: 
 
(A.131) conditional 
 Jei tu ka nors/ kazˇ -ka matai, pasaky-k man.  
 if you what INDEF INDEF-what see tell-IMPV to:me 
 ‘If you see anything/something, tell me.’ 
 
In the indirect-negation function, only the nors-series is possible. 
 
(A.132) indirect negation 
 Ne-langva rasti ka4  nors kas pade%tu4 jums.  
 NEG-possible find whom INDEF who help you 
 ‘It’s impossible to find anyone who would help you.’ 
 
The direct-negation function is generally expressed by the nie-series, which cooccurs with 
verbal negation. 
 
(A.133) direct negation 
 Nie-kas man nie-ko ne-saki.  
 NEG-who to:me NEG-what NEG-told 
 ‘Nobody told me anything.’ 
 
The free-choice and comparative functions are expressed by the bet-series. In the comparative 
function, the nors-series is also possible. 
 
(A.134) free choice 
 Bet kas gali paaisˇ kinti sˇ ia problema.  
 INDEF who can solve this problem 
 ‘Anybody can solve this problem.’ 
(A.135) comparative 
 Asˇ  esme suprantu geriau negu kas nors/ bet kas kitas. (P84: 146) 
 I essence understand better than who INDEF INDEF who other 
 ‘I understand the essence better than anyone else.’ 
 
The single determiner joks is used in both the direct-negation and the indirect-negation 
functions: 
 
(A.136) direct negation 
 Zˇ irardo ne-atskleidzˇ ia jokiu nauju savo talento pusiu. (P84: 87) 
 Girardeaux NEG-shows any new her talent’s sides 
 ‘Girardeaux does not show any new sides of her talent.’ 
(A.137) indirect negation 
 Dauguma meteoru pasirodo nakti be jokiu/ kokiu nors  
 majority of:meteors appear at:night without any which INDEF 
 desningumu. (P84: 87) 
 regularities 
 ‘The majority of meteors appear at night without any regularities.’ 
 
The kai-series indicates that the referent is known to the speaker, much like the Russian koe-
series (see ex. 100 in § 3.2.4). 
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A.18. Latvian 
 
A.18.1. Inventory. Latvian (Indo-European, Baltic) has three major series of indefinite 
pronouns, all derived from interrogatives: (i) the general kaut-series, (ii) the negative ne-series, 
and (iii) the free-choice jeb-series. 
 
 interrogative kaut-series ne-series jeb-series 
person: kas kaut kas, ka¯ ds ne-viens jeb-ka¯ ds 
thing: kas kaut kas ne-kas jeb-kas 
place: kur kaut kur ne-kur jeb-kur 
time: kad kaut kad ne-kad jeb-kad 
manner: ka¯  kaut ka¯  ne-ka¯   
determiner: ka¯ ds kaut ka¯ ds ne-ka¯ ds jeb-ka¯ ds 
 kursˇ    jeb-kursˇ  
 
There is also a marginal X ne-X-series (kur ne-kur ‘here and there’, ka¯ ds ne-ka¯ ds ‘some(one) or 
other’), and the bare interrogatives may also be used as indefinites (especially ka¯ ds in the 
meaning ‘somebody’). 
A.18.2. Origins. The particle kaut also means ‘at least, even’, cf. § 7.1. The particle jeb also means 
‘or’, cf. § 7.2. The prefix ne- seems to be identical to the verbal prefix ne- ‘not’. 
A.18.3. Distribution. The distribution of the three series is shown in Figure A.18. The data are 
all from reference works and from a native speaker (Ivonna Wagner). 
 
Figure A.18.     direct 
   question indirect negation 
 specific irrealis  negation  
  non-specific  
   conditional comparative  
     free-choice 
 
The kaut-series is used in all non-emphatic functions: 
 
(A.138) specific 
 Vinsˇ  kaut kur aizga¯ jis. 
 he INDEF where left 
 ‘He went somewhere.’ 
(A.139) irrealis non-specific (imperative) 
 Nope¯ re kaut ko. 
 buy INDEF what 
 ‘Buy something.’ 
(A.140) question/conditional 
 a. Vai tu gatavojies kaut kur braukt? 
  Q you you:are:prepared INDEF where to:go 
  ‘Are you going to go anywhere?’ 
 b. Ja ka¯ ds atna¯ k(tu), saki, lai vinsˇ  pagaida. 
  if who arrives say:IMPV let he wait 
  ‘If anyone comes, say that he should wait.’ 
 c. Ja kaut kur <*jeb-kur> ejat, tad pasakiet  man. 
  if INDEF where INDEF-where you:go then tell:IMPV me 
  ‘If you go anywhere, tell me.’ 
 
The jeb-series is used in the free-choice, comparative, and indirect-negation functions. 
 
(A.141) free choice 
 Varat na¯ kt jeb-kura¯  laika¯ . 
 you:can to:come INDEF-which time:LOC 
 ‘You can come at any time.’ 
(A.142) comparative 
 Tas vinu iepriecina¯ ja vaira¯ k neka¯  jeb-kas cits. 
 that him delighted more than INDEF-what other 
 ‘It made him more glad than anything else.’ 
(A.143) indirect negation (cf. § 4.7.2) 
 a. bez jeb-ka¯ da¯ m pa¯ rmaina¯ m 
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  without INDEF-which changes 
  ‘without any changes’ 
 b. Es nedoma@ju, ka ka@ds atna@ks. 
  I not.think that who came 
  'I don't think that anybody came.' 
 
In the direct-negation function, the ne-series cooccurs with verbal negation. 
 
(A.144) direct negation 
 Vinu ne-kas  ne-interese¯ . 
 him NEG-what NEG-interests 





A.19.1. Inventory. Irish has three series of indefinite pronouns, all of them derived from generic 
nouns: (i) the non-emphatic éigin-series, (ii) the negative-polarity series marked by aon, and (iii) 
the emphatic ar bith-series.  
 
 interrogative éigin-series aon-series ar bith-series 
person: cé duine (éigin), neach aon duine duine ar bith 
thing: cad, cén rud (éigin), ní aon rud/ní rud ar bith 
place: cá, cár in áit éigin, in aon bhall, in áit ar bith 
  i mball éigin in aon áit 
time: cathain   
manner: conas ar chaoi éigin, in aon chor ar chor/dhóigh ar bith, 
  ar dhóigh éigin  ar chaoi ar bith 
determiner: cé éigin aon ... ar bith 
 
In addition, there is one isolated indefinite pronoun dada 'anything', and several expressions 
for 'ever': riamh, go brách (referring to past events), choíche, go deo (referring to future events). 
 Irish indefinites show a very low degree of grammaticalization, and perhaps only two in-
definite determiners (éigin, aon) and one indefinitizing prepositional phrase (ar bith)should be 
recognized.i However, the above paradigm makes it easier to see the parallels with other 
languages (where some slots are also occupied by little grammaticalized expressions). 
 
A.19.2. Origins. Aon is originally ‘one’, ar bith is ‘in the world’, dada is 'jot, tittle'. 
 
A.19.3. Distribution. The distribution of the three series is shown in Figure A.19. The data are 
from Ó Dónaill (ed.) (1977) (D77), De Bhaldraithe (ed.) (1959) (B59), and a native speaker 
(Dónall P. Ó Baoill). 
 
Figure A.19.     direct 
   question indirect negation 
specific specific irrealis  negation  
known unknown non-specific  
   conditional comparative  
     free-choice 
 
The éigin-series is used in specific and irrealis non-specific functions (perhaps there is a 
preference to omit éigin and use the bare generic nouns when the referent is known to the 
speaker): 
 
(A.145) specific known/unknown 
 a. Tá rud agam le rá leat. (NT, Lk 7.40) 
  is thing on:me for telling to:you 
  ‘I have something to tell you.’ 
 b. Dúirt duine éigin liom é. (B59: 683) 
  told person certain to:me he 
  ‘Somebody told me.’ 
(A.146) irrealis non-specific (modal, imperative) 
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 a. Caithfear teacht ar réiteach éigin eile. (B59: 682) 
  must:FUT coming on solution certain other 
  ‘Some other solution will have to be found.’ 
 b. Abair rud éigin. (B59: 683) 
  say:IMPV thing certain 
  ‘Say something.’ 
 
In all negative-polarity functions, the aon-series or the ar bith-series may be used: 
 
(A.147) questions 
 a. An bhfuil aon airgead/ airgead ar bith  agat? 
  Q is any money  money on world at:you 
  ‘Do you have any money?’ 
 b. An bhfuil dada le rá agat? (D77: 361) 
  Q is anything for telling at:you 
  ‘Do you have anything to say?’  
 c. An bhfeiceann tú duine ar bith ansin thall? 
  Q see you person on world there over 
  ‘Do you see anyone over there?’ 
(A.148) conditionals  
 a. Má thagann aon duine acu ... (B59: 28) 
  if comes any person at:them 
  ‘If any of them should come ...’ 
 b. Má thagann sé go deo/ choíche ... (B59: 229) 
  if comes he ever 
  ‘If he ever comes ...’ 
 c. Má chuir sé fearg ort ar dhóigh ar bith ... (B59: 28) 
  if puts he anger on:you on manner on world 
  ‘If he has in any way offended you ...’ 
(A.149) indirect negation 
 a. Ní mheasaim gur tháinig aon duine/ duine ar bith acu. (B59: 28) 
  NEG I:think that arrived any person man on world at:them 
  ‘I don’t think any of them has arrived.’ 
 b. Níorbh áil leis go mbeadh fios ag aon duine.  
  NEG:was desire with:him that be knowledge at any person 
  ‘He didn’t want anyone to know it.’ (NT, Mk 9.30) 
(A.150) comparative 
 a. Tháinig an bháisteach níos tréine ná riamh. (B59: 229) 
  arrived the rain more power than ever 
  ‘It started to rain, faster than ever.’ 
 b. chomh maith le aon duine beo (B59: 28) 
  as  good with any man living 
  ‘as good as any man’ 
 
In the direct-negation function, the indefinites cooccur with verbal negation.  
 
(A.151) direct negation 
 a. Níor labhair aon duine/ duine ar bith  liom. (B59: 477) 
  NEG spoke any person person on world with:me 
  ‘Nobody spoke to me.’ 
 b. Ní dúirt siad aon ní/ dada/ rud ar bith le haon duine.  
  NEG said they any thing anything thing on world to any person 
  ‘They didn’t say anything to anybody.’ 
 c. Ní labhair sé riamh air. (D77: 997) 
  NEG spoke he ever on:it 
  ‘He never spoke of it.’ 
 
In the free-choice function, too, either the aon-series or the ar bith-series is used: 
 
(A.152) a. Tar lá ar bith/ aon lá (a thogrós tú). (B59: 28) 
  come day on world any day that like you 
  ‘Come any day (you like).’ 
 b. Íosfaidh sé rud ar bith/ aon rud/ *dada. (B59: 28) 
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  eats:HAB he thing on world any thing anything 
  ‘He eats anything.’ 
 
The indefinite dada and the various worlds for 'ever' are only used in the negative-polarity 





A.20.1. Inventory. Ossetic (Indo-European, Iranian) has five major series of indefinite pro-
nouns, all of them based on interrogative pronouns: (i) the specific -dær-series, (ii) the non-
specific is-series, (iii)-(iv) the two negative series in ni- and ma-, and (v) the free-choice series in 
-dæriddær. 
 
 interrogative -dær-series is-series ni-series ma-series -dæriddær-series 
person: cˇ i (obl. kæj) cˇ i-dær is-cˇ i ni-cˇ i ma-cˇ i cˇ i-dæriddær 
thing: cy (obl. cæj) cy-dær is-ty ni-cy ma-cy cy-dæriddær 
place: kæm kæm-dær is-kæm ni-kæm ma-kæm kæm-dæriddær 
time: kæd kæd-dær is-kæd ni-kæd ma-kæd kæd-dæriddær 
manner: kuyd kuyd-dær is-kuyd ni-kuyd ma-kuyd kuyd-dæriddær 
determiner: kæcy kæcy-dær is-kæcy ni-kæcy ma-kæcy kæcy-dæriddær 
 
There  is  another  free-choice  series  marked  by -fændy  which s eems to be equivalent to the -
dæriddær-series: cˇ i-fændy ‘anyone’, cy-fændy ‘anything’, etc. 
A.20.2. Origins. The suffix -dær is identical to the focus particle dær ‘also, even’. the prefix is-  is   
originally   the   3rd   person   singular  of  ‘be’.  I  have  no  information  on  the  origin  of -
dæriddær. The two negative prefixes are related to the negative particles næ ‘not’ and ma ‘not’. 
A.20.3. Distribution. The distribution of the three series is shown in Figure A.20. The data are 
from Kulaev (1958) (K58), Axvlediani (1963), Bagaev (1965), and a native speaker (Zarema 
Xubecova) . 
 
Figure A.20.     direct 
   question indirect negation 
 specific irrealis  negation  
  non-specific  
   conditional comparative  
     free-choice 
 
The -dær-series is used only in specific functions: 
 
(A.153) specific 
 Cy-dær mæ qygdær-y. (K58: 52) 
 what-INDEF me bother-PRES.3SG 
 ‘Something bothers me.’ 
 
The is-series is used in non-specific functions, in irrealis contexts, in questions and conditionals, 
and in indirect-negation contexts. 
 
(A.154) irrealis non-specific (imperative) 
 a. Mænæm dær ma is-ty ratt.  
  I:DAT also PT INDEF-what give(IMPV) 
  ‘Give me something, too.’ 
(A.155) question/conditional 
 a. Dy is-kæj uyn-ys?  
  you INDEF-who see-PRES.2SG 
  ‘Do you see anybody?’ 
 b. Dy is-ty kuy ssar-i-s, uæd mænæm dær æxsyzgon uaid.  
  you INDEF-what if find-SBJV-2SG then I:DAT also glad will:be 
  ‘If you find anything, I’ll be glad.’ 
(A.156) indirect negation  
 Æz dyzærdyg kæn-yn, is-cˇ i ærbacæu-dzæn ævi næ.  
 I doubt do-PRES.1SG INDEF-who come-FUT(3SG) or not 
 ‘I doubt that anyone will come.’ 
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The -dæriddær-series is used in the free-choice and comparative functions. 
 
(A.157) free choice 
 Aj xuymætæg xyncinag u, cˇ i-dæriddær dær æj baxync-dzæn.  
 this simple problem is who-INDEF also it solve-FUT(3SG) 
 ‘This is a simple problem, anyone will solve it.’ 
(A.158) comparative 
 Uyj jæ k’lasy kæmæj-dæriddær zonddzˇ yn-dær u. 
 he his class who:ABL-INDEF smart-COMPR is 
 ‘He is smarter than anyone in his class.’ 
 
In the direct-negation function, the ni-series or the ma-series is used. The choice depends on the 
modality of the clause, like the choice between the corresponding verbal negators næ and ma. 
Næ is used in indicative clauses, and ma is used in imperative and subjunctive clauses. Ossetic 
is like Latin, standard English and standard German in that negative pronouns do not cooccur 
with verbal negation. (However, unlike Latin, English and German, Ossetic allows more than 
one negative pronoun in one clause, see § 8.2.6.1.) 
 
(A.159) direct negation 
 a. Æz uym ni-kæj uyd-t-on. 
  I there NEG-who see-PAST-1SG 
  ‘I didn’t see anyone there.’ 
 b. Ma-kædæm acu.  
  NEG-where go(IMPV) 





A.21.1. Inventory. Persian (Indo-European, Iranian) has only two series of indefinite pronouns:  
(i) the generic-noun-based -i-series, and (ii) the negative hicˇ -series. 
 
 interrogative i-series hicˇ -series  
person: ki kas-i hicˇ  kas(-i) 
thing: cˇ e cˇ iz-i hicˇ cˇ iz(-i) 
place: kojˇ â jˇ â-yi hicˇ jˇ â(-yi) 
time: key vaqt-i hicˇ  vaqt 
manner:   hicˇ  gune 
determiner: kodâm yek X-i hicˇ (yek)  
 
The indefinites of the i-series may also be preceded by yek ‘one’ (yek kas-i, yek cˇ iz-i, yek jˇ â-yi, 
etc.). 
A.21.2. Origins. The i-series is nothing but generic nouns (‘person’, ‘thing’, ‘place’, etc.) suffixed 
with the indefinite article -i. The determiner yek is identical to yek ‘one’. The hicˇ -series is also 
based on generic nouns. The particle hicˇ  originally meant ‘anybody’ and appears to go back to 
Old Persian aiva ‘one’ plus cˇ iy (an emphatic particle cognate with Sanskrit cit, cf. A.22.2). 
A.21.3. Distribution. The distribution of the two series is shown in Figure A.21. The data are 
from reference works and from a native speaker (Parviz Rostampour) . 
 
Figure A.21.     direct 
   question indirect negation 
specific specific irrealis  negation  
known unknown non-specific  
   conditional comparative  
     free-choice 
 
The i-series can be used in all functions except for the comparative and free-choice functions. 
 
(A.160) specific known/unknown 
 Diruz kas-i-râ dar otobus did-am.  
 yesterday person-INDEF-ACC on bus see:PAST-1SG 
 ‘Yesterday I saw someone [known/unknown] on the bus.’ 
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(A.161) irrealis non-specific (imperative) 
 Yek vaqt-i be xâne-ye mâ bey-âyid.  
 one time-INDEF to house-LK we SBJV-come:IMPV 
 ‘Come to our house sometime.’ 
 




 a. Âyâ (hicˇ ) cˇ iz-i mi-sˇ anav-i?  
  Q INDEF thing-INDEF IMPF-hear-2SG 
  ‘Can you hear anything?’ 
 b. Agar (*hicˇ ) cˇ iz-i sˇ anid-i, be man be-gu.  
  if INDEF thing-INDEF hear-2SG to me SBJV-say 
  ‘If you hear anything, tell me.’ 
(A.163) indirect negation 
 Fekr na-mi-kon-am (ke) Sorâyâ (hicˇ ) cˇ iz-i sˇ anide bâsˇ ad.  
 thinking NEG-IMPF-do-1SG that Soraya INDEF thing-INDEF heard has 
 ‘I don’t think that Soraya heard anything.’  
 
While hicˇ  in the question and indirect-negation functions is possible, but not preferred, it is 
quite normal in the direct-negation function. However, not even here it is required. (For the 
case of two negated indefinites in one clause, see § 8.2.6.2.) 
 
(A.164) direct negation 
 Hicˇ  kas(-i)/ kas-i zang na-zad.  
 INDEF person-INDEF person-INDEF ring NEG-hit 
 ‘Nobody called.’ 
 
For the free-choice and the comparative series, har ‘every’ has to be used: 
 
(A.165) Har kas(-i) mi-tavânad in mas?ale-râ hall konad.  
 every person-INDEF IMPF-can this problem-ACC solving do 
 ‘Anyone can solve this problem.’ 
(A.166) Pesar az har kas-i tondtar mi-davad.  
 boy than every person-INDEF faster IMPF-runs 





A.22.1. Inventory. Hindi/Urdu (Indo-European, Indic) has only two major series of indefinite 
pronouns:  (i) the koii-series, which is morphologically similar to, but not synchronically 
derivable from, the interrogative pronouns; (ii) the bhii-series, derived from the koii-series. 
 
 interrogative koii-series bhii-series  
person: kaun (obl. kis) koii (obl. kisii) koii bhii 
thing: kyaa kuch kuch bhii 
place: kahã kah i˜   kah i˜   bhii 
time: kab kabhii kabhii bhii 
 
Besides these, there is a peripheral X na X series (koii na koii ‘someone or other’, kuch na kuch 
‘something or other’), cf. § 8.3.4.2. 
A.22.2. Origins. The indefiniteness marker bhii is identical to the focus particle bhii ‘also, even’. 
The koii-series is etymologically derived from the interrogative series: koii < Sanskrit ko ’pi, 
sandhi form of kah5 api (kah5 ‘who’, api ‘particle’), kuch < Sanskrit kim%cit (kim% ‘what’, cit, a 
particle) (Beames 1875, vol. II: §72). 
A.22.3. Distribution. The distribution of the three series is shown in Figure A.22. The data are 
from Bhatia (1978) (B78), Davison (1978a) (D78), (1978b), Mahajan (1990), and a native speaker 
(Sangeeta Sharma). See also Dayal (1995) on bhii. 
 
Figure A.22.     direct 
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   question indirect negation 
specific specific irrealis  negation  
known unknown non-specific  
   conditional comparative  
     free-choice 
 
The koii-series may be used in all functions except the comparative and the free-choice 
functions. However, in the direct-negation function the bhii-series seems to be preferred. 
 
(A.167) specific known/unknown 
 Kisii-ne <*bhii> fon kiy-aa thaa,   
 someone-ERG INDEF phone do-PFV was   
   — par mãi˜  tumhe˜  nahi˜   bataau˜ gii, kis-ne.  
    but I you NEG I:will:tell who-ERG 
   — par mujhe nahi˜  maaluum, kis-ne.  
    but I:DAT NEG known who-ERG  
 ‘Someone has phoned, but I won’t tell you who/but I don't know who.’ 
(A.168) indirect negation 
 Mujhe nahi˜  lag-taa hai ki kal koii (bhii) aaege. (D78: 37) 
 I:DAT NEG seem-IMPF is that tomorrow someone INDEF he:will:come 
 ‘It doesn’t seem to me that anyone will come tomorrow.’ 
(A.169) direct negation 
 a. Ghar me˜  koii (bhii) nah i˜   hai. (B78: 69) 
  house in someone INDEF NEG is 
  ‘No one (at all) is at home.’ 
 b. Kisii-ne kuch nahi˜   dekh-aa. (D78: 29) 
  someone-ERG something NEG see-PFV 
  ‘Nobody saw anything.’ (Or: ‘Someone saw nothing.’) 
 
In irrealis contexts, the bhii-series is always non-specific. 
 
(A.170) irrealis non-specific (‘want’, imperative) 
 a. Wah kisii-ko/  kisii-ko bhii fon kar-naa caah-tii hai.  
  she someone-DAT someone-DAT INDEF phone do-INF want-IMPF is 
  ‘She wants to phone someone (specific/non-specific).’ 
 b. Kisii-ko (bhii) fon kar-o!  
  someone-DAT INDEF phone do-IMPV 
  ‘Phone someone!’ 
 
In questions and conditionals, the bhii-series differs from the koii-series in being more emphatic 
(‘any ... at all’). 
 
(A.171) question/conditional 
 a. Kyaa aap-ne kisii-ko/ kisii-ko bhii dekh-aa? (D78: 27-8) 
  Q you-ERG someone-DAT someone INDEF see-PFV 
  ‘Did you see somebody/anybody?’ 
 b. Agar koii (bhii) fon kare, mujhe bataanaa.  
  if someone INDEF phone calls I:DAT tell 
  ‘If anybody (at all) calls, tell me.’ 
 
The free-choice and comparative functions are only expressed by the bhii-series: 
 
(A.172) comparative 
 Yeh larkaa apne vidyaalay ke kisii bhii larke se zyaada tez 
 this boy his class of someone INDEF boy from more fast  
 daur-taa hai.  
 run-IMPF is 
 ‘This boy runs faster than anyone in his class.’ 
(A.173) free choice 
 Ghar me˜  koii bhii aa sak-taa hai. (B78:70) 
 house in someone INDEF come can-IMPF is 
 ‘Anyone can come into the house.’ 
 




A.23.1. Inventory. Turkish (Turkic) has three major series of indefinite pronouns, all of them 
based on generic nouns and bir ‘one’:  (i) the non-emphatic bir-series, (ii) the negative hiç-series, 
and (iii) the free-choice series marked by herhangi: 
 
 interrogative bir-series hiç-series herhangi-series 
person: kim biri(si) hiçbiri, hiç kimse herhangi biri 
thing: ne bir s3ey hiç bir  s3ey herhangi bir  s3ey 
place: nerede bir yerde hiç bir yerde herhangi bir yerde 
time: ne zaman bir zaman hiç bir zaman herhangi bir zaman 
manner: nasıl bir s3ekilde hiç bir s3ekilde herhangi bir s3ekilde 
determiner: hangi bir hiç bir herhangi bir 
 
In addition, there is the isolated indefinite (bir) kimse ‘someone, anyone’, which can only be 
used non-specifically. 
A.23.2. Origins. Bir is identical to the numeral ‘one’. Some of the combinations of bir plus 
generic nouns are strongly lexicalized; bir s3ey is felt as a single word (cf. § 1.2.2). The indef-
initeness marker hiç was borrowed from Persian (cf. A.21). Herhangi consists of her ‘every’ (also 
borrowed from Persian) and hangi ‘which?’. Kimse seems to be derived from kim ‘who’ and the 
conditional suffix -se. 
A.23.3. Distribution. The distribution of the three series is shown in Figure A.23. The data are 
from Xovratovicˇ (1989)  and from a native speaker (Fethi Inan) . 
 
Figure A.23.     direct 
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     free-choice 
 
In the specific-known function, only the bir-series is possible: 
 
(A.174) specific-known 
 San-a biri(si) telefon et-ti. Bil, bakalım, kim.  
 you-DAT one  phone do-PAST know we’ll.see who 
 ‘Someone phoned you. Guess who.’ 
 
In all the functions from specific-unknown to direct negation, either the bir-series or the 
herhangi-series are possible. 
 
(A.175) specific-unknown 
 San-a biri(si)/ herhangi biri telefon et-ti. Kim ol-dugˇ -u-nu  
 you-DAT one any one phone do-PAST who be-REL-3SG-ACC 
 bil-m-iyor-um.  
 know-NEG-IMPF-1SG 
 ‘Someone phoned you. I don’t know who.’ 
(A.176) irrealis non-specific (imperative) 
 Herhangi bir yer-e/ bir yer-e telefon et! 
 any one place-DAT one place-DAT phone do(IMPV) 
 ‘Call somewhere (or other)! 
(A.177) question/conditional 
 a. Herhangi bir  s3ey/ bir  s3ey/ hiç bir  s3ey duy-du-n mu? 
  any one thing one thing INDEF one thing hear-PAST-2SG Q 
  ‘Did you hear anything?’ 
 b. Herhangi biri/ biri telefon ed-er-se, ban-a hemen söyle. 
  any one one phone do-AOR-COND I-DAT straight.away say(IMPV) 
  ‘If anyone calls, tell me immediately.’ 
 
In the question function (cf. A.177a) and in the negation functions, the hiç-series is another 
possible alternative. 
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(A.178) indirect negation 
 Kimse-nin/ herhangi biri-nin/ hiç kimse-nin gel-me-si  
 anyone-GEN any one-GEN INDEF anyone-GEN come-MASD-3SG 
 gerekli degˇ il. 
 necessary NEG.is 
 ‘It is not necessary for anyone to come.’ 
 
In the direct-negation function, the hiç-indefinites are the most usual form. They always cooccur 
with verbal negation. (For the case of two negated indefinites in one clause, see § 8.2.6.2.) 
 
(A.179) direct negation 
 Hiç bir  s3ey/ herhangi bir  s3ey/ bir  s3ey gör-me-di-m. 
 INDEF one thing any one thing one thing see-NEG-PAST-1SG 
 ‘I didn’t see anything.’ 
 
In the free-choice and comparative functions, only the herhangi-series is possible: 
 
(A.180) free choice 
 Herhangi biri bu problem-i çöz-ebil-ir. 
 any one this problem-ACC solve-ABIL-AOR(3SG) 
 ‘Anyone can solve this problem.’ 
(A.181) comparative 
 Murat sınıf-ın-da-ki herhangi birin-den daha hızlı kos3-ar.  
 Murat class-3SG-LOC-ATTR any one-ABL more fast run-AOR 





A.24.1. Inventory. Kazakh (Turkic) has four major series of indefinite pronouns, three of which 
are based on interrogatives: (i) the non-emphatic bir-series, (ii) the specific älde-series, (iii) the 
negative esˇ -series, and (iv) the free-choice series marked by bolsa da. 
 
 interrogative bir-series älde-series esˇ -series bolsa da-series 
person: kim birew älde-kim esˇ -kim kim bolsa da 
thing: ne birnärse,  älde-ne esˇ -närse ne bolsa da 
  birdeme  esˇ -teme 
place: qajda bir zˇ erde älde-qajda esˇ -qajda qajda bolsa da 
time: qasˇ an bir kezde  älde-qasˇ an esˇ -qasˇ an qasˇ an bolsa da 
manner: qalaj    qalaj bolsa da 
determiner: qandaj  älde-qandaj esˇ -qandaj qandaj bolsa da 
   älde-bir esˇ -bir 
 
A.24.2. Origins. The bir-series is based on bir ‘one’ and generic nouns (except for birew and 
birnärse, birdeme, whose origin is not clear to me). The prefix esˇ - is etymologically identical to 
Turkish hiç and goes back to Persian hicˇ (Section 21) . The origin of the prefix älde- is obscure, 
but a connection with Tatar and Bashkir ällä ‘possibly; question particle; indefiniteness marker’ 
seems possible. 
A.24.3. Distribution. The distribution of the four series is shown in Figure A.24. The data are 
from a native speaker (Kusain Rsaldinov)  and from Sauranbaev (ed.) (1954) (S54). 
 
Figure A.24.     direct 
   question indirect negation 
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   conditional comparative  
     free-choice 
 
The älde-series is used only in specific functions. 
 
(A.182) specific 
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 a. Älde-qajdan masˇ ina-nyN gudag-y estil-di. (S54: 151) 
  INDEF-where car-GEN honk-3SG sound-PAST 
  ‘Somewhere the honk of a car sounded.’ 
 b. Ol älde-qandaj dälel-der keltir-di. (S54:319) 
  he INDEF-which argument-PL adduce-PAST(3SG) 
  ‘He adduced some arguments or other.’ 
 
The bir-series is used in specific functions, both known and unknown. 
 
(A.183) specific known/unknown 
 Birew telefon soq-ty  — byraq kim ekenin bil-me-j-min.  
 someone phone hit-PAST  but who [?]  know-NEG-PRES-1SG 
        — kim ekenin tapsˇ y.  
         who [?] guess(IMPV) 
 ‘Someone called — but I don’t know who.’ 
     — guess who.’ 
 
It is also used non-specifically in irrealis contexts, in questions and conditionals, and in indirect-
negation contexts. 
 
(A.184) irrealis non-specific (imperative, hortative) 
 Bir zˇ er-de kezde-ser-miz.  
 one place-INESS meet-FUT-1PL 
 ‘Let’s meet somewhere.’ 
(A.185) question/conditional 
 a. Birew <*älde-kim> kel-di me?  
  someone INDEF-who  come-PAST(3SG) Q 
  ‘Did anyone come?’ 
 b. Birew <*älde-kim> kel-se, ma-Van ajt.  
  someone INDEF-who come-COND(3SG) I-DAT tell(IMPV) 
  ‘If anyone comes, tell me.’ 
(A.186) indirect negation 
 Birew kel-di dep sen-be-j-min.  
 someone come-PAST(3SG) that think-NEG-PRES-1SG 
 ‘I don’t think that anyone came.’ 
 
In the direct-negation function, only the esˇ -series is possible, cooccurring with verbal negation. 
 
(A.187) direct negation 
 a. Esˇ -kim esˇ -närse de-me-di.  
  NEG-who NEG-anything say-NEG-PAST(3SG) 
  ‘Nobody said anything.’ 
 
The bolsa da-series is used in the free-choice function, and also (though much less commonly 
than the bir-series) in questions and conditionals. (I lack data for the comparative function.) 
 
(A.188) free choice 
 SeniN kim-di bolsa da sˇ aqyru-Na bolady.  
 you who-ACC INDEF invite-MASD may 
 ‘You may invite anyone.’ 
(A.189) Bir waqyt-ta/ qasˇ an bolsa da seniN Moskva-da bol-gˇ a-nyN bar ma?  
 one time-INESS when INDEF you Moscow-INESS be-PAST-2SG is Q 





A.25.1. Inventory. Yakut (Turkic) has four major series of indefinite pronouns, all of which are 
derived from interrogatives:  (i) the specific ere-series, (ii) the non-specific eme-series, (iii) the 
negative da-series, and (iv) the free-choice series marked by baVarar. 
 
 interrogative ere-series eme-series da-series baVarar-series 
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person: kim kim ere kim eme kim da kim baVarar 
thing: tuox tuox ere tuox eme tuox da tuox baVarar 
place: xanna xanna ere xanna eme xanna da xanna baVarar 
time: xahan xahan ere xahan eme xahan da xahan baVarar 
manner: xajdax xajdax ere — xajdax da xajdax baVarar 
determiner: xannyk xannyk ere — xannyk da xannyk baVarar 
 xaja xaja ere xaja eme xaja da xaja baVarar 
 
A.25.2. Origins. The particle ere is also used with the meaning ‘or’ (cf. § 7.2). The particle eme is 
also used with the meaning ‘at least’ (cf. § 7.1). The particle da is also used with the meaning 
‘and, also, even’ (cf. § 7.1). The indefiniteness marker baVarar is derived from baVar ‘want’. 
 
A.25.3. Distribution. The distribution of the four series is shown in Figure A.25. The data are 
from Afanas’ev and Xaritonov (1968) (AX68) and from Ubrjatova (ed.) (1982) (U82). 
 
Figure A.25.     direct 
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The ere-series is restricted to specific functions. 
 
(A.190) specific 
 Kim ere eji-exe kiir-e syld’y-byt-a. (AX68: 250) 
 who INDEF you-DAT enter-CONV go-PERF-3SG 
 ‘Someone has come to you.’ 
 
The eme-series is used in non-specific functions in irrealis contexts, questions and conditionals. 
 
(A.191) irrealis non-specific (future) 
 Xojut kim-inen eme tug-u eme yyt-ya-m. (U82: 200) 
 afterwards who-INSTR INDEF what-ACC INDEF send-FUT-1SG 
 ‘Afterwards I’ll send something with someone.’ 
(A.192) question/conditional 
 a. En xahan eme Moskva-Va syld’y-byt-yN duo? (AX68: 229) 
  you when INDEF Moscow-DAT go-PERF-2SG Q 
  ‘Have you ever been to Moscow?’ 
 b. Kim eme kel-leVine, mii-gin üle-t-iger bar-byt-a die.  
  who INDEF come-COND I-ACC work-3SG-DAT go-PERF-3SG say(IMPV) 
  ‘If anyone comes, say that I went to work.’ (AX68: 250) 
 
The da-series is used in the direct-negation function (cooccurring with verbal negation), the 
comparative function and the free-choice function. Unfortunately, I lack data on the indirect-
negation function, but my implicational map predicts that the da-series is also possible in this 
function. 
 
(A.193) direct negation 
 Kini-ni tuox da interiehirge-ppet. (AX68: 336) 
 he-ACC what INDEF interest-NEG.3SG 
 ‘Nothing interests him.’ 
(A.194) comparative 
 AjylVa kiergel-in kim-ten da syanalyy-r. (U82: 209) 
 nature beauty-3SG:ACC who-ABL INDEF appreciate-3SG 
 ‘He appreciates nature’s beauty more than anyone.’ 
 
The baVarar-series may also be used in the free-choice function. 
 
(A.195) free choice 
 Kini-tten tug-u baVarar küüt-üö-xxe söp. (U82: 207) 
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 he-ABL what-ACC INDEF expect-MASD-DAT possible 





A.26.1. Inventory. Hungarian (Finno-Ugrian) has four major series of indefinite pronouns, all of 
them derived from interrogatives:  (i) the general vala-series, (ii) the negative sem-series, and 
(iii-iv) the two free-choice series in akár- and bár-. 
 
 interrogative vala-series sem-series akár-series bár-series 
person: ki vala-ki sen-ki akár-ki bár-ki 
thing: mi vala-mi sem-mi akár-mi bár-mi 
property: milyen vala-milyen sem-milyen akár-milyen bár-milyen 
place: hol vala-hol se-hol akár-hol bár-hol 
time: mikor vala-mikor sem-mikor akár-mikor bár-mikor 
manner: hogy(an) vala-hogy(an) se-hogy(an) akár-hogy(an) bár-hogy(an) 
amount: hány — se-hány akár-hány  
 mennyi — se-mennyi akár-mennyi bár-mennyi 
determiner: mely(ik) mely(ik) — akár-mely(ik) bár-mely(ik) 
 
There is also a marginal né-series (né-mi ‘something, a little’, né-hol ‘in some places, here and 
there’, né-hány ‘some, a few’, né-melyik ‘some’). 
A.26.2. Origins. The indefiniteness prefix vala- is probably related to van/vol- ‘be’. The prefix 
akár- is identical to akár ‘or; at least’, related to akar ‘want’. The prefix bár is identical to bár 
‘although; if only’. The prefix sem- (se-) is identical to sem ‘not either, neither’ (< is ‘too’ plus nem 
‘not’). The prefix né- was borrowed from Slavic (cf. Russian ne- Polish nie-, Bulgarian nja-). 
A.26.3. Distribution. The distribution of the three series is shown in Figure A.26. The data are 
from Stephanides (1983, 1985) (S85), Hunyadi (1987), dictionaries, the New Testament, and a 
native speaker (Edith Moravcsik). (See also Szarvas (1892), Beke (1914).) 
 
Figure A.26.     direct 
   question indirect negation 
specific specific irrealis  negation  
known unknown non-specific  
   conditional comparative  
     free-choice 
 
The vala-series is used in all functions from ‘specific’ to ‘indirect negation’. 
 
(A.196) specific unknown 
 Vala-hol már tolál-koz-t-unk.  
 INDEF-where already meet-REFL-PAST-1PL 
 ‘We have met somewhere before.’ 
(A.197) specific known 
 Mester, lát-ánk vala-ki-t,  a ki a te nev-ed-del  
 master see-1PL INDEF-who-ACC who ART you name-2SG-INSTR 
 ördög-ök-et üz. (NT, Mk 9.38) 
 devil-PL-ACC drive 
 ‘Master, we saw one casting out devils in thy name.’ 
(A.198) irrealis non-specific 
 Majd csak meglesz-ünk vala-hogy.  
 later only manage-1PL INDEF-how 
 ‘We’ll manage somehow.’ 
 
The sem-series can only be used in the direct-negation function: 
 
(A.199) direct negation 
 a. Nem lát-t-am sem-mi-t <*akár-mi-t, *bár-mi-t>.  
  NEG see-PAST-1SG INDEF-what-ACC  
  ‘I did not see anything.’ 
 b. Sen-ki-nek  sem-mi-t sem szólának. (NT, Mk 16.8) 
  INDEF-who-DAT INDEF-what-ACC NEG say:3PL 
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  ‘Neither said they any thing to any man.’ 
 
The akár- and bár-series are used mainly in the free-choice function, but also in the comparative 
function, the indirect-negation function, and with an emphatic value in the conditional 
function. However, these series cannot be used in questions. 
 
(A.200) free choice 
 Akár-ki tanul-hat-ott.  
 INDEF-who learn-POT-PAST(3SG) 
 ‘Anybody could learn.’ 
(A.201) comparative 
 Itt jobb a klíma, mint akár-hol/bár-hol Európá-ban.  
 here better ART climate than INDEF-where Europe-INESS 
 ‘Here the climate is better than anywhere in Europe.’  
(A.202) indirect negation 
 Nem hisz-em, hogy vala-ki/ bár-ki/akár-ki lát-t-a volna.  
 NEG think-1SG that INDEF-who INDEF-who  see-PAST-3SG SBJV 
 ‘I don’t think that anybody has seen it.’ 
(A.203) conditional 
 Ha bár-mi-t/akár-mi-t/vala-mi-t hal-asz, ébressz fel.  
 if INDEF-what-ACC   hear-2SG wake up 
 ‘If you hear anything (at all), wake me up.’ 
(A.204) question 
 Hall-ott-ál  vala-mi-t  <*akár-mi-t,  *bár-mi-t>?  
 hear-PAST-2SG INDEF-what-ACC INDEF-what-ACC INDEF-what-ACC 





A.27.1. Inventory. Finnish (Finno-Ugrian) has three main series of indefinite pronouns, two of 
which are derived from interrogatives:  (i) the mainly negative -kaan-series and (ii) the free-
choice series marked by hyvänsä. The non-emphatic -kin-series (iii), by contrast, is based on 
relative pronouns. 
 
 interrogative series series series 
person: kuka jo-ku (jo-n-ku-n) kuka-an kuka hyvänsä 
thing: mikä, mitä jo-kin, jota-kin mikä-än mikä hyvänsä 
place: missä jossa-kin missä-än missä hyvänsä 
time: milloin jolloin-kin milloin-kaan milloin hyvänsä 
manner: miten, kuinka joten-kin miten-kaan miten hyvänsä 
dual determiner: kumpi (‘which of two’) jompi-kumpi kumpi-kaan kumpi hyvänsä  
 
Note that the members joku and jompikumpi of the -kin-series do not contain the suffix -kin, but 
are compounds of the roots jo- and ku- and inflect doubly: joku, Partitive jotakuta, Inessive 
jossakussa, etc.; jompikumpi, Partitive jompaakumpaa, etc. An equivalent of hyvänsä is tahansa. In 
addition, there is eräs 'a certain'. 
A.27.2. Origins. The suffix -kin also means ‘also, even’. The suffix -kaan also means ‘not either; 
not even’. Hyvänsä is somehow related to hyvä ‘good’, and tahansa is somehow related to tahtoa 
‘want’. 
A.27.3. Distribution. The distribution of the three series is shown in Figure A.27. The data are 
from native speakers (Juhani Rudanko, Angela Bartens, Hannu Tommola). See also Karttunen 
and Peters (1980). 
 
Figure A.27.     direct 
   question indirect negation 
specific specific irrealis  negation  
known unknown non-specific  
   conditional comparative  
     free-choice 
 
The -kin-series is used in non-emphatic functions, but not in the specific-known function, where 
eräs ‘a certain’ must be used. 
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(A.205) specific known 
 a. *Joku soitt-i. Arvaa kuka (se oli)?  
  someone call-PAST(3SG) guess:IMPV who it was 
  ‘Someone called. Guess who (it was).’ 
 b. Eräs ystäväni kerto-i sen. 
  certain friend tell-PAST(3SG) it 
  'A certain friend told him.' 
(A.206) specific unknown 
 Joku soitt-i, mutta en saa-nut    
 someone call-PAST(3SG) but NEG:1SG get-PAST.PTCP   
 nime-stä selvää.  
 name-ELAT clear:PRTV 
 ‘Someone called, but I didn’t understand the name.’ 
(A.207) irrealis non-specific (‘want’) 
 Hän haluaa mennä naimisiin jonkun kanssa, jolla on tumma tukka.  
 she wants go marriage someone with who-on is dark hair
  
 ‘She wants to marry someone [non-specific] with black hair.’ 
 
In questions, the -kaan-series is a possible alternative (cf. Schmid 1980: 139), but the hyvänsä-
series is impossible. In conditionals, the hyvänsä-series is a possible (more emphatic) alternative, 
but the -kaan-series is impossible. 
 
(A.208) question 
 Soitt-i-ko joku/ kuka-an/ *kuka hyvänsä?  
 call-PAST(3SG)-Q someone who-INDEF who INDEF 
 ‘Did someone/anyone call?’ 
(A.209) conditional 
 Jos joku/ kuka hyvänsä/ *kuka-an soittaa, sano minulle.  
 if someone who INDEF who-INDEF calls tell(IMPV) I:on 
 ‘If someone/anyone at all calls, tell me.’ 
 
The -kaan-series is used in the negation functions and in the comparative function. In the direct-
negation function, it cooccurs with verbal negation. 
 
(A.210) direct negation 
 Kuka-an ei kerto-nut minulle mitä-än.  
 who-INDEF NEG:3SG tell-PAST.PTCP I:on when-INDEF 
 ‘Nobody told me anything.’ 
(A.211) indirect negation 
 Epäilen että poika varast-i mitä-än.  
 I:doubt that boy steal-PAST(3SG) what-INDEF 
 ‘I doubt that the boy stole anything.’ 
(A.212) comparative 
 Ilmasto on täällä mielyttävä-mpi kuin missä-än muualla Euroopa-ssa.  
 climate is here pleasant-COMPR than where-INDEF else Europe-INESS 
 ‘Here the climate is more pleasant than anywhere in Europe.’ 
 
The hyvänsä- (or tahansa-) series is used mainly in the free-choice function. 
 
(A.213) free choice 
 Kuka tahansa osaa natkaista tämän ongelman.   
 who INDEF can solve this problem 
 ‘Anyone can solve this problem.’ 
 
Since the hyvänsä-series also occurs in the conditional function (cf. A.209), the implicational map 
predicts that it can be used in the comparative function. This is indeed the case, but only in the 
standard of equative comparison: 
 
(A.214) comparative 
 Täällä on yhtä mukavaa kuin missä tahansa muualla.  
 here is as pleasant as where INDEF else 
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 ‘It is as pleasant here as anywhere else.’ 
 
In the standard of comparison of inequality, the -kaan-series is used, cf. (A.212). In my data 
Finnish is the only case of a language where comparison of equality behaves differently from 
comparison of inequality. Maybe this case shows that eventually the map will have to be 





A. 28.1. Inventory. Nanay (Manchu-Tungusic) has three major series of indefinite pronouns:  
the specific -nuu-series, (ii) the non-specific -daa-series, and (iii) the free-choice series marked by 





A.29.1. Inventory. Lezgian (Nakh-Daghestanian) has three major series of indefinite pronouns, 
two of which are derived from interrogatives:  (i) the general sa X jat’ani-series, and (ii) the free-
choice xˆ ajit’ani-series. The third series is the negative sa X-ni-series. 
 
 interrogative jat’ani-series xˆ ajit’ani-series sa X-ni-series 
person: wuzˇ /ni- sa wuzˇ  jat’ani wuzˇ xˆ ajit’ani sa kas-ni 
thing: wucˇ /kü- sa wucˇ  jat’ani wucˇ xˆ ajit’ani sa zat’-ni 
property: hixˆ tin sa hixˆ tin jat’ani hixˆ tin ... xˆ ajit’ani — 
place: hina sa hina jat’ani hina xˆ ajit’ani sana-ni 
time: mus sa mus jat’ani mus xˆ ajit’ani sadra-ni 
manner: hik’ sa hik’ jat’ani hik’ xˆ ajit’ani sak’-ni  
determiner: hi sa hi jat’ani hi ... xˆ ajit’ani sa...-ni  
 
The sa in the sa X jat’ani-series and in sa kas-ni/sa zat’-ni may optionally be absent. Perhaps also a 
special specific sa-series (sa kas ‘somebody’, sa zat’ ‘something’, sadra ‘once’, etc.) must be 
recognized. 
A.29.2. Origins. Sa is identical to the numeral sa ‘one’. Both jat’ani and xˆ ajit’ani consist of ‘be’ (ja 
‘be (standard copula)’, xˆ un ‘become; be’),  the  conditional  suffix -t’a, and the focus marker -ni 
‘also, even’. Kas is ‘person’, zat’ is ‘thing’. 
A.29.3. Distribution. The distribution of the three series is shown in Figure A.29. The data are 
from Haspelmath (1993a: 194-9). 
 
Figure A.29.     direct 
   question indirect negation 
specific specific irrealis  negation  
known unknown non-specific  
   conditional comparative  
     free-choice 
 
The sa X jat’ani is used for all functions from specific-known to question/conditional: 
 
(A.215) specific known/unknown 
 a. Za wa-z sa wucˇ  jat’ani luhu-da. 
  I:ERG you-DAT one what INDEF say-FUT 
  ‘I’ll tell you something.’ 
 b. Gila cˇ ar-ar wucˇ iz jat’ani xükwe-zma-cˇ .  
  now letter-PL why INDEF come-CONT.IMPF-NEG 
  ‘Now the letters don’t come anymore for some reason.’ 
(A.216) irrealis non-specific (imperative) 
  Sa ni-z jat’ani ewer ce!  
  one who-DAT INDEF call give:IMPV 
  ‘Call someone!’ 
(A.217) question/conditional 
  a. Wa-z sa wucˇ  jat’ani aku-r-t’a, za-z lah!  
    you-DAT one what:ABS INDEF see-AOR.PTCP-COND I-DAT say:IMPV 
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    ‘If you see anything, tell me.’ 
  b. Sa wuzˇ  jat’ani ata-nwa-ni?  
    one who:ABS INDEF come-PERF-Q 
    ‘Has anyone come?’ 
 
The xˆ ajit’ani-series is used in the free-choice and comparative functions. 
 
(A.218) free choice 
  Ada-qh galaz kwe-kaj xˆ ajit’ani sühbet iji-z zˇ e-da. 
  she-POSTESS with what-SUBEL INDEF talk do-INF can-FUT 
  ‘With her one can talk about anything.’  
(A.219) comparative 
  Jusuf.a ne-laj xˆ ajit’ani qhsan-diz mani-jar luhu-zwa.  
  Jusuf(ERG) who-SUPREL INDEF good-ADV song-PL say-IMPF 
  ‘Jusuf sings better than anyone.’ 
 
The sa X-ni-series is used in the indirect-negation and direct-negation functions (cooccurring 
with verbal negation in the latter). 
 
(A.220) direct negation 
  Däwe mad sadra-ni sa kasdi-z-ni q’ismet ta-xˆ u-raj. 
  war again once-even one person-DAT-even destiny NEG-be-OPT 
  ‘May war never again be anyone’s destiny.’ 
(A.221) indirect negation 
  Cˇ a-z sada-z-ni hicˇ  sa cˇ ’aw.u-z-ni däwe xˆ a-na  
  we-DAT one-DAT-even ever one time-DAT-even war be-AOR.CONV  
  k’an-da-cˇ . 
  want-FUT-NEG 





A.30.1. Inventory. Maltese (Afro-Asiatic, Arabic) has two series of indefinite pronouns which 
are not related to interrogatives: (i) the non-negative xi-series, and (ii) the negative ebda-series. 
 
 interrogative xi-series ebda-series 
person min xi Ìadd Ìadd 
thing xi xi Ìag· a xejn 
place fejn xi mkien imkien 
time meta xi darba qatt 
manner kif b’xi mod (u manjiera) bl’ ebda mod 
determiner liema xi ebda 
 
There is also a marginal free-choice determiner kwalunkwe ‘any’ (a recent loan from Italian 
qualunque). 
A.30.2. Origins. The determiner xi goes back to Classical Arabic sˇ ay? ‘thing, something’. Some 
of the second elements in the xi-series are synchronically existing generic nouns (Ìaga ‘thing’, 
darba ‘time, i.e. French fois’, mod ‘manner’). The root Ìadd goes back to Classical Arabic ?aÌad 
‘one’ (related to waaÌid, Maltese wieÌed ‘one’), and mkien goes back to makaan ‘place’. Qatt goes 
back to Arabic qattu ‘never’, and ebda goes back to ?abadan ‘(n)ever’, the adverbail accusative of 
?abad ‘eternity’. 
A.30.3. Distribution. The distribution of the two series is shown in Figure A.30. The data are 
from Haspelmath and Caruana (to appear). 
 
Figure A.30.     direct 
   question indirect negation 
specific specific irrealis  negation  
known unknown non-specific  
   conditional comparative  
     free-choice 
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The xi-series is used in non-negative functions. 
 
(A.222) Xi Ìadd qed jaÌdem fil-g· nien. 
 INDEF anyone PROG he:work:IMPF in:the-garden 
 ‘Somebody is working in the garden.’ 
(A.223) irrealis non-specific (future) 
 Xi darba is-sena d-dieÌla mmur l-Afrika. 
 INDEF time the-year the-entering I:go:IMPF the-Africa 
 ‘I’ll go to Africa sometime next year.’ 
(A.224) question/conditional 
 a. Jekk tara xi Ìag· a <*xejn>, gÌidli. 
  if you:see:IMPF INDEF thing anything tell:me:IMPV 
  ‘If you see anything, tell me.’ 
 b. Rajt xi Ìag· a <*xejn>? 
  you:see:PERF INDEF thing anything 
  ‘Did you see anything?’ 
 
The ebda-series is used in the negative and comparative functions. 
 
(A.225) Comparative  
  Dan huwa l-isbaÌ inkwatru li Ìadd qatt ping· a. 
  this it the-beautiful:COMP picture that anyone ever he:paint:PERF 
  ‘This is the most beautiful painting that anyone has ever painted.’ 
(A.226) Indirect negation 
  It-tifla gÌamlitha mingÌajr ebda gÌajnuna. 
  the-girl she:do:it:PERF without any help 
  ‘The girl did it without any help.’ 
(A.227) Direct negation (see also § 8.2.1) 
 It-tifla ma rat xejn. 
 the-girl NEG she:see:PERF anything 
 ‘The girl didn’t see anything.’  
 
The free-choice function is not expressed by indefinite pronouns. Either universal pronouns are 
used (kulÌadd ‘everyone’), or circumlocutions like min trid ‘whoever you want’ (cf. § 3.3.3-4). The 





A.31.1. Inventory. (Modern) Hebrew (Afro-Asiatic, Semitic) has three major series of indefinite 
pronouns: (i) the -sˇ ehu-series, which is derived from interrogative pronouns, (ii) the negative-
polarity isˇ -series (isˇ  ‘man’, davar ‘thing’), (iii) the kol-series, and (iv) the negative af/sˇ um-series. 
 
 interrogative -sˇ ehu-series isˇ -series kol-series af/sˇ um-series  
person: mi mi-sˇ ehu/-sˇ ehi isˇ   af eÌad 
thing: ma ma-sˇ ehu davar  sˇ um davar 
place: eyfo eyfo-sˇ ehu  kol makom be-sˇ um/af makom  
time: matay pa¿am, matay-sˇ ehu kol zman af pa¿am, le¿olam  
manner: ex ex-sˇ ehu   
determiner: eyze/eyzo eyze-sˇ ehu  kol af, sˇ um 
 
Besides sˇ um davar ‘nothing’, there are also two non-derived expressions: klum ‘nothing’, and 
me?uma ‘nothing’, which behave in the same way. The kol-series and the isˇ -series almost occur 
in complementary distribution, so they could perhaps be regarded as forming one formally 
heterogenous series. 
A.31.2. Origins. Two of the three series are formally rather heterogeneous. Pronouns from the 
negative af/sˇ um-series are generally made up of one of the determiners af and sˇ um plus a 
generic noun (eÌad ‘one’, davar ‘thing’, makom ‘place’, pa¿am ‘time, fois’), but le¿olam is literally ‘in 
eternity’. Two of the pronouns of the isˇ -series are originally general nouns (isˇ  ‘man’, davar 
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‘thing’), and kol ‘any’ is originally ‘all’. The suffix of the -sˇ ehu-series stems from a parametric 
concessive conditional clause (cf. mi-sˇ ehu yihiye ‘whoever he is...’; cf. § 6.2.3). 
A.31.3. Distribution. The distribution of the three series is shown in Figure A.31. The data are 
from Glinert (1982) (G82), (1989) (G89), and a native speaker (David Gil) . 
 
Figure A.31.     direct 
   question indirect negation 
specific specific irrealis  negation  
known unknown non-specific  
   conditional comparative  
     free-choice 
 
The -sˇ ehu-series is normal for the specific functions and up to the indirect-negation function.  
 
(A.228) specific 
 Ra?i-ti mi-sˇ ehu <*isˇ >.  
 saw-1SG who-INDEF person 
 ‘I saw somebody.’ 
(A.229) irrealis non-specific 
 Ti-r?e ma-sˇ ehu <*davar>.  
 2sg-will:see what-INDEF thing 
 ‘You will see something.’ 
 
In the question, conditional and indirect-negation functions, the -sˇ ehu-series and the isˇ -series 




 a. Im ti-r?e ma-sˇ ehu, t-agid li.  (informal) 
  if 2SG-will:see what-INDEF 2SG-will:tell to:me 
 b. Im ti-r?e davar, haged li.  (formal) 
  if 2SG-will:see thing tell:IMPV to:me 
  ‘If you see anything, tell me.’ 
(A.231) question 
 Ha?im amr-u zot le-isˇ / -mi-sˇ ehu? (G82: 463) 
 Q said-3PL that to-person who-INDEF 
 ‘Did they tell this to anyone?’ 
(A.232) indirect negationii 
 Ani lo Ìosˇ evet sˇ e-nir?a isˇ / mi-sˇ ehu ba-reÌov.  
 I NEG think:F that-was:seem(3SG) person who-INDEF in:the-street 
 ‘I don’t think that anyone was seen in the street.’ 
 
When the negation is in the same clause, either the isˇ -series or the af/sˇ um-series may be used: 
 
(A.233) direct negation 
 a. Lo ra?i-ti isˇ / af eÌad.  
  NEG saw-1SG person INDEF one 
  ‘I did not see anybody.’ 
 b. Lo ra?i-ti kol/ sˇ um student.  
  NEG saw-1SG any any student 
  ‘I did not see any student.’ 
 c. Af eÌad/ isˇ   lo ba. (G82: 4 34,) 
  INDEF one person NEG came(3SG) 
  ‘Nobody came.’ 
 
For the free-choice function, kol ‘every, any’ or kol...sˇ ehu is used: 
 
(A.234) a. Ti-rsˇ om kol ktovet sˇ ehi. (G82: 445) 
  2SG-will:note any address INDEF 
  ‘Note down any address.’ 
 b. Ani muxan la-gur be-dira kol-sˇ ehi. (G89)  
  I willing to-live in-apartment any-INDEF 
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A.32.1. Inventory. Hausa (Chadic, Afro-Asiatic) has two series of indefinite pronouns, (i) the 
emphatic koo-series which is based on interrogative pronouns, and (ii) the non-emphatic wani-
series, which consists of the determiner wani plus generic nouns. 
 
 interrogative koo-series wani-series  
person: wàa, wàanee koo-waa wani/wata 
thing: mèe, mèenee koo-mee wani àbù (‘some thing’) 
place: ìnaa koo-’ìnaa wani wurii (‘some place’) 
time: yàushè/yàushe koo-yàushè, -yàushe wani lookàcii (‘some time’) 
manner: yàayàa koo-yàayàa 
determiner: wànè/wàcè koo-wànè/-wàcè wani/wata 
 
A.32.2. Origins. The particle koo has a plethora of other uses, described in Meyers (1974): ‘or’, 
question particle, ‘whether’, ‘even’, ‘even though’. In all likelihood, its use as a scalar additive 
focus particle (‘even’) is responsible for its use as indefiniteness marker. The determiner wani is 
from the same pronominal root wa- as the interrogatives wàa, wànè (cf. Attouman and Caron 
1984: 12-13), but it need not be interrogative-based because this root is also used for 
demonstratives (wannàn ‘this’) and relatives (wandà ‘(the one) which’). 
A.32.3. Distribution. The distribution of the three series is shown in Figure A.32. The data are 
from Ma Newman (1990) (M90), Attouman and Caron (1984) (AC84), Abraham (1946) (A46), 
and Marit Lobben (p.c.). 
 
Figure A.32.     direct 
   question indirect negation 
 specific irrealis  negation  
  non-specific  
   conditional comparative  
     free-choice 
 
The wani-series is used in all non-emphatic functions. 
 
(A.235) specific 
 Wani àbù yaa sàamee shi. (M90: 252) 
 some thing 3SG:PAST happen him 
 ‘Something has happened to him.’ 
(A.236) irrealis non-specific (future) 
 Wata raanaa sáà daawoo. (M90: 252) 
 some day 3PL:FUT return 
 ‘Some day they’ll return.’ 
(A.237) question/conditional 
 a. Kaa ga wani mùtûm à oofìs? (M90: 252) 
  2SG:PAST see some man in office 
  ‘Did you see someone at the office?’ 
 b. Ìdan kaa jíì wani àbù, kà taashè ni.  
  if 2SG:PERF hear some thing 2SG:SBJV wake me 
  ‘If you hear anything, wake me up.’ 
   
The koo-series is used in the comparative and free-choice functions. 
 
(A.238) comparative 
 Yaa san tà fìye dà koo-waa. (M90: 11) 
 3SG:PAST know her better than INDEF-who 
 ‘He knows her better than anyone else.’ 
(A.239) free choice 
 Anàa saamùn-sà koo-’ìnaa. (M90: 12) 
 one:PRES get-3SG INDEF-where 
 ‘You can get it anywhere.’ 
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It is also used in the direct-negation function (cooccurring with verbal negation), but only after 
the negation, i.e. in non-subject position. (Unfortunately, I lack data on the indirect-negation 
function. When the negated indefinite is in subject position, a paraphrase must be used (cf. § 
8.2.5). 
 
(A.240) direct negation 
 Bà mù hàdu dà koo-waa à hanyàa ba. (M90: 11) 
 NEG 1PL:PAST meet to INDEF-who on road NEG 
 ‘We didn’t meet anyone on the road.’ 
  
The koo-series is apparently also used in questions. Abraham (1946) has examples like the 
following: 
 
(A.241) a. Koo-mèe ya batà? (A46: 535) 
  INDEF-what 3SG:PAST lost 
  ‘Is anything lost?’ 
 b. Koo-wàa ya zoo? (A46: 541) 
  INDEF-who 3SG:PAST come 
  ‘Has anyone come?’ 
 
In these examples, koo-mèe and koo-wàa have a low tone on the root syllable, and it appears that 
this tonal difference corresponds to a functional difference. The high-tone counterpart of 
(A.241a) has a different meaning. 
 
(A.242) Koo-mee ya batà? 
 INDEF-what 3SG:PAST lost 
 ‘Is everything lost?’ 
 
Unfortunately, my data do not allow me to come to any clear conclusions with respect to this 





A.33.1. Inventory. Swahili (Niger-Congo, Bantu) has only two major series of indefinite 
pronouns: (i) a series consisting of generic nouns, and (ii) a free-choice and negative series 
consisting of the determiner CL-o CL-ote (where CL stands for a gender prefix).  
 
 interrogative generic-noun-series CL-o CL-ote-series  
person: nani mtu (‘person’) mtu ye yote 
thing: nini neno, kitu (‘thing’) kitu cho chote, neno lo lote 
place: wapi mahali (‘place’) mahali po pote 
time: lini wakati (‘time’) wakati wo wote 
manner: -je  kwa njia yo yote, vyo vyote 
determiner: -pi -moja (‘one’) CL-o CL-ote  
 
It is quite conceivable that the generic nouns have not yet been grammaticalized as pronouns 
yet. I describe them as an indefinite series for the sake of comparability with the other 
languages. 
 In the CL-o CL-ote-series, the generic noun may also be omitted when the gender and the 
context make it clear which generic noun is to be understood. Thus, po pote is common for 
mahali po pote (because this gender is restricted to a few nouns), ye yote, cho chote and lo lote are 
possible variants, but *wo wote ‘ever’ is not possible because this gender is too large.  
 Another indefinite determiner is fulani ‘a certain’ (from Arabic fulaan). 
A.33.2. Origins. All I can say about CL-o CL-ote is that it is based in CL-ote, which means ‘all, 
whole’ (e.g. daftari yote ‘the whole notebook’, wanafunzi wote ‘all the pupils’). 
A.33.3. Distribution. The distribution of the two series is shown in Figure A.33. The data are 
from various reference works  and from the New Testament. 
 
Figure A.33.     direct 
   question indirect negation 
specific specific irrealis  negation  
known unknown non-specific  
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   conditional comparative  
     free-choice 
 




 a. Mtu a-li-ni-gusa. (NT, Lk 8.46) 
  man 3SG-PAST-me-touch 
  ‘Somebody has touched me.’ 
 b. A-na neno la ku-mw-arifu.  
  3SG-has word of INF-him-tell 
  ‘She has something to tell him.’ 
(A.244) irrealis non-specific (subjunctive complement) 
 Yesu a-li-mw-ambia... kwamba a-wa-pe maskini kitu.  
 Jesus 3SG-PAST-him-tell that 3SG-them-give:SBJV poor thing 
 ‘Jesus told him to give something to the poor.’ (NT, John 13.29) 
(A.245) question/conditional  
 a. Wa-ona kitu? (NT, Mk 8.23) 
  2SG-see thing 
  ‘Do you see anything?’ 
 b. Kama mtu a-ki-wa-ambia neno, seme-ni, Bwana a-na haja na-o. 
  
  if man 3SG-if-you-tell word say-PL Lord 3SG-has need with-3PL 
  ‘AIf anyone says anything to you, say, the Lord needs them.’ (NT, Mt 21.3) 
(A.246) indirect negation 
 Tokea hapo ha-i-ja-siki-wa ya kuwa mtu a-me-ya-fumbua macho ya kipofu.  
 since then NEG-hear-PASS that man 3SG-PERF-them-open eyes of blind 
 ‘Since the world began was it not heard that any man opened the eyes of one that  
 was born blind.’ (NT, John 9.32) 
 
In the direct-negation function, bare generic nouns can only be used postverbally (A.247). If the 
indefinite is the subject, a different strategy has to be resorted to (§ 8.2.5). 
 
(A.247) direct negation 
 Wala ha-wa-kumw-ambia mtu neno. (NT, Mk 16.8) 
 and NEG-them-him-say man thing  
 ‘And they did not say anything to anybody.’ 
 
The CL-o CL-ote-series can be used in the free-choice and negative functions, as well as in 
questions (at least rhetorical questions) and conditionals, where it seems to have emphatic 
value. I have no data for the comparative function, but I predict that CL-o CL-ote is possible there 
as well. 
 
(A.248) free choice 
 Daktari yule a-ta-ponya magonjwa yo yote.  
 doctor that 3SG-FUT-cure disease any 
 ‘That doctor will cure any disease whatsoever.’ 
(A.249) direct negation 
 Ninyi ha-m-jui neno lo lote. (NT, John 11.49) 
 you NEG-it-know word any 
 ‘You don’t know anything.’  
(A.250) question/conditional 
 a. A-li-mw-ambia malaika yupi wakati wo wote, Ndi-we mwana-ngu?  
  3SG-past-him-say angel which time any you-are son-1SG 
  ‘To which of the angels did he ever say, You are my son?’ (NT, Heb 1.5) 
 b. M-ki-ni-omba neno lo lote kwa jina langu, ni-ta-li-fanya.    
  you-COND-me-ask word any by name mine 1SG-FUT-it-do 
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A.34.1. Inventory. Georgian (Kartvelian) has five series of indefinite pronouns, all of them 
derived from interrogatives: (i)  the specific -Vac-series, (ii) the non-specific -me-series, and (iii)-
(iv) the three negative series marked by ar(a)-, ver(a)- and nur(a)-. (Below only the ara-series is 
given.) 
 
 interrogative -Vac-series -me-series ara-series 
person: vin vi-Vac vin-me ara-vin 
thing: ra ra-Vac ra-me ara-peri, ara-ra 
place: sad(a) sad-Vac sad-me ar-sad 
time: rodis rodis-Vac rodis-me ara-sodes 
manner: rogor rogor-Vac rogor-me  
determiner: romeli romeli-Vac romeli-me ara-vitari 
 
A.34.2. Origins. The origin of -me is unknown. The suffix -Vac consists of -Va ‘only’ and -c(a) 
‘also’. The prefixes ara-, vera- and nura- derive from the negative particles ar, ver and nu ‘not’. 
 
A.34.3. Distribution. The distribution of the four series is shown in Figure A.34. The data are 
from Tschenkéli 1958 (T58), Vogt 1971 (V71), Revaz Tchantouria, Winfried Boeder (p.c.) and 
dictionaries (cf. also Apridonidze 1972, Topuria 1925). 
 
Figure A.34.     direct 
   question indirect negation 
specific specific irrealis  negation  
known unknown non-specific  
   conditional comparative  
     free-choice 
 
The -Vac-series is restricted to specific functions. 
 
(A.251) specific known/unknown 
 a. Es c’igni sad-Vac v-isˇ ove. (V71: 47) 
  this book where-INDEF 1SG-found 
  ‘I found this book somewhere [I could say where].’ 
 b. Movida vi-Vac <*vin-me> rusi. (V71: 47) 
  came who-INDEF who-INDEF Russian 
  ‘Some Russian person has come [I don’t know him/her].’ 
 
In all  non-emphatic  non-specific  functions, including indirect negation and comparative, the -
me-series is used. 
 
(A.252) irrealis non-specific (imperative, modal, future, distributive) 
 a. DauJaxet vi-s-me!  
  call:IMPV:PL who-DAT-INDEF 
  ‘Call somebody!’ 
 b. Es c’igni sad-me unda v-isˇ ovo. (V71: 47) 
  this book where-INDEF necessary 1SG-find:SBJV 
  ‘I have to find this book somewhere.’ 
(A.253) question/conditional 
 a. Mosula vin-me  <*vi-Vac>? (V71: 47) 
  came who-INDEF who-INDEF 
  ‘Has anyone come?’ 
 b. Tu vin-me movides, utxari.  
  if who-INDEF comes tell:IMPV 
  ‘If anyone comes, tell (me).’ 
(A.254) indirect negation 
 Vera-prit ver daitanxmes rom rogor-me sad-me sc’avla 
 NEG-way NEG persuade:him that how-INDEF where-INDEF study  
 ganegrJo. 
 he:continue:SBJV  
 ‘They couldn’t persuade him to continue his studies anywhere in any way.’ 
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(A.255) comparative 
 Man kartuli ena uk'et icis vidre sxva vin-me-m. 
 he:ERG Georgian language better knows than other who-INDEF-ERG 
 'He knows Georgian better than anyone else.' 
 
In the direct-negation function, one of the three negative series (ara-, vera-, nura-) is used, 
normally together with verbal negation (though this may optionally be omitted). Ar is the 
unmarked negator, ver contains an additional semantic component of possibility, and nu is used 
in prohibitive sentences. 
 
(A.256) a.  Me ara-sodes  ara-vis-gan ara-pers  ar mi-v-iVeb. (T58: 223) 
  I NEG-when NEG-who-from NEG-thing NEG PREV-1SG-get  
 ‘I’ll never get anything from anybody.’ 
 b. Mas ara-vis-tvis utkvams.  
  he NEG-who-for has:told 
  ‘He hasn’t told anybody.’ 
 c. Nura-vi-s nu et’q’vi! (V71: 48) 
  NEG-who-DAT NEG tell 
  ‘Don’t tell anybody!’ 
 
The free-choice sense is expressed by means of the adjective nebismieri 'arbitrary, any', which 
can hardly be considered an indefinite pronoun. Other possibilities are the universal quantifier 





A.35.1. Inventory. Kannada (Dravidian) has three series of indefinite pronouns, all of them 
derived from interrogatives:  (i) the specific -oo-series, (ii) the non-specific -aadaruu-series, and 
(iii) the negative and free-choice -uu-series. 
 
 interrogative -oo-series -aadaruu-series -uu-series 
person: yaaru yaar-oo yaar-aadaruu yaar-uu 
thing: eenu een-oo een-aadaruu een-uu 
place: yalli, elli elliy-oo elliy-aadaruu elliy-uu 
time: yaavaaga yaavaagal-oo yaavaagal-aadaruu yaavaagal-uu 
manner: heege heeg-oo heeg-aadaruu heeg-uu 
amount: yas5t5u, es5t5u es5t5-oo es5t5-aadaruu es5t5-uu 
determiner: yaava-nu/-l5u yaava-n-oo/-l5-oo yaavanaadaruu yaava X-uu 
 
A.35.2. Origins. The suffix -oo is identical to -oo ‘or; question marker’. The suffix -aadaruu also 
has the meaning ‘even, German auch nur’ and consists of aa-d- ‘be(come)’, -are ‘if’ and -uu (i.e., 
the original meaning is ‘even if it be(come)’). The suffix -uu is identical to -uu ‘also, even’. 
 
A.35.3. Distribution. The distribution of the three series is shown in Figure A.35. The data are 
from Bhat (1981) (B81), Sridhar (1990) (S90), and native speakers (Anilkumar Belvadi,  D.N.S. 
Bhat) . 
 
Figure A.35.     direct 
   question indirect negation 
specific specific irrealis  negation  
known unknown non-specific  
   conditional comparative  
     free-choice 
 
The -oo-series is only used in the specific-unknown function – it cannot be used if the speaker 
knows the identity of the referent. 
 
(A.257) specific unknown 
  Yaar-oo <*yaar-uu, *yaar-aadaruu> bandaru;  (*yaaru uuhisi.) (B81: 7) 
  who-INDEF     came who guess 
  ‘Someone <*anyone> came; (*guess who).’ 
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The non-specific -aadaruu-series is used in irrealis and question/conditional functions. 
 
(A.258) irrealis non-specific (imperative) 
  Ellig-aadaruu <*ellig-oo> hoogu. (B81: 6) 
  where-INDEF   go 
  ‘Go somewhere.’ 
(A.259) question/conditional 
  a. Raamu ellig-aadaruu <*ellig-oo, *ellig-uu> hoodan-oo? (B81: 6) 
   Ramu where-INDEF    go-Q 
   ‘Did Ramu go anywhere?’ 
  b. Yaar-aadaruu <*yaar-oo, *yaar-uu> band-are heel5-utt-eene. (B81: 7) 
   who-INDEF    come-COND tell-FUT-1SG  
   ‘I’ll tell you if anyone comes.’ 
 
The -uu-series is used in the free-choice function, in the direct- and indirect-negation functions 
(cooccurring with verbal negation in the latter), and in the comparative function (although ella 
‘all’ is preferred there). 
 
(A.260) free choice 
  Raamu ellig-uu hoodaanu. (B81: 4) 
  Ramu where-INDEF may.go 
  ‘Ramu may go anywhere.’ 
(A.261) direct negation 
  Illige yaar-uu baral-illa. (S90: 256) 
  hither who-INDEF come-NEG 
  ‘No one came here.’ 
(A.262) indirect negation 
  Yaar-uu  baruvudu avas´ ya illa.  
  who-INDEF come:MASD necessary NEG 
  ‘It is not necessary for anyone to come.’ 
(A.263) comparative 
  Illi have beere yaava kad5e-g-intal-uu cann-aag-ide.  
  here climate other which place-DAT-than-INDEF good-become-is 
  ‘Here the climate is better than in any other place.’ 
 





A.36.1. Inventory. Mandarin Chinese (Sino-Tibetan) makes extensive use of the bare 
interrogatives as indefinites. In addition, two series are derived by the words do¯ u and yeˇ , and 
the determiner rènhé ‘any’ can be considered a series of its own.  
 
 interrogative do¯ u-series yeˇ -series  
person: shéi shéi do¯ u shéi yeˇ  
thing: shénme shénme do¯ u shénme yeˇ  
place: naˇ r, shénme dìfang shénme dìfang do¯ u shénme dìfang yeˇ  
time: shénme shíhou  
manner: zeˇ nme 
determiner: neˇ i neˇ i ... do¯ u 
 
Generic nouns (e.g. ren ‘person; someone’) are also commonly used as indefinites. 
 
A.36.2. Origins. Yeˇ  and do¯ u mean ‘even, also; every, all’. Rènhé is composed of the old 
interrogative hé ‘what?’ plus rèn ‘allow; appoint’. Perhaps the current meaning ‘any’ arose from 
an original meaning ‘choose what’ > ‘anything’ (‘choose’ is similar to ‘appoint’). 
 
A.36.3. Distribution. The distribution of the three series is shown in Figure A.36. The data are 
from Li (1992) (L92), Li and Thompson (1981) (LT81), Tsai 1990 (T90), reference works , and 
native speakers (Fengxiang Li, Wenfang Zhang) . 
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Figure A.36.     direct 
   question indirect negation 
specific specific irrealis  negation  
known unknown non-specific  
   conditional comparative  
     free-choice 
 
The bare interrogatives are used in all non-specific non-emphatic functions. 
 
(A.264) irrealis non-specific (imperative) 
 Chi¯  diaˇ n shénme zài zoˇ u ba! (L92: 152) 
 eat a.bit what then go PT 
 ‘Please eat a little something before you leave.’ 
 
As shown in detail in Li (1992), bare interrogativs are also used in contexts of uncertainty and 
inference. 
 
(A.265) a. Ta¯  haˇ oxiàng x iˇ  huan shénme. (L92: 131) 
  he seem like what 
  ‘He seems to like something.’ 
 b. Ta¯  kàndao (le) shénme le. (L92: 133) 
   he see PERF what perf 
   ‘He must have seen something.’ 
 
Examples of the question/conditional functions and the direct negation functions are given 
below (unfortunately, I lack data for the indirect negation function). 
 
(A.266) question/conditional 
 a. Shéi x iˇ  huan ta¯  ma? (L92: 128) 
   who like him Q 
   ‘Does anyone like him?’ 
 b. Niˇ  yàoshì yào shénme dehuà, èn língr zhòu xíngle.  
   you if want what  press    
   ‘If you want something, ring the bell.’ 
 
In the direct-negation function, only shénme is perfect, shéi being less acceptable, and nage (N) 
‘which (N)’ is unacceptable (Li 1992: 150): 
 
(A.267) direct negation 
 a. Ta¯  bù wèi shénme rén zuò shì. (L92:127) 
   he not for what man do thing 
   ‘He does not work for anyone.’ 
 b. Ta¯  bù xiˇ  huan shénme. 
   he not like what 
   ‘He does not like anything.’ 
 c. ?Ta¯  bù x iˇ  huan shéi. 
   he not like who 
   ‘He does not like anyone.’ 
 d. *Ta¯  bù x iˇ  huan naˇ ge (rén). 
   he not like which man 
   ‘He does not like anyone.’ 
 
However, bare interrogatives are not admissible in specific contexts that lack an element of 
uncertainty.iii In such cases, generic nouns are used. 
 
(A.268) specific (known/unknown) 
 Yoˇ u rén daˇ  diànhuà le.  
 exist man hit phone PERF 
 (Wo bù zhi¯  dao shì shéi./ Ca¯ i y i¯   ca¯ i shì shéi.)  
 I not know is who guess one guess is who 
 ‘Someone called. (I don’t know who./Guess who.)’ 
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The do¯ u- and yeˇ -series are used interchangeably in the direct-negation function. 
 
(A.269) direct negation 
 a. Woˇ  shéi-yeˇ  bù rènshi. (LT81: 529)  
   I who-INDEF not know 
   ‘I don’t know anyone.’ 
 b. Ta¯  shéi-do¯ u bù xìnren. (LT81: 528) 
   she who-INDEF not trust 
   ‘She doesn’t trust anyone.’ 
 c. Woˇ  shénme dìfang do¯ u/yeˇ  bù qù.  
   I which place INDEF not? go? 
   ‘I’m not going anywhere.’ 
 d. Shèi-do¯ u bù co¯ ngmíng. 
   who-INDEF not intelligent 
   ‘No one is intellingent.’  
 
Two things are remarkable about these forms. First, they only occur preverbally, which Li and 
Thompson (1981: 530) explain by the fact that do¯ u and ye¯  are adverbs and hence must occur 
preverbally. If they are adverbs and follow their own syntactic rules, it may seem doubtful 
whether the combinations shéi-yeˇ , shénme-do¯ u etc. can be regarded as single constituents at all, 
and hence whether yeˇ  and do¯ u can be considered as indefiniteness markers.iv This is done here 
because they never non-adjacent to interrogative pronouns (i.e. *Ta¯  do¯ u bu xìnren shéi is not a 
possible alternative to (A.36.6b)). 
 Second, shéi-do¯ u etc. are also used as universal quantifiers (e.g. woˇ  shéi-do¯ u x iˇ  huan ‘I like 
everyone’), so sentences (A.36.6a-d) should perhaps not be regarded as instances of indefinite 
pronouns, but as a rare type of replacement strategy: Instead of saying ‘She doesn’t trust 
anybody/She trusts nobody’, Chinese says ‘She doesn’t trust everybody’, with wide scope of 
‘everybody’ (i.e. for every person x, she doesn’t trust x). I have to leave this question open here.
  
 The indefinite determiner rènhé is used (mainly in conjunction with the particle/adverb do¯ 
u) to render the free-choice and comparative functions. 
 
(A.270) free choice 
  Rènhé shíhou niˇ   do¯ u keˇ y iˇ   lái.  
   any time you INDEF can come 
   ‘You can come anytime.’ 
(A.271) comparative 
  Ta¯  paˇ o de biˇ   rènhé y i¯  ge nánshe¯ ng do¯ u kuài.  
  he run PT than any one boy INDEF fast 
  ‘He runs faster than any boy.’ 
 
Finally, the determiner rènhé may also be used in the direct-negation and indirect-negation 
functions. 
 
(A.272) direct negation 
  Ta¯  bù néng táo dào rènhé dìfang qu.  
  he NEG can escape to any place go 
  ‘He cannot escape anywhere.’ 
(A.273) indirect negation 
  Wo¯  bù xiaˇ ngxin rènhé rén lái le.  
  I not think any man come PERF 
  ‘I don’t think that anyone came.’ 
 
These generalizations should be approached with some caution –  my data on Chinese are less 
complete than I would have wished. 
 
 
A.37. Ancash Quechua 
 
A.37.1. Inventory. Ancash Quechua uses only the bare interrogatives and one interrogative-
derived series, the non-specific -pis-series.  
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 interrogative -pis-series  
person: pi pi-pis 
thing: ima ima-pis 
place: may may-pis 
time: imay imay-pis 
manner: imanaw imanaw-pis 
 
A.37.2. Origins. The suffix -pis also means ‘also, even’. 
 
A.37.3. Distribution. The distribution of the three series is shown in Figure A.37. The data are 
from a native speaker (Hernán Aguilár) (cf. also Parker 1976: 74-5). The data from Weber (1989), 
where a closely related dialect is described, are also taken into account. 
 
Figure A.37.     direct 
   question indirect negation 
 specific irrealis  negation  
 unknown non-specific  
   conditional comparative  
     free-choice 
 
The bare interrogative pronouns are used in the specific-unknown function. 
 
(A.274) specific unknown 
 a. Ima-ta-chi wambra yurapa waqta-n-chaw riqa-rqa-n. 
  what-ACC-VAL boy tree behind-3SG-LOC see-PAST-3SG 
  ‘The boy saw something behind the tree.’ 
 b. Pi-wan-chi qanyan awtobus-chaw parla-rqu-u. 
  who-COMIT-VAL yesterday bus-LOC talk-PAST-1SG 
  ‘I talked to someone on the bus yesterday.’ 
 
The -pis-series is used in all non-specific functions. 
 
(A.275) irrealis non-specific (imperative, future) 
 a. Mana musya-pti-iki-qa pi-ta-pis tapuku-y. 
  not know-CONV-2SG-TOP who-ACC-INDEF ask-IMPV 
  ‘If you don’t know, ask somebody.’ 
 b. Imay-pis Afrika-man-mi aywa-shaq. 
  when-INDEF Africa-ALL-VAL go-FUT.1SG 
  ‘I’ll go to Africa sometime next year.’ 
(A.276) question/conditional 
 a. Ima-ta-pis rika-rqu-nki-ku? 
  what-ACC-INDEF see-PAST-2SG-Q 
  ‘Did you see anything?’ 
 b. Ima-ta-pis rika-rnin-qa willa-ma-y. 
  what-ACC-INDEF see-2SG-TOP tell-1SG-IMPV 
  ‘If you see anything, tell me.’ 
(A.277) comparative 
 Ollqu wambra-m pi-piq-pis ras ayqiqninmi. 
 male boy-VAL who-ABL-INDEF fast runs 
 ‘The boy can run faster than anyone.’ 
(A.278) free choice 
 Pi-pis  kay problema-ta-qa atinman-mi. 
 who-INDEF this problem-ACC-TOP solves 
 ‘Anyone can solve this problem.’ 
 
The -pis-series is also used in the negative functions. The scope of negation is indicated by the 
discontinuous negators mana/ama/ni ... -tsu. 
 
(A.279) direct negation 
 a. Ama ima-pis ni-y-chu. (Weber 1989: 21) 
  not what-INDEF say-IMPV.2SG-NEG 
  ‘Don’t say anything!’ 
 b. Pi-pis  ni ima-ta-pis ni-ma-rqa-n-tsu. 
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  who-INDEF not.even what-ACC-INDEF tell-1SG-PAST-3SG-NEG 
  ‘Nobody told me anything.’ 
(A.280) indirect negation 
 Mana muna-shkaa-chu pi-pis musyanan-ta. (Weber 1989: 340) 
 not want-PERF.1SG-NEG who-INDEF know-ACC 





A.38.1. Inventory. Japanese has three series of indefinite pronouns, all of them derived from 
interrogatives:  (i) the non-negative ka-series, (ii) the negative mo-series, and (iii) the free-choice 
-demo-series. 
 
 interrogative ka-series mo-series demo-series 
person: dare dare-ka dare-mo dare-demo  
thing: nani nani-ka nani-mo nani-demo 
place: doko doko-ka doko-mo doko-demo  
time: itu itu-ka  itu-demo  
manner: doo doo-ka  doo-demo  
amount: ikura ikura-ka  ikura-demo 
 ikutu ikutu-ka  ikutu-demo  
determiner: dore dore-ka dore-mo dore-demo  
 
A.38.2. Origins. The suffix -ka is formally identical to ka ‘or; question particle’ (cf. Tamba-Mecz 
1984). The suffix -mo is formally identical to -mo ‘also’. The suffix -demo is is from de mo ‘even if 
it is’ (demo is also a focus particle ‘even’). 
 
A.38.3. Distribution. The distribution of the three series is shown in Figure A.38. The data are 
from McGloin (1976) (M76), Ohno (1984) (O84), and native speakers (Masa Koizumi, Yoshiko 
Ono) , and various reference works. See also Yamada (1993), Chang and Labrune (1994). 
 
Figure A.38.     direct 
   question indirect negation 
specific specific irrealis  negation  
known unknown non-specific  
   conditional comparative  
     free-choice 
 
The ka-series is used in non-negative functions. 
 
(A.281) specific known/unknown 
 Dare-ka kara denwa at-ta kedo, 
 who-INDEF from phone be-PAST though  
 ‘Someone called,’ 
 — dare kara da ka wakara-na-i.  
  who from be:PRES Q know-NEG-PRES 
  ‘I don’t know who.’ 
 — dare kara da ka ate-te goran.  
  who from be:PRES Q figure.out-CONV try:IMPV 
  ‘guess who!’ 
(A.282) irrealis (hortative, distributive) 
 a. Dare-ka ni ki-ite mi-masyoo.  
  who-INDEF DAT ask-CONV try-POL:HORT 
  ‘Let’s ask somebody.’ 
 b. Minna-ga nani-ka-o tabe-ta. (O84: 238) 
  every-NOM what-INDEF-ACC eat-PAST 
  ‘Everybody ate something (non-specific).’ 
(A.283) question/conditional 
 a. Rusutyuu-ni dare-ka <*dare-mo> ki-masi-ta ka?  
  absence.duration-DAT who-INDEF who-INDEF come-POL-PAST Q 
  ‘Did somebody/anybody come while I was gone?’ (M76: 409) 
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 b. Nani-ka <*nani-mo> tabe-tara, eiga e ture-te it-te 
  
  what-INDEF what-INDEF eat-COND movie to take-CONV go-CONV  
  age-na-i yo. (M76: 415) 
  give-NEG-PRES ASS 
  ‘If you eat something/anything, I won’t take you to the movie.’  
 
The -mo-series is used in the negative functions and in the comparative function. In the case of 
direct negation, it cooccurs with verbal negation. 
 
(A.284) comparative 
 Kono syoonen-wa kono kurasu-no dare-yori-mo hayaku hasir-u.  
 this boy-TOP this class-GEN who-from-INDEF fast  run-PRES 
 ‘This boy can run faster than anyone in his class.’ 
(A.285) direct negation 
 Dare-mo kanojo-o aisi-te i-na-i.  
 who-INDEF she-ACC love-CONV DUR-NEG-PRES 
 ‘Nobody loves her.’ 
(A.286) indirect negation 
 Kyoo-wa dare-mo ku-ru to omow-ana-i. (M76: 405) 
 today-TOP who-INDEF come-PRES SBOR think-NEG-PRES 
 ‘I don’t think anybody is coming today.’ 
 
The demo-series is used in the free-choice function. 
 
(A.287) free choice 
 Dare-demo deki-masu.  
 who-INDEF possible-POL-PRES 





A.39.1. Inventory. Korean has six series of indefinite pronouns, three of which are derived from 
interrogatives:  (i)  the  general  -nka-series,  (ii-v) the four free-choice series in -na and -tunci, 
which may be derived either from interrogatives or from general nouns, in which latter case 
they are preceded by the determiner amu, and (vi) the negative -to-series, which is also derived 
from amu + general noun. In addition, bare interrogatives are also commonly used as indefinite 
pronouns. 
 
 interrogative -nka-series -na-series -tunci-series amu X-to-series
  
person: nwukwu nwukwu-nka nwukwu-na nwukwu-tunci amu (salam)-to 
thing: mues mue-nka mues-ina mues-itunci amu kes-to 
property: etten  etten ...-na etten ...-tunci 
place: eti eti-sunka eti-na eti-tunci amu kos-to 
time: encey encey-nka encey-na encey-tunci amu ttay-to 
determiner: enu  enu ...-na enu ...-tunci amu X-to 
 
For reasons of space, the amu X-na-series and the amu X-tunci-series are omitted from the above 
table – they are completely analogous to the amu X-to series. There is also an incomplete -to-
series derived from interrogatives (nwukwu-to ‘nobody’, but *mues-to ‘nothing’). 
 
A.39.2. Origins. The suffix -nka seems to come from i- ‘be’ + -n (present tense) + -ka ‘question 
particle’. The suffix -na is also used with the meanings ‘or; for example; approximately’; it 
seems to come from the Adversative mood (marked by -(u)na) of i- ‘be’. The Adversative is also 
the mood used in parametric concessive conditional clauses, so nwukwu-na would come from 
‘whoever it may be’ (cf. § 6.2.3). The suffix -tunci (also used in the sense ‘or’) has a similar 
origin: -tunci is a verbal suffix that can also be used in parametric concessive conditional 
clauses. The suffix -to also means ‘also’. 
 
A.39.3. Distribution. The distribution of the series is shown in Figure A.39. Since the indefinites 
derived frominterrogatives do not seem to differ in their distribution from the indefinites based 
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on amu X-, the two types are not distinguished. The data are from Martin and Lee (1986) 
(ML69), Chang and Labrune (1994) as well as from native speakers (Hee-Rahk Chae, Kyu-Ryun 
Choi, and Du-Pyo Hong). See also Lee (1983). 
 
Figure A.39.     direct 
   question indirect negation 
specific specific irrealis  negation  
known unknown non-specific  
   conditional comparative  
     free-choice 
 
The bare interrogatives are the most commonly used indefinites. The -nka-indefinites are more 
formal, less colloquial. 
 
(A.288) specific known/unknown 
 a. Nwu’-ka/ nwukwu-inka-ka kel-ess-ta.  
  who-NOM who-INDEF-NOM call-PAST-DECL 
  ‘Somebody called. (I didn’t catch her name./Guess who.’) 
 b. Ku sonyen-un mues-ul/ mues-inka-lul po-ass-ta.  
  this boy-NOM what-ACC what-INDEF-ACC see-PAST-DECL 
  ‘The boy saw something.’ 
(A.289) irrealis non-specific (imperative, hortative) 
 a. Molu-myen, nwukwu-eykey/ nwukwu-nka-eykey mul-ela.  
  ignorant-CONV who-DAT who-INDEF-DAT ask-IMPV 
  ‘If you don’t know, ask somebody.’ 
 b. Eti ka-psita. (ML69: 411) 
  where go-HORT 
  ‘Let’s go somewhere.’ 
(A.290) question/conditional 
 a. Ku sonye-ka mues-ul/ mue-nka-lul <*mues-ina/ *mues-itunci> 
  this girl-TOP what-ACC what-INDEF-ACC what-INDEF what-INDEF  
  chacu-myen, kunye emeni-eykey malha-lkesi-ta.  
  find-CONV she mother-DAT tell-FUT-DECL 
  ‘If the girl finds anything, she will tell her mother.’ 
 b. Chelswu mues-ul/ mue-nka-lul <*mues-ina *mues-itunci>  
  Chelswu what-ACC what-INDEF-ACC what-INDEF what-INDEF  
  ilk-ess-ni?  
  read-PAST-Q 
  ‘Did Chelswu read anything?’ 
 
The -na- and -tunci-series are used interchangeably in the free-choice function. 
 
(A.291)  Nwukwu-na/ nwukwu-tunci/ amu-na/ amu-tunci i muncey-lul 
  who-INDEF who-INDEF any-INDEF any-INDEF this problem-ACC
  
  phul  swu-iss-ta.  
  solve do-can-DECL 
  ‘Anybody can solve this problem.’ 
 
The -to-series is used in the indirect and direct negation functions. In the direct-negation 
function, it cooccurs with verbal negation. In the indirect-negation function, the bare 
interrogatives and the -nka-series are also possible. 
 
(A.292) indirect negation 
 Nwukwu-to/ nwukwu-lul/ nwukwu-nka-lul chacki-ka pulkanung ha-ta.  
 who-INDEF who-ACC who-INDEF-ACC find-TOP impossible be-DECL 
 ‘It’s impossible to find anyone.’ 
(A.293) direct negation 
 a. Ku sonye-nun amu-to/ nwukwu-to an po-ass-ta.  
  this girl-TOP any-INDEF who-INDEF NEG see-PAST-DECL 
  ‘The girl did not see anybody.’ 
 b. Amu-to amu kes-to malha-ci anha-ss-ta. 
  any-INDEF any thing-INDEF say-CONV NEG-PAST-DECL 
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  ‘Nobody said anything.’ 
 
Furthermore, the -to-series is used in the standard of comparison: 
 
(A.294) comparative 
 Yeki-ka enu kos pota to te alumtap-ta.  
 here-TOP which place than INDEF more beautiful-DECL 





A.40.1. Inventory. Basque has four major series of indefinites, all of them derived from in-
terrogatives:  (i) the non-emphatic bait-series, (ii) the negative-polarity series in i-, and (iii-iv) 
the two free-choice series in edo- and -nahi. 
 
 interrogative -bait-series i-series edo-series nahi-series 
person: nor nor-bait i-nor edo-nor nor-nahi 
thing: zer zer-bait e-zer edo-zer zer-nahi 
place: non non-bait i-non edo-non non-nahi 
time: noiz noiz-bait i-noiz edo-noiz noiz-nahi 
manner: nola nola-bait i-nola edo-nola nola-nahi 
determiner: zein — — edo-zein zein-nahi 
 
In addition, non-standard dialects have an X edo X-series (nor edo nor ‘someone’, zer edo zer 
‘something’), and a neh-series (nehor ‘anyone’, nehon ‘anywhere’, nehoiz ‘ever’). When used in 
their negative function, the pronouns of the i-series may optionally be followed by ere (‘even’).
  
 
A.40.2. Origins. The suffix -bait is formally identical to the verbal prefix bait- ‘because’, but its 
relation to it is obscure. Other potential connections include ba- ‘if’, and bai ‘yes; and’. The 
prefix edo- is identical to edo ‘or, probably’, and the suffix -nahi is identical to the stem nahi 
‘want’. 
 
A.40.3. Distribution. The distribution of the three series is shown in Figure A.40. The data are 
from Saltarelli 1988 (S88), Aulestia 1989 (A89), and native speakers (Karmele Rotaetxe, José 
Hualde). 
 
Figure A.40.     direct 
   question indirect negation 
specific specific irrealis  negation  
known unknown non-specific  
   conditional comparative  
     free-choice 
 
The bait-series is used in non-negative polarity environments. 
 
(A.295) specific unknown 
 Nor-bait-i utzi nion argazki-makina eta ez naiz oroi-tzen  
 who-INDEF-DAT lend I:it:to.him photo-machine and NEG I:it remember-HAB 
 nor-i. (S88: ex. 1070) 
 who-DAT 
 ‘I lent the camera to someone and I do not remember to whom.’ 
(A.296) irrealis non-specific (intention, hypothetical) 
 a. Nora-bait joa-te-ko gogoa dut, baina ez dakit nora.  
  where-INDEF go-HAB-REL thought I:have:it but NEG I:know:it where 
  ‘I have an urge to go somewhere but I do not know where.’ (S88: ex. 976b) 
 b. Pozik hartu-ko nuke nor-bait-ek laguntzea. (S88: ex. 158) 
  gladly accept-FUT I:would who-INDEF-ERG helping 
  ‘I would gladly accept someone helping me.’ 
 
In the specific-known function, the bait-series is apparently not possble, and the numeral bat 
'one' is used: 
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(A.297) specific known 
 Kanpoa-n zengoze-n-en-ean baten batek dei egin zizun. 
 away-LOC be-2SG-REL-LOC one:GEN one:ERG call make he:you:has 
 Esan nor. 
 say who 
 'Someone called while you were away. Guess who it was.' 
 
The i-series is used in negative-polarity contexts: questions/conditionals, comparatives, direct 
and indirect negation. In the direct negation function, it cooccurs with verbal negation. 
 
(A.298) question/conditional 
 a. E-zer <??zer-bait> jan nahi al duzu? (A89: 206) 
  INDEF-what what-INDEF eat want Q you:it 
  ‘Would you like to eat something?’ 
 b. E-zer <??zer-bait> ikusten ba-duzu, esaidazu. 
  INDEF-what what-INDEF see COND-you:have tell:you:me 
  'If you see anything, tell me.' 
(A.299) comparative 
 Donostia-ko eguraldia i-non/ edo-non baino  
 Donostia-ATTR weather INDEF-where INDEF-where than  
 atsegin-ago-a   da. 
 pleasant-COMPR-ART is 
 The weather in San Sebastián is more pleasant than anywhere else.' 
(A.300) indirect negation 
 Ez dut uste [gizon hori i-noiz ikusi dud-anik. (S88:ex. 178) 
 NEG I:it believe [man that INDEF-when see I:him]-SBOR 
 ‘I don’t believe that I’ve ever seen that man.’ 
(A.301) direct negation 
 I-nor-i i-noiz ez diozu deusik eman. (A89: 305) 
 INDEF-who-DAT INDEF-when NEG you:it:to.him anything give 
 ‘You haven’t ever given anyone anything.’ 
 
The edo- and the -nahi-series are used in the free-choice and indirect-negation functions. 
 
(A.302) free choice 
 a. Galde-tzen duzuna edo-zein liburu-tan aurki dezakezu. (S88: ex. 895) 
  ask-HAB you:it INDEF-which book-LOC find you:can:it 
  ‘You can find what you are asking about in any book.’ 
 b. Nor-nahi-k eduki-ko du hik baino botere gehiago. (A89: 432) 
  who-INDEF-ERG have-FUT he:it you:ERG than power more 
  ‘Anyone will have more power than you.’ 
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i But note that expressions such as aon duine acu ‘anyone of them’ (A.149a) are 
possible, which suggests that the phrase aon duine does have pronominal status. 
Partitive phrases are generally not possible with true nouns (*‘a person of them’).  
ii The situation in indirect-negation contexts seems to be complicated, with different 
negators behaving differently, see the discussion in Glinert (1982: § 6). 
iii Thus, Li 1992:127 stars sentence (i): 
 
 (i) *Ta¯  xiˇ huan shénme. 
 he like what 
 ‘He likes something.’ 
 
iv Notice also that ye¯  and do¯ u can occur only once per sentence. Thus, the second 
negative indefinite in (i) must be a bare interrogative. 
 
 (i) Shéi-yeˇ  méi tingjian shénme. 
  who-INDEF NEG:PFV hear what 
      ‘No one heard anything.’ 
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Appendix B: 
The data of the 100-language sample 
 
1. The sample. The languages of the 100-language sample are listed in Table 2 
(for the selection of the sample from the world's languages, see § 2.4.3.2). The 
numbers in parentheses after genetic groupings are the numbers of languages 
from each grouping that the sample should contain according to the selection 
procedure. A number of the form '(n>m)' means that the number should have 
been n, but due to readjustment (resulting from the lack of data for certain 
groupings) the actual number is m. 
 The geographic distribution of the languages of the 40-language sample and 
the 100-language sample is shown on the map on p. 413. 
 
 
Table 2. The languages of the 100-language sample 
———————————————————————————————— 
I. Afro-Asiatic (6>7) 
 Ancient Egyptian (1): Ancient Egyptian 
 Berber (1):   Kabyle 
 Chadic (1>2): 
  Biu-Mandara Margi 
  West   Hausa 
 Cushitic (1):  Harar Oromo  
 Semitic (1>2):    
  West   Amharic 
  East    Akkadian 
 Omotic (1>0)    
II. Altaic (2>3) 
 Altaic proper (1>2):  
  Mongolian-Tungusic: Khalkha Mongolian 
  Turkic:   Bashkir 
 Korean-Japanese (1): Ainu 
III. Amerind (17>19) 
 Northern Amerind (5>7) 
  Almosan-Keresiouan (1): 
   Keresiouan: 
    Siouan-Yuchi Lakhota 
    Iroquoian Cayuga 
  Penutian (2) 
   Gulf:   Koasati 
   Mexican: Huastec 
   Oregon:  Takelma 
  Hokan (2) 
   Seri-Yuman: Maricopa 
   Northern: Eastern Pomo 
 Central Amerind (2) 
  Uto-Aztecan: Classical Nahuatl 
  Oto-Manguean: Mixtec  
  Chibchan-Paezan (2) 
  Chibchan (1): Sumu 
  Paezan (1):  Paez 
 Andean (1>2):    
  Aymaran:  Jaqaru 
  Southern:  Mapuche 
 Equatorial-Tucanoan (4>2) 
  Macro-Tucanoan (2>0) 
  Equatorial (2) 
   Kariri-Tupi: Guarani 
   Macro-Arawakan: Goajiro 
 Ge-Pano-Carib (3>4) 
  Macro-Carib (1>2): 
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   Peba-Yaguan: Yagua 
   Carib:  Panare 
  Ge-Pano (2): 
   Macro-Panoan (1>0):  
   Macro-Ge (1>2): 
    Unclassified: Iatê 
    Ge-Kaingang: Kaingang  
  
IV. Australian (7) 
 Unclassified:  Mangarayi 
 Maran:    Warndarang 
 Bunaban:  Gooniyandi 
 Pama-Nyungan (1>4):  
  Dyirbalic:  Dyirbal 
  Kalkatungic: Kalkatungu 
  Wiradhuric: Yuwaalaraay 
  South-West: Djaru 
V. Austric (15>17) 
 Miao-Yao (1):  Hmong Njua 
 Austro-Asiatic (2>3) 
  Mon-Khmer (1>2)  
   North:  Xinh Mul  
   East:   Khmer 
  Munda (1):  Santali 
 Austro-Tai (12>13) 
  Daic (1):  Thai 
  Austronesian (11>12) 
   Atayalic (1): Atayal 
   Tsouic (1>0)  
   Paiwanic (1): Paiwan 
   Malayo-Polynesian (8>10) 
    Western Malayo-Polynesian (4>5) 
     Meso-Philippine Tagalog 
     Celebes Bugis 
     Borneo Malagasy 
     Sundic Indonesian 
     Unclassified Palauan 
    Central-Eastern Malayo-Polynesian (4>5) 
     Central Malayo-Polynesian (1>0)  
     Eastern Malayo-Polynesian (3>5) 
      S Halmahera-NW New Guinea (1>0)  
      Oceanic (2>5) 
       Siassi Takia 
       Milne Bay-Central Province Kilivila 
       Southern New Hebrides Kwamera 
       Remote Oceanic 
        Micronesian Yapese  
        Central Pacific Samoan 
VI. Caucasian (1>2):  
 Nakh-Daghestanian Lak 
 Abkhaz-Adyghean Abkhaz 
VII. Chukchi-Kamchatkan (1): Koryak 
VIII. Elamo-Dravidian (1): Telugu 
IX. Eskimo-Aleut (1): W. Greenlandic Eskimo 
X. Indo-Hittite (4>5) 
 Anatolian (1):  Hittite 
 Indo-European (3>4) 
  Indo-Iranian: Pashto 
  Celtic:  Welsh 
  Italic:   Romantsch 
  Balto-Slavic: Upper Sorbian  
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XI. Indo-Pacific (12>4) 
 Trans-New Guinea 
  Main section 
   Central and Western 
    East New Guinea Highlands 
     Kalam Kobon 
     East-Central Hua 
  Madang-Adelbert Range  
   Madang  Amele 
 Sepik-Ramu  Haruai 
XII. Khoisan (1>0)   
XIII. Na-Dene (1): Slave 
XIV. Niger-Kordofanian (11>12) 
 Kordofanian (1>0)  
 Niger-Congo (10>12) 
  Mande (1>2)  
   Unclassified: Bobo 
   Northern-Western: Bambara 
  Niger-Congo proper (9>10) 
   West Atlantic (1): Fula 
   Central Niger-Congo (8>9)  
    North Central Niger-Congo (4>3) 
     Kru (1>0)  
     Dogon (1): Dogon 
     Gur=Voltaic (1): Koromfe 
     Adamawa-Ubangian (1): Gbeya 
    South Central Niger-Congo (4>6) 
     Ijo-Defaka (1>0):  
     Western (1): Ewe 
     Eastern (2>5) 
      Yoruba-Northern Akoko Yoruba 
      Lower Cross Ibibio 
      Benue-Zambesi  
       Nyima 
        Wel 
         Bantoid 
          Broad Bantu Babungo 
           Narrow Bantu 
            Northwest Bantu Ntomba 
            Central Bantu Xhosa 
XV. Nilo-Saharan (5>6) 
 Songhai   Songhai 
 Saharan   Kanuri 
 Maban    Masalit 
 East Sudanic (1>2) 
  Eastern   Dongolawi 
  Nilotic   Lango 
 Central Sudanic Logbara 
XVI. Sino-Tibetan (3>4) 
 Sinitic (1):   Chinese 
 Tibeto-Karen (2>3) 
  Karen (1>0) 
  Tibeto-Burman (1>3) 
   Tibetic  Newari 
   Burmic   
    Kuki-Naga Manipuri 
    Burmese-Lolo Burmese 
XVII. Uralic-Yukaghir (1>2) 
 Yukaghir:   Yukaghir 
 Uralic:    Ingrian 
XVIII. Yeniseyan (1): Ket 
XIX. Pidgins and Creoles (2): 
 Pacific    Tok Pisin 
 Indian Ocean  Seychelles Creole 
XX. Isolates:     
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 Sumerian (1):  Sumerian 
 Nahali (1):  Nahali 
 Burushaski (1): Burushaski 
 Basque (1):   Basque 
 Nivkh (1):   Nivkh 
 Hurrian (1>0)   
 Meroitic (1>0)  
 Etruscan (1>0)  
——————————————————————————————— 
2. The data. The following pages contain the data of the 100-language sample. The 
following abbreviations are used: 
 
Q interrogative-based indefinite N north 
G generic-noun-based indefinite S south 
sf suffixed indefiniteness marker W west 
pf prefixed indefiniteness marker E east 





The bibliographical references to the reference works consulted for the 100-
language sample are not integrated into the main bibliography and follow 
immediately after the data. 
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  indefinite example 
  type 
1.  Abkhaz N a-J°´ ‘someone’, a-k’´ ‘something’ 
2.  Ainu  Q-sf, Q/rd nen ‘who’ nen-ka ‘sb’  
3.  Akkadian  Q-sf minû ‘what’ min-ma ‘sth’ 
4.  Amele G  dana oso ‘sb’ (‘a man’) 
5.  Amharic  Q-sf m´n ‘what’ m´n-´m ‘sth’ 
6.  Atayal  Q ima? ‘who; anyone’ nanu? ‘what; anything’ 
7.  Bambara G  fèn ‘thing; sth’ 
8.  Bashkir  Q-sf, pf-Q kem ‘who’ kem-dyr ‘sb’ 
9. Basque  Q-sf, pf-Q nor ‘who’ nor-bait ‘sb’ 
10. Bobo G  soˇ n ‘person; sb’ 
11. Bugis  Q-sf, Q/rd niga ‘who’ niga-re ‘sb’ 
12. Burmese N, Q-sf badhu ‘who’ badhu-m´shou ‘anybody’ 
13. Burushaski  Q men ‘who; sb’, bo ‘what; sth’ 
14. Cayuga  Q-sf so: ‘who’ so-kwa ‘sb’ 
15. Chinese  Q, Q-sf shenme ‘what; sth’ shenme-yeˇ  ‘anything’ 
16. Djaru  Q nyamba ‘what; sth’ 
17. Dogon G  kidé ‘thing; something’ 
18. Dongolawi G  ha¯gˇ a ‘thing; sth’, wEr ‘one; sb’ 
19. Dyirbal  Q wanya ‘who; sb’ 
20.  Ancient Egyptian G  s ‘person; sb’ ht ‘things; sth’ 
21. Ewe G  ame ‘person; sb’ 
22. Fula G  huunde ‘thing; sth’ 
23. Gbeya G  mO ‘thing; sth’ 
24. Goajiro  Q kasa’ ‘what; sth’ 
25. Gooniyandi  Q, Q-sf ngoorndoo ‘who; sb’ ngoorndoo-ngaddaya ‘sb’ 
26. W. Greenlandic   Q-sf suna ‘what’ suna-luunniit ‘anything’ 
27. Guarani G, Q ava ‘who; person; sb’, mba-e ‘what; thing; sth’ 
28. Haruai G  ap=y ‘sth’ (‘thing-INDEF’); nöbö=y ‘sb’ (‘man-INDEF’) 
29. Hausa G, pf-Q koo-mee ‘anything’; wani abu ‘sth’ (cf. A.32) 
30. Hittite  Q-sf kuisˇ  ‘who’ kuisˇ -ki ‘sb’ 
31. Hmong Njua  Q leej twg ‘who; sb’ 
32. Hua G  vi-ka ‘someone’ (man-2SG) 
33. Huastec  Q, Q-sf hit ‘who’ hita? ‘sb’ 
34. Iatê  Q-sf tô ‘what’ to:-ná ‘sth’ 
35. Ibibio G  áwó ‘person; sb’, mkpO ‘thing; sth’ 
36. Babungo G  w´ mO’ ‘sb’ (‘person some’) 
37. Indonesian G Q-sf sese-orang ‘sb’ (‘one person’); siapa-pun ‘anyone’ 
38. Ingrian  Q-sf ken ‘who’ ken-ikke ‘sb’ 
39. Jaqaru  Q-sf qachi ‘who’ qach-psa ‘sb’ 
40. Kabyle G  lxelq ‘person; sb’ 
41. Kaingang  Q ne ‘what; sth’ 
42. Kalkatungu N minaNara ‘sth’ 
43. Kanuri G, Q-sf aví ‘what’ aví-yaye ‘anything’ 
44. Ket  pf-Q anæ ‘who’ tam anæ ‘sb’ 
45. Khmer  Q qw´y ‘what; sth’ 
46. Kilivila G, pf-Q te-tala (‘man-one’) ‘sb’ 
47. Koasati  Q ná:si ‘what; sth’ 
48. Kobon G  bI ap (‘a man’) ‘sb’ 
49. Koromfe G  a fo ‘person; sb’ 
50. Koryak  Q-sf meki ‘who’ meki-N´n ‘b’ 
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 S, O, V N, G Pr/Po location source 
 
1. SOV GN Po NW Georgia Hewitt 1979:158  
2.  SOV GN Po Hokkaido (Japan) Refsing 1986:103-109 
3.  SOV NG Pr Mesopotamia Ryckmans 1960:35 
4.  SOV GN Po New Guinea Roberts 1987:209 
5.  SOV GN Pr/Po NC Ethiopia Cohen 1936:125-26 
6.  VSO NG Pr N Taiwan Egerod 1980 
7.  SOV GN Po/Pr SW Mali Bailleul 1981 
8.  SOV GN Po SW Urals (C Russia) Juldasˇ ev 1966:182 
9. SOV GN Po NE Spain, SW France Saltarelli 1988 
10. SOV GN Po W Burkina Faso Le Bris and Prost 1981:42 
11. VSO NG Pr SW Sulawesi (Indonesia) Sirk 1979  
12. SOV GN Po SWC Burma Richter 1983 
13. SOV GN Po N Jammu and Kashmir (India) Berger 1974:26  
14.  ? ? ? New York State, S Ontario Hans-Jürgen Sasse, p.c.  
15. SVO GN Pr China Li and Th. 1981, Li 1992  
16. SVO/SOV ? ? NE Western Australia Tsunoda 1981 
17. SOV GN Po SC Mali Vladimir Plungian, p.c.  
18. SOV GN Po N Sudan Armbruster 1960:176-77 
19. OSV NG – NW Queensland (Australia) Dixon 1972:265 
20. VSO NG Pr Egypt Gardiner 1957:79-80 
21. SVO GN Po/Pr S Benin, S Togo, SE Ghana Westermann 1907:62  
22. SVO NG Pr W Africa Jungraithmayr & A. ’89:119  
23. SVO NG Pr W C. Afr. Republic, NW Zaire Samarin 1966  
24. VO ? Pr NE Venezuela, N Colombia Olza Zubiri and J. 1986:92  
25. SOV(?) NG Po N Western Australia McGregor 1990  
26. SOV GN Po W Greenland Fortescue 1984:254-56  
27.  SVO ? Po E Paraguay Ortiz Mayans 1980 
28. SOV GN Po NE Papua New Guinea, Madang Prov. Bernard Comrie, p.c.  
29. SVO NG Pr NW Nigeria, S Niger Kraft & Kirk-Greene 1973 
30. SOV GN Po ancient Anatolia Friedrich 1940 
31. SVO ? Pr S China, N Vietnam, Laos Harriehausen 1990:132 
32. SOV GN Po Eastern Highlands (PNG) Haiman 1991 
33. VSO GN(?) Pr E San Luis Potosí, N Veracruz (Mex.) McQuown 1984 
34. OV ? Pr Pernambuco (Brazil) Lapenda 1968 
35. SVO NG Pr SE Nigeria Kaufman 1972 
36.  SVO NG Pr NW Cameroon Schaub 1985:197 
37. SVO NG Pr Indonesia Kähler 1965 
38. SVO ? Po/Pr St. Petersburg region (W Russia) Laanest 1966:109 
39. SOV? GN Po SC Peru Hardman 1983:133  
40. VSO NG Pr N Algeria Dallet 1985  
41. SOV? ? ? S Brazil (Paraná, Sta Catarina, R.G. do Sul) Wiesemann 1972  
42. SOV GN ? W Queensland (Australia) Blake 1979:105  
43. SOV NG Pr NE Nigeria Lukas 1937  
44. SOV GN Po Yenisey river (Siberia) Krejnovicˇ  1968b:462  
45. SVO NG Pr Cambodia Huffman 1967:153-56  
46. SVO GN/NG  Pr Trobriand Islands (SE PNG) Senft 1986:67  
47.  SOV GN Po SW Louisiana (USA) Kimball 1991:423-428 
48. SOV GN Po C PNG (W Highlands & Madang Pr.) Davies 1981:156  
49. SVO GN Po/Pr SC Burkina Faso  Rennison 1986 
50. SVO ? Po Kamchatka peninsula (Russian Far E) Zˇ ukova 1968:273  
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  indefinite example 
  type 
51. Kwamera  G nari riti (‘thing one’) ‘sth’ 
52. Lak   Q-sf cu ‘who’ cu-unugu ‘anyone’ 
53. Lakhota  Q, Q-sf tuwe ‘who; sb’ tuwe-hci ‘anyone’ 
54. Lango G  Nàt ‘person; sb’ 
55. Logbara G  àfa ‘thing; sth’ 
56. Malagasy G pf-Q/red olona ‘person; sb’     iza ‘who’, na iza na iza ‘anyone’ 
57. Mangarayi  Q Niñja ‘who; anybody’ 
58. Manipuri  Q-sf k´dayd´ ‘where’ k´dayd´-no ‘somewhere’ 
59. Mapuche  Q, Q-sf chem ‘what; sth’ chem-rume ‘anything’ 
60. Margi G pf-Q(-sf) mdù ‘person; sb’   mì ‘what’, kó mì(-yé) ‘anything’ 
61. Maricopa  Q mki ‘who; sb’   kawish ‘what; sth’ 
62. Masalit  Q Ngaw ‘who; sb’ 
63. Mixtec N, G ñiyIvI ‘people; sb’,  sa ‘sth’ 
64. Khalkha Mongolian G neg xün (‘one person’) ‘sb’  
65. Nahali  Q-sf na¯ ni ‘who’ na¯ ni-ka¯  ‘anyone’ 
66. Classical Nahuatl  Q-sf a¯ c ‘who’ ac-ah ‘sb’ 
67. Newari  Q su ‘who; anyone’ 
68. Nivkh  Q-sf aN ‘who’ aN-lu, aN-laq ‘sb’ 
69. Ntomba G  moto Oˇ mO (‘person one’) ‘sb’ 
70. Harar Oromo G  namá ‘person; sb’ 
71. Paez  Q-sf kim ‘who’ kim-pa ‘sb’ 
72. Paiwan G, Q-sf tsautsau ‘person;sb’, a-nema ‘what’, nema-nga ‘thing; sth’ 
73. Palauan G  chad ‘person; sb’ 
74. Panare  Q ? 
75. Pashto  Q cok ‘who; sb’ 
76. Eastern Pomo  Q cˇ hi ‘how; somehow’ 
77. Romantsch  pf-Q tgi ‘who’ insa-tgi ‘somebody’ 
78. Samoan G  se tangata ‘sb’ (‘any man’); se mea ‘sth’ (‘any thing’) 
79. Santali  Q ? 
80. Seychelles Creole G  keksoz ‘thing; sth’ 
81. Slave G  t’asíi ‘thing; sth’, léé ‘sb’ (lée ‘one’) 
82. Songhai G  boro ‘person; sb’ 
83. Upper Sorbian  pf-Q, Q-sf sˇ to ‘what’,  neˇ -sˇ to ‘sth’, sˇ to-zˇ kuli ‘anything’ 
84. Sumerian  Q-sf ana ‘what’ na.me ‘anything’ (< ana-me) 
85. Sumu G  di (as) ‘sth’ (thing (one)) 
86. Tagalog  Q-sf sino ‘what’                     sinu-man ‘anything’ (§2.3.2) 
87. Takelma  Q nekc ‘who, sb’ 
88. Takia G  tamol ‘man; sb’; mel ‘thing; sth’  
89. Telugu  Q-sf evaru ‘who’ evar-oo ‘sb’ 
90. Thai  Q khray ‘who; anyone’ 
91. Tok Pisin G  wanpela man (‘one person’) ‘sb’ 
92. Warndarang  Q, pf-Q -ngaNa ‘what; sth’; ra-ngaNa ‘sth’ 
93. Welsh G  peth ‘thing’, rhyw-beth ‘sth’ 
94. Yagua  Q táá(ra) ‘what?’, tara ‘sth’; chíí(ra) ‘who’, tíí ‘sb’ 
95. Yapese N, G beaq ‘sb’; ba-nean ‘sth’ (ba ‘a’, nean ‘thing’) 
96. Yoruba G  ohun ‘thing; sth’ 
97. Yukaghir  pf-Q kin ‘who’ me-kin ‘sb’ 
98. Yuwaalaraay  Q-sf Na:n- ‘who’                   Na:n-du-wa: (ERG) ‘somebody’ 
99. Xinh Mul  Q nôh ‘who; sb’ 
100. Xhosa G  umntu ‘man; sb’, into ‘thing; sth’ 
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 S, O, V N, G Pr/Po location source 
 
51. SVO NG Pr Tanna Island (S Vanuatu) Lindstrom 1986:183  
52. SOV GN Po SC Daghestan (S Russia) Murkelinskij 1967:498  
53. SOV GN Po N and S Dakota (USA) Schmidt 1980:128 
54. SVO NG Pr N Uganda Noonan 1992:166 
55. SVO GN/NG  Po NE Zaire Crazzolara 1960:65 
56. VOS NG Pr Madagascar Korneev 1966 
57. OVS NG/GN  Pr NC Northern Territory (Australia)  Merlan 1982:118-19  
58. SOV GN ? Manipur (E India) Bhat 1993+:22  
59. SVO GN Po C Chile de Moesbach 1963:60  
60. SVO GN Pr NE Nigeria Hoffmann 1963  
61.  SOV GN Po C Arizona (near Phoenix) (SE USA) Gordon 1986:61-65 
62. SOV NG Po W Sudan, E Chad Edgar 1989:60  
63. VSO NG Pr SW Oaxaca (SC Mexico) Pensinger 1974  
64. SOV GN Po Mongolia Luvsanvandan 1982   
65. SOV GN Po W Madhya Pradesh (C India)  Kuiper 1962:30-31  
66. SOV GN Po Mexico Andrews 1975:175  
67. SOV GN Po C and W Nepal Korolev 1989:62 
68. SOV GN Po Lower Amur, N Sakhalin (E Russia)  Panfilov 1968:419  
69. SVO NG Pr W Zaire (Lake Tumba) Mamet 1955  
70. SOV NG Po NE Ethiopia Owens 1985:192  
71. SOV GN Po SW Colombia Jung 1989:218, 306  
72. VSO ? ? S Taiwan Ferrell 1982  
73. SVO NG Pr Palau Islands (W Micronesia) Josephs 1975:459 
74. OVS ? ? Venezuela Thomas Payne, p.c. 
75. SOV GN Pr/Po NE Pakistan, Afghanistan  
76. SOV GN  N California (E USA) McLendon 1975:130  
77. SVO NG Pr Graubünden (E Switzerland) Gartner 1883:105-106 
78. VSO NG Pr Samoa Mosel & Hovdhaugen 1993  
79. SOV NG Po E Bihar (India) Vermeer 1969  
80. SVO NG Pr Seychelles Islands  D’Offay & Lionnet 1982:162 
81. SOV GN Po N Alberta, NE B. C. (E Canada)  Rice 1989:259  
82. SVO GN Po C Mali, SW Niger Prost 1956  
83. SVO NG Pr E Saxony (=Lusatia) (E Germany) Fasske 1981:591-605   
84. SOV NG/GN Po Mesopotamia Thomsen 1984  
85. ? ? ? N Nicaragua, E Honduras von Houwald 1980  
86. VOS NG Pr S Luzon, N Mindoro (N Philippines)  Schachter and Otanes 1972 
87. SOV ? Pr/Po Oregon (NE USA) Sapir 1922:§105  
88. SOV GN Po Karkar Island, N PNG Malcolm Ross, Bruce Waters, p.c.  
89. SOV GN Po Tamil Nadu (SE India), N Sri Lanka Bhat 1989  
90. SVO NG Pr/Po S Thailand Hudak 1987:770  
91. SVO NG Pr Papua New Guinea  Mihalic 1971 
92. SVO ? ? SE Arnhemland (N Australia) Heath 1980:88  
93. VSO NG Pr Wales (United Kingdom)  S. Williams 1980 
94. VSO GN Po NE Peru Payne and Payne 1990, p.c.  
95. SVO NG Pr Yap Island (Micronesia) Jensen 1977:182 
96. SVO NG Pr SW Nigeria Schmid 1980  
97. SOV GN Po Kolyma river (Russian Far E) Krejnovicˇ  1968a:448  
98. SOV NG ? S Queensland, N N.S.W. (Australia) C. Williams 1980  
99. SVO NG Pr Vietnam Pogibenko and Buj 1990:59 
100. SVO NG Pr E South Africa Fischer et al. 1985 
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